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Abstract 
 
 
 
This study is concerned with security; particularly security in Lebanon. It is also 
equally concerned with various means to improve security. Building on debates at the heart 
of world politics and Security Studies, this study first discusses trends in global 
governance, in the study of security, and in security assistance to post-conflict or 
developing countries. It pays particular attention to the theoretical contributions of critical 
security studies, the conceptual contributions of human security, and the policy-relevant 
contributions of Security Sector Reform. 
It then moves on to examine the case of Lebanon, with particular emphasis on that 
country’s precarious security. It examines Lebanon’s problematic prevailing system and 
highlights efforts of progressive groups in transforming Lebanon’s system. Importantly, it 
also studies Lebanon’s security sector: both contemporary developments and historical 
circumstances that led up to its chronic weakness. In doing so, this study examines 
international aid efforts to Lebanon’s security sector, and problematizes both external and 
domestic roles in the reform process.  
This study draws links between debates and experience taking place at various levels and 
the security of Lebanon. It argues for a transformative process to achieve stability and 
human security in Lebanon. In light of this, this study is in favour of a progressive 
approach combining state and non-state actors – thus recommending an institutional 
approach that is responsive to bottom-up voices of positive change. Nevertheless, this 
study’s scope is limited; it therefore puts forward suggestions and recommendations which 
involve Lebanon’s security sector and which can positively contribute to human security. 
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Introduction 
 
I- Background 
 
Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) marked the start of a new era for 
Lebanon. It called for the withdrawal of ‘all remaining foreign forces’, for the 
‘disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,’ for the ‘extension of the control 
of the Government’ over all its territory, and for ‘free and fair’ presidential elections.1 
Since then, Lebanon has returned to the forefront of international politics. Indeed, within 
less than a year, following the March 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic 
Hariri, the international community greatly intensified its involvement in Lebanon in an 
effort to prevent the country from becoming another ‘rogue’ state.  
The international community’s revived interest in Lebanon is strongly linked to the 
post-9/11 international security environment. Through the UN, major Western powers 
undertook bold initiatives pertaining to the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. These steps 
ranged from Chapter VI ½ to Chapter VII resolutions such as Resolution 1559 (2004), to 
the creation of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) into 
the Hariri assassination (Resolution 1595 (2005)), a Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(Resolution 1757 (2007)), and increased bilateral aid initiatives. On one level, the Security 
Council was demonstrating its new firmness against terrorist attacks;
2
 on another level, the 
major powers were clearly including Lebanon in their transformative plans for the Middle 
East. At the height of the Israeli war on Lebanon in July 2006, US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice made clear Lebanon’s position within US government strategy: ‘What 
we are seeing here, in a sense, is the growing—the birth pangs of a New Middle East and 
                                                 
1
 It was sponsored by the US and France and was seen to be directed against Syria and Hezbollah; it 
passed with 6 abstentions including by China and Russia. From: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm (accessed on 10/5/2011). 
2
 Following the SC’s recognition that terrorism is a ‘threat to international peace and security’, the STL 
was the first and only international tribunal set up in response to a terrorist act. The STL will be 
covering a series of other subsequent targeted attacks on Lebanese public figures found to be similar to 
or connected with the Hariri assassination. The STL website, from: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-
stl/unique-features/unique-features-a-terrorism-trial (accessed on 3/3/2012). 
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whatever we do, we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the New Middle East, 
not going back to the old one.’3  
The Hariri assassination is now considered a landmark in Lebanese politics, as the 
repercussions of this event put Lebanon under a powerful spotlight. The International 
Community’s interest in Lebanon is linked to a number of factors—mostly pertinent to its 
geo-strategic position. Firstly, Lebanon represents a stepping stone into the Middle East. 
Secondly, it has served as an open battlefield in which regional and international powers 
have been able to conduct their showdowns—the height of which has been the 
confrontation between the West and its Arab allies on the one hand, and Iran and Syria on 
the other. Thirdly, because it walks a thin line between being a fragile and a failing state, 
while at the same time still possessing the infrastructure to alleviate it from its current 
position. The troubled case of Lebanon is therefore of great interest to a large range of 
international and regional stakeholders. Meanwhile, for the academic and scholarly 
community, the Lebanese situation continues to serve as a fascinating, albeit tragic, case 
study on fragile states and on societies in transition from war-to-peace.
4
 
The relationship between Lebanon and the donor community is a symbiotic one. 
This study illustrates the previous argument and illuminates the link between international 
actors and Lebanon. On the one hand, Lebanon’s weak capabilities and periodic flare-ups 
justify its need for assistance, and possibly even its dependence, on foreign powers. On the 
other hand, Lebanon is considered a security concern for the international community.
5
 
The latter has found it vital to secure Lebanon’s alignment with the West and to raise state 
capabilities to face the spread of instability from its territory. In a meeting with journalists 
from members of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Belgium, Rosa Belfour, Senior 
Policy Analyst of the European Policy Center made this point by announcing that 
                                                 
3
 "Special Briefing on the Travel to the Middle East and Europe of Secretary Condoleezza Rice," 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S State Department, July 21, 2006 ). From: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm (accessed on 11/11/2007). 
4
 There is no agreed upon definition of what constitute a ‘fragile state’; especially because of the 
difference in contexts and problems of categorization. Nevertheless, a working definition could consist 
of: ‘states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service 
entitlements or legitimacy.’  Post conflict and fragile states share common weaknesses; the World Bank 
noted in 2006 that three quarter of fragile countries are affected by conflict. Specific characteristics of 
post-conflict countries are: the dominance of an elite, a ‘fragile peace-consolidation process,’ a lack of 
confidence among socio-economic factors,’ and ‘weak judicial, financial, fiscal, administrative and 
regulatory capacities of the state.’ Frances Stewart and Graham Brown, "Fragile States,"(Oxford: Centre 
for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), 2009). p 1-2. And "The Transition 
from War-to-Peace: An Overview,"(World Bank, 1999). p 1. 
5
 Lebanon being the ‘weak link of the Middle East’. Mostafa Adib, "Perspectives for a Reform of the 
Security Sector in Lebanon," Arab Reform Initiative (Feb. 2012). p 4. 
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‘Lebanon is the heart of instability in the region.’ She also said that it has registered little 
improvement and political change. As Belfour points out, under the Neighbourhood Policy, 
the EU expects Lebanon to implement political reform, transparent economic 
administration, and guarantees in terms of security and stability.
6
 Far behind the strategic 
concerns are the developmental voices which are also echoed in some donor approaches, 
and which have been recognized to be inextricably linked to security. This study, 
nevertheless, takes the view that Lebanon’s efforts in both realms, while essential, have not 
benefited from the seriousness of purpose, or the commitment and the investments 
required.
7  
The broader context explains the revival of the relationship between Lebanon and 
international society.
8
 Traditional politics had focused strongly on competition, non-
intervention, and military defence. The current environment however, has been 
characterized by ‘new’ or non-traditional security threats and interventionism.9  With 
globalization reaching new peaks, the collapse of the ‘Iron Curtain,’ and the relaxation of 
international relations, ‘threats’ erupting from hot spots the world over have become truly 
transnational concerns. The 1990s represented a new chapter in world politics. Former 
Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that: ‘the challenges to peace and security today are 
predominantly global. While they are not necessarily or entirely new, they take place in a 
new context and have far-reaching effects. They require complex and collective responses, 
which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed, and 
                                                 
6
 See an Nahar archives at: 
http://www.annahar.com/print.php?table=mahaly&type=mahaly&priority=11&day=Sat&kind=article 
(accessed on 7/3/2010). 
7
 This can be seen from the previous elusive quote: asking for ‘guarantees in terms of security’ and 
‘transparent economic administration’ do not address the complexity of the situation and of the response 
required. 
8
 This study adopts the English School’s terminology. It refers to an international society instead of an 
international system to underscore the difference between a system and a society. The former merely 
consists of ‘interacting parts’, and the latter involves a more evolved form of ‘self-conscious and in part 
self-regulating’ community that develops institutions, shared rules and norms to regulate relations  (i.e. 
for states to deal with and maintain order in the anarchic international system). Despite recognition of 
some role to non-state actors, international society remains a state system.  Barry Buzan, "From 
International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English 
School," International Organizations 43, no. 3 (summer 1993). p 331-336. 
9
 Mary Kaldor coined the term ‘New Wars’ to describe political violence within states (wars fought by a 
combination of state and non-state actors for liberation/independence, human rights, ethnic, religious 
and sectarian reasons); but also ‘new terrorism’ (suggested by Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman), 
nuclear proliferation, the environment, resources, poverty, population growth, health, and migration 
were recognized—although contestably—as ‘new’ security threats. For the ‘New Wars’ see Mary 
Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era(Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999). 
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properly used.’10 The attacks of September 11, 2001 also, of course, had dramatic effects 
on world politics and security.
11
 Prior to 2001, most calls to recognise some of these ‘new’ 
forms of threats were scattered and remained low politics. Since, international society 
realised the implications of having ignored distant hotspots and revived its engagement 
with countries like Lebanon. 
For many scholars, Security Studies as a sub-field of International Relations had to 
be re-oriented or re-invented. It has slowly but firmly been evolving to include new 
referents and new issues under its umbrella.
12
 Nevertheless, there are vanguards, primarily 
realists, who have resisted this transformation. Setting this discussion aside for the time 
being, this paradigm shift came to broaden and deepen the scope of Security Studies.  
Scholars have also highlighted the effects of globalization by emphasising the 
increasing interdependence between localities, states and regions in different parts of the 
globe.
13
 Global governance, as a by-product of globalization, has led to a dual process of 
fragmentation as well as integration. It is widely accepted that networks of global 
governance have been responsible for the severe inequality between the Global North and 
the Global South, which affects security at various levels.
14
 Equally, however, international 
society has converged on a set of human-centric norms.
15
 
Many changes are therefore taking place in international relations, particularly in 
terms of mobilizing actors of international society against the different manifestations of 
                                                 
10
 "Sg Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration," UN Millennium 
Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/sgreport2003.pdf?OpenElement. (accessed on 10/9/2011). 
11
 The terrorism threat is widely seen to overshadow the other non-traditional security threats. For 
example, Chapter VII SC Resolution 1373 imposes on states counter terrorism legislation, cooperation 
with the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and compliance with demands and related sanctions. 
12
 For example, Barry Buzan identifies five sectors of security: military, environmental, societal, 
economic, and political. See chapter 3. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. 2nd, 2nd ed.(Essex: Pearson Education 
Limited, 1991). 
13
 This by making a connection between what goes on in the South to what goes on in the North, what 
goes on in the East to what goes on in the West, as well as between what goes on at the local level to 
what goes on at the international level. Anthony Giddens defined globalization as the intensification of 
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings by events 
occurring miles away and vice versa.’ Anthony Giddens, "The Globalizing of Modernity," in The 
Global Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew(Malden: Polity, 2000).P 92. 
14
 Caroline Thomas, "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links," 
Third World Quaterly 22, no. 2 (2001). or Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The 
Merging of Development and Security(London: Zed, 2001). or Mary Kaldor, "Cosmopolitanism and 
Organised Violence," in Conceiving Cosmopolitanism (Warwick 27-29/4/2000). 
15
 Such as the protection of human rights, international humanitarian law, and the fight against 
discrimination, torture, human trafficking, global diseases, and poverty. 
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instability but also in propagating world society ideals.
16
 States, regional organizations, the 
UN, as well as International Financial Institutions, multinational corporations and non-
governmental organizations—the main actors in global governance—have all taken up the 
role of propagating and – importantly – imposing a set of norms and values for the conduct 
of world politics. International society has made a decisive move towards the governance 
of transnational issues. Former SG Kofi Annan noted that ‘soft threats’ such as 
environmental degradation, poverty and disease – including ‘oppressive and corrupt 
management' – are partly responsible for the deprivation and inequality which pose the 
greatest threat to the majority of the world’s population.17 In this respect, Amartya Sen 
spoke of ‘development as freedom.’18 Robert Cox, more brusquely, spoke of the tendency 
for ‘riot-control’ to contain the instability emanating from the Global South.19  The reason 
seems to be that the strength of the international community is only as strong as its weakest 
link. In regards to ‘hard threats’ such as terrorism, for example, it was no longer acceptable 
to have legal loopholes and safe havens in which ‘terrorists’ could operate and find 
refuge,
20
 or for states to run against the leading governance trends and clubs. This 
translated domestically through binding Security Council resolutions, international 
conventions, bilateral treaties, conditional aid and conditional membership to international 
and regional organizations, as well as sanctions.  
The international environment, therefore, explains international society’s 
heightened involvement across the world, including in Lebanon. 
 
II- Rationale and Research Questions  
 
This study stems from a seemingly enthusiastic national initiative, endorsed by 
international actors, to improve the performance of Lebanon’s security institutions. It is a 
process inspired by the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, but which 
gained momentum only in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. 
                                                 
16
 See chapter 2. 
17
 SG Report, 2003. 
18
 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
19
 Duffield, 2001, p 9. 
20
 ‘It is to deny them the opportunity to find refuge, in any cause, any country (…)’said former 
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan addressing the Security Council 
on the one-year anniversary commemoration of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) on 
04/10/2002. From: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/sg10april_02.html (accessed on 
3/12/2007). 
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This study is concerned with the lack of security in Lebanon, but it is also equally 
concerned with various means to improve security—primarily for the individual. 
Therefore, building on debates at the heart of world politics and Security Studies, this 
study first discusses trends in global governance and the study of security, as well as trends 
in security assistance to post-conflict or developing countries. It then moves on to examine 
the case of Lebanon, with particular emphasis on that country’s precarious security. It 
studies Lebanon’s security sector: both current developments and historical circumstances 
that led up to its chronic weakness. In doing so, this study examines international aid 
efforts to Lebanon’s security sector, and problematizes both the external and domestic 
processes. Finally, this study favours a wide transformative process to achieve stability and 
relative security in Lebanon. But in light of the challenges to transformation, this study 
puts forward some suggestions and recommendations involving, on one hand, an 
institutional approach for sustainable progress, and, on the other hand, concerted bottom-
up efforts to feed a process of positive change – thus recommending an approach which 
combines state-centric and non-state-centric efforts.  
This study therefore asks two core research questions:  
● What is the security debate at the theoretical, conceptual and policy levels? 
● How can it be linked to, and how can it contribute to Lebanon’s security? 
 
In answering the above, this study highlights discussions pertinent to the 
governance of security. It constructs a tool-kit out of governance, critical security studies, 
human security, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) to formulate a conception of security 
and better understand the role of different actors in security governance. It uses the tool-kit 
to link trends in the study and the governance of security to the Lebanese context. At the 
empirical level, this study, therefore, examines the efforts that the Lebanese government 
and its foreign partners have undertaken to improve Lebanon’s security governance. More 
importantly, it assesses the extent to which these have been effective, and offers 
suggestions for more sustainable results. 
From the above, it may at first seem that this study takes an exclusively state-
centric approach; however, this is neither the choice of this study nor convenient in the 
case of Lebanon, since the state not only shares authority as the concept of governance 
suggests, but is also heavily dependent on non-state actors in the provision of justice and 
7 
 
security. Informal structures such as militias, community and politico-sectarian leaders 
constitute a long-standing alternative to the state.  One must be wary of the role and the 
power which states have acquired throughout history.
 
 In the case of Lebanon and other 
war-torn countries, however, the weakness of the state has allowed alternative structures to 
flourish. This said, powerful non-state actors may equally replicate regressive power 
relations. This study, therefore, puts forth a platform for grassroots-level voices and other 
inclusive and egalitarian voices both from inside and outside the ruling establishment to 
reconcile competing forces.  
Without turning the state into a scarecrow, therefore, this study finds itself halfway 
between the two extremes – engaging with both state and non-state actors.21 This issue has 
been a very difficult challenge to overcome given the nature of the subject and the 
resilience of state-centric approaches in modern Western models. Having said that, 
whatever structures of governance are in place, it is this study’s view that they need to be 
nurtured into inclusive, conciliatory and egalitarian ones.  
 
Next, chapter 1 presents the methodological framework of this study. 
                                                 
21
 Although empirical work has only been conducted for non-armed non-state actors (chapter 6).  
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Chapter 1: Methodological Framework 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological choices made for this study. It briefly 
explains this study’s general approach to social research and then outlines the research 
design used to conduct empirical research. It discusses methods for data collection, 
sampling, data analysis, and briefly shares the interview experience. This chapter also 
discusses issues of reliability and validity, ethical considerations and limitations, and 
lessons learned from the research design.  
 
I- Research methods 
 
Mirroring its theoretical framework, this study has sought to ground itself in critical 
social science. Critical social science explains ‘the social order in such a way that it 
becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order.’1 Critical 
social science exposes the underlying structures that trap people in false consciousness; 
this exposed knowledge is intended to empower people to fight injustice. Critical social 
science is political and action-oriented; it is ‘unembarrassed by the label “political” and 
unafraid to consummate a relationship with an emancipatory consciousness.’2 Unlike other 
post-positivist approaches, critical social research is not content with the deconstruction of 
existing structures, but seeks also to reconstruct and suggest alternatives for progress. 
Broadly speaking, positivist social science believes in value-free science, objectivity, 
qualitative evidence, verification by replication, and instrumental orientation to control 
events and conditions. Interpretive social science believes in subjectivity, a constructionist 
view of reality, an understanding of social context and personal interpretations, and a 
relativistic view of values.
3
 While all approaches contribute to knowledge in different 
ways, these alternative approaches have been sidelined because positivism is detached 
from real people
4
 and interpretive social research is passive;
5
 they are ‘concerned with 
                                                 
1
 Brian Fay, Critical Social Science: Liberation and Its Limits(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1987). p 252. 
2
 Joe Kincheloe and Peter McLaren, "Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research," in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln(Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 1994). p140. 
3
 Lawrence Newman, Social Research Methods. Qualitative and Quantitative Approache, 7th edition 
ed.(Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc., 2003).p 100, 108. 
4
 Its emphasis on objectivity, laws and control alienates context and perceptions. 
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studying the world instead of acting on it’.6 Critical social science is broader, more flexible 
and more ethical than positivist research. It has elements in common with post-
structuralism and interpretive social science,
7
 and it is open to a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Importantly, it is concerned with both actual conditions and people’s 
perceptions of these conditions; it uses immanent critique to explain and critique 
conditions,
8
 and uses praxis by ‘putting theory into practice’ to refine explanations.9  
 
Based on critical social science’s premise that the researcher actively engages with 
the research rather than remain a neutral observer I acknowledge that my upbringing and 
my experiences as a Lebanese have shaped the direction of this study. This study aims to 
challenge the mainstream discourses on conflict in Lebanon, expose structural limitations, 
and make a case for transformation. Critical security studies and the concepts of 
governance, human security, and SSR are used to construct a tool-kit that helps explain 
what is taking place in Lebanon, and steer the system towards more progressive change. 
Actors of international society have tried implementing a loose SSR policy in Lebanon, 
broadly consisting of assistance in strengthening and reforming the security sector. This 
study will subject these concepts to immanent critique; it will show that they may be 
vulnerable to regressive and problematic policies. However, should these concepts and 
policy be applied in the critical normative spirit outlined in the study, then they may be 
able to provide some progress for Lebanon (an example of praxis). The purpose of this 
tool-kit is therefore to affect ‘real people’ positively by inducing change in the system 
(whether top-down or bottom-up).  
 
 This study asks two research questions: What is the nature of the security debate in 
Lebanon at the theoretical, conceptual and policy level? And how can this debate be linked 
to, or contribute to, Lebanon’s security? To answer these questions, this study starts with 
an investigative account of theoretical, conceptual and policy discussions on security. 
                                                                                                                                                    
5
 Its emphasis on context and personal perceptions ignores actual structures and conditions (such as 
oppression) and possibilities for change. 
6
 Newman, 2003, p 115. 
7
 Such as the attention paid to social contexts, subjectivity and criticism of positivist anti-humanism. 
8
 Immanent critique is to judge the prevailing order according to its own claims instead of against 
outside values. Ken Booth, ed. Critical Security Studies and World Politics(Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 
2005). p 11. 
9
 As well as refine the theory itself. Newman, 2003, p 108-113. 
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From this, the study constructs a tool-kit to weigh what has been taking place in Lebanon, 
in order to determine to what extent reform and donor support has been conducive to 
progress. 
This study adopts a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to answer these 
research questions. This choice is linked to three characteristics of social research relevant 
to this study. The first is a focus on the in-depth study of a specific case, which informs 
conclusions inductively, rather than tests hypotheses (deductively) and measures variables 
across cases. The second touches on the nature of the data in this study, which is mostly 
concerned with soft rather than hard data.10 The third concerns the logic of the study: it 
follows a ‘logic in practice’ consisting of a non-linear path rather than a systematic linear 
plan.11 That last characteristic is the basis for the flexibility of qualitative research; it 
allows the researcher to adjust the focus and direction of the study periodically. As the 
study reached its model for security governance for Lebanon inductively, this flexibility 
has been essential.  
  
                                                 
10
 I.e. text as opposed to numbers; thereby separating the subjectivity of soft data to an evolving context, 
changing factors, and diverse methods from the objectivity of precise and replicable evidence. 
11
 Neuman, 2003, p 165. 
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II- Research Design 
1) Data collection 
 
This study was conducted using triangulation by data source and triangulation by 
method.12 Secondary sources in English, Arabic and French were used throughout the 
study. Academic literature was used to set the theoretical framework of this study and to 
discuss the concepts of governance, human security, and SSR.
13
 Critical security studies 
were used to deconstruct conflict in Lebanon and provide a platform for emancipatory 
voices. The background chapters on Lebanon challenge the mainstream discourse on 
conflict and expose its limitations. This is followed by an empirical chapter focused on the 
contributions and failings of the security sector to security in Lebanon (an area very poorly 
covered by academics). Primary sources consisted of interview transcripts, official 
documents,
14
 data collected from formal websites,
15
 field-work notes, and media coverage 
of contemporary events, speeches, and statements by public figures. The core of the 
empirical data was collected from field-work conducted in Lebanon between 2010 and 
2011.  
Further, data from primary sources was supported by secondary sources, such as an 
opinion survey on the performance of the ISF and reports by international organisations 
(IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The last chapter ties these discussions 
back together, evaluating the events which have been taking place in Lebanon using the 
tool-kit constructed for this study.  
 
This study reached its model for assessing security sector governance and progress 
inductively. The development of the model was built from the ground up and took shape as 
a result of continuous interaction between the theoretical/conceptual framework and 
                                                 
12
 Data collected from different persons and through different methods. Miles and Huberman identify 
five types of triangulation: by data source (different persons, at different times or places), by method 
(interviews, observation, documents), by researcher, by theory, and by data type (qualitative and 
quantitative data). Mathew B. Miles and Michael A. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis, 2nd edition 
ed.(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994). 
13
 i.e. books and articles. 
14
 Such as laws, decrees, the Lebanese Constitution, UN resolutions and international conventions. 
15
 Of embassies, government agencies, and NGOs. 
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empirical evidence.
16
 This approach required acquisition of thorough and detailed data 
from respondents in specific positions of authority. The choice to gather data using semi-
structured interviews instead of survey questionnaires was justified by a preference for 
more active participation on the part of both the researcher and the participant. This 
allowed me to establish rapport and thereby conduct a more flexible and deeper 
investigation. Empirical work for this study was primarily investigatory; themes were 
gradually identified from observations made out of the range of primary and secondary 
sources and arguments were formulated accordingly. The knowledge, experience, 
perceptions, and attitudes of respondents were essential for this study;
17
 therefore 
standardised survey questions, close-ended questions, and any strict control over the 
survey interviews were not appropriate for this study.
18
 Although some questions were 
formulated beforehand as an ‘aide-memoire’, the pace and direction of the discussions 
were fluid, leaving room for dialogue and for the participants to delve deeper into themes 
based on their experiences and on their positions. This in turn left room for further probing 
and for the respondents to elaborate and explain further.19 
 
2) Data analysis 
 
The flexibility of the qualitative approach to social research is also useful in data 
analysis. The strategy for analysis is a mix of ‘successive approximation’ and the 
‘illustrative method’.20 The latter, in the form of ‘case clarification’,21 is used in the 
Lebanon chapters, where themes from critical security studies, governance, and human 
security are used in subsection titles to organise the evidence from Lebanon’s pre-war, war 
                                                 
16
 Although the study started with field-work on state security providers, adopting critical security 
studies as a non-state centric framework required revisiting the initial emphasis on state actors at the 
expense of non-state actors. Therefore, the institutional approach was later supplemented with evidence 
on progressive non-state actors. In this manner, this study maintained interaction between empirical 
evidence and the theoretical framework. 
17
 They were the basis for descriptive and analytical investigation. 
18
 i.e. the control of the pace, direction, questions, and answers. 
19
 Jennifer Mason, "Semistrustured Interview," in The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research 
Methods, ed. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao(2004).From: 
http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-social-science-research-methods/n909.xml 
(accessed  on 13/11/2013). 
20
 Successive approximation consists of moving ‘back and forth between the empirical data and the 
abstract concepts’ to adjust the final model; the illustrative method uses theoretical concepts as ‘empty 
boxes to be filled with specific empirical examples and description’. Neuman, 2003, p 519-520. 
21
 ‘A theoretical model used to illuminate or clarify a specific case or single situation, making the case 
more understandable by applying theory to it’. Neuman, 2003, p 520. 
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and post-war experiences. Successive approximation is also used in the chapter on 
Lebanon’s security sector, in order to link evidence with the model formulated in the 
previous chapters. This change can be explained by the need to conserve the richness of the 
data and the decision not to limit the narrative to neat thematic boxes from the model. 
 
3) Reliability and validity 
 
Dependability within the study was ensured by using a variety of sources to record 
empirical data in order to transmit a truthful depiction of the “situation on the ground”.22 
Evidence is consistently introduced, described, and linked to sources to provide an 
authentic representation of the respondents’ viewpoints and of other empirical evidence. A 
fair attempt at preserving ‘ecological validity’ has been made.23 
The field-work was checked for internal and external consistency; the former consisted 
of assessing whether the data fit well with the overall Lebanese context.
24
 In terms of 
external consistency, evidence taken from interviews was cross-checked, when possible, 
by two or more respondents and corroborated by secondary sources.
25
 Evidence was 
considered more trustworthy when corroborated by sources belonging to different sides.
26
 
Some statements particular to the post of the respondents,27 which were more difficult to 
corroborate, were checked for internal consistency.  
Reliability also depends on the credibility of respondents. Generally, there is no reason 
to doubt the credibility of interview respondents; especially as they assumed formal posts 
in large institutions. However, a better question would be: to what extent these institutions 
wished to disclose information? Although there is inherent competition and subjectivity, 
given that respondents have different agendas, priorities and visions, they share the 
common goal of improving the performance of the formal security sector in Lebanon. 
Despite attempting to balance statements between the varied actors, one remaining 
                                                 
22
 Such as analysis of interview scripts, legal documents, and other sources. 
23
 A measure of validity that emphasises the degree to which the researcher’s depiction matches reality 
on the ground or as described by respondents. Neuman, 2003, p 456.  
24
 i.e. that it makes sense given the range of information compiled but also the ‘insider’ status inherent 
in being Lebanese.  
25
 e.g. short articles, reports by NGOs, media coverage of events or statements. 
26
 That is from stakeholders from the NGO community, donors, or state agencies. 
27
 Insights from consultant, advisor, or information that could only be disclosed by the person 
possessing the information and authorised to do so. 
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challenge was that the main interview respondents are joined by a symbiotic relationship.
28
 
While this might mean that respondents were unwilling to burn bridges by disclosing 
certain information, to a large extent respondents expressed a number of grievances.  
Finally, in adopting a critical approach to this study I also accept that there is little 
space for ‘objectivity’ as understood by positivism. In spite of the awareness of my 
personal motivations and the lens through which I see the world, which certainly influence 
my analytical angle, I have made every effort to present a balanced analysis of Lebanon's 
security challenges. 
 
4) Sampling 
 
The approach to sampling was a mix of purposive (or judgmental) sampling and 
snowball sampling.29 Purposive sampling consists of targeting a specific and specialised 
population to acquire in-depth information. As the time for field-work approached, I had 
already identified Lebanese state actors I needed to contact; these were not specific 
individuals, but rather state institutions that provide access to the ‘specialised population’. 
Furthermore, before embarking on field-work I conducted online research covering the 
work of foreign embassies in Lebanon’s security sector.30  
Identifying foreign state actors was relatively straightforward; identifying civil society 
actors was more difficult. I searched for the Beirut offices of research institutes and NGOs, 
which are known to issue publications and reports on security and the security sector. I also 
attended a number of short courses at Cranfield University on the Security Sector 
Management programme to expose myself to the conceptual and practical dimensions of 
the policy-concept that is SSR.
31
 The head of the programme, Dr Anne Fitzgerald, 
discussed a project currently underway intended to allow representatives of the Lebanese 
security sector to attend courses at Cranfield, as well as their intended support for a limited 
number of Lebanese civil society groups. This conversation led me to a contact within the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF) and to the Lebanese NGO, Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques 
pour le Moyen-Orient (CESMO). This was the start of snowball sampling. 
                                                 
28
 Some of the state actors and NGOs interviewed are funded by donors also interviewed. 
29
 Neuman, 2003, p 267-268. 
30
 This by researching official websites and media coverage of events. 
31
 Cranfield University is the academic partners of the UK Ministry of Defence. 
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Identified actors were contacted by email, formal written requests, or phone calls. 
Email was an efficient tool for contacting embassies, mostly western, and NGOs, and for 
exchanging documents.
32
 Formal written requests were presented to relevant Ministries.
33
 
Phone calls were used to contact the embassies of Russia and of Arab nations. NGOs that 
did not respond to emails were also subsequently contacted by phone.  
Embassies of Arab countries such as Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
as well as the embassy of the Russian Federation, refused requests for interview or to 
comment on their contributions to the security sector in Lebanon, referring me instead to 
the Lebanese authorities. The Geneva-based institute the Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), initially accepted an invitation to discuss the work of 
their newly opened Lebanon office on projects that promote democratic governance of the 
security sector;34 however, despite a number of exchanges and referrals I reached a dead-
end and eventually decided to give up.35 Furthermore, a year after conducting field-work, I 
was made aware that the consulting group Pursue Ltd and the NGO, International Alert, 
which both work on security matters, had opened offices in Lebanon, but I did not get the 
chance to interview them. 
 
In total, during my seven months field-work in Lebanon (between July 2010 and 
January 2011), fourteen interviews were conducted. Western stakeholders interviewed 
included Mr Duccio Bandini (EU Delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché),36 
Mr Ted Kontek (US Embassy INL Director, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs),37 Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer),38 the UK Stabilisation 
                                                 
32
 Such as laws, policies, articles, referrals and advice. 
33
 These are the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities and the Ministry of Defence.  
34
 Such as the workshop held on 16/7/2010 on ‘What Role for Civil Society in Strengthening Good 
Governance of the Security Sector?’ (in cooperation with CESMO) and ‘Security Sector Governance 
and Parliamentary Oversight in the Arab Region’ held in May 2006 (in cooperation with UNDP). See 
DCAF website: http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Assistance-Programme-Lebanese-Security-Sector-
Reform/(show)/events (accessed on 25/10/2013). 
35
 Reports of these workshops were posted online; I therefore had the opportunity to review the 
proceedings. 
36
 Interview held on 17/8/2010. 
37
 Interview held on 23/8/2010. 
38
 Interview held on 24/8/2010. 
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Advisor who wishes to remain anonymous,39 Mr Mirko Hinz (German Embassy, advisor to 
the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team),40 and Mr Marc Passoti (French 
Embassy Stabilisation Advisor).41 
Lebanese stakeholders interviewed included General Pierre Salem (advisor to the 
Minister of the Interior and Municipalities Ziad Baroud),42 General Pierre Nassar (ISF 
Head of Planning and Organisation),43 and ISF Major Antoine Frangieh. I initially met 
Major Frangieh on a short course at Cranfield University entitled Managing Public 
Security and Rule of Law (May 2010); upon his return to Lebanon, Major Frangieh acted 
as a valuable contact within the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities. His personal 
opinions, as well as additional information, were originally disclosed off the record, but the 
Major was instrumental in supporting my request for interviews to the Ministry and in 
speeding up my meeting with General Salem. Following initial visits, the Ministry of 
Defence preferred to exchange communications via its Communication Department by 
formal letters and email: I presented the Department with a list of questions and the 
Department prepared written answers for them.
44
 No interviews were approved for my 
request to meet with the generals in charge of coordinating operations with donors.
45
 
From the civilian sphere, interviews were conducted with retired security expert and 
academic General Elias Hannah;46 another interview was conducted with the Senior 
Advisor to Northern Ireland Consultant Group (NICO), Mr Marc Maouad;47 a separate and 
highly valuable interview with Mr Jonathan McIvor, also Senior Advisor at NICO, was 
later conducted;48 and an interview was conducted with Executive Director of CESMO Mrs 
Flavia Adib.49 
                                                 
39
 Interview held on 25/8/2010 (although also met on a number of other occasions). 
40
 Interview held on 15/9/2010. 
41
 Interview held on 12/1/2011. 
42
 Interview held in 11/1/2011. 
43
 Interview held in January 7/1/2011. 
44
 LAF Communications dated 1/11/2010. 
45
 These exchanges however can be regarded as a form of a fully structured interview. 
46
 Hannah is also an academic and an independent researcher, as well as recently becoming MTV (Murr 
Television) news advisor. Interview held on 14/9/2010. 
47
 Interview held on 7/9/2010. 
48
 Mr McIvor provided me with a copy of the ISF’s 2008 Strategic Review (Mr McIvor is the author of 
the Review). Interview held on 17/9/2010. 
49
 Interview held on 17/9/2010. 
17 
 
My sample size was limited to these fourteen interviews, which I believe led to relative 
data saturation.50 Hence, I have forgone the initial, slightly bigger, sample size. I did not 
pursue the DCAF interview further. Additionally, because of the slow bureaucratic process 
of receiving consent from Lebanese agencies, I neither arranged an interview with Airport 
Security51 nor included responses I received from the Communications Department of the 
Directorate of General Security (GS).52 My request for information and interviews was 
formally submitted to the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities on 30/8/2010; on 
17/9/2010, as per ministerial request, I submitted a list of sample questions; general 
ministerial approval was issued on 22/10/2010. The Internal Security Forces (ISF), the GS 
and the Airport Security all fall under the authority of the ministry. In the first weeks of 
January (2011), I was contacted by the ISF; the GS and the Airport Security contacted me 
in February, after I had returned to the UK. Returning to Lebanon for these interviews 
would have incurred charges and time which were no longer justified as essential, 
especially given pending theoretical dilemmas. Despite the detail and the institutional 
specificity that this new data would have added to my analysis, it was clear that these two 
institutions would conform to the ministerial line (which I had already documented). I 
considered that the data would have reinforced but not added to my conclusions.53 In 
determining the sample size, it is advised to stop ‘data collection when the results start to 
become redundant’ – a stage I felt I had reached. Therefore, I made the choice to consider 
my field-work complete. 
 
5) The Interviews  
 
One pilot interview was conducted before field-work at Cranfield University on a short 
course in Intelligence Reform.
54
 Mr Kelly Conteh, a retired army general, has been the 
National Security Coordinator for Sierra Leone since 2000; the interview allowed me to 
                                                 
50
 While it is essential to ‘collect sufficient data to represent the breadth and depth of the phenomenon’, 
it is also important for the researcher not to become ‘overwhelmed.’ Kjell Erik Rudestam and Rae R. 
Newton, Surviving Your Dissertation. A Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process, 3rd edition 
ed.(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007). p 108. 
51
 Approval was issued on 3/2/2011, approximately two weeks after returning to the UK. 
52
 Approval was issued on 11/2/2011, also shortly after returning to the UK. However, the General 
Security had attached answers to some of the questions on the list I provided with my application. These 
answers were brief and thus needed follow-up, which would have required another formal application I 
considered I could not afford to pursue (time and cost of returning to Lebanon to do so). 
53
 Rudestam and Newton, 2007, p 108. 
54
 The short course took place in September 2009. 
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listen to first-hand experience in a Security Sector Reform programme. It helped me 
conceptually understand the topic and the practical challenges involved; it illuminated 
themes that I went on to consider in my field-work in Lebanon.
55
 I practiced the use of 
prompts and non-leading questions while also steering the conversation towards 
controversial topics. The interview, in short, was good practice for a novice researcher to 
be confident facing ‘men of authority’ particularly in the security/military field.56  
Initially personal introductions were conducted (including probing of where I was born 
or currently live, the school I attended, family members etc.)57 covering my course of 
study, the reason for my interest in the topic, and the journey that took me to the UK. 
Interviews generally begun with a couple of simple descriptive questions, such as: ‘If 
security sector reform is (…) can we say that the security sector in Lebanon is undergoing 
SSR? Is this the term that your institution utilises? What other terms does your institution 
prefer? Is SSR (or the preferred term) a formal policy adopted by your institutions? Could 
individual projects loosely fit under this label?’ More open-ended questions followed, 
including: ‘How do you describe the security sector in Lebanon? Can you discuss, in your 
opinion, some of the causes for its current state (legal, institutional, cultural or societal, and 
political)? Is there a role for politicians that needs to be mentioned?’  
 
Interviews were then steered back to more specific questions involving the institutions 
themselves:  
 ‘What are some of the changes that your institution has undertaken?  
 What caused these changes?  
 Any help from foreign actors?  
 How do you qualify the relationship between these foreign actors and your 
institution?  
 Do you have any comments to share on all or some of these actors?  
 What do you suggest can be done to improve the relationship and maximise efforts 
undertaken by both sides?  
 Where do you see the changes taking the service?  
                                                 
55
 Such as coordination, resistance to change, priorities, soft issues, piecemeal vs. comprehensive 
approaches etc. 
56
 Or at least as I saw them before getting to know respondents. 
57
 These questions are quite common in Lebanon because they help the interlocutor place you in a box. 
For example, if you are from Beirut, the next question asked of you is where in Beirut (what was 
formally known as West and East Beirut usually discloses your religion/sect). Similarly, certain areas in 
Mount Lebanon, the North, the South or the Beqa’a can identify a person’s sect. Attending a secular or 
a religious school also helps the interlocutor construct a label. 
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 How do you think we could have better results; or what exactly and practically 
needs to be done differently?  
 Any priorities?  
 What vision of security or values the institution promotes? 
 What can you say about the multiplicity of state actors and their mandates? 
(checking for overlap of jurisdiction or legal gaps in delimiting the mandates or 
security agencies) 
 What do you think about the cooperation between these state actors? With donors?  
 Do non-state actors affect your work?  
 Would you consider that the changes the security sector is undertaking have wider 
repercussions (e.g. on various forms of security and on political stability)?  
 How do you view the general atmosphere in the country? Followed by prompts for 
political, security and other dimensions such as socio-economic and whether they 
are linked?’ 
 
 
Further questions were tailored to the post and experience of the respondents. For 
example, my discussion with Head of Strategic Planning at the ISF, General Nassar, was 
steered towards the controversial paralysis at the command council and the ‘extra-legal’ 
expansion of the Intelligence Department. The discussion with General Salem (advisor to 
the minister) was more difficult to steer, as he led the conversation and our time was cut 
short by a mutiny organised by Islamic fundamentalists detained in a Tripoli prison, which 
of course required his attention. As I assumed the listener’s role, General Salem (who has 
clearly bought into UK-sponsored discourse on soft security and strategic planning)58 
expressed his frustration over the lack of vision, lack of long-term planning, lack of 
cooperation, and the image of his institution. Questions to foreign actors and questions to 
civil society actors were similar, and stressed the direction and their assessment of the 
changes taking place. 
 
One success in the field-work was the general ability to establish rapport with 
participants. The fact that my name does not reveal a particular religious denomination
59
  
and that I do not conform to mainstream Lebanese labels has meant that I could emphasise 
or de-emphasise certain aspects of my background in order to help me break the ice with 
                                                 
58
 I can confirm this because the General was using language identical to language used by the UK 
stabilisation advisor, language used in the UK funded NICO ISF review, and language used in short 
courses on the security sector management programme at Cranfield University – language which (later 
discussions show that) the UK has spearheaded in the donor community. 
59
 Many in Lebanon have distinctly Christian or Muslim first and/or surnames. 
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interlocutors – whether it be my place of birth, the school I attended, or the city I currently 
live in.
60
 Those interviewees who are only able to determine that I am from West Beirut 
assume that I am likely to be a Sunni, but those who discover the neighbourhood in which I 
was born (Mazraa) assume that I may be Shia. Neither are true. Further, those who learn 
that my family and I currently reside in the Metn assume that we are Christian. This is true, 
although we subscribe to very different political orientations than stereotypical ‘Lebanese 
Christian’ ideology.61 This ‘indeterminate’ label was therefore an asset during field-work. 
As far as foreign participants were concerned, mostly they were enthusiastic that a 
Lebanese civilian was interested in their work with the Lebanese security sector – often 
treating the interview as an opportunity to disseminate their ‘positive’ contributions.62 In 
addition, British participants enjoyed discussing British weather, food, and reminiscing on 
their university days; the ‘Durham experience’ intrigued one key participant, the UK 
Stabilisation Advisor; as a result he arranged for me, among other things, to have a 
meeting with NICO Senior Advisor Jonathan McIvor (the author of the ISF review). 
Access to participants, however, started with Mr Duccio Bandini whom I met first and who 
shared his contact list with me. It was clear that Mr Bandini and his British colleague were 
gatekeepers63 of the Lebanon security sector field site, so I tried to nurture and capitalise on 
our relationship by keeping in touch, informing them of my progress and arranging 
informal meetings.  
Although, as mentioned above, I personally targeted a number of respondents,
64
 several 
of the interviews were pursued and acquired through the ‘snowballing’ approach.65 Using 
the names of Mr Bandini and the UK Stabilisation Officer (as per their suggestion and 
                                                 
60
 The area I was born in, West Beirut, reflects a Muslim orientation; the school I attended, a French-
speaking secular school, reflects a secular orientation, confessional coexistence or a Western 
orientation; and the city I currently live in reflects a Christian orientation. 
61
 I am part of a family that is ‘Greek orthodox Christian’. Traditionally, Greek Orthodox in the cities 
(particularly Beirut) have shared very close relationships with their Sunni and Shia neighbours. We are 
a family that resisted confessional segregation during the war (having stayed in what was turned into a 
predominantly Muslim neighbourhood during the war, my family relocated to what would be known as 
a ‘Christian’ area only years after the war), we attended secular schools, our careers are in what was 
previously known as ‘West Beirut’ (still considered as a predominantly Muslim area), and we are very 
much attached to the idea of confessional coexistence. 
62
 Although, to be fair, most expressed the challenges and shortfalls of their work. 
63
 A gatekeeper is a ‘person in an official or unofficial role who controls access to a setting.’ Neuman, 
Social, p 429. 
64
 Such as embassies, ministries, and a number of civil society actors such as CESMO and security 
expert Elias Hannah.  
65
 Such as the NICO interviews, the Advisor to the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, Mr 
Mirko Hinz, and the choice of Generals in the ISF. 
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recommendation) was an efficient way to target specific persons in embassies or institutes 
as well in expediting a number of interviews such as that with Mr Ted Kontek (US 
Embassy INL Director), with Mr Marc Passoti (French Embassy Stabilisation Advisor), 
and Mr Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer).  
As a woman, I was met with frivolity, suspicion and sheer confusion as to why I would 
be working on this topic, especially by Lebanese state actors.
66
 However, noting that the 
ISF, for example, only introduced women to the police force in 2012,67 I can also assume 
that this factor (following my satisfying their curiosity) led to my being considered a 
‘breath of fresh air;’ this allowed conversations to flow lightly and meant that participants 
were patient with my requests for further clarifications, for specificity and for advice. 
Generally, I succeeded ‘in developing social trust and securing cooperation’ with 
respondents.68 However, there were two exceptions to this. Dr Mostafa Adib, head of 
CESMO, and Lt. Colonel Moussa Karnib, from the ISF, are two persons that I failed to 
establish a meaningful rapport with. The former was completely uninterested and shunned 
my presence at his office,69 and the other viewed me as a naïve and reckless person who 
did not appreciate the seriousness of my access and seemed paranoid about the information 
I was asking for. 
70
 
 
 
 
6) Ethical considerations 
 
Issues pertaining to consent, power, transparency, anonymity and confidentiality are 
key in conducting ethical research. Due effort was made to ensure that field-work and the 
interpretation of data was conducted in an ethical manner. Realising the sensitivity of a 
study on security in Lebanon, and conscious that the responsibility for conducting ethical 
                                                 
66
 both the look on the faces of personnel and the probing questions from the Communication 
Department of the ISF or the Ministry of Defence were quite explicit. 
67
 Although two female officers have served in the ISF. 
68
 Neuman, 2003, p 431. 
69
 Having entered the office while his executive director and I were discussing their work, he said hello 
in passing and for the next hour he kept himself busy with other tasks (in the same office).  
70
 More is said below on the meeting with Karnib. 
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social research lies with the researcher,71 efforts were made to protect respondents from 
any harm (physical, emotional or to their careers) that they might incur from participating 
in this research; efforts were made to respect their personal integrity as well as the 
accuracy of their responses.  
Efforts to maintain transparency consisted of presenting all respondents with an 
abstract and outline of the study, as well as a letter of support from my supervisor to 
confirm affiliation with Durham University, programme of study, and topic.  
Informed consent was acquired either through email correspondence, in which 
respondents explicitly accepted to be interviewed following consideration of my request 
and attached documents, or by signed approval (hard copies) from the relevant ministries. 
Follow-up by telephone was often necessary in order to schedule meetings. As I am aware 
that institutional consent is distinct from personal consent, no information recorded in 
confidentiality is disclosed and no pressure was exerted on respondents to provide 
information beyond their institutional authorisation. Recording interviews was my 
preferred option; however, respondents were first asked for recording permission, and 
many preferred note-taking instead. Out of fourteen interviewees, only three consented to 
be recorded.72   
 
Since this study’s sample population was not part of a ‘vulnerable group’, power was 
largely in favour of the respondents: access to respondents and to important information 
(expected from interviews) was controlled by the sample population.  
In terms of anonymity and confidentiality, several opinions expressed off the record by 
respondents and other information discussed in informal conversation are not included in 
this study (or any other). Furthermore, as per Ted Kontek’s73  request any direct quotes 
included in the study are first confirmed with him. In addition, the request of the ‘UK 
Stabilisation Advisor’ for anonymity is respected;74 and since no ministerial-level 
permission for Major Frangieh was granted, none of his responses or views are disclosed.  
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 For a discussion on ethical social research see: Newman, 2003, p 143-153. 
72
Mr Duccio Bandini and NICO Senior Advisors Mr Jonathan McIvor and Mr Marc Maouad .  
73
 Kontek is US Embassy INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) Director. 
74
 The individual in question preferred that this title be used in this study.  
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7) Limitations and lessons learned  
 
Time, cost, scope, and personal challenges generally pose limits on research designs. 
As a result of these constraints, the pool for interviews for this study was relatively limited; 
additional interviews – with state actors but also more crucially with non-state actors – 
would have been valuable in order to explore further the wider implications of reforms to 
the security sector. With more time and access, political parties, armed groups, and other 
NGOs such as those working on human rights and transitional justice would have been 
added to the sample. Focus groups and survey questionnaires to document popular 
perceptions and attitudes towards the security sector, the changes it is undergoing, and 
security in Lebanon (both national and human security) would complement the work I 
have started here. A bigger sample size and more diverse methods (including quantitative 
ones such as survey interviews) would allow for a more rounded challenge and exposure of 
structural limitations to progress, therefore presenting a more comprehensive case for 
change. Having said that, the sample for this study is in itself highly valuable. It covers the 
necessary actors in the barely accessed site of the Lebanese security sector, thus building 
the ground-work for further research. The tension that may rise from a non-state centric 
choice of framework and a largely state-centric field-work is reduced when one considers 
that the objective of this study is to critique state actors with the tool-kit constructed. 
Other constraints were the slow process and the resistance of some state actors to 
meaningfully collaborate with the research. As General Nassar (ISF) could not provide 
detailed answers to questions regarding statistics and figures of donor contributions,75 I 
submitted another request to the Ministry on 13/1/2011. It took until 14/7/2011 for the 
Ministry to contact me again to inform me of the refusal of my request.
76
 The complete file 
I received from the Ministry showed that not all concerned had a problem with my request; 
however, the deciding factor was the negative response of the head of the Intelligence 
Bureau on the grounds that ‘some of these questions are of a purely political nature.’ 
Official acknowledgement that the US is the biggest donor can cause public 
discontentment, although anyone following the media closely can draw this conclusion. 
Furthermore, the Intelligence Bureau, which seems to have become a US mini-project, is a 
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 Including the share of contributions of different donors and the general distribution of aid across the 
different agencies and departments. Such data might have allowed me to better substantiate the 
observation that certain actors are disproportionately supporting departments/units of the ISF at the 
expense of others, or to discuss why certain agencies are receiving more western aid than others. 
76
 Note the time span (around 6 months). 
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controversial department seen by many as a biased Sunni mini-agency.
77
 Another 
encounter with Lt Colonel Mussa Karnib also ended in rejection. Unlike the Intelligence 
Branch, however, Karnib is Shia and seemed to be affiliated to Hezbollah. This could be 
inferred from his name and accent, as well as a book to which he referred me: Watan Bila 
Siaj (A Nation Without a Fence) is by a retired army General Amin Hoteit, who is also a 
Hezbollah sympathiser in support of the Hezbollah/army formula of ‘resistance’ to Israel. 
His discourse was also telling, as he used words and phrases such as the ‘West,’ ‘spies,’ 
‘threats,’ ‘we are at war,’ ‘disclosing our secrets to foreign universities’ to dissuade me 
from pursuing my request for more answers on aid and donors. Two things are worth 
noting here: Lt. Colonel Karnib is much lower-ranking than other individuals I met with, 
and therefore his rejection for further details was not a major obstacle to my acquisition of 
other necessary information, or to substantiating the claim of disproportionate donor 
support made by other sources. Aside from these two incidents, and aside from the 
formalities and the bureaucracy that render the process excessively slow, my experience 
with the ISF was a pleasant one: the Department of Communication at the ISF and 
Generals Nassar and Salem were happy to meet with me and were encouraging.  
My experience with the Ministry of Defence for information on the Lebanese 
Armed Forces was much more formal and distant. They were efficient in exchanging 
communications but quite brusque. Initially I met with the Department of Communications 
to present my case and explain my formal application; afterwards I followed up over the 
phone and any exchange of documents took place by email. Here my contacts clearly did 
not succeed in smoothing the process or in providing me deeper access. Therefore, another 
limitation to this study is my limited access to and interaction with the LAF. 
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from my experience conducting research on and 
field-work in Lebanon. My status as a woman conducting research in a largely patriarchal 
and male-centric country, not to mention in a militaristic environment, should be given due 
attention. Although this largely worked in my favour (in terms of establishing a rapport 
with respondents), it left me in a slightly uncomfortable situation, where I was constantly 
self-conscious of the role I was playing in that context. My ‘insider’ status, however, was a 
valuable asset in terms of knowledge of context, culture, stakeholders, general attitudes, 
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 See chapter 7. 
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and locations.
78
 Another lesson to be drawn is not to take for granted the opportunities 
offered by conducting research in the West, as research in a developing country is slow, 
messy and unreliable.
79
 The bureaucracy, lack of transparency, and the scarcity of 
accessible information for researchers is a time- and effort-consuming hurdle that cannot 
be ignored. A simple example: at the time of my field-work, legislation could not be found 
online. Therefore I needed a lawyer to access the archives of the official gazette or undergo 
the lengthy formal process of permission from a government body. Now, with donor 
support, Lebanese laws are found on a database.  
As for lessons to be learned from constructing a tool-kit from critical security 
studies, governance, human security and SSR, I think it was an ambitious decision which 
could have been simplified by either opting for an investigation of human security in 
Lebanon or by taking a critical security studies approach to investigating conflict in 
Lebanon. That being said, the ground I have covered will be an asset I can use in other 
academic projects. The final lesson is the importance of a clear focus as to the direction of 
the study prior to embarking on field-work; this would have spared time, effort, and 
confusion. Unfortunately this was not possible in my case, as my theoretical framework 
changed after completion of field-work.  
In short, while this study encountered a number of obstacles and may likely still 
suffer from certain weaknesses, it makes contributions to the study of security in Lebanon. 
Furthermore, the experience itself has contributed to my intellectual development and has 
been a valuable life lesson in number of ways.  
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 This included details such as the location of ministries, agency headquarters and embassies but also 
general political affiliations. 
79
 Researches in developing countries, including in the Middle East, have complained of ‘a lack of 
reliable data and statistics including archives, which impeded, amongst other things, the ability to define 
sample sizes. Twenty-nine-percent of respondents were frustrated by the challenges related to locating 
interviewees and data—the dearth of good directories and phone books, unreliable Internet, outdated 
telephone numbers, lack of accurate addresses, restrictive opening hours, and the cancellation’ or refusal 
of appointment due to a culture of suspicion and authoritarianism. Similarly, field-work conducted in 
other areas share a concern over ‘data availability and accuracy’. The chapter by Sarah Howard on her 
experience conducting field-research in Nicaragua is one such example. Among other things, she 
discusses the scarcity and sometimes contradictory data compiled by government institutions; she also 
mentions logistical difficulties such as the availability of photocopying machines at government 
institutions. All such ‘hurdles mean that everything takes longer than you think’ and affects both sample 
size and data collection. Janine Clark, PS: Political Science & Politics (July 2006). From: 
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/PSJul06Clark.pdf (accessed on 19/3/2013). Sarah Howard, 
"Methodological Issues in Overseas Fieldwork: Experiences from Nicaragua’s Northern Atlantic 
Coast," in Postgraduate Fieldwork in Developing Areas: A Rough Guide, ed. Elsbeth Robson and Katie 
Willis(London: Developing Areas Research Group of the Royal Geographical Society, 1997).p 34-35. 
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This chapter outlined this study’s methodological framework. It started with the 
choice of grounding the study in critical social science to answer both theoretical and 
action-oriented research questions. These research questions hold theoretical/conceptual 
value for the study of security as well as practical implications for security in Lebanon. In 
order to answer these questions, this study adopted a qualitative approach to collecting and 
analysing data from field interviews and in-depth reading of primary and secondary 
sources. It raised issues pertaining to reliability and validity arising from qualitative data, 
ethical decisions made throughout field-work that pertain to consent, power, transparency, 
anonymity and confidentiality, as well as limitations and obstacles to methods adopted. 
The next chapter marks the start of the theoretical and conceptual framework; it examines 
the concept of governance to contextualise the discussion on security. 
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Chapter 2: Contextualizing Security: Governance 
 
The first part of this thesis contextualizes and conceptualizes the concept of 
security. The discussions in the first half gradually construct the vision of security that this 
study envisages for Lebanon. This chapter is an introductory discussion that lays down the 
nature of international society which shapes the concepts under study. It therefore sets the 
path for the discussion on security and SSR.  
‘Architecture’ of governance has come to occupy an increasingly important role at 
all levels of world politics. Governance is a continuous problem-solving process in which 
groups interact to manage their affairs and further their goals.1 Scholars have noted that 
governance is a by-product of the 70s, a period of marked increase in globalization;2 it has 
since become a catch phrase for development, security and international relations policy-
makers, practitioners and researchers alike. It is a pragmatic practice which attempts to 
deal with the complexities of transnational politics.3 The concept captures the gradual ‘shift 
from government to governance’;4 it refers to the formal and informal processes, structures 
and arrangements taking place at different levels and between different actors of the 
international society. Governance may be seen as offering alternatives to traditional state-
centric channels; it is increasingly seen as a challenge to the supremacy of the state. As 
Ken Booth noted, there are options – other than the state – for everyone to play a part in 
world politics.5 The concept is fluid but also complex and evolving. Although widely 
adopted, it faces much criticism as to its malleability and applicability. In addition, 
governance is not necessarily a counter-hegemonic alternative; indeed, many scholars have 
shed light on the undemocratic character of the predominant structures of governance.6 
This chapter looks at the context that supports governance, at its definitions and features, at 
                                                 
1
 In ‘its basic notion’, governance refers to the processes of managing affairs though either ‘centralised 
control’ or ‘self-regulation’; these may range from the family to businesses, governments and 
international institutions. Heiner Hänggi, "Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance 
Perspective," in Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner 
Hänggi(Geneva: DCAF, 2005). p 7. See also: James N. Rosenau, "Governance in a Globalizing World," 
in The Global Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew(Cambridge: Polity, 
2000). 
2
 Mark Duffield and Mary Kaldor for example identify the ‘70s as the time when the post-colonial state 
started losing its legitimacy and when governance was sharply on the rise as a by-product of new 
heights in globalization’. See Kaldor, 2000 and Duffield, 2001.  
3
 Oran Y. Young, Governance in World Affairs(New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). p 1-3. 
4
 Hänggi, 2005, p 7. 
5
 Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991). p 326. 
6
 See Thomas, 2001. 
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its shortcomings, as well as opportunities for governance to positively influence world 
politics.  
 
1) International Society  
 
For long, states were considered the primary, if not the only, actors of international 
society; the relationship between them – competition and cooperation – has been at the 
centre of the debate between and within the different schools of international relations. 
While much of the Cold War was characterised by the rivalry between the two main 
blocks,
7
 some viewed its end as ‘ushering in a new era of peace and cooperation’; others 
thought it would bring anarchy by unleashing conflicts around the world.8 One certainty is 
that the collapse of bipolarity revived multilateralism. This allowed for increased 
cooperation on a range of transnational issues, giving way to new opportunities: both new 
issues and new actors played a bigger role in world politics. Advances in global 
communication technology and globalisation reaching new peaks precipitated the downfall 
of stringent borders; this, in turn, led to an increase in the complexity of global issues.
9
 
Globalization has taken over the economic, social, health, humanitarian, political, 
environmental, and technological spheres. As scholars explain, the movement of 
individuals or goods and the flow of ideas are taking place at a record pace, reach and low 
cost; ‘contemporary globalization [therefore] is marked by an unprecedented degree of 
integration of markets, states, and technologies’.10 Globalization, however, is not a new 
                                                 
7
 Although cooperation remained part of the debate and in the real world cooperation remained 
particularly salient within these blocks. 
8
 On anarchy, see for example: Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72, 
no. 3 (summer 1993). Or John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990). Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "From Security 
to Strategy: Foundations of Critical Security Studies," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, 
ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (London: UCL, 1997b). p 33. 
9
 As Barry Buzan notes, the end of the Cold War only provided ‘more scope to blow away geopolitical 
barriers, both opening up new areas for non-state actors and giving them more leeway in areas already 
open’. Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). p 80. 
10
 P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Managing Global Issues: An Introduction," in 
Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learnt, ed. P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat(Washington 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).p 4. 
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phenomenon;
11
 what is relatively new is its speed and its complexity.
12
 Scholars 
differentiate between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ globalization; these two characteristics essentially 
mark the difference between old and new globalization.13 New opportunities and the 
involvement of new actors ‘may enrich the process, but they do not simplify it (…) 
[instead they] add layers of difficulty as they intertwine with other issues’.14 The world 
today is defined by increasingly intricate links between global issues. Keohane and Nye 
speak of ‘islands of governance’15 that take place in different parts of the world and at 
different levels – the most powerful being in the West. Simmons and Oudraat replaced 
‘islands’ with ‘archipelago’16 to make room for the links between the many ‘islands of 
governance’ that manage issues of global concern. 
Scholars have long debated the incentives for, the level of, and the impact of 
cooperation on actors of the international society. English School scholars have made a 
distinction between a pluralist international society and a solidarist world society. The 
solidarist vision argues that the world is moving towards a humanist world society 
characterised by cosmopolitan values, dialogue and ‘reconciliation’ between communities, 
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 Nigel Dower and Michael Williams note that globalization has been accelerating rapidly since the 
early 1970s (...) although [it] only caught on in the 1990s’. And, as Buzan notes, the end of the Cold 
War provided more ‘scope’ for globalization. Nigel Dower and Michael Williams, eds., Global 
Citizenship: A Critical Reader(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002). p 4 and Buzan, 2004, p 
80.  
12
 David Held notes ‘the widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing impact of worldwide 
interconnectedness’. This has meant that political communities have become ‘significantly entwined’. 
David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideas and Realities, vol. Polity Press(Cambridge and MA2010). p 306-
307. 
13
 A classic example given is the Silk Road between Europe and Asia, which benefited or affected a 
select number of people along the route. However, thickness entails ‘that different relationships of 
interdependence intersect more deeply at more different points’; events which occur in one area and in a 
specific field can have ‘catalytic’ effects on a different area in a number of fields. The use of ozone-
depleting chemicals in parts of the world, for example, is leading to serious effects over Argentina, 
Chile, and Australia. Another example is development, which ‘has become inseparable’ from 
environmental sustainability. Previously, a development initiative would have consisted of building 
roads and infrastructure; nowadays it has to be done in balance with environmental sustainability. For 
example, mass demonstrations took place in 27 Chilean cities in protest to the damming of two rivers 
which would cause the destruction of some 15,000 acres of forest. Similarly, a state’s GDP is no longer 
considered a suitable metric to measure its development, as it does not show distribution of wealth or 
the negative repercussions that raising a GDP has on societies and the environment. Robert O. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye., "Introduction," in Governance in a Globalizing World 
ed. Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). p 7,11; 
Simmons and Oudraat, 2001, p 6; and Report of the International Peace and Security Institute 
(27/5/2011). ‘Report of the International Peace and Security Institute.’ from http://ipsinstitute.org/news-
events/. (accessed on 10/6/2011). 
14
 Simmons and Oudraat, 2001, p 5. 
15
 Keohane and Nye. 2000, Intro.  
16
 Simmons and Oudraat, 2001.  
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and ‘universality’ of norms.17 The pluralist vision argues for a traditional international 
society characterised by state-centricism, interest-specific cooperation, and a ‘low, or 
narrow, degree of shared norms’. 18 Many recognise the cohabitation of both.19 The latter is 
the perspective preferred by this study; but in any case, this debate largely underscores the 
different roles the schools of politics accord to actors in world affairs. 
Modern day governance mirrors the state of world relations. The transformation in the 
international system has had ‘seismic’ effects on the conduct and study of international 
relations. Longstanding practices, theories and perceptions have been challenged; to a large 
extent, the primacy of the state has disintegrated.20 The following few sections illustrate 
this argument.  
 
2) The Role of Non-State Actors  
 
The changing nature of international society allowed for traditional concepts in 
international relations – including security, development, governance, and sovereignty – to 
be revisited.21 As mentioned, the international environment was moving towards 
multilateralism. Hence, the role of the UN, which had been relatively stagnant during the 
Cold War, was reactivated, and the international society was further opened for new actors 
to contribute in dealing with issues that crossed borders. Discussing this shift in the 
international environment, Jessica Mathews illustrates the revival of the role of the UN by 
noting in 1997 that ‘since 1990 the Security Council has declared a formal threat to 
international peace and security 61 times, after having done so only six times in the 
preceding 45 years’.22 This can also be linked to an evolving definition of security which 
will be discussed later. However, when hopes for the UN to play the leading role in 
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 A solidarist vision of world society is based on a global network of actors that create a non-territorial 
space for the conduct of world politics – i.e. supra-territoriality. See: John Williams, "Pluralism, 
Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory," International Relations 19, 
no. 1 (2005). 
18
 A pluralist vision of international society is a traditional vision largely based on territoriality, 
sovereignty and ethnic identities. Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory 
and the Social Structure of Globalisation, New York. P 49. 
19
 See Williams, 2005 and Buzan, 2004.  
20
 Jessica T.  Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (1997). p 50. 
21
 In the second part of this chapter, the revisited understanding of security is discussed in detail; 
development is also briefly discussed; and in regards to sovereignty, a brief overview is presented in the 
next subparagraph.  
22
 Mathews, 1997, p 59. 
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international governance disintegrated,
23
 other state and non-state actors (regional, 
specialized, and private) took up the task in an ad hoc manner.24 In the absence of a 
unifying body, a move to issue-specific and regional governance was registered.25 For 
example, in 1993, several NGOs came together and formed the network for The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines; its work successfully culminated in an 
international treaty in 1997.
26
 As a result of the contributions of NGOs to world politics, 
landmines became ‘a humanitarian and a human security issue instead of an arms control 
or national security issue’.27 This, as Oran Young says, is an ‘innovative’ practice ‘to solve 
discrete or distinct problems by creating regimes or sets of roles, rules, and relationships 
that focus on specific problems and do not require centralized political organizations to 
administer them’.28 As illustrated, some issues, especially those which are increasingly of 
global concern, cannot be managed by ‘states acting alone’; terrorism, financial markets, 
HIV/AIDS and other public health threats, climate change, and weapons of mass 
destruction’, poverty, internet, ethnic and sectarian intra-state conflicts as well as failed 
states ‘all require cooperation of some sort among governments and the increasing number 
of non-state actors in the world.’29 Fathers of neo-liberal institutionalism, Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye (1971), first observed state and non-state actors interacting across 
boundaries. Some decades later, Karns and Mingst noted that these ‘networks have become 
increasingly dense’.30 That said, such scholars maintained their emphasis on the primordial 
role of the state. However, networks are not only about ‘managing’ issues that affect states; 
English School solidarist scholars and cosmopolitanists highlight a range of issues that 
attain supra-territorial status – ones that speak to a world audience and that involve a 
higher commitment to ethical politics.
31
 The ‘pieces of governance’ are the structures, 
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 For example in the realm of peace and security, following the failure of its peacekeeping missions in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, and in addressing other global concerns. 
24
 Intergovernmental organizations (EU, NATO, and the AU), NGOs (ICRC), or private (Private 
Military Companies-PMCs and Private Security Companies-PSCs).  
25
 Elke K rahmann, "Conceptualizing Security Governance " Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 1 
(2003).p 12 
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 And in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. See the Mine Ban Treaty at: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty (accessed on 13/11/2013).  
27
 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations. The Politics and Processes of 
Global Governance(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004). p 211. 
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 Young, 1999, p 1-3. 
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 Karns and Mingst, 2004, p 3. 
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centuries witnessed a revival of cosmopolitanism along-side the solidification of the of Westphalian 
nation-state system. This revival was reinforced in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War See: 
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‘activities, rules, and mechanisms’ at various levels and by various actors, set up to 
regulate, institutionalise, facilitate, and promote the governance of these increasingly 
transnational issues.32 They are formulated by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), 
non-governmental organisations, international law, and transnational networks. Non-state 
actors that have gained prominence ‘in governance at all levels from global to local’33 
include NGOs, trade unions, private multinational businesses and corporations,
34
 social 
movements,35 transnational networks, and coalitions of all.36 
Mathews argues that as a result of the involvement of non-state actors in transnational 
issues, the ‘steady concentration of power in the hands of states’ has been eroding:  
National governments (…) are sharing powers – including political, social, and 
security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international 
organisations, and with a multitude of citizen’s groups (...).37  
Transnationalisation entails enhanced interaction, cooperation and coordination between 
actors at domestic and international levels. However, the fact that issues can be considered 
global suggests that actors in international society can encroach on domestic sovereignty.38 
The rise of the role of non-state actors domestically and internationally, humanitarian 
intervention, and non-traditional approaches to international relations have slowly 
undermined the primacy of state sovereignty, which has become a contested right rather 
than a natural one. Sovereignty has traditionally entailed autonomy over domestic and 
foreign politics;39 however, both willingly and unwillingly, the state increasingly refers to 
non-state actors to perform its duties.
40
 The rise of non-state actors and the fragmentation 
of the authority of the state have led to a debate over sovereignty.41  
                                                                                                                                                    
Dower and Williams, 2002, p 2-13. Also, Buzan 2004, p 63-89; Williams, 2005; and Held, 2010, p 308-
313.  
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 Such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The latter is the name given 
to the mothers of the ‘disappeared’ in Argentina under the military dictatorship. 
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 See for example: Walker, 2002. Also, Didier Bigo. Globalized (In)Security: the Field and the Ban-
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3) Revisiting Sovereignty  
 
Barry Buzan states that ‘sovereignty, simply put, means self-government. It requires a 
denial of any higher political authority, and the claiming by the state of supreme decision-
making authority both within its territory and over its citizens’. However, sovereignty is 
much more complex to conceptualise and to operationalise. Waltz notes that a claim to 
sovereignty suggests that the state decides whether or not to ask for assistance;42 however, 
the need for assistance in dealing with internal or external issues detracts from the state’s 
sovereignty. Assistance unequivocally limits the sovereignty of the state. Buzan explains 
that states are too diverse; in reality, states do not always have the choice in relinquishing 
some of their sovereignty.43 While sovereignty in Weberian terms strongly entails a 
monopoly over the use of force, security is one of the sectors in which many states require 
assistance – from both state and non-state actors. Mirroring the changing nature of the 
international environment, sovereignty is no longer a rigid and uncontested concept. In 
Neil Walker’s Sovereignty in Transition, Ernest-Ulricht Petersmann points to the shift from 
the sovereignty of the state to the ‘sovereignty of citizens’ in the context of the EU.44 The 
discussion, however, is not exclusive to the EU; the debate over the concept is a global 
one. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the UN Charter (1945), and through the Cold 
War, International Law recognised state sovereignty as an irreducible right.45 On the 
international level, ‘external sovereignty’ was based on the ‘equal sovereignty’ of states; 
internal sovereignty meant that states had absolute domestic autonomy from the 
international community. International law evolved as a system for regulating state 
sovereignty in an anarchic international environment; it thereby specifies the rights and 
obligations of states. However, the right to sovereignty existed irrespective of popular 
aspirations and human rights standards. Nevertheless, the rights and obligations of states 
under International Law have undergone a transformation: ‘human rights and popular 
sovereignty have become universally recognised by all UN member states’.46 In 2001 the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published a report entitled 
The Responsibility to Protect. The Commission ‘sees human security at the heart of a 
redefinition of the nature of sovereignty in respect of the state and the international 
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community’.47 The Responsibility to Protect ‘re-inscribed within the juridico-political 
architecture of the nation-state’ human security, and was subsequently established as an 
international norm. The Responsibility to Protect makes a distinction between ‘effective 
and ineffective states’ and emphasised the rights of people living under ineffective states. 
When states – strong or ‘fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state 
entities’48 – are unwilling or incapable of providing security, ‘the principle of non-
interference yields to the international responsibility to protect’.49 The Commission recast 
sovereignty as a ‘responsibility’ instead of a ‘right’. Sovereignty has become contingent 
upon approval from the domestic population and the international community.50 
Nevertheless, the responsibility to protect51 became not only an ethical duty but a provision 
to maintain international stability: ‘security depends on a framework of stable sovereign 
entities’.52  
It is clear, however, that despite a rhetoric that prioritises the people, the report still 
underscores the place of the state in the international system. Like Duffield, post-
structuralist David Chandler, in The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal 
Peace’?, is not convinced by the moral stance that The Responsibility to Protect claims to 
uphold. They argue that the ‘justifications for new interventionist norms as a framework 
for liberal peace are as dependent on the needs of realpolitik as was the earlier doctrine of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention.’53 The norm was developed to allow the coalition 
of states, notably Western powers, to intervene when it was ‘not formally sanctioned by the 
United Nations’.54 Cases which illustrate this point include the failures to effectively 
intervene in Kosovo, Somalia and Rwanda. Chandler contends that The Responsibility to 
Protect gives Western powers the space to extend their traditional Realpolitik motivations.  
Notwithstanding the co-option of The Responsibility to Protect, one can safely note 
that the understanding of the concept of sovereignty has been revisited. And, there are now 
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mechanisms at the institutional level that allow for seeing this re-definition applied in the 
real world. I prefer to be cautious, not going as far as noting that ‘the Realist framework of 
the Cold War Period when state security was viewed as paramount has been superseded’.55 
I find the use of the term slightly sweeping since remnants of the traditional approach 
clearly remain present.
56
 I note instead that irrespective of ulterior motives and some 
double standards by the main actors of the international society, which have been exposed 
by post-structuralist scholars, at the policy level state sovereignty has received a 
considerable blow. This is illustrated by the new norms established by The Responsibility 
to Protect, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and human rights regimes such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its European alternative allowing individuals 
to raise claims against states. 
Having considered this, however, what do the discussions concerning non-state actors 
and the permeability of state sovereignty say about the role of the state? 
 
4) Revisiting the Role of the State  
 
The state has traditionally been considered the most significant actor in the 
international system; scholars from the traditional schools of international relations say that 
it still is.57 As aggregations of resources, authority and legitimacy, states have dominated 
the domestic and international scenes and occupy different places in global governance.58 
Multilateralism allows states to play an important part in global governance; they may act 
‘as both followers and leaders’.59 However, as noted earlier, multilateralism is not only 
limited to states. The state can no longer act alone; and it is important to emphasise the 
influence of non-state actors on states. The influence to restrict, contest, support, or push in 
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a certain direction should not be underestimated.
60
 Critical security theorist Booth argues 
that states are ‘not immune to influence’, and stressed the role of non-state actors in 
instigating positive change.61 Similarly, Keith Krause and Michael Williams highlight that 
the state is ‘flexible and capable of reorientation’.62 Despite the ‘enormous power’ of 
states, the space is available ‘for all those who want it to be’ to influence the prevailing 
order. This can be about anything and from anywhere.63 While this study espouses this 
stance, there are still challenges and limits to the ‘influence and effectiveness’ of non-state 
actors.64 
For many scholars, the role of NGOs is still a limited one. According to Keck and Sikkink, 
NGOs are in competition with state actors ‘only in clearly delimited circumstances’.65 
Hence, like realists/neo-realists and pluralists, neo-liberalists such as Keohane and Nye 
still maintain that:  
The nation-state is not about to be replaced as the primary instrument of domestic 
and global governance. (…) Instead we believe that the nation-state is being 
supplemented by other actors – private and third sector – in a more complex 
geography.66 
Politics is constantly being transformed; governance is now taking place ‘in new 
and contested spaces’.67 However, although governments often resort to non-state actors 
for many of its functions, non-state actors are still in need of governments to operate 
(favourable legislation etc.). The state is still the final arbitrator, so to speak; it has the 
power to enforce policies, maintain order, and possesses the resources to cover the widest 
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spectrum of issues. As Krause and Williams note, the state is still the ‘most structurally 
capable actor in world politics’.68 Going one step further, Karns and Mingst argue that 
States alone have sovereignty. They create IGOs and determine what actions they 
can or cannot take; they create international law and norms, and determine their 
effectiveness through their compliance or failure to comply.69  
As discussed above, objections to this statement can be noted. Sovereignty is no 
longer an uncontested right given to states; this is true not only in scholarly debates but 
also in international policy. States are increasingly under pressure from and constrained by 
universal norms. The Responsibility to Protect, and even more so, the Responsibility to 
Prevent are illustrations of the conditionality of sovereignty. In addition, non-state actors 
have been able to contribute greatly to international law.70 Steve Smith also illustrates this 
by noting the role of non-state actors in international security.71 Further, with the rise of 
world society institutions or global civil society, the tangible constituents of the state 
(territory, population and government) cannot account for the spectrum of factors involved 
in identity-formation and legitimacy.
72
 Conditionality and fragmentation are now key 
attributes of the re-visited conception of sovereignty. 
Despite recognising the centrality of state capabilities in the governance of 
international affairs, this study diverges from traditional schools of international 
relations.
73
 It considers that the centrality of the state is limited to practical or pragmatic 
reasons.
74
 The ethical commitment of this study, shared by solidarist English School 
scholars and critical security scholars, entails that the primary concern is the individual. 
Although the case study is context-specific (Lebanon), the study is concerned with issues 
such as security, justice, progress and emancipation, that affect individuals in any part of 
the world—with no ethnic, racial, religious, sectarian or national overriding denomination.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, many issues nowadays transcend territoriality; they cut 
across geographic borders and speak to a wider audience. Some world issues such as 
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human rights, social justice, fair trade, and environmental sustainability have reached 
supra-territorial status. While, for this study, this means that the state is not equipped to 
address these world issues alone; this study also recognises that the state continues to retain 
an essential role in advancing these and managing other traditional issues. The state’s 
performance however is increasingly – and necessarily – placed under scrutiny to comply 
with ethical people-centred norms. 
This discussion shows that the state retains an important role in domestic and global 
governance. Three critical security theorists that share an ambivalence to the state – 
Krause, Williams, and Booth – attest to its ‘enormous’ power.75 However, more 
importantly, this discussion adds that the prevailing assumptions regarding the state are 
being transformed.  
 
5) Defining Governance 
 
The Commission on Global Governance defined governance as the: 
sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes 
formal (...) as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have 
agreed to be in their interest.76  
There are key elements to examine in this definition and in governance in general. It 
consists of a management process, it is interest-based, it takes place in the public and/or 
private sector, and lastly, it takes place through formal and/or informal mechanisms. 
Elke Krahmann’s definition highlights the lack of central authority in the process of 
governance and notes that the actors of governance create ‘binding policy decisions’ for 
themselves to delineate their actions.77 Rosenau and Keohane and Nye do not limit their 
definitions in the same way Krahmann does. Governments may coordinate with non-state 
actors on certain issues while retaining their supremacy in central authority; as such, 
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Keohane & Nye and Rosenau choose a more flexible definition of governance, whereby 
they note that the process may or may not involve government rule or central authority.78  
There is both a vertical and a horizontal dimension to governance. The two 
dimensions represent the two variables of governance: its actors and its levels. The 
horizontal dimension refers to the three types of actors of governance – private, 
governments and the third sector as categorised by Keohane and Nye.79 The vertical 
dimension represents the levels at which governance occurs. ‘Multi-level governance’80, 
for example, occurs on the subnational, national and international levels.81 All actors can 
operate on all three levels. In a nine-box matrix, Keohane and Nye plotted the actors 
against the levels; ‘government’ occupied only one third of the table.82 This observation is 
important in showing the share government has in the overall concept of governance.83 
This represents the ‘fragmentation of political authority among public and private actors on 
multiple levels of governance, as well as the emergence of formal and informal cooperative 
problem-solving arrangements and activities’.84  
On the level of national governance, Hänggi spoke of ‘governance by government’. 
This might be the traditional Western approach; however, one must note that in weak states 
and post-conflict environments, the state has traditionally shared its powers, including the 
monopoly over the use of coercive force. Partnership, competition or division of labour 
determine domestic governance. Where governance is starkest, ‘international 
organisations, foreign powers, armed rebel groups or criminal organisations’ play an 
integral role.85 Even in stable countries, governments are increasingly less reluctant to 
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share responsibilities on a domestic level. This is visible through ‘the outsourcing of 
central government functions to the private sector.’86  
This is applicable even to security arrangements; security being one sector which 
several states outsource to foreign and/or domestic non-state actors.87 Security 
professionals have developed private transnational networks and multinational 
corporations. These networks are not confined to national borders; transnationalization has 
pushed the domestic and the international spheres closer to each other.88 International 
society has witnessed an increase in and a deepening of ‘network-type (...) cooperation 
between states, international organisations and private actors’;89 governance on the 
international level, therefore, takes place between these actors. A dynamic of competition, 
but also of cooperation, is at the centre governance. Peacebuilding missions, post-conflict 
reconstruction, humanitarian intervention, foreign policy, foreign aid and assistance are all 
scenes where governance is most obvious. In this sense, the thickness of the relationship 
between state and non-state actors has become denser, and the line that separates them is 
no longer a clear one.  
The literature tells us that leverage and power are key in governance. In addition, 
authority is increasingly being shared by different types of actors, and opportunities are 
available to further common interests and goals. Thus, following this discussion, an added 
characteristic of governance is that sources of authority are no longer exclusive to 
governments.  
 
6) Governance vs. Government  
 
Governance ‘surpasses’ government, and the latter is therefore ‘only part of 
governance’.90 Government has traditionally had room for ‘governmental institutions’ 
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only; in contrast, governance incorporates governmental as well as non-governmental 
institutions and other informal arrangements.91 Therefore, in terms of actors, governance 
encompasses more actors; in terms of structure, Czempiel explains that governance ‘is not 
a single world order […] It is the collection of governance-related activities, rules, and 
mechanisms, formal and informal, existing at a variety of levels in the world today’.92 The 
word ‘architecture’ refers to the collection of ‘islands’ of governance found at various 
levels and at different parts of the world. The islands of governance are not subject to a 
higher central authority or to a world government, although they create frameworks for 
their interactions in the form of structures, laws, norms, and networks.93 Keohane and Nye 
explain that equating governance with government is ‘infeasible’ because it would require 
building state structures on an international level, as well as somehow creating the dynamic 
that glues people to one state.94 
Both can exist without the other, but some argue that governance is more 
important. Rosenau notes that governance is the opposite of ‘anarchy or chaos’, and it 
entails the existence of ‘regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function 
effectively, even though they are not endowed with formal authority’. This would not be 
the case for countries in conflict which lose the ‘regulatory mechanisms’ necessary to 
bring order.95 This is reflected in divided societies which suffer from weak central 
governments, but rely instead on informal structures to maintain order; once these 
structures collapse, as in Lebanon, disorder and insecurity take hold. 
Governance involves self-regulation in the absence of a global governor on the 
international level, or a reduced government role on the national level. This, however, 
entails constant competition, with ‘each party trying to induce, or to force, the other party 
to do certain things it otherwise would not have done.’96 Governance does not necessarily 
have the means of enforcement as governments do, but it ‘uses power’ and is ‘equally 
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effective’.97 Thus, in absence of formal enforcing mechanisms, power and leverage become 
the key variables. In this sense, ‘governance is a system of rule that works only if it is 
accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects)’.98  
To summarize, the main differences between governance and government are their 
scope, their legitimacy, and their enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, they are both 
systems of rule: 
Both refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but 
government suggests activities backed by formal authority, by police power to 
insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers 
to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and 
formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police power 
to overcome defiance and attain compliance.99 
Again, as will be discussed, Lebanon’s power-sharing system has long relied on an 
informal system of accommodation between the political elite. Moreover, at the global 
level, UN, major and regional powers’ policies towards Lebanon represent the shared 
interest of the main actors of global governance. Governance therefore is an essential 
concept: it helps us understand the actors and the levels at which they interact to formulate 
formal or informal rules that affect security in Lebanon. Both domestic and global 
governance largely transcend the government in Lebanon, reducing it to a weak actor 
which responds to, rather than dictates, policy.
100
  
 
7) Critique of Governance 
 
Building on the previous discussion, the following is a critique of the concept of 
governance. There is a common understanding that governance consists of proliferating 
sets of practices and values which are seen to be best suited to regulating world affairs. 
Czempiel states that governance distributes values in a non-authoritative but ‘effective’ 
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manner.
 101 By differentiating government and governance, Rosenau explains that 
governance must be accepted by the majority or the most powerful actors.102 The majority 
imposes these values through ‘power’ rather than ‘rule’.103 The rule of governments 
emanates from legal or constitutional responsibilities; whereas in the case of governance, 
rules are constructed by the powerful. Governance is therefore based on the ‘shared goals’ 
and values of the most powerful sets of islands of governance.104 However, the absence of 
a legitimate central authority makes power and hegemony central attributes of 
governance.105 It can therefore be argued that governance does not subsume representative 
characteristics. The rule of the powerful may be seen as a blow to those who seek 
governance as an alternative to hegemonic approaches. Scholars such as Caroline Thomas 
have noted the undemocratic nature of the structures of international governance.
106
 In 
‘development, finance, trade, aid, economic policy (…) ecology, human rights, law and so 
forth’ governance has legitimised and universalised Western ideology and interests which 
contributed to the ‘marginalisation and neutralisation of competing visions and values.’ 
This has constituted a great challenge to the legitimacy of global governance.107 
Furthermore, while the complex web of governance networks play essential roles in 
domestic as well global issues, Simmons and Oudraat rightly point out:  
Governance strategies developed by private, self-selected groups can strain the 
limits of democratic accountability and give rise to complaints, for instance, about 
the unelected NGOs that worked with the World Bank to shape guidelines for the 
development of an oil pipeline in Chad.108 
NGOs have certainly carved out a place for themselves in international relations, and have 
come to share the traditional role of the state. This is particularly visible through their role 
in promoting human rights, through their championing of developmental and 
environmental issues, and their role in security. There are, however, questions regarding 
the legitimacy of non-state actors involved in governance. These concerns involve 
                                                 
101
 Czempiel, 2000, p 250. 
102
 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4. 
103
 Czempiel, 2000, p 250. 
104
 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4. 
105
 Ibid, p 4. 
106
 In the economic realm, for example, G8 countries dictate the norms and rules of governance on the 
G77. 
107
 Thomas, 2001, p 168, 171.  
108
 Simmons and Oudraat, 2001, p 10. 
44 
 
‘representation, accountability, and transparency’ within the organisations and to the areas 
and individuals they claim to represent.109  
On a note closer to our subject, security governance underscores the regularization 
of security at the international level.110 It suggests a framework for the governance of 
security within the international system. States are increasingly accepting this move 
towards governance, because of budgetary and expertise considerations.
 111 Critics however 
have highlighted that this framework is elaborated by a club made up of the privileged 
few.
112
 The system and structures of governance increasingly are seen to be based on 
trends, practices, and norms that are identified with Western interests and ideology. Having 
said that, as the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ has shown, China and Russia resist this system of 
governance; even liberal democracies such as France
113
 and Germany,
114
 at times, run 
against the main stream of security governance.  
That being said, critics have noted that the pieces of global governance converge into 
the Liberal Model in its economic and political dimensions. Post-structuralists have argued 
that the Liberal model, is another method for ‘Northern governments (…) to reassert their 
authority’ on the South.115 Mark Duffield notes that the international extension of this 
model is a policy pursued in order to ‘contain instability’ and further economic interests.116 
Likewise, Chandler notes that ‘rather than promoting democracy and liberal freedoms, the 
discussion has been how to keep the lid on or to manage the ‘complexity’ of non-Western 
societies.’117 Some have therefore viewed the pieces of governance as a tool to pursue this 
aim rather than to support an indigenous democratic process.118  
Post-structuralists like Duffield and Chandler have made important contributions in 
uncovering some of the double standards of governance and thereby dismissing its 
democratic potential. However, are we to take a fatalist stance and submit to hegemony? 
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Critical research suggests that the exposure of structural limitations is knowledge to be 
used for influencing change. Failure to do so simply means that we are submitting to 
prevailing power structures and allowing hegemonic policies to go unchallenged. What 
options then do we have to presently shape a more ethical future other than engaging with 
governance? The purpose for deconstruction should be to identify areas for reform and 
ideally transformation. The pragmatic approach taken by this study suggests ‘playing the 
game’: engaging with existing governance structures (i.e., the institutional approach) and 
supporting humanist actors that can pressure for progress. It is not only unethical but also 
empirically ungrounded to assume that we face a dead end. There has been substantial 
movement in global governance, and there will always be movement. Although slow, 
change is plausible;
119
 progress is seen in terms of (among other things) human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, in international criminal law, environmental law, and in the 
Millennium Development Goals.
120
 
While neo-liberal institutionalists and pluralists argue that cooperation is driven by 
self-interest, solidarists argue that there is a higher ethical dimension to the conduct of 
politics and governance. Although conscious of the paramount concerns of interest, power, 
and competition in an anarchic order, this study does not accept that these elements alone 
drive world relations and hence global governance. This study is convinced that a 
combination of both solidarist and pluralist approaches better reflects world relations (and 
governance).
121
  
In light of this, we can build on Booth’s assertion that there is a place for everyone to 
play a positive role. The use of scholarly work from outside and within the prevailing 
system can be constructive. Neo-liberal work provides access to ‘real’ institutional 
structures and to their reformist approach. Post-structuralist work is very useful for 
uncovering realities and exposing regressive policies. However, post-structuralists take a 
fatalist stance;
122
 and neo-liberal institutionalists fall short from engaging with 
transformative change. This study cannot be content with deconstruction; engaging with 
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existing or alternative structures allows us to contribute to change in the name of the 
individual. In subsequent chapters, this study engages with two policy-relevant concepts 
and with their application in Lebanon. More immediately, the next section discusses the 
use of governance as a tool for progressive change. 
 
8) A tool for progressive change?  
 
The study of governance allows us to discern the layers and the intricacies of 
domestic and world issues; it ‘offers a conceptual perspective which helps grapple with the 
complexity of the contemporary world’ where states share ‘authority with non-state actors 
on multiple levels of interaction’.123 Any study in politics must take into account the 
interdependent nature of world politics; this means that domestic, regional, international 
and global interests will have some effects on issues and problems across the world. 
Understanding governance traces and clarifies these relationships. It is for these reasons 
that governance represents the first piece of a tool-kit this study intends to construct, first 
to elucidate relationships between actors affecting Lebanon’s security (or other contexts) 
and second, to promote progressive change. 
Despite the criticisms directed at a concept as wide as governance, it can offer 
opportunities for positive change. Governance offers a variety of channels for a variety of 
actors to shape world politics; in addition, the fact that governance relies on shared values 
– in our time, human-centric values124 – means that these values can be brought to the 
forefront. In this respect, Czempiel notes: 
Understanding international systems as systems of governance also leads to insights 
that the object (and subject) of foreign policy is not the state but the individual. 
While the strategy of deterrence and neorealism neglected the individual, the 
strategy of democratisation and liberal theory center around it.125 
Governance can be joined with solidarist, cosmopolitan, and emancipatory values. 
Such voices and the institutions that represent them are increasingly finding a place in 
governance. They may be thinner than traditional ones but we are increasingly seeing 
actors in global governance advocating for and even successfully institutionalising 
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solidarist norms.
126
 Human rights law, the Rome Statute, the campaign to ban landmines, 
human security, responsibility to protect are all non-state centric norms that have found a 
footing in international society. 
Hence, although there have been many objections as to the illiberal structures and 
practices of global governance, liberal values need not be hegemonic. The solidarist 
version of the English School’s commitment to ethical politics, cosmopolitanism, and the 
more radical theory in the realm of security, critical security studies are well placed to 
positively influence governance in the human interest.
127
 These are not about imposing 
liberal Western values on the Majority World, but about a higher ethical ground for the 
conduct of politics; about accepting emancipation as put forward by Booth and his 
colleagues in the Welsh School.128 The backdrop of governance is that it rests on the self-
interest of parties involved. This facilitates hegemonic behaviour. In some ways, 
governance therefore constitutes an outpost for traditional regressive politics.129 In order to 
influence governance positively, the propagation of a ‘global civic culture’ needs to take 
place.130 A number of schools have supported alternatives to statist approaches for 
promoting change and reconciling communities. Global Civil Society needs to continue 
pushing for more progressive assumptions and practices. Booth’s theory of security, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter, centres around an emancipatory strategy that is based 
on an ‘egalitarian concept of liberty’; it consists of an inclusivist, reconciliatory, culturally 
sensitive and reciprocal strategy to advance ‘true security’.131 He mentions Joseph Nye’s 
1987 coining of the term ‘process utopian,’ which they both agree is not ‘confined to 
governments’ and which suggests a process of incremental reform.132 The approach they 
encourage is ‘reformist’ and ‘progressive’ and is based on the ‘idea of reciprocity of 
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rights’.133 Along these same lines, Ernest-Ulricht Patersmann notes in Neil Walker’s 
Sovereignty in Transition that ‘transforming ‘legal’ into ‘real’ sovereignty of citizens over 
the state involves persistent bottom-up struggles for rendering human rights and 
democracy effective not only in principle, but also in the day-to-day exercise of national 
and international government powers’.134 Proponents of an emancipatory strategy and of an 
ethical approach to global governance have been receiving consistent and rising support.135 
Their progress is crucial for positive change in world politics.  Hence, while recognizing 
the maturity of institutions of international society relative to world society, the emphasis 
is on solidarist pressures to loosen state-centricism and attain achievements for progressive 
ideals.
136
 
In brief, the theoretical stance of this study goes beyond the institutional approach 
of neo-liberalism and pluralism, while also going beyond post-structuralist determinism.  
Given the structure of international society, a combined approach involving 
traditional and non-traditional mechanisms is the way forward. This study argues for an 
institutional and a solidarist approach to governance that is engaged in ethical and 
progressive politics. 
In this thesis, discussing the role and power of non-state actors is intended to argue 
that progressive voices can influence power centrifuges;
137
 that states need to open up to 
these voices to formulate more ethical policies.
138
 The purpose of this would be to 
constantly re-adjust relationships between the state and society; in other words, to 
constantly remind institutions that they are a service by and for the people. Furthermore, it 
is not the intention of this chapter to pave the way solely for an examination of the non-
state actors trying to influence policy and power politics; it is also intended to weigh the 
performance of state actors against the interests of individuals that make up society.  
Hence, this study argues that, despite Realpolitik, governance, through international 
society and/or world society, can propagate more ethical and progressive policies. It is 
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through global governance that the world community plays a part in Lebanese politics 
(with positive and negative repercussions). One ideal that has risen to the attention of 
international and world society is the concept of human security. I am interested in the 
supposed marriage between governance and human security and whether current donor and 
Lebanese efforts reflect this concept. By the end of this study, I will assess whether these 
contribute to the overarching concern for progress in terms of security in Lebanon.  
The next chapter takes the discussion on security one step further by discussing 
critical security studies as the theoretical guide to this study’s chosen approach to security. 
This will be followed by a conceptual discussion on human security. One way to 
operationalise human security has been through Security Sector Reform. Since donors that 
have espoused human security are active in Lebanon in what can be loosely framed SSR, 
the contributions of these two concepts are highlighted. I then ask: what is the situation in 
Lebanon? And are donors’ and Lebanese state institutions’ efforts contributing to any 
progress?  
The first part of this study therefore provides a theoretical, conceptual and policy 
discussion on security. It formulates a tool-kit through which one can better understand and 
shape change in specific contexts. The second part uses the tool-kit to look at security, or 
more appropriately, insecurity in Lebanon, including causes of insecurity, waves of 
insecurity, and efforts to address insecurity. 
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Chapter 3: Security 
 
 
At the core of this study is security. Therefore, it is essential to answer important 
questions about security that are of theoretical, conceptual and practical nature. What do 
we mean by security? Security for whom? How can security be provided?   
The different schools of International Relations view the conduct of politics in different 
ways; unlike the natural sciences, many concepts in social science, including in politics 
and international relations, are contested ones. Security is undoubtedly one of these 
concepts.
 Furthermore, like many other concepts ‘security is undergoing a fundamental 
transformation’.1 Security has traditionally been thought of as defence from external 
military threats. However, changes in the meaning of security have taken place on both 
theoretical and policy fronts. In 1983 Barry Buzan extended the theoretical scope of 
security, from its original, single military dimension to five sectors of security. His work 
paved the way for serious discussions on the widening of security.
2
 Mahbub ul-Haq and his 
team at the UNDP moved the work of non-traditional approaches in academia to the policy 
world. The late ul-Haq was special adviser to the Human Development Report of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of 1994 in which the concept of Human 
Security was first introduced.
3
 There is a long stretch between the traditional concepts of 
security and Human Security. This discussion covers the highlights of the debate within 
security studies, with an emphasis on approaches best suited to provide a more thorough 
investigation to the aims of this study.  
Chapter 3 highlights four schools of security studies: the Copenhagen School, Critical 
Security Studies, Realism/Neorealism, and Human Security. The discussion on security is 
divided into two: one uses a theoretical dimension to emphasise critical security studies, 
while the other uses a conceptual dimension to discuss Human Security. The chapter ends 
                                                 
1
 Mahbub ul-Haq, "Global Governance for Human Security," in Worlds Apart: Human Security and 
Global Governance, ed. Majid Tehranian(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999). p79. 
2
 Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. 
Ken Booth(Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2005). p 31. 
3
 Ul-Haq’s work was very influential to the evolution of the development and security discussions: he 
developed the Human Development Theory, inspired the creation of the United Nations ECOSOC, he 
was behind the Human Development Index, as well as recommended the creation of a Human Security 
Council.  
51 
 
with piecing together a tool-kit made of governance, human security and critical security 
studies to understand and shape security in local contexts.  
It is believed that the international system has been moving towards new ways of 
thinking about world affairs. The search for security takes place against ‘a background of 
evolving transnational norms relating to security and governance’ notes Edward Newman.4 
Our understanding of the concept of security is changing and will continue to transform. 
Furthermore, as Robert Cox writes, ‘perspectives derive from a position in time and 
space’;5 thus far, the concept of security has developed into a wider and a deeper one. 
There has been a move away from the security of the state and a move closer to the 
security of the individual.
6 
 
I. Security: A Theoretical Discussion 
 
1) The Transformation 
a) The ‘New Times’ 
 
Parallel to the discussion on governance, changes in the international system also 
transformed traditional understandings of security – these are the ‘New Times’, writes Ken 
Booth.
7
 As Jessica Mathews explains in her 1997 Power Shift article, globalization and 
interdependence brought about ‘seismic’ changes. Generally, the state lost its privilege of 
unconditional sovereignty and its status as the only significant player in the international 
system.
8
 Traditional norms, principles and practices were revisited, and new issues 
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surfaced. In this sense, the changes in the international system allowed for the 
reconsideration of our understanding of security.  
As mentioned, the meaning of security was both widened and deepened. Generally 
speaking, ‘widening’ refers to the horizontal dimension of security, whereby more issues 
have come to be considered security issues.
9
 Its vertical dimension – ‘deepening’ – seeks 
to cut through the level of the state to target deeper levels of security: the society or the 
individual. Superpower rivalry had long prevented non-military issues from being 
considered security issues; however, although the broadening of the concept of security 
had started in the 1980s, it ‘gained ground in the 1990s when the ending of the Cold War 
seemed […] to herald a new era of international politics’.10 The breathing space that the 
new era bestowed on international politics allowed old and new issues to be widely 
accepted as security issues. ‘Terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, 
and the combination of rapid population growth, environmental decline, and poverty that 
breeds economic stagnation, political instability, and, sometimes, state collapse’ were 
referred to as ‘non-traditional threats’.11  
The schools of International Relations reacted differently to the changes taking place to 
the definition of security. Realists did not support ‘such an expansionist interpretation of 
security’.12 Even as late as 1991 Walt defined Security Studies as the ‘study of threat, use 
and control of military force’.13 The resistance by realists against the widening of the 
definition of security is associated with concern for the dilution or understatement of 
external military threats.
14
 However, in contrast to realist assumptions, most conflicts were 
internal: ‘the nearly 100 armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have virtually all 
been intrastate affairs’. As Mathews suggests, it is increasingly accepted that for most 
states ‘the security threat […] from other states is on a downward course’.15  
                                                 
9
 For example: Paris, 2001, p 97. The mainstream literature describes widening and deepening as two 
separate changes; but, as will be explained shortly, widening happens as a result of deepening. 
10
 Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian, "Evolving Security Regimes," in Global Governance for Human 
Security, ed. Majid Tehranian(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999). p 25. 
11
 Mathews, 1997, p 50. 
12
 Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, 2nd Edition ed.(New York and Oxon: Routledge, 
2008). 
13
 Based on Nye and Lynn-Jones’ 1988 definition. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security 
Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991).p 212. 
14
 Realists, such as Mearsheimer and Huntington, thought that the balance of power did not exist in the 
post-Cold War period to guarantee international security. In some ways this is true: the environment 
was favourable for conflicts to erupt. Huntington, 1993 or Mearsheimer, 1990.   
15
 Mathews, 1997, p 50. 
53 
 
However, scholars such as Edward Newman also argue that some of the changes 
underlined by many scholars have been exaggerated;
16
 the non-traditional threats are not 
new phenomena per se. He notes that the ‘difference today is that academics, policy 
analysts, and politicians are focusing on these factors more than before.’17 Having 
considered this, there is little contestation that a new way of thinking about security has 
been developing; it is now increasingly being presented as a ‘public good’ open to 
discussion and debate.
18
 Furthermore, the emergence of concepts such as Human Security 
and New Wars illustrate the new dynamism and the newly found drive to re-invent security 
studies by questioning long-standing assumptions that no longer seem to fit neatly into the 
security environment. The long legacy of exclusive focus on foreign military threats is 
being shattered; threats to the majority of the world’s populations are beginning to be 
recognised.
19
  
 
b) The widening of security 
 
Despite general agreement that the widening of security was cemented in the early 
1990s, the same broad approach had been articulated much earlier. In 1983, Richard 
Ullman advised that a threat to security should be:  
an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively 
brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of state or (2) 
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a 
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government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, 
corporations) within the state.
20 
 
Ullman’s definition was prescient; it included notions of both the widening and the 
deepening of security. It is important to note the absence of references to the traditional 
conception of security; his definition mentioned neither state security nor external military 
threats. He identified, instead, the ‘inhabitants of a state’ as the subject of security. 
Secondly, he viewed security as threatening the welfare of the individual, subsuming 
therefore a notion of security that transcends survival and physical insecurity. And third, he 
recognized the effects that security threats have on governments but also recognized such 
effects on non-state actors. He thus defied many of the established assumptions of the time.  
Similarly, Barry Buzan noted that external military threats ‘are not the only threats 
that face states, people and the world as a whole’.21 In this sense, Buzan also laid the 
groundwork (also in 1983) for the broadening of the concept of security in People, States 
and Fear.
22
 Buzan noted that ‘the traditional conceptions of security were (...) too narrowly 
founded’,23 and he proposed a ‘wider perspective on security than that encompassed by the 
traditional focus on national military policy’.24 He identified five sectors of security 
overall; he maintained that military threats have a ‘special’ character because they involve 
the use of force, but that ‘the range of potential national security issues is wide, stretching 
across the military, political, economic, societal and ecological sectors’.25 That same year, 
Ullman identified demographic changes and resource depletion as rising security threats to 
states. This was picked up by Jessica Mathews in 1989; she identified the environment as a 
rising security problem. By the end of the Cold War, there was already a surge of voices 
highlighting non-military threats to security. Peterson and Sebenius pointed out in 1992 
that education and economic disparity threatened the stability of developed countries, 
including the most powerful of them. Lynn-Jones and Miller followed suit in 1995 by 
highlighting the effects of migration in both economic and social terms and its role in 
firing up nationalist sentiments. Mohammed Ayoob noted in 1997 that for most developing 
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countries ‘internal rather than external threats were the principal security concern’.26 From 
there on the list grew longer, and this new direction increasingly gained grounds in the 
study of International Relations and its subset, Security Studies. Threats from within as 
well as external threats were seen to threaten state security; furthermore, these were no 
longer exclusively military threats. 
So far, however, the new threats identified were mainly considered threats to the 
stability of the state. Therefore, ‘widening was simply a case of extending the range of 
factors which affected state power beyond the confines of military and trade affairs.’27 
These new issues were seen to advance or regress states’ status in respect to others. Hard-
core realists did not support this extension of the scope of security studies; however, given 
that the widening so far maintained the centrality of the state, some neo-realists jumped 
onto the bandwagon of the widening agenda.
28
  
 
c) Deepening of security 
 
Meanwhile, another move was slowly building ground: this was a movement towards 
the deepening of the meaning of security. Social constructivists and other scholars with 
critical inclinations continued the transformation of security. ‘Deepeners embrac[ed] the 
concept of ‘human security’’; they introduced the argument that the ‘chief referent object 
of security should not be the state or certain sub-state groups’, but the individual, as the 
basic unit of these collectivities.
29
 It is interesting to note that despite Buzan’s work in 
widening security and his recognition of the individual as the ‘irreducible basic unit’, he 
nonetheless still maintained that the state is the ‘standard unit of analysis’ of security.30 
In 1991, Booth noted that the ‘individual humans are the ultimate referent’.31 Security 
was increasingly seen by the likes of Richard Falk to mean ‘the negation of insecurity as it 
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is specifically experienced by individuals and groups in concrete situations’.32 Finally and 
concretely, security was transformed to be understood as threats posed to the individual. 
This was a drastic shift from the traditional concept of security and was seen as such even 
by proponents of widening the concept. This move, therefore, introduced to security a new 
vertical dimension, even while its horizontal dimension still faced resistance. The concept 
of security remains a contested one to the present day, and possibly for an unforeseeable 
time into the future. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the efforts made have indeed 
amassed support. The changes in the policy-world illustrate this through the birth of the 
policy-relevant concept of Human Security, the nexus between development and security, 
and the prominence of human rights in international relations.  
The renaissance of Critical Theory in the early 1990s inspired the birth and 
development of interpretive approaches to security. Analysts increasingly accepted the 
constructed nature of security, and interpretive approaches sought to deconstruct it. Wyn-
Jones, for example, contended that ‘identity’ should play an integral part in the 
conceptualization of security.
33
 Security reflects situational and cultural experiences; 
indeed, there are different and sometimes ‘competing conceptions of human security’.34 
Buzan notes that national security is ‘as diverse as the condition and situation of the 
different states to which it applies’.35 His collaboration with Ole Waever and Jaap de 
Wilde, dubbed the Copenhagen School, had a large impact on interpretive approaches. 
Their work developed the sector of societal security – based on the study of identity – as a 
response to issues arising from European integration in the 1990s.
36
 Furthermore, Ole 
Waever introduced the ‘speech act’ to the study of security.37 The incorporation of their 
contributions culminated in the Securitization/Desecuritization theory. Based on Buzan’s 
multi-sectoral approach, their theory recognized that threats may emanate from different 
areas. However, as Buzan had noted, the difficulty in defining a security issue is the 
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characteristic that separates it from an ordinary political issue.
38
 This said, their 
collaboration reached the following argument: 
To count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that 
distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be 
staged as existentialist threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who 
thereby generates endorsements of emergency measures beyond rules that 
otherwise bind.
39 
Initially, the Copenhagen School did not specify or limit the securitization actor or 
the referent;
40
 but it soon concluded that the state is the securitizing actor and the referent 
is primarily the state, and in some cases the society.
41
 The criterion that distinguishes an 
ordinary political issue from a security issue is its packaging by the agent to an audience as 
an ‘existential threat’;42 the process therefore involves the agent successfully constructing 
and selling a security issue to the public. ‘A successful securitization attempt requires that 
the actor has the position of authority to make the securitizing claim, that the alleged 
threats facilitate securitization, and that the securitizing speech act follows the grammar of 
security,’ wrote Smith.43 Securitization is ‘discourse-centric’;44 security issues are confined 
to ‘top leaders’;45 and the ‘language of security is (...) a jus necessitates for threatened 
elites, and this it must remain’.46 Securitization was developed to explain non-traditional 
threats incorporated under the new security agenda.
47
 However, securitization remained 
elitist, status-quo oriented and state-centric.
48
  
The expansion of the security agenda has entailed the expansion of the role of the 
military, with ‘the tendency of military forces to be employed less for traditional defence 
tasks and more on broader security tasks’.49 A corollary of this has been a concern over the 
militarization of non-military threats. Furthermore, despite the progress on both the 
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widening and deepening fronts, since the campaign against terrorism has been launched, 
scholars have noted the expansion of the role of the military alongside crude power 
politics;
50
 this has set the two perspectives back in competition. Therefore, with the 
broadening of the concept of security comes broadening from an orthodox standpoint. 
Others such as Booth, however, do not entirely dismiss the use of the military in non-
traditional issues;
51
 it is merely the orthodox approach or traditional power politics that are 
problematic.   
Therefore, the Welsh School of critical security studies disagreed with the 
Copenhagen School, and argued that securitization can be populist. For Booth, ‘security 
and emancipation are in fact two sides of the same coin’; in contrast to traditional thinking, 
‘power and order’ are not necessary precursors to long-term security. He championed the 
argument that emancipation is a universal value; that values such as justice, equality, 
sustainability, inclusiveness, the respect of human rights, equitable development bring 
about ‘true security’. Unjust deprivation or infringement on these human security concerns 
undermines security.
52
 Another Welsh School theorist, Richard Wyn-Jones, supported the 
rejection of the ‘fetishization’ of the individual: when the individual is the ultimate 
referent, analysis gains depth, and it becomes possible to ‘understand the various contexts 
that impinge upon an individual’s security and simultaneously [discourages] their 
reification and fetishization.’53 This suggests that such analysis can uncover or deconstruct 
human fears and insecurities, and clears the way for a better informed response. This study 
therefore believes that the individual as the referent is inescapable in the search for 
security.  
According to the Welsh School, widening and deepening are ‘often 
misunderstood’.54 The two share a relationship much more complex than that depicted by 
the mainstream literature. This study agrees that it is a mistake to think that the two 
processes can be separated; deepening should be a precursor to widening. Booth explains 
that it is the deepening of the meaning of security that provides for a wider agenda: by 
taking the individual as the referent, the scope of issues to consider under security is 
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widened.
55
 Therefore, widening is ‘secondary to deepening’ and deepening precedes 
widening. Broadening is not ‘itself a radical move’; it can be ‘conservative’. As is often 
illustrated by governments across the world, broadening can take place from a conservative 
position – for the same aim, by the same means, for the same referent, and derived from 
the same theory – which perpetuates existing power structures. According to Booth, the 
sectoral approach taken by the Copenhagen School ‘broadens the agenda, but only from 
within a basically neorealist perspective’; the referent is still the state and securitisation 
remains power-centric – a position which this study rejects as it perpetuates regressive 
policies. No matter how broad, some approaches cannot be considered critical.
56 
The widening and the deepening of security has set off debates and revisions 
concerning every one of its constituent parts – referents, definition, levels, scope, actors, 
and agents, as well as interlinked and related concepts.
57
 For Booth and Vale, ‘we must 
simply accept the problems of an expanded security agenda’.58 In addition, this study 
supports Krause and Williams’ contention that the expansion of the security agenda may 
be a necessary evil before achieving progress: 
It may be necessary to broaden the agenda of security studies (theoretically and 
methodologically) in order to narrow the agenda of security. A more profound 
understanding of the forces that [...] give rise to threats, [...] could open the way to […] 
‘desecuritisation’ – the progressive removal of issues from the security agenda as they 
are dealt with via institutions and practices that do not implicate force, violence, or the 
‘security dilemma’.59 
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2) Traditional vs. non-traditional approaches 
 
a) The traditional approach 
 
 ‘Traditional security thinking’ has long ‘dominated’ the study of security and ‘has 
been associated with the intellectual hegemony of realism.’60 Rational choice theory, 
neorealism, defensive realism, and offensive realism are variations of the traditional realist 
discourse. These are joined together in their emphasis on the role of the state and on 
external military threats to security.
61
 The traditional approach stresses survival through 
constant competition, the multiplication of power, and the external threat in an anarchic 
system. Alliances or humanitarian interventions are undertaken in this mind-set. Non-
military issues have traditionally been considered Low Politics and military issues High 
Politics; low politics issues may rise to high politics in the absence of an obvious military 
threat. However, this is done in conjunction with a consideration of the balance of power 
and the security dilemma.
62
 Booth refers to Edward Luttwark’s 1985 Strategy and History 
to summarize the traditional position: strategy’s ‘only purpose is to strengthen one’s side in 
the contention of nations’.63 
It is agreed that security is always referential.
64
 The traditional approach maintains 
that the state is the referent of security and resists the deepening of the meaning of security. 
Stephen Walt noted in 1991 that the study of security is ‘the cumulative knowledge about 
the role of the military’ through an ‘unbiased measurement of critical concepts’.65 Krause 
and Williams, explain that the identification of the state as the referent of security 
‘provides the basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military 
diplomacy from the field.’66 The agenda of the traditional approach has been described as 
‘narrow’.67 In this sense, ‘defining an issue as of security on the basis of whether it 
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involves military forces strips the term of any real meaning.’68 It severely confines the 
concept and fails to address its complexity. This study contends that security should 
subsume a much broader scope than that of the state. This becomes clearer when we 
remind ourselves that ‘security is a human condition’.69 Moreover, it is in this study’s view 
that identifying a security issue should not remain an elitist exercise; rather, it requires 
people to be able to voice their insecurities. Security is a ‘social construct’;70 consequently, 
it is futile to use the traditional approach to fit security issues into state security and the 
military sphere. Resistance oppresses insecurities and exacerbates situations – the Arab 
Spring is a clear illustration of the backlash of states’ disregard for human security.  
One voice against the widening of the agenda of security is David Baldwin, who 
argues that security ‘no longer has a core meaning’; therefore, it risks losing its ‘analytical 
usage’.71 However, if security is commonly understood as ‘absence of threats’,72 then the 
‘movements of a neighbour’s army’ is not the main source of insecurity around the 
world.
73 
Military and violent threats might be a precondition for other human security concerns, but 
in many instances, they are less significant than others.
74
 Security is subjective, relative 
and relevant to the regional and individual situation of countries, societies and individuals. 
A sound assessment of threats is necessary to customize a security agenda.
75
 This study 
does not argue that external military threats are no longer important; rather, that this threat 
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is not the only important one. To critics of the widening of the agenda, the concern over 
the loss of focus cannot be justified and should be responded to by a prioritization and 
division of labour.
76
 Therefore, the Cold War fixation on ‘extravagant military spending’77 
should be abandoned; resources should not be put on hold to service this one threat while 
the individual, society, and possibly the state are insecure in the face of other threats. It is 
in this sense that many analysts as well as this study argue that the state-centric approach is 
‘impeding’ issues central to the individual from being prioritised.78 
The traditional approach survives by relying on power,
79
 but it has been facing 
increased delegitimization.
80
 As Booth notes, the traditional approach is ‘regressive'81 
because ‘realism (...) has been a theory of the powerful, by the powerful, for the 
powerful’.82 Although the traditional approach emphasised order based on non-intervention 
and state sovereignty, the centrality of power and competition in an anarchic system has 
made realism/neorealism an approach that is power-centric; its state-centrism makes it a 
top-down approach focused on the preservation of the status-quo. It was shaped by the 
interwar years as well as by Cold War ‘necessities’, and it continues to be largely 
ethnocentric, non-inclusive, militarised and masculinist.
83
   
By taking the prevailing order – the state and the international system – as its 
framework, the traditional approach does not examine the status quo or its assumptions.
84 
This means that it ‘perpetuates’ flawed or regressive assumptions.85 Furthermore, the 
traditional approach believes in the fatalism of human nature and the international system; 
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it does not involve any commitment to change, and does not leave space to question the 
prevailing order – the traditional approach is therefore ‘static’.86  
Another problem with the traditional approach is its foundation on ‘claims that are now 
presented as unproblematic facts’.87 Traditional approaches adopt a ‘scientific objectivist 
epistemology’. Their ‘epistemological position is premised on a claim that it is potentially 
possible to draw clear dividing lines between subject and object, fact and value, description 
and prescription’ writes Wyn-Jones.88 However, this study agrees with the argument that 
the study of security from a naturalist and objectivist approach is problematic. The 
‘unbiased’89 study of security has led to the naturalisation of seemingly objective 
knowledge, while disregarding the constructed social fabric.
90
 As Cox states, theory is 
always ‘for someone and for some purpose’.91 Booth and Smith hence argue that there is 
no such thing as a neutral place from which to speak about security.
92
 Moreover, 
McSweeney contends that words like security are not ‘factual’, and cannot be tested by 
‘objective measurement’.93 Therefore, as concepts and theories always depend on a given 
place and time in history,
94
 Booth and Smith note that security is a ‘derivative’ concept – 
its meaning depends on or is derived from a particular standpoint.
95
 Along these lines, 
Krause and Williams write that ‘security after all is a historically variable condition: while 
one might perhaps agree with Thomas Hobbes’s claim that the fear of death is one truly 
human condition, the sources of this fear (...) vary drastically across time and space’.96 The 
objectivist approach is therefore a ‘reductionist’ one:97 it chooses to study humans as 
scientific ‘objects’,98 disregards constructions that shape both security and insecurity, and 
casts out threats that are not of a military nature. 
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Lastly, Buzan contends that the state is ‘the highest form of human collective’; it is 
responsible for ‘managing’ insecurity. 99 The failure of states to provide security leads to 
‘civil conflict among groups, communities and peoples; it threatens states from inside as it 
were and hence global order itself.’100 Conflict in an intensely globalized international 
system threatens the security of individuals across borders. For states to achieve their 
raison d’être, they should have the capabilities to ‘manage’ insecurity. This, however, 
should be done in the sense of a ‘minimal state’. The failure of states to uphold rule of law, 
such as in Lebanon during the late 70s, causes serious and violent threats to individuals; 
nevertheless, irrespective of capabilities, states can also intentionally undermine the 
security of individuals.
101
 It is, therefore, important to note that ‘states should be treated as 
means not ends’.102  States are not reliable; they can be egocentric and abusive, and 
examples of this can be drawn from all corners of the world. One should have the end – the 
individual – clear in mind when dealing with the means –the state.103 Here lies the 
importance of critical security studies. It is adamant that parting ways with the static 
approach is necessary: this study supports its problematisation of pre-defined assumptions 
and structures, and accepts wider and deeper conceptions of security, on the basis that the 
individual is the ‘ultimate referent’.  
 
b) Critical security studies 
 
The term ‘Critical Security Studies’ was coined by Ken Booth at a 1994 conference 
organized by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams.
104
 Participants represented varied and 
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very different non-traditional approaches to security studies; their contributions were 
grouped in Krause and Williams’ 1997 Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases.105 
Two concerns brought critical security studies together. The first was the rejection of the 
traditional approach; the second, the frustration with the non-critical ‘expansionist’ 
approach to the security agenda in the immediate post-Cold War period.
106
 As Krause and 
Williams explained, widening simply consisted of ‘a grab bag of different issue areas’; this 
move lacked ‘a cohesive framework for analysing the complementary and contradictory 
themes at work’. In addition, it failed to ‘move security studies away from its traditional 
concerns’.107 The reconceptualisation of security required serious critical theoretical 
engagement. Critical theorists re-examined this ‘expansionist’ move by breaking away 
from the traditional reductionist approach, and adopting a critical reflective one. Contrary 
to the traditional approach, interpretive epistemology does not subscribe to the argument of 
an abstract other and of ‘timeless structures’.108 A ‘fixed reality’ does not exist; rather, 
subjectivity is considered the basis of all human and social behaviour. Interpretive 
approaches investigate the origins and the causes of conflict; they examine how ‘threats 
and interests are constructed’. Critical reflexion allows for a ‘fuller understanding of 
conflict’, clarifies the road ahead, and paves the way for ‘conscious transformation’.109  
 
Two schools of critical security studies subsequently developed out of the 1994 
conference. There were different views on ‘the construction of a critical theory of 
international relations and, in turn, to contemporary security studies’.110 The broad version 
of critical security studies intends to re-examine issues that had been considered 
orthodoxies in security studies, and to engage with newer ones. Proponents of this broad 
version refused, and still refuse, to develop a specific theory of critical security studies; 
they do not want to ‘invoke a new orthodoxy of critical security studies’. They believe it 
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would be ‘health[ier] for security studies as a whole’ if the field was not ‘straightjacketed 
by the criteria of inclusion and exclusion or by a renewed call for definitive answers’. For 
this reason, the broad version of critical security studies does not specifically define either 
‘security’ or ‘critical’. Instead, it focuses on self-reflection, the search for, and the 
exploration of ‘alternative positions’.111 
Critical Security Studies (CSS), as understood by Booth and his colleagues in the 
Welsh School, is different to the broad version of critical security studies. Booth, along 
with Richard Wyn-Jones, sought to appropriate Critical Theory to security studies.
112
 They 
are the foremost advocates of a distinct and coherent CSS theory based on Critical Theory 
– particularly on the Frankfurt School.113  
Generally, non-traditional approaches view security as being constructed; 
according to this, they take an interpretive stance to deconstruct prevailing positions.
114
 
Critical security studies supplements this by engaging in a search for alternatives in order 
to reconstruct these positions.
115
 Welsh School scholars further argue that a ‘distinctive’ 
theory of critical security studies is imperative in order to liberate security from the 
traditional approach.
116
 As a commitment to emancipation is at the heart of Critical 
Theory, CSS is committed to that goal as well. Emancipation is defined by Booth as ‘the 
securing of people from those oppressions that stops them carrying out what they would 
freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others’.117 Therefore, CSS not only is 
engaged in the deconstruction of traditional security, but also ‘has a clear view of how to 
reconceptualise security studies’.118 Wyn-Jones believes that all non-traditional approaches 
involve a commitment to emancipation, ‘on some notion of the existence of possibilities 
for progressive alternatives—that is emancipation’; some may not be aware of it, while 
others keep it implicit and do not engage in it.
119
 CSS explicitly develops this normative 
commitment. 
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However, emancipation has been the key challenge to CSS. Some critics reject 
CSS’s focus on emancipation; others object to Booth’s definition.120 This commitment runs 
in opposition to traditional, even poststructural and postpositivist approaches – including 
the Copenhagen School. However, Wyn-Jones argues that if critical approaches do not 
seriously engage in reconstruction, they are not that different from the traditional approach. 
He notes that ‘statism, whether its theoretical justification is realist or poststructuralist, is a 
hindrance’.121 Along the same lines, Booth admits that the ‘speech act’ of the 
Securitization theory is an interesting and helpful theory but that ‘it has been pushed too 
far’ by the Copenhagen School.122 This is not only because it justifies and legitimizes 
power and elitist discourse while excluding weaker voices, but also because the rise of new 
actors on all levels has illustrated the viability of a bottom-up approach.
123
 Furthermore, 
just as the ethical and moral dimension to the theory of security studies derive from the 
mother theory – the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory – so too does the Gramscian 
version of the organic intellectual accompanies the Welsh School analyst in his/her 
examination of security.
124
  
One criticism directed at the normative commitment to emancipation has been that 
reporting on security should be objective. In response, firstly, as we have established 
above, there is no neutral place from which to speak of security. Secondly, refusing to take 
a stance based on claims of objectivity allows the prevailing order to continue imposing its 
vision. Silence is an accomplice to prevailing injustices; silence justifies, empowers and 
replicates traditional power-centricism. Building on Robert Cox’s famous stance, Booth 
notes that: ‘all silences are “against somebody or against something”.’125 Prevailing 
theories cannot be replaced by a vacuum; therefore a critical theory of security studies 
needs to be developed. Moreover, in line with CSS’s normative commitment, a critical 
theory of security studies must be relevant to ‘real people in real places’.126 According to 
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the Welsh School, this is the only basis by which to resist and limit prevailing theories. 
Otherwise, such an exercise will be ‘nothing more than an area of academic enquiry’.127  
A critical security studies theory relevant to the ‘real’ world therefore undertakes 
two tasks – critique and reconstruction:  
Critique entails critical explorations of what is real (ontology), what is reliable 
knowledge (epistemology), and what can be done (praxis). Reconstruction requires 
engagement with concrete issues in world politics, with the aim of maximizing 
opportunities for enhancing security, community, and emancipation in the human 
interest.
128 
A theoretical commitment, therefore, involves engagement with knowledge in a 
critical manner and on a continuous basis. The critical theory of security also has a 
‘political orientation’, which entails a commitment to ‘emancipatory politics and networks 
of community at all levels’.129 CSS does not ignore the omnipresence of power (and the 
state); it ‘cannot be escaped, but it can be reordered in a more benign direction’.130 This is 
what this study hopes to do. As we are in an ‘interregnum’;131 however, the future is 
shaped today, and ‘human society will not achieve tomorrow what its most powerful do 
not choose to begin to practice today’.132 It is therefore important to fuse ends with means 
‘in a manner whereby one’s ideals are evident in how one acts’.133 The ideals of CSS are 
encapsulated in emancipation and subsume progressive values.
134
 These are based on an 
‘egalitarian concept of liberty’ and on the ‘reciprocity of rights’; it is ‘inclusivist’, 
‘culturally-sensitive’, ‘universalistic’ and reconciliatory.135  
 
How does Booth see emancipation taking place? The emancipatory strategy is 
based on an enhanced role of civil society at all levels of the international system. 
Emancipation celebrates the breaking down of barriers between the different levels of the 
international system as well as the move towards transnationalism. Furthermore, the 
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emancipatory strategy involves breaking down constructed and artificial barriers that 
position groups and identities against each other, rather than as part of a global community 
with shared rights, interests and obligations.
136
 Emancipation and global governance can be 
closely linked; the architecture of governance is key to disseminating this emancipatory 
culture. As mentioned in the chapter on governance, world society is considered the means 
by which a solidarist and emancipatory global culture can be developed. Booth and Peter 
Vale use South Africa as a case to operationalise a strategy that spreads an emancipatory 
culture. They explain that the soundest approach to ‘comprehensive’ and true security is 
the development of ‘civil society throughout the region: within individual countries it 
needs to deepen, but at the same time, it needs to be transnational’, emphasising therefore 
the role of local, regional and world civil society. Their approach ensures that human 
security concerns are voiced, shared and flow across frontiers;
137
 and that ‘the global-we’ 
supports these voices by challenging power and high politics.
138
 ‘True (stable) security can 
only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it’;139 this attitude 
has to be fostered in the hearts and minds of people across the world. Hence, Booth’s 
emphasis on civil society is intended to encourage a bottom-up approach to the study and 
practice of security. The rationale of a theory of CSS is to prevent or limit the ‘maximal’ 
state – which Buzan referred to in People, States and Fear – from continuing its 
oppressions.
140
The Welsh School therefore strongly puts forward the bottom-up approach 
to represent ‘real people’ facing insecurity.141 
 This study does not go so far as to engage with transnational politics,
142
 or suggesting 
a precise road map for wholesale transformation of the Lebanese system. CSS emphasises 
the need to develop local civil society, which this study also agrees with. The discussion in 
chapter 6 on local efforts to break from mainstream regressive policies are presented with 
this assumption in mind. This study agrees that bottom-up efforts are needed to induce 
progressive change. Having said this, critical security studies do not preclude engaging 
with state actors when the purpose is to critique their work, as this study does.
143
 Krause 
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and Williams themselves argue that ‘to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost 
certain to result in continued disciplinary [and practical] exclusion’.144 Hence, while both 
critical security studies and this study are wary of state actors, we can agree that in the 
process of change the state is not circumventable.
145
 By using primary material from state 
actors, this study examines whether state efforts are reflecting and responding to peoples’ 
security. Thus, for practical purposes, there should be no conflict in adopting both a critical 
security studies and an institutional human security approach
146
 as they stand at different 
levels of analysis; while one looks at institutional policy the other assesses its contributions 
to progress. 
 
c) The Copenhagen School and CSS: steer or transform? 
 
Within the non-traditional approaches, the Copenhagen School and the Welsh School 
(CSS) are the two approaches that offer the most coherent and influential theories on 
security. As mentioned above, Buzan’s People, States, and Fear (1983) was a seminal 
work; it paved the way for the birth of the non-traditional approach to security studies.
147 
Nevertheless, Buzan did not make the full leap into what would become CSS. He 
maintained that the state should remain the referent object of security.
148
 Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde wrote that ‘in principle, securitizing actors can attempt to 
construct anything as a referent object’.149 However, at a later date they concluded that the 
state is the primary referent object and that their approach is ‘not dogmatically state centric 
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in [its] premises’ but in its ‘findings’.150 In this sense, Bill McSweeney, among others, 
insists that Buzan’s approach did not represent a substantial break with neorealism.151 
Buzan personally admits to adopting a liberal neorealist approach.
152
 Despite his work 
being categorized as a non-traditional approach, he clearly distanced himself from CSS 
after his collaborations with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. In Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (1998), the three analysts recognized the emergence of CSS as an 
approach ‘to challenge conventional security studies by applying postpositivist 
perspectives, such as critical theory and postructuralism’.153 They note CSS’s ‘intent of 
showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted’.154 However, their 
work, dubbed the Copenhagen School by McSweeney,
155emphasises that ‘the socially 
constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice 
that one must do analysis’ on that basis.156 In this sense, the Copenhagen School notes that 
it is ‘closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempt[s] to grasp security 
constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions.’ Thereby, their work ‘stands 
in contrast to the ‘critical’ purpose of CSS, which point[s] toward a more wholesale 
refutation of current power wielders.’157 Copenhagen School scholars state that their work 
is intended to ‘grasp’ and ‘steer’ security; therefore, as suggested by Wyn-Jones, there are 
traces of a commitment to change – emancipation – which is implicit but unengaged. The 
implicit commitment to change is another reason why, despite their innovative work on the 
‘speech act’, on societal security and on identity, the Copenhagen School remains on the 
margins of critical security studies.
158
 Despite the ‘sedimented’ practices, critical security 
studies adopts a more explicit (and sometime wholesale) commitment to change and insists 
on the irreducibility of the individual as the referent. 
 
                                                 
150
 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power: The Structure in International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).p 71. 
151
 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).  p 123. 
152
 Although he admits that the traditional approach is ‘too narrowly founded’, and announces that he is 
committed to revising neorealism, he states that: ‘some might even see international security studies as a 
liberal reformulation of Realism, emphasizing the structural and security oriented approach of 
Neorealism, and applying it across a broad agenda. I would support such a view’. Buzan, 1991, p 14, 
373. 
153
 Buzan et al, 1998, p 34-35. 
154
 Ibid. 
155
 Smith, 2005, p 32. 
156
 Buzan et al, 1998, p 34-35. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Booth: ‘only “marginally” critical’. Booth, 2005, p 271. 
72 
 
3) A final debate?  
 
Security is possibly the term used most in this study. For ‘far too long security was not 
considered to be a contestable concept’; the inter-war period and the Cold War had halted 
the evolution of security studies. Currently, however, the concept of security has become a 
‘battleground in and of itself’.159 The different strands of security studies approach security 
very differently. The realist approach maintains its statist and defensive dimensions, while 
non-traditional approaches continue to re-examine the concept after introducing new 
dimensions and other referents. The Copenhagen School supplemented, valuably, its state-
centric approach with the ‘speech act’, identity studies, and the society as a referent to 
security. In addition, for Buzan, security ‘can only be relative’.160 He therefore maintains 
that it was futile to define it specifically: that we should accept security to be ‘an 
essentially contested concept’.161 The broad version of critical security studies also refuses 
to give a specific definition of the term. Booth, however, strongly opposes this. In his view 
we cannot aspire to something we cannot define: ‘if we cannot name it, can we ever hope 
to achieve it?’162 – hence his efforts to develop a theory of critical security studies. It is 
agreed that security is a derivative concept. Krause and Williams state that security is ‘not 
self-referential’; it needs a subject to secure.163 Taking the individual, the state, or society 
as the referent has different repercussions on the scope of security. The choice of the 
referent and the degree of deepening, as Booth and Smith explain, suggest a specific 
theoretical standpoint.
164
 In addition, security is indeed a ‘powerful political word’ and an 
‘instrumental value’.165 The work of Waever on security as a ‘speech act’ is of particular 
relevance to this argument.
166
 The label of ‘security’ transforms responses to issues; it 
amasses political as well as material support. According to the Copenhagen School, to 
identify an issue as a security issue is to label it as an ‘existential threat’; this allows the 
securitisation agent to remove it from the realm of ‘ordinary politics’ and allows 
‘emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind’ to be taken.167 It is 
important, however, not to place CSS and the Copenhagen School in one basket. 
Securitisation theory views security issues as militarised and outside ‘ordinary’ politics; 
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they invoke the state of exception. Their concern over the effects of securitising non-
traditional issues led to its corollary, desecuritisation.
168
 Efforts to desecuritise certain 
issues have been made by scholars and practitioners. However, this study points out that a 
security issue needs not be securitised in the sense of the Copenhagen School. This study 
argues that a security issue does invoke priority and resources, but it does not need to be 
militarised and placed outside the realm of ‘ordinary’ politics. At the same time, some non-
military issues might deserve militarisation or securitisation. Furthermore, although the 
securitisation theory seems to explain ‘sedimented practices’ well, I take issue with the 
logic suggesting that if important issues are placed outside the scope of security, they then 
need to lose ‘their salience‘,169 or that issues can only acquire the label of a security issue if 
they are ‘staged as existential threats’.170 Salience should also be afforded to non-
existential threats, as security ‘is not synonymous with survival,’171 rather, security 
transcends survival. Indeed, security need not be associated with negative, militarised 
and/or confrontational connotations.
172
 The conceptualisation of security by the 
Securitisation theory is problematic. 
173
 It instils fear and introversion. True and 
comprehensive security requires the acceptance of egalitarian values that deconstruct the 
walls between groups. Inclusiveness, reconciliation and mutual rights are the bases for true 
security; security is not genuine, stable or sustainable if it is at the expense of others.
174
  
‘Security studies’ have undergone several changes since the 80s. However, this does 
not mean that the debate about security has been resolved. Buzan states that ‘the nature of 
security defies pursuit of an agreed general definition.’175 In the absence of an agreed-upon 
definition, there is still a ‘general sense of what one is talking about’176; generically 
speaking, ‘the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat.’177 Many agree that 
the lack of a definition is not an obstacle to progress; ‘the absence of a universal definition 
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does not prevent constructive discussion’ writes Buzan.178 Krause and Williams add that 
the debate within security studies is a healthy one:
179
 ‘now we begin to see the full range 
and diversity of what the security concept can do across a range of issues and 
approaches’.180 Furthermore, security ‘needs to be challenged and contested’, particularly 
for the purpose of reconstructing it.
181
  
One assertion to take away from this discussion is that alternative approaches ‘have 
scored deeply in moving the understanding of threat away from purely material 
calculations towards more social and political understandings.’182 Even if the ‘military 
agenda does assert itself as central again, it seems unlikely that all of the widening and 
deepening developments in ISS will be rolled back’.183 The progress made is not 
retractable; the threshold has been pushed so that any traditional reassertion will have to 
take into account some aspects of this progress. It is believed that the concept will continue 
to evolve alongside the changing international environment.
184 
In the end, one can note that security is what ‘enables people(s) some opportunity to 
choose how to live.’185 The search for it is perpetual; it is a constant struggle to, at the very 
least, reduce threats to everyday life.
186
 However, we must also accept that, to a large 
extent, ‘insecurity is a life-determining condition’.187  
 
4) A stance on ‘security’ 
 
This study particularly espouses the contributions of critical security studies. One 
reason for this preference is that critical security studies is intended to be ‘pragmatic’,188 
                                                 
178
 Ibid, p 18. 
179
 Krause and Williams. 1996, p 249. 
180
 Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p 272. 
181
 Smith, 2005, p 58. 
182
 Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p 272. 
183
 Ibid. 
184
 A Buzan and Hansen note, ‘It will continue to evolve not just in keeping pace with new security 
concerns, but also in developing new ways to think about them’. Ibid.  
185
 Booth, 2005, p 23. 
186
 Booth and Vale note that ‘no security policy can erase the whole of life’s threats. Instead, we must 
conceive of the search for security as a balanced attempt to try to create a less threatening structural 
context for life’s ordinary struggles’. Booth and Vale, 1997, p 336. 
187
 Booth, 2007, p 101. 
188
 Ibid, p 14. 
75 
 
allowing this study to engage with the efforts of the security sector in Lebanon. The study 
intends to critique existing assumptions in order to generate the soundest possible 
knowledge and to suggest the reconstruction of more inclusive, reconciliatory and 
egalitarian conceptions of security in Lebanon. This is done in the Lebanese background 
chapters by challenging the prevailing sectarian system. Critical security studies entails a 
commitment to engagement with political matters that are in the human interest; looking at 
the contributions of Lebanese non-traditional civil society groups and at the contributions 
of state security providers to human security reflects this. CSS takes the individual as an 
anchor and recognises that emancipation is the central concern for individuals.
189
 Indeed, 
emancipation is the factor that differentiates security from insecurity. Emancipation is the 
relative freedom – contingent on the freedom of others – to pursue life in the manner we 
choose; it implies the freedom or liberty from both man-made and natural constraints, both 
throughout the course of an individual’s life and for humanity in general. Constraints 
generally emanate from long-standing attitudes and structures; they might vary between 
war or political oppression, or environmental degradation, poverty and poor education. 
This study cannot address all these constraints, and the definition of emancipation remains 
a contested one within critical security studies. However, the study takes the individual as 
its referent and adopts the commitment to emancipation, particularly from oppression and 
violence. This study takes elements from both the broad school and CSS in order to make 
way for positive change. However, instead of taking a comprehensive, multi-sectoral, 
transformative approach, this study limits its scope to a more manageable focus on curbing 
threats to individuals emanating from conflict and state oppression – i.e., from regressive 
policies anchored on militaristic, top-down and exclusivist assumptions. It does not expand 
to a transnational approach as suggested by CSS, but remains limited to a Lebanese 
context; it does not adopt a radical approach that refutes all prevailing structures and does 
not refuse to engage with state actors. It instead deconstructs the system to explicitly steer 
efforts for change into more ethical and people-centred policies.   
 
The first part of this chapter discussed security from a theoretical stand point and took 
a stance in favour of critical security studies; the second part moves on to a conceptual 
discussion of Human Security.   
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II. Human Security: A Conceptual Discussion 
 
The previous theoretical discussion has set the framework for this study; this done, 
however, how do we translate our understanding of security to real life? The changes to the 
meaning of security were picked up by the UNDP in the early ‘90s; a theoretically wider 
and deeper security came together in the concept of Human Security. The work of the 
UNDP was seminal in transferring these theoretical changes to the policy world. This 
change took place gradually; it built up from an expanded and deeper meaning of 
development, it evolved to encompass these changes in the understanding of security, and 
ultimately linked the two together. This progress was accompanied by extensive work on 
the academic front; the move was supported by scholars working on humanitarian issues, 
on development, on security, and on the link between conflict and development. The UN, 
therefore, was instrumental in developing the concept of Human Security and placing it 
centre-stage in world politics discussions – both at the academic and policy-making levels. 
Hence, during the 1990s, as the UN was given a new lease on life, Human Security 
gathered much attention: the period witnessed a surge in the number of commissions, 
reports, books and publications in favour of the new concept.
190
 
 
1) Overview 
 
The 1994 Human Development Report of the UNDP is considered the key document in 
introducing the concept of Human Security to international policy-making. However, its 
foundations were first set out in the first Human Development Report (HDR) of 1990 and 
in the 1992 UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. The first Human 
Development Report introduced the concept of Human Development; the 1992 Secretary 
General’s Agenda for Peace redirected the focus of security to the individual – noting that 
both development and security take the individual as the referent; it also broadened the 
scope of security to include environmental, demographic, health, economic and political 
threats. Finally, the 1994 Human Development Report explicitly bridged the two concepts 
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under the term Human Security. The concept was seen to incorporate both ‘freedom from 
fear’ as well as ‘freedom from want’.191    
Traditionally, ‘security is often viewed as the absence of physical violence, while 
development is viewed as material development – improved living standards’. This is now 
accepted to be far from our modern understanding of the two terms. As Kaldor notes, 
‘security is about confronting extreme vulnerabilities, not only in wars but in natural and 
man-made disasters as well’.192 Human Security pertains to the welfare of the individual; it 
transcends physical security to include human development. The first Human Development 
Report (1990) notes that ‘development is about expanding people’s choices’. Development 
is no longer understood solely in terms of economic growth and increased income; it is 
concerned with ‘advancing health, education, and political freedom in addition to 
economic well-being.’193 Development, therefore, became understood as ‘more than a 
decent standard of living’;194 it is now seen to encompass the opportunities to participate 
and advance in different aspects of life.
195
 Therefore, Human Security is not only ‘a 
concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity’.196 Caroline Thomas’ 
seminal work emphasises the two components of Human Security: human needs as well as 
an ‘unhindered participation in the life of the community’.197 The 1994 report specifically 
identifies seven categories of Human Security.
198
 The concept is characterised by its 
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universality, by the interdependence of its components; it is people-centred, and is best 
approached through prevention.
199
 The 1994 Human Development Report notes that: 
Human security has two central aspects: it means, first, safety from such chronic 
threats as hunger, disease and repression. And, second, it means protection from 
sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily-life—whether in homes, in jobs or in 
communities.
200
  
Human Security is therefore a holistic concept.
201
 It is concerned with present threats 
and fears but also with future risks and opportunities. Duffield explains that the aim of 
Human Security is to empower weak populations: to make them more resilient and self-
sufficient in facing the challenges of the new world order.
202
 By incorporating such a 
multi-faceted outlook, Human Security is seen by some to offer a multi-layered analysis of 
the human condition.
203
 This optimistic overview of the term will soon be put into 
question. 
 
2) An Integrated approach 
 
 
The 1992 Agenda for Peace by the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali had shed light on a sharp increase in a ‘new’ form of wars: internal wars.204 
Furthermore, there was growing agreement that the nature of the state in developing 
countries was conducive to internal conflict, which had become the source of suffering for 
many and instability for most. Moreover, the ‘disruptive effects’ of globalization were 
increasing the rift between the ‘insured’ and the ‘non-insured’.205 Development was 
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therefore centred on the rectification of these adverse effects.
206
 As a result, development 
and security were found to share an increasingly intricate relationship; both had found a 
new and reinforced raison d’être.207 Thus far, most approaches to security and 
development had been separate; however, this was found to ‘actually exacerbate 
insecurity’.208 Reed and Tehranian explain that ‘each realm impinges upon the others and 
is intrinsically connected to wider political and economic consideration’.209 Collins notes 
that there is a causal pathway between the dependent and the independent variables of 
Human Security. Independent variables of underdevelopment lead to the dependent 
variables of insecurity as political violence. However, this pathway runs both ways; 
poverty and bad governance may lead to violence, while at the same time violence breeds 
underdevelopment, poverty and bad governance.
210
 Proponents of Human Security, 
therefore, strongly advocate an integrated approach to security and development.  
Consistent with the work of the UNDP, the wide approach acts on this 
interconnectedness, and two separate documents by commissions from each side of the 
spectrum have come to represent Human Security. The Responsibility to Protect (2001) 
and Human Security Now (2003) constitute the ‘institutional framework’ of Human 
Security; the former looks at its security focus whereas the latter represents the 
comprehensive integrated approach.
211
 Henceforth, when this study refers to the broad 
approach of Human Security the term will be capitalised; in the case of the narrow 
approach this study will use lower case for the term.  
 
3) Narrow and broad approaches 
 
The 1991 Agenda for Peace and the 1994 Human Development Report as well as 
academic support instigated further research into the operationality of the concept and laid 
the ground for political action in this regard. In a Canadian-led initiative, 13 states came 
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together in the Human Security Network, which was launched in Norway in 1999.212 The 
Canadian initiative adopted a narrow approach, which focused on physical and political 
security — freedom from fear.213 Since the ICISS published its report in 2001,214 this 
category has had an ‘affinity to the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’.215 The other 
approach was led by Japan; it consisted of a much broader approach to Human Security. It 
stresses the ‘interrelatedness of different types of security’ as well as development as a 
‘security strategy’.216 It is concerned with Human Security as freedom from fear as well as 
freedom from want. In March 1999, the Japanese government, along with the UN 
Secretariat, established the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS).
217
 This 
division evolved into two parallel schools of Human Security. Subsequently, an 
independent Commission on Human Security was established in 2000 and published the 
2003 report Human Security Now.
218
 The Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen Report is 
considered another ‘milestone’ in the development of the concept.219 A number of 
developments indicate the propagation of the concept in world politics.
220
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4) Human Security and global governance 
 
One relationship to highlight is that which exists between Human Security and global 
governance. Tehranian writes that the two concepts seem to ‘stand at micro and macro 
polarities’. While Human Security is involved with individual welfare and security, global 
governance is concerned with world affairs. However, there is more to this contrast than 
the apparent levels at which these two concepts operate. Due to the increasingly 
transnational nature of issues, domestic security problems inherently affect global 
governance.
 221
 Reed and Tehranian note that Human Security and global governance share 
an ‘intrinsic relationship’.222 This relationship is twofold: on the one hand insecurity 
affects global governance, and on the other, Human Security requires access to global 
governance. For Human Security to be successful, it must become part of the norms of 
global Governance. ul-Haq, who suggested institutionalising Human Security by creating a 
Human Security Council similar to the ECOSOC, noted that ‘compulsions of human 
security demand a new framework of global governance’.223 Previous discussions indicated 
that ethical democratic policies, cosmopolitan norms, and a coordinated transnational 
response are identified as key to a solidarist orientation to global governance. 
Hence, the ‘democratisation’ of global governance is considered a necessary condition 
for promulgating the concept. 
224
  A concerted effort is being made to turn Human Security 
into an established norm of global governance; this is evident through the work of 
individual countries, the UN and other organisations and agencies. As Falk explains, 
Human Security’s statute needs to rise to the level of international regimes in order for 
global actors to enforce it more systematically. Therefore, states, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions, and global civil 
society all play an important role in this. Much more effort, however, is required for 
Human Security to reach universality. As noted by Falk, non-state actors are required to 
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push the Human Security agenda from below, in order to keep it in the spotlight and 
therefore be adopted as a policy from above: their effort ‘[requires] a much stronger and 
more focused campaign within global civil society, a strengthening of globalisation-from-
below that balances globalisation-from-above’.225  
In 1994 the then Secretary General acknowledged that the UN had been lagging behind 
in responding to the new post-Cold War environment.
226
 Since then, progress has been 
made. A more complex and inter-sectoral approach was necessary.  Peacebuilding 
missions were introduced and a Peacebuilding Commission was created in 2006. The 
conceptual and institutional frameworks of Human Security were conceived to address a 
new security environment.
 227
 Nevertheless, sceptics such as Duffield contend (as in the 
discussion on governance) that Human Security has been used as a ‘technology’ of 
governance; although useful to understand and manage conflict and insecurity in different 
parts of the world, it serves as a tool for international actors to ‘individuate, group and act 
upon Southern populations’.228 While this might resonate at the strategic level, as the 
international system does not seem to be transforming into a purely solidarist 
orientation,
229
 ethical and people-centred concepts have managed to shape policy and have 
made positive contributions to international law and to a larger sample of people across the 
world. One can note that if Human Security continues to be linked with governance, 
primarily as a result of pressure from non-state actors, then grassroots concerns will have a 
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place in policy circles. Lebanon is one case where state actors, local and international 
NGOs, international organisations, and regional and international powers have contributed 
to advancing Human Security. Although many have also been complicit in exacerbating 
certain aspects of Lebanon’s conflict, one needs to differentiate between actors, the roles 
they are playing, and the contributions they are making. The same applies to actors 
involved at the level of international or world politics. 
 
5) Problematic institutional conceptualisation 
 
This study is looking at Human Security because it is looking for tools that help 
contribute to change. Human Security presents a mix of contributions to the policy world; 
unfortunately, however, they are undermined by its conceptual overstretch. Despite Human 
Security rapidly becoming popular at the institutional level, the scholarly community soon 
recognised that the broad concept has weaknesses on all theoretical, normative and 
practical levels. Roland Paris describes Human Security as ‘slippery by design’.230 Critical 
and post-structuralist scholars in particular are outraged by the broad approach to Human 
Security. Booth strongly criticises Human Security as being incoherent, misleading and 
deceiving.
231
 In The Dog that Didn’t Bark, David Chandler, therefore, states that the value 
of Human Security ‘has been much exaggerated’.232  
 
Theoretically, Human Security stretches the concept of security without analytical 
rigour. The concept does not seriously explore the relationship between its constituent 
parts, its objectives, its principles, its values and its targets. It adopts instead an approach 
that Krause and Williams describe as a ‘grab-bag’ to refer to the post-Cold War widening 
of security. 
As security threats were recognised to have become more complex, the 2003 Report of 
the Commission on Human Security (CHS), entitled Human Security Now, talked about a 
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need for a paradigm shift that broadens the scope of attention to the ‘security of people’.233 
Hence, CHS notes that ‘respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human 
security’; it relies on the promotion of democratic principles to ‘enable people to 
participate in governance and make their voices heard’.234 So far this seems promising and 
these are aspects that this study strongly espouses. Human Security contains several 
buzzwords that made practitioners, policy-makers and scholars enthusiastic for its 
promotion. It proposes policy conclusions pertaining to the ‘protection of people in violent 
conflict’, ‘from the proliferation of arms’, ‘people on the move’ (refugees and migrants), 
provides ‘funds for post-conflict situations’, and emphasises the need for ‘a global human 
identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and 
affiliations’. These are areas that human security can effectively contribute to. However, 
the CHS recognised that threats are contextual, contingent on the situation that individuals 
find themselves in. Therefore it preferred to maintain open-ended the ‘critical and 
pervasive threats and situations’ that human security is meant to address.235 But, 
conceptually and operationally this is problematic. 
Building on the Millennium Development Goals to formulate responses to security
236
 is 
where uncertain areas begin to arise.237 The more controversial policy conclusions pertain 
for example to ‘encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor’, ‘working 
to provide minimum living standards everywhere’, ‘enduring universal access to basic 
health care’, ‘developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights’, and 
‘empowering all people with universal basic education’.238 This long list invites us to 
assume that the concept is too ‘idealistic’; in the words of CS scholar Buzan, ‘simplistic’ 
and ‘reductionist’.239 Indeed, the Human Security ideal ‘embraces far more than the 
absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to 
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education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices 
to fulfil his or her own potential’. This is an ethical ideal; but the wide approach is 
problematic because it dilutes the meaning of security. No analytical or practical value is 
added by incorporating so many issues under its scope; instead this ‘diminish[es] its 
political salience’.240 Krause’s criticism is also directed at the wider definition of Human 
Security. According to him, this approach is ‘nothing more than a shopping list; it involves 
slapping the label “human security” on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link’. 
He agrees for example that ‘it is not clear that anything is gained by linking ‘human 
security’ to issues such as education, fair trade practices and public health’.241 Roland Paris 
explains that the frustration of analysts with Human Security is that the term ‘seems 
capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis – along with its opposite – depending on the 
prejudices and interests of the particular researcher’.242 This study, therefore, notes that 
Human Security incorporates an extensively wide range of principles and objectives but 
does not establish a convincing causal relationship between them.
243
  
Also, how do we justify labelling such issues as ‘basic education’, ‘basic health care’ 
and ‘fair trade’ as security issues? Following the Copenhagen School securitisation 
approach, labelling these as security issues provides them with added salience and 
resources; however, it also labels them as ‘existential threats’ that can be placed outside 
ordinary politics. There is much concern over the securitisation and in certain cases the 
militarisation of these areas. This means we are inviting the state further into controlling 
the governance of areas that it did not necessarily monopolise. Moreover, in relation to 
militarisation, in conflict areas, the securitisation of development and humanitarian aid has 
meant that the military has achieved primacy over non-state actors. The militarisation of 
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aid not only undermines the credibility and the contributions of humanitarian agencies but 
also subjugates them to state ‘hard’ security/military policy. In this sense, the securitisation 
takes us back to regressive rather than progressive change. Recognising the salience of 
these issues needs to take place without the state’s take-over and militarisation. 
Furthermore, Human Security incorporates a dual approach of ‘protection and 
empowerment’. For example, in relation to post-conflict situations, the responsibility to 
protect is intended to be complemented by a responsibility to rebuild. While ‘strengthening 
the civilian police and demobilising combatants’ and ‘promoting reconciliation and 
coexistence’ do promote protection against violent conflict, it is not entirely clear that 
reconstruction and development efforts fulfil the empowerment component and that they 
should be moved from the realm of humanitarian/development to that of security. 
Furthermore, while cooperation and coordination cannot be emphasised enough and 
security organisations need to seriously consider and coordinate with the humanitarian and 
development dimensions of conflict, it is problematic that the CHS suggests that all these 
areas and all actors involved should be placed under a ‘unified leadership’.244 Crucially, 
how do we operationalise Human Security? The integrated holistic approach is seen by this 
study as problematic. It would not be feasible for actors to pursue all issues along the same 
priority. Therefore, many consider Human Security to be operationally unrealistic. 
MacFarlane and Khong explain that three problems stem from its ‘conceptual overstretch’: 
‘false priorities, confusion about the causes of human security, and militarized 
solutions.’245 As mentioned above, attempts to broaden the concept reinforces the place of 
the state and risks securitising issues in the sense of the Copenhagen School.
246
 
In addition, the ‘people-centred security’ that the CHS puts forward only ‘complements 
state security’; according to the report, strong institutions and a strong state is necessary for 
protecting people.247 Granted, capable (and democratic) state institutions are necessary to 
establish order, but to emphasise that human security only ‘complements’ rather than 
overrides state security is not enough of a paradigm shift. This is not compatible with the 
stance taken in this study’s theoretical discussion, which anchors the study in the security 
of the individual. Therefore this study believes that, by complementing state security, 
human security is in fact only given a subsidiary status; furthermore this complementarity 
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dangerously ‘invites’ the state into traditionally contested governance spaces such as 
‘education’, ‘public information’ and ‘public media’.248 This risks entrenching a 
monopolistic state role.
249
 However, one may take a more optimistic stance and argue that 
while this risk is always there, given the role of domestic and international NGOs and 
organisations, the state has no choice but to compromise in governance and therefore 
develop an interest in and pre-disposition to multilateralism.
250
 This debate is one which is 
unsettled in theoretical circles; however, this study considers that giving the state a bigger 
role is undesirable but accepts that academics can only expose limitations and critique 
policies.   
The CHS adds a global outlook to Human Security that rests on a support network 
made out of ‘public, private, and civil society actors’ to ‘create horizontal, cross-border 
sources of legitimacy’.251 The role of non-state as described by the CHS is to ‘help in the 
clarification and development of norms, embark on integrated activities, and monitor 
progress and performance’; but this role is clearly a limited one. The ‘global initiative’ is 
intended to ‘strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the 
state with a global world’.252 Human security therefore contains an inherent contradiction: 
it aims to empower people to ‘act on their own behalf’ but then reinstates the state as the 
primary domestic agent and as the link with the ‘global world’. This study’s view is that 
Human Security reduces rather than activates the agency of individuals. This is possibly an 
unintended consequence, but nonetheless a consequence that does not promote critical 
empowerment. 
One may be tempted to assume that Human Security’s institutional, but wide and deep 
approach, brings it close to the stances of the Copenhagen School. However, inviting the 
state into such a wide array of issues has contributed to Copenhagen School scholars 
having to develop their desecuritisation theory in order to remove such issues from the 
realm of ‘existential threats’.253 Furthermore, reinvigorating and expanding the role of the 
state, as well as giving a subsidiary role to non-state actors, makes the concept ‘inherently 
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conservative’.254 Human security fails to roll back the statist tradition. Therefore Human 
Security cannot be considered critical and cannot bring about transformation. 
 
That being said, critical scholars have continued to engage with this concept, if not in 
order to espouse or refine it then simply to critique the ‘real world’ institutional approach 
to security governance. This study recognises that the concept cannot bring about the 
transformation that CSS advocates for. Human security largely remains a traditional neo-
liberal institutional approach to responding to a broad security agenda. As this concept is 
people-centred and mainstreamed in global governance, what contributions can it make? 
Human security provides us with an interesting and comprehensive view of the threats 
and conditions that affect the human experience; however, we must be cautious not to 
assume problematic and unnecessary corollaries and not to formulate entangled responses 
that undermine rather than induce sustainable progress. This study follows human security 
in asmuch as it seeks to provide physical and political security. This study therefore 
supports the conceptualisation of a human security approach which seeks to promote 
human rights, humanitarian law, and ‘coexistence and trust among people’. This includes 
‘protecting women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable groups’, as well as 
‘disarming people and fighting crime through preventing the proliferation of weapons and 
illegal trade in resources and people’.255  
This study, therefore, suggests emphasising the ‘people-centred’ aspect of human 
security by democratising the state and limiting its intrusiveness, by representing people’ 
voices, and by promoting human rights. This will, however, involve restricting the scope of 
human security to a more conceptually and operationally coherent package.
256
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6) Trouble implementing Human Security  
 
As noted, the width of Human Security makes it unrealistic to focus on particular 
issues when they are all ‘equally important’.257 Newman simply states that freedom from 
fear and freedom from want are ‘hardly a research agenda, and even less of a policy 
orientation’. As such, in practice, Human Security policies have either been one-
dimensional,
258
 or they have been too broad to fit into a coherent operational policy.
259
 The 
main concern, therefore, is whether the concept can overcome its normative and conceptual 
aspects to translate into an operational policy.
260
  
Building on the previous discussions, the conditions of realpolitik have tainted Human 
Security. Hough illustrates the gap between the debate on security and the attitudes of 
governments by highlighting the distinction between traditional high and low politics. For 
example, although South Africa is a supporter of Human Security, its state expenditures 
put things in perspective: ‘South Africa trebled its allocation of the state exchequer for 
fighting AIDS for 2002–03 to $1 billion from the previous financial year’.261 However, the 
share allocated to defence was $21 billion for the same year. Nevertheless, while South 
Africa does not have an ‘obvious external military threat’, 11% of the population is 
infected with HIV; ‘AIDS is the country’s biggest killer, claiming an estimated 40 percent 
of all deaths in 2002’. 262 South Africa is an interesting example because it has been almost 
a vanguard of Human Security, and it is the only state that has chosen to unilaterally 
abandon its nuclear military program. Yet the discrepancy in allocating resources to threats 
highlights the continued precedence of traditional concerns. Therefore, despite debates 
moving forward on Human Security, governments continue to prioritise hard security 
issues. Moreover, although some adjustments have been made, even ardent government 
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supporters of Human Security are not about to let hard security issues lag behind.
263
 Power 
seems to remain central between states, and state behaviour is still closer to the neo-realist 
approach.  
In addition, large-scale events have added to the grim condition of the conduct of world 
politics. There is agreement among scholars, practitioners and policy-makers that the 
progress achieved in the realm of Human Security has been reversed in the aftermath of 
9/11, with hard security issues overshadowing softer ones in many parts of the world,
264
 
including in mature democracies.
265
 The ‘war on terror’ spearheaded traditional security 
policies at the expense of Human Security concerns.
266
 Necla Tschirgi wonders whether all 
this progress will wither away, while noting that there has been a return to ‘state-centric 
conceptions of security with human security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
moving to the back of the international agenda’. With such cases as Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Pakistan in mind, she is concerned that states have and might continue to ‘consider 
retreating from hard-gained commitments to human rights, good governance and rule of 
law’.267 Duffield, Tschirgi, Hough, and Kaldor all agree that the post-9/11 era has blurred 
the divide between assistance and foreign policy, and that assistance has been politicised 
and militarised. While some agencies found in this change an opportunity to amass more 
resources, others are resentful of losing their most priced attribute: neutrality. Ardent 
critics such as Thomas and Tow describe foreign humanitarian assistance associated with 
such conditions, namely counter-terrorist ones, as ‘neo-imperialism’.268 An added failing 
of the militarisation of assistance is the military’s lack of sensitivity, experience and 
training to deal with non-military issues.
269
 The Human Security agenda is seen by some to 
have become a foreign policy tool used to protect the borderlands; the essence of human 
security therefore risks being lost when it is applied selectively and conditionally. 
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On the far side of CSS, Booth reminds us of his disdain of the ‘cold monster of the 
sovereign state’; he blames the prevailing institutions for appropriating Human Security in 
their favour, but, ‘business-as-usual with an admixture of progressive rhetoric will not 
deliver the improved human security the framers of the concept first envisaged’.270 Booth 
writes that ‘governments have learned to talk the talk about human security without 
changing their priorities’.271 Chandler (true to his post-structuralist roots) argues that 
Human Security was not only co-opted by governments; rather, ‘its integration into the 
mainstream of policymaking has reinforced, rather than challenged, existing policy 
frameworks’.272 Chandler is sceptical of what came to be considered a ‘global 
responsibility’,273 and he highlights the negative aspects of post-Cold War norms 
associated with Human Security.
 He argues that these new norms are ‘pragmatic’ ways of 
dealing with the new conditions of realpolitik,
274
 and that the protection of individual rights 
is less concerned with humanitarianism and more with the ‘balance of power in the 
international sphere’.275 Chandler cites the militarisation of humanitarian work, and argues 
that the Responsibility to Protect and the Liberal Peace theories are mere justifications for 
intervention.
276
 Along the same line, and like Duffield, Booth refers to Human Security as 
a ‘technology of control’; in this sense, he notes that Human Security masks Western 
interests, and that it ‘has taken on the image of the velvet glove on the iron hand of hard 
power’.277 Booth’s now well-known stance asserts that the only way to see insecurity 
diminish is through a radical change in the ‘attitudes and behaviour of governments’.278 
Although providing valuable insight into the conduct of international relations, Booth and 
Chandler’s positions are radical; and it is this study’s view that they fail to be constructive. 
As in the discussion on governance, this study believes that despite the abuse of, co-option 
and problems of implementation with Human Security, positive normative pressures have 
also taken root. Human Security is a new concept, and given the complexities of world 
affairs, time and effort can be and have been invested to refine the concept. Progress is 
being achieved as states, international organisations and civil society actors are 
incorporating a new approach to development and  security. It is becoming more and more 
difficult for states to justify ignoring Human Security.  
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Because of its analytical failings and its conceptual incoherence, many scholars – 
whether from critical security studies, the Copenhagen or the post-structuralist schools – 
have established that Human Security cannot amount to an international relations theory.279 
However, proponents of Human Security claim that the concept is a policy-relevant one 
and is not intended for theoretical analysis.
280
 This being said, Neil MacFarlane conceded 
that Human Security could be a ‘useful concept’ but that it ‘risks losing its political 
salience’.281 As Krause and others suggest, some level of coherence is necessary not only 
for analysis but also for practical purposes.
282
 Furthermore, for the reasons mentioned, this 
study notes that Human Security falls short from the paradigm shift its inceptors 
envisioned. Nevertheless, this study, like others by many scholars,
283
 does not dismiss the 
concept. After re-evaluating some problems in implementing Human Security, the study 
advocates for the refinement of the concept and for the salience of the narrow approach.
284
 
This approach is one which can yield concrete ‘wins’.  
 
7) Salvaging a useful policy concept 
 
Although there have been mixed responses to the emergence of the Human Security 
concept and to its application (broad or narrow), especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, optimism has also surrounded the concept. Preventive diplomacy, peace-making 
and peace-building missions based on the human security agenda contribute to the 
alleviation of insecurity for millions across the world. The UN family continues to pursue a 
broad Human Security approach because of the added value of coordination and 
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cooperation between the realms of security and development. This cooperation has made 
the work of practitioners more efficient and more effective. In regards to its narrow 
approach, the Human Security Report of 2005, for example, notes that ‘the UN’s 17 peace 
operations cost less to run for a whole year than the US spends on Iraq in a month’.285 
Narrowly targeted human security operations and projects286 therefore bring progress to a 
wider sample of people. Although individual states may at times suspend their 
commitment to the human security agenda, at least numerous international organisations 
have succeeded in promoting the ethical and practical utility of the concept. In this sense, it 
is up to the UN ‘to provide leadership on human security’; international and regional 
organisations or institutions, as well as NGOs and civil society, have an essential role to 
play in keeping the concept alive on the agenda of global governance.
287
 States do remain 
crucial to the application of the agenda of human security, both internally and in their 
foreign policy; their support is essential for the relevance of the concept.
288
 As a norm of 
global governance, it will be more difficult for states to justify the political and selective 
approach to their approach to human security.  
Paris, quoted above in his Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? does not 
dismiss the concept; he sees its potential and suggests either ‘sharpen[ing]’ its definition or 
treating it as a ‘broad category of research – a distinct branch of security studies’.289 
Critical security scholar Krause does not go as far as suggesting a human security branch, 
but contends that the concept is ‘an idea whose time has come.’290 However, he argues that 
a narrow definition can serve as a useful policy tool.
291
 This study supports Krause’s stance 
that it is necessary to find a balance between analytical coherence and practical relevance; 
this can be done using the narrow definition of human security.
292
 Indeed, in its narrow 
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version, human security has been ‘a superb tool for addressing narrowly defined issues’.293 
The human security agenda has led the way in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, protection of 
vulnerable groups in conflict, banning the recruitment of child soldiers, adding sexual 
violence to war crimes,
294
 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration of Combatants 
(DDR), de-mining, and security sector reform (SSR).295 The narrow version therefore has 
had a substantial and tangible impact on the lives and security of communities the world 
over.   
This study, hence, conceptualises human security as the protection of the individual 
from threats of organised violence, but also from political oppression.
296
 And, the main 
focus of the case study is for state security providers in Lebanon to enhance human 
security.  
Despite the previous discussion, human security has succeeded in redirecting attention 
to the individual in mainstream discourses and in propagating to a large extent the norm of 
democratizing the state. MacFarlane and Khong note that ‘there now exists a framework 
for the international protection of human beings and for holding to account states that fail 
in their responsibilities in this area’.297 While Newman notes that the state is ‘an 
aggregation of capacity and resources’ and remains the central provider of security in ideal 
circumstances’,298 MacFarlane and Khong confirm that human security ‘is not about 
transcending or marginalising the state’. Rather, it is concerned with ‘ensuring that states 
protect their people[; when] they do not, it is about ensuring that there are international 
mechanisms that can fill the gap ad interim and redesign states so that they will fulfil their 
purpose in the future’.299 Our discussions have given several examples of the changing 
norms of the international system and the ways in which a bottom-up approach is 
increasingly being promoted as a characteristic of the New Times; ‘people’s awareness and 
expectations of rights […] is having an impact’.300 One could argue that human security 
has and can still contribute to this evolution, crucially in ‘real’ policy terms. Given the 
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pragmatic and less dogmatic stance vís-a-vís existing institutions of the broad school of 
critical security studies, it would be constructive to continue engaging with the narrowly 
defined version of this policy-concept.   
As human security has established itself in the lexicon of security – particularly in the 
policy world,
301
 academics cannot afford to refuse to engage with it. Should they want their 
work to have impact, they must continue refining the concept. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the final part of this chapter assembles a tool-kit that 
can be used to examine the situation in Lebanon. 
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III. A Tool-Kit for Investigating Security in Local Contexts  
 
This study espouses the progress achieved by the contributions of critical security 
studies, particularly in relation to the referent and the commitment to progressive 
emancipatory politics. From CSS it adopts the conceptualisation of an egalitarian, 
inclusivist, and reconciliatory security. It borrows pragmatism and engagement with the 
prevailing order from broad critical security studies;
302
 after all, as Krause and Williams 
note: ‘analysing state policy need not be tantamount to embracing the statist assumption of 
orthodox conceptions’.303  
Security is a broader and deeper concept than claimed by the traditional approach. 
Despite acceptance of a wider security agenda, this study also remains cautious of the 
negative effects of a wider definition of security, which deflates its meanings and takes 
away its sense of urgency. Not all issues of concern to the individual can be considered 
threats to security. Bringing in such varied issues as disease, health, education, inequality 
and other development issues runs the risk of causing a loss of focus, and as a result 
targeted solutions become less feasible. According to Owen, this makes it harder to set 
priorities and weigh the urgency of challenges.
304
 Similarly, the traditional perspective 
shares the concerns of such a wide security agenda; Walt states that ‘defining the concept 
in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise 
solutions to any of these important problems’.305 Nevertheless, as Booth suggests, a wider 
security agenda does not prevent prioritisation and a division of labour.
306
 In addition, at 
the level of policy-making it is important to take a wider look at the challenges facing the 
well-being of societies and contributing to conflict; an overarching, comprehensive, long-
term vision is necessary for sustainable progress to take place. However, this study judges 
that human security, in its narrow rather than its broad approach, can effectively 
operationalize security policy that is coherent and useful. A human-security orientation to 
security policy allows for balance between the necessities of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security 
including de-militarization, de-mining, DDR, SSR, peacebuilding, rule of law, access to 
justice, and respect of civil and human rights. In fragile and post-conflict settings in 
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particular, human security is valuable in the support it gives to states which aim to 
‘provid[e for] the interests of their citizenry’.307 In addition, this study judges that 
democratising and civilianiz[ing]
308
 the practices of the state hold stronger than 
circumventing its role: after all, the state can be ‘both a source of insecurity and a provider 
of security to its citizens’.309   Furthermore, to a large extent, the state remains ‘the 
principal source of political legitimacy’.310 Although, as the case of Lebanon shows, local 
and informal structures may enjoy legitimacy, the state- if democratised- can provide a 
more inclusive option. That being said, as discussed in previous sections, the role of the 
state can no longer be performed in isolation from non-state actors; the bottom-up 
approach provides representation and sustainability. Therefore, despite examining the 
performance of the state in its security functions in Lebanon, this study emphasises the role 
of non-state actors in shaping security and the direction of progress. 
Using the tools of governance, human security can increasingly assert itself as a global 
norm. Furthermore, the discussion on governance has allowed us to understand how the 
actors in and between international society and world society interact to formulate world 
policy. We can now piece together two conceptual components of the tool-kit to push for 
progressive change. Despite post-structuralist concerns of hegemony and neo-imperialism, 
we can give due credit to world society to keep shaping governance into more benign and 
ethical orientations. Indeed, the state can no longer discard what have been described as 
‘cosmopolitan normative pressures’.311 This study uses this tool-kit for the Lebanon 
context, but since ground work discussions are covered, the approach can be transferred to 
other cases, and interestingly, it can be applied between cases. 
This tool-kit provides for a thicker understanding and multi-layered explanation of 
issues. The governance component of the tool-kit allows this study to highlight local, 
institutional, national, regional and international actors as well as disparate factors, the 
relationship between them, and their contributions to conflict or progress. Human security 
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allows this study to focus its investigations on the narrow conception of freedom from fear, 
thereby investigating political and physical security. Critical security studies allows this 
study to constantly tap into the overriding concern for people-centred research that can 
contribute to progress. Critical security studies is the anchor of this research, which takes a 
pragmatic and practical approach by engaging in ‘real’ institutions that have equal leverage 
to undermine or promote human security. 
This study has talked about emancipation, about human security, states and non-state 
actors, and a move towards a solidarist world society. However, to answer a question from 
the beginning of the chapter: how do we provide security? The institutional approach must 
provide space for protecting and empowering individuals, society and vulnerable groups. 
The international community has devised a policy concept called Security Sector Reform 
to turn security sectors into providers of human security. SSR is a policy that several actors 
of global governance have adopted in Lebanon, hence the added interest. The next chapter 
completes the tool kit by examining SSR as a governance tool that is intended to reflect 
human security.  
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Chapter 4: Security Sector Reform 
 
One of the areas of global governance is security; Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one 
of several tools that actors of global governance have adopted to advance or operationalize 
the rising norm of human security.
1
 I have chosen SSR because it is a policy that donors 
seem to have adopted in Lebanon; I have traced it up to human security and up to global 
governance — hence the previous discussions on both. This chapter therefore moves 
deeper at the institutional level by discussing this policy-relevant concept. 
From a post-structuralist point of view, like human security SSR may be a tool for 
security governance intended to contain the instability of the South; yes, as will be 
discussed, it may be hegemonic and may have been co-opted by governments. But, does it 
bring benefits in line with progress discussed in the previous chapters? This study believes 
so, particularly in terms of putting individuals to the fore, in terms of deepening and 
widening the programming of responses to insecurity,
2
 in terms of being more inclusive 
and responsive to vulnerable groups — in establishing more effective, efficient, 
representative, and accountable security sectors. 
However, in terms of SSR’s relationship with critical security studies, one needs to 
admit that like human security, we need to rule out transformation of the social order.
3
 
Nonetheless, SSR involves reform (or development or transformation) of the security 
sector so as to promote the security of individuals and society. I argue that SSR, if 
implemented appropriately, can lead to progress in favour of the individual by adjusting 
the asymmetric relation between the state and society. Promoting a security sector capable 
of protecting the different groups from the state as well as from other threats is a security 
sector that is advancing security that critical security studies can appreciate. SSR of course 
remains limited and partial in terms of its contributions to the vision of critical security 
studies. It provides a fraction of the progress aspired for; but even this fraction requires 
examination. As discussed in chapter 3, civil society and grassroots levels should inform 
and shape progress; equally however, the security sector needs to stay open and responsive 
to these voices. This study examines later whether the security sector in Lebanon is being 
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developed in a manner that can live up to this vision of a security sector. Is what is taking 
place in Lebanon contributing to progress (chapter 7), even if within a limited scope? 
Before answering this, this discussion conceptualises and problematizes SSR. Then in 
chapters 5 and 6 the study discusses the causes for, the waves of, and efforts to overcome 
insecurity in Lebanon.     
The discussion on governance is also central to this chapter as the discussion on SSR 
needs to examine the emerging trend towards security sector governance. Security sector 
governance adopts a wide and a deep notion of security; it subsumes human security and 
recognizes the interdependencies between freedom from fear and freedom from want.
4
   
Security sector governance suggests a particular normative framework, which SSR, as a 
strategic programme, is designed to promote.  
 
I. Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform 
 
1) Security Sector Governance 
 
The previous discussions shed light on both the security and the governance 
components of the term security sector governance. They also highlighted that both these 
terms are contested ones. Thus, as Heiner Hänggi notes, security sector governance is, as a 
result, inherently contested as well. Although the ‘‘interconnectedness’, and sometimes 
interdependencies, between security and governance are progressively becoming 
understood’, the term security sector governance has not yet been universally recognized.5 
Furthermore, Fred Tanner notes that security sector governance is still in its ‘formative 
stage.’6 Despite this, security governance and security sector governance are increasingly 
becoming part of the discourses on governance, security and development.  
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For the purpose of this study, security governance is understood as the governance 
of security at the international level.
7
  In contrast, security sector governance refers to a 
domestic process.
8
 It is increasingly accepted that domestic governance is of relevance to 
international governance. The fragmentation of authority that governance suggests 
involves a parallel process of integration between its dominant actors
9
 — a convergence or 
a ‘common language’ is being promoted.10  
Critics assumed that the move ‘from government to governance’ would not take 
place in the security realm; this is increasingly being challenged. The emerging norms of 
governance in the security sector are gradually gaining more ground; furthermore, in many 
countries – in  ‘established democracies as well as developing countries, in post-
authoritarian and post-conflict states’ –  governments are already sharing their influence on 
security, whether by undermining or by providing it.
11
 
 
a) Democratic and Good governance of the Security Sector 
 
Good governance was developed by the donor community and rose to prominence in 
the 1990s ‘as a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the provision of 
public services in recipient countries.’12 The normative framework for good governance 
identifies five key principles: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, 
and responsiveness.
13
 Tanner offers a more nuanced version by emphasising ‘respect for 
human rights and rule of law’ and ‘efficiency in the use of public resources and the 
delivery of public services.’14  Definitions of ‘governance’ are diverse, but three key 
principles seem to be held in common: ‘accountability, transparency and participation.’15 
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As Hänggi notes, ‘it is not entirely clear what distinguishes good governance of the 
security sector from democratic governance’; nevertheless, the latter seems to ‘emphasise 
the regular holding of free and fair elections’ – a democratic system.16 The literature has 
come to accept the interchangeability of the terms ‘security sector governance’ and 
‘democratic security sector governance’. A generic definition of good governance 
identifies it as ‘the efficient, effective and legitimate use of resources by governing 
elites.’17 
It is accepted that ‘governance also suggests a clear delineation within a government of 
responsibilities;’18 this prevents overlap of jurisdictions and allows for sound planning and 
tracking of achievements and of abuse. The availability of information, or transparency, is 
‘a crucial condition for effective accountability’, and the ‘existence of mechanisms to call 
individuals or institutions to account,’ such as ombudsmen and audit offices, is also a 
precondition for accountability.
19
 Finally, accountability in domestic governance is to 
‘government, (…) to the parliament and the public at large.’20 
 
Standards of good governance ‘apply to public governance in general’ and there were 
initially no specific references to security sectors.
21
 The Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2000/47, subsequently adopted in General Assembly Resolution 55/96, was one 
of the first initiatives that called for ‘ensuring that the military remains accountable to the 
democratically elected civilian government.’22 Some years later, this idea was reinforced 
with the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, which strongly emphasised the 
centrality of ‘democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace.’23 However, by 
and large, ‘standards on good governance of the security sector have been set outside the 
UN system’;24 and although they represent an ‘emergent view of various communities’, the 
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concept has not yet received ‘formal standing on a universal level.’25 Having recognised 
this, several regional and international regimes have converged on the normative 
framework of security sector governance.  The OSCE, NATO, EU, OAS, OECD, the 
Community of Democracies,
26
 and the Club of Madrid have introduced, to varying 
degrees, the language of democratic security sector governance to their guidelines and 
membership criteria.
27
 Furthermore, grouping most of the main actors and donors in world 
politics, these organizations are pursuing the promotion of security sector governance 
through both bottom-up and top-down approaches amongst members and with partner 
countries; these approaches involve both formal exchanges and civil society support.
28
  
Good governance can and should be extended to the security sector. Former Secretary 
General Kofi Annan notes that the security sector, as with any other public sector, should 
be ‘subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability.’29 Nicole Ball 
argues that even transparency in the security sector is not unrealistic.
30
 Good governance of 
the security sector is essential for making sure that the state is responsive to people’s 
interests.  
Security sector governance incorporates two aspects: a governance aspect and an 
operational aspect. Both of these suggest democratic control of the security sector. The 
governance aspect deals with accountability, transparency and participation. Tanner notes 
that security sector governance involves two forms of participation: one suggests political 
control of ‘civil authorities over defence budgets, security forces and military judicial 
system’; the other suggests public participation—‘political parties and civil societies’—in 
the formulation of defence and security policies.
31
 Democratic control requires, therefore, 
an ‘adequate constitutional framework’ that promotes ‘civilian leadership and civilian 
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management of the defence sector,’ ‘parliamentary oversight’ and, ‘public involvement.’32 
However, good governance is about effectiveness and efficiency as much as it is about the 
control of institutions. Security sector governance, therefore, ‘enable[s] governments to 
provide for security and stability within policy and budgetary constraints that are consistent 
with national development goals.’33 Thus, the principles of security sector governance can 
be grouped, overall, into three categories: capacity, cooperation, and control.
34
 Importantly, 
capacity involves security forces, institutions, and ministries — a ‘system of governance’ 
— capable of tasking, monitoring and implementing ‘the security policies of governments 
in efficient and effective ways.’35And, control involves: 
general adherence to the rule of Law – both domestic and international; making the 
security sector adhere to the same principles of financial management and 
transparency as the non-security sector; creating and embedding clear lines of 
authority which establish civilian government and civil society to scrutinize 
defence policy(…); creating an environment conducive to the  participation of civil 
society in security matters; and ensuring that the training of professional soldiers is 
in line with the requirements of democratic societies.
36
 
 
The extension of good or democratic governance to the security sector is reinforced 
by the contributions that the process is expected to make. Democratic control of the 
security sector entails well-functioning civil structures, authorities and groups who can 
participate in the formulation of security policy, who can monitor the system, and who can 
hold parties accountable for abuse, mismanagement and mistakes. Alex Bellamy notes that 
the creation of strong civilian institutions such as parliaments, judiciaries and 
bureaucracies, which reinforce civilian supremacy over the military, ‘‘lock in’ the 
military’s subservience to civilian control.’37 This equally implies that democratization and 
good governance in the security sector may be a ‘catalyst’ for further reforms which extend 
beyond the immediate security forces – allowing such norms and practices to ‘filter into 
other areas of government.’38 Furthermore, good governance of security forces entails that 
resources and budgets are appropriately and proportionately distributed between the 
various sectors of government; it also entails that information is publically available, and 
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that the public may oversee, participate and monitor the process of governance within the 
security sector and beyond. Crucially, security sector governance is therefore seen to 
contribute to human security, human development, democratization, and regional 
integration and stability.
39
  
These are of course laudable but also ambitious claims; they represent an ‘ideal-
type’ which no state can claim to fulfil at all times40 – states are constantly expected to 
adapt and review their governance to accommodate for changing conditions.  
Ball argues that ‘the ability to implement the principles of good governance in the 
security sector is reliant on the existence of well-functioning institutions and capable 
human resources.’41 In instances where the security system is ‘dysfunctional,’ Security 
Sector Reform has been devised to address this dysfunction.
42
 SSR is therefore partly an 
institution-building endeavour, but at the same time, SSR is linked to wider institutional 
and governance culture – an aspiration for a ‘changing political culture.’43 Finally, security 
sector governance ‘is a social process that may take a long, complex and uneven path’;44 
therefore expectations of quick fixes should be set aside.  
Before addressing SSR, this study must first answer an essential question: what 
constitutes a security sector?  
 
2) Security Sector 
 
In its broad version, SSR includes a range of actors beyond traditional security 
providers; in its narrower version, it focuses on immediate actors. A dilemma arises 
between the two spectrums of definitions: on the one hand, a narrow definition may not 
address the scope of the problem; while on the other hand, a broad definition is often 
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associated with lack of coherence, clarity and priority.
45
 Experts, practitioners and policy-
makers are divided between the two; however, it is essential, as Herbert Wulf notes, that 
‘institutions engaging in SSR should be clear about their vision (…), objectives (…), 
strategies (…) and implementation process[es] (…)’ because this sets the framework for 
their engagement – including actors and activities;46 Also because a number of cases have 
shown that the policy consequences can have detrimental impact on the shape and 
orientation of the security sector.
47
 
A generic definition of the security sector would incorporate ‘all those 
organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, 
to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for 
their management and oversight.’ This would involve the: ‘(a) military and paramilitary 
forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards and customs services; (d) 
judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and 
oversight of the above.’48 This definition falls midway between the two ends of the 
spectrum; it ‘reflects a traditional governmental approach which is premised upon a state-
centric view of security and the state’s monopoly of coercive force.’49 Bellamy’s emphasis 
is very different, in the sense that he chooses a non-state-centric definition by referring to 
‘political communities’; according to Bellamy, a security sector is made up of the 
‘organizations that are able to employ lethal violence in a way considered legitimate by a 
political community and the mechanisms used to control those organization.’50 Bellamy 
therefore opens up to alternatives present in traditional communities. 
The OECD-DAC speaks of a system;
51
 this might be a better term to encompass the 
intricate spectrum of actors and institutions influencing security. A distinctive feature of 
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the DAC definition is in the inclusion of ‘non-statutory security forces.’52 As for UNDP, it 
emphasises the essential role of non-state actors, including that of civil society.
53
 
According to Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, ‘considering civil society actors and armed 
non-state actors as component parts of the security sector (…) helps to transcend its 
essentially state-centric nature;’54 furthermore, this rightly underscores their role in the 
governance of security.  Ball identifies a ‘security sector’ within a ‘security community.’55 
There is no formal consensus on the definition of a security sector, but there is a certain 
degree of convergence concerning the various actors that influence security. This study 
advocates for the inclusion of non-state actors in the governance of domestic security; 
however, for scope considerations this study examines the narrow definition of the security 
sector in Lebanon– understood as the institutions formally tasked with the provision of 
security as well as those in charge of their tasking, monitoring and control.  
 
3) Security Sector Reform 
a) Background 
 
The ‘building-blocks’56 of SSR are manifold; it was influenced by changes 
stretching from the 1980s to the late 1990s. These were changes taking place on a 
conceptual level, in policy circles, and on the ground.
57
 Bellamy notes that SSR ‘had its 
roots in development studies, security studies and practical policy and in the ‘new aid 
paradigm’ specifically.’58 
 
                                                 
52
 OECD-DAC, 2005, p 20-21.  
53
 Such as ‘professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy organizations, non-
governmental organizations, community groups.’ UNDP, 2002, p 87. 
54
 Emphasis added. Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 26. 
55
 And Ball does not conform to the simple separation of state-armed actors from the rest of the security 
community. Ball, 2002b, p 1. 
56
 Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice and 
Research," in New Directions in Security Sector Reform 2005(Ottawa: for Peace, Conflict and 
Development Program Initiative, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2006). p 5. 
57
 As seen in previous discussions on Human Security, Human Development, and governance. 
58
 Bellamy, 2003, p 105. 
108 
 
Traditional security assistance and the ‘new aid paradigm’ 
 
The Cold War reinforced a security culture fixated on state security, which came at 
the expense of people-centred security. In many cases, the security services and the regime 
developed a life of their own.
59
 The traditional security assistance mentality disregarded 
corruption, abuse, and bad governance. There was little consideration that security 
assistance might not conform to local needs, or that it was counter-efficient or 
counterproductive.  It was not controversial for security assistance to contribute to the 
escalation of tension between states; to tightening the grip of states, regimes and security 
apparatus on power; or to undermining movements for reform, participation, and 
democracy.
60
 The international system was such that states were fixated on the wider 
security dilemma. The line separating the domestic and the international spheres were 
therefore clearly delineated; the concern of the international community rested in the 
international balance of power. This resulted in support to friendly regimes to ‘consolidate 
the influence of donor countries’ and their respective ideologies.61 The major powers even 
extended this policy to the economic sphere, whereby their support ‘reduced the economic 
burden of maintaining security services in states of high strategic importance.’62 Security 
assistance or traditional ‘defence diplomacy’63 was ‘aimed merely to strengthen or 
modernise the armed forces’64 or, as Bryden and Hänggi put it, used for ‘beefing up’ the 
armed forces. This was done (and is still often done) ‘irrespective of governance 
considerations’,65 democratic control or domestic security needs.66  
Although debate over the role of the military took place,
67
 the norm was for 
development agencies not to get involved in the security sector.
 68
 Furthermore, democratic 
governance had not made its way to discussions on the international agenda. Therefore, on 
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one front, development donors were not willing to engage with the security sector; on 
another, security assistance did not engage with the governance aspect of the security 
sector. The result, as explained by Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, was that security 
sectors ‘absorbed a significant amount of state resources without being held to account for 
the use of those resources or necessarily being able to protect the state and the people from 
violence in its various forms.’69 These trends occurred, of course, at the expense of human 
security; however, soon the international community recognized that they also occurred at 
the expense of regional and international security.
70
  
By the 1990s, this approach was increasingly seen to be unsustainable.  Firstly, the 
international community, as noted by Jane Chanaa, needed a response to the “new wars” 
and the “new” security threats.71 Furthermore, it was considered that ‘excessive, 
inefficient, and/or inappropriate security expenditure[s] reduced the resources available for 
development’72 and exacerbated regional instability.73 Faced with these realities, the 
international community’s response started with separate and ad hoc projects. However, 
‘approaches [were] remarkably convergent.’74 This convergence slowly took shape in SSR; 
its general principles were informed by the experiences of actors in development, human 
rights, democratization, civil-military relations, peacekeeping, disarmament, DDR, 
SALW,
75
 access to justice, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention. Therefore, as weak 
states or ‘malign governance’ were ‘increasingly perceived as security threats of a global 
scope,’76 the international community was increasingly open to involvement in domestic 
governance.  
This, therefore, ‘created space’ for discussions to revisit security assistance and the 
provision of security. It made it possible for non-traditional actors to take part in the 
discussions, and to build on the experiences of transformation taking place in the 
developing world.
77
 The military, which had long monopolized discussions pertaining to 
the provision of security, started to share the platform with other security actors – 
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particularly in internal security. Furthermore, development made a substantial leap towards 
security, and a ‘new aid paradigm’ emerged. 78   
An increasing amount of research in the late 1990s identified security as a ‘major 
concern for poor people’ and encouraged the donor community to make the leap in 
accepting the nexus between development and security.
79
 It was noted that ‘crime and 
violence, civil conflict and war, persecution by the police and lack of justice’ were 
identified as the main concerns of populations.
80
 The experience of development donors 
showed that no amount of economic development could be a ‘guarantee of peace and 
security.’81 Moreover, weak, ‘repressive or corrupt security structures (…) undermin[ed] 
the stability crucial to maximising the benefits of aid programmes.’82 Similarly, the lack of 
development gave rise to many forms of insecurity. In this sense, it was argued that 
‘development assistance also had an important and direct contribution to make to conflict 
prevention, potentially strengthening peace and stability.’83 Therefore, as discussed, 
development and security were recognized as sharing a symbiotic relationship. The 
unprofessional performance of the security sector
84
  and its consumption of state resources 
were recognized to pose just as much of a threat to security as a lack of development did. 
The security sector was in many instances part of the problem.Neil Cooper and Michael 
Pugh note that since this was the case, it needed to be part of the solution.
85
 The new 
paradigm recognized that ‘self-sustaining security depends upon the creation of a 
legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector.’86 The 
1990s therefore brought the military and the wider security sector ‘into the mainstream of 
development policy.’87 Furthermore, it would soon be recognized that the role of the 
security sector is ‘a legitimate development issue in its own right.’88 Hence, increased 
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donor involvement in security sectors of developing and divided societies was registered to 
promote Human Security. The narrow and broad approaches were pursued. This study 
remains cautious about some of the correlations that this new aid paradigm makes; 
nevertheless at this point, this study is merely depicting the development of a new trend in 
the international system. 
 
Indigenous transformations 
 
Despite the prominence of SSR within the donor community, and although its 
framework is shaped along Western democratic models, several experts note that SSR has 
indigenous roots.
89
 While, donors’ re-definition of existing polices only materialized in the 
late 1990s, since the 1980s, a ‘parallel process’ was taking place in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham argue that the transformations in developing 
and post-Communist countries were the ‘true progenitors of security sector reform’; they 
cite the example of South Africa as ‘the most outstanding’ one, where the transition was 
shared by a wide array of state and non-state actors who came together under a ‘shared 
interest’ and vision for reform.90 The wave of democratization in parts of these areas 
inspired and encouraged the donor community to break with their traditional modus 
operandi.  
The transition of former communist countries into Western democratic models is 
another factor which shaped the concept of SSR. The difference between the former Soviet 
states and the experiences of the developing world lies in the role of foreign actors; the 
process in former Soviet states was externally driven, whereas in developing countries it 
started domestically. Furthermore, while change in the former was led by political and 
security actors, development actors had a leading role in the latter.
91
 Former Soviet states 
were incentivised by the carrot of membership of the EU and NATO; and, democratic 
civil-military relations were an integral part of the integration process.
92
 NATO and EU 
enlargement have, therefore, played a large part in drawing attention to democratic 
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accountability of the security sector;
93
 this is a theme which, of course, ‘predate[s]’94 the 
now widely recognized DAC SSR approach.
95
  
In both cases, civil society played an essential role in influencing and, to some 
extent, in shaping new security policies.
96
 Some experts agree that pro-reformers in the 
developing world emphasised the “softer” and political aspect of reform before it was 
recognized by international security and development actors.
97
 Aside from South Africa, 
other examples can be found in civil society groups in Chile and Ghana, who were at the 
heart of transformation; these examples ‘challeng[ed] the conventional assumption that the 
state should necessarily be at the centre of reform.’98 At the time, this was still not common 
practice by donors; the international community in the early 1990s was reluctant to engage 
with the political domain. Development donors were still only: 
focused on how much developing and transition countries were spending on the 
military (…) the rather simplistic view held sway that donors could pressure 
governments to change resource allocation patterns without tackling any of the 
deep-rooted and highly political reasons why resources are allocated as they are.
99
  
This ‘simplistic’ approach eventually backfired; the trend towards severe cuts to security 
and defence budgets of recipient countries as conditions for aid by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) ‘aggravated the crises of fragile regimes.’100 These were not provided 
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‘assistance on the management of the effects of such drastic restructuring’; therefore, in 
places such as in Sierra Leone and the DRC, ‘demilitarisation by default’ occurred.101 This 
resulted in governments failing to pay their security and armed forces; a portion of them 
resorted to alternative means of sustenance – both legitimate and illegitimate; the 
capabilities, professionalism, discipline, and therefore the performance of these security 
and armed forces severely deteriorated; finally, in some extreme cases, the security 
establishments subsequently disintegrated.
102
   
This was, therefore, a bottom-up process; civil society and experience eventually 
swayed donors into the political sphere. Beginning in the 1990s, it slowly became accepted 
by the donor community that a decent level of human security and good governance – at 
least in managing state resources – were necessary for development. 
 
In brief, the new paradigm recognized a place for security in development work and 
vice versa; furthermore, first governance, then security sector governance, entered the 
development discourse; the pieces were falling into place, and as Michael Brzoska notes, 
‘the time was ripe’ for the birth of a new concept.103 This study examines the concept for 
its contributions to raising the capabilities of and democratizing providers of human 
security. 
 
b) Defining Security Sector Reform 
 
As can be seen, SSR is largely a concept that is institution-oriented. From a critical 
security studies perspective, it clearly stands inside the prevailing order; it also clearly 
subsumes the notions of governance and human security that are slowly acquiring the 
status of norms of the international system. In this study’s efforts to assess the norms and 
institutions of the status quo, what does SSR offer? Although faced with many obstacles, 
the concept attempts to steer prevailing institutions into more progressive orientations. 
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However, like Human Security, in the claim that it can establish a paradigm shift, as will 
be discussed, it cannot quite achieve this. 
This study has noted that SSR is designed to assist dysfunctional security sectors in 
adopting the trajectory of security sector governance. If democratic security sector 
governance is the aspired model – ‘the objective that is desirable,’ then, security sector 
reform (SSR) is the process by which a security sector ‘com[es] closer to meeting this 
objective.’104 SSR and security sector governance, therefore, share the same normative 
framework.  
SSR incorporates a wide and deep notion of security, particularly that of human 
security.
105
 Therefore, at the core of SSR is the concern to provide an inclusive, just and 
participatory security. The OECD-DAC notes that SSR is ‘people-centered, locally owned 
and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to 
provide freedom from fear’106 (which for development workers is a prerequisite for 
freedom from want). SSR involves the establishment of institutions that can guarantee the 
safety, rights and the participation of the wider population as well as control the 
‘instruments of lethal force.’107 Chanaa further clarifies that SSR ‘promotes not only 
civilian governance, but (…) democratic civilian control’;108 this is because, as Wulf 
argues, ‘democratic, civilian control over security forces is crucial for the provision of 
security in the interests of the population’ rather than in the interest of the regime.109  
As mentioned above, democratic governance of the security sector involves a number 
of elements. In practice to say that the security sector is democratically governed is to say, 
firstly, that ‘the executive determines security policy and exercises control over the 
security services’, and that the security services are ‘accountable to citizens, chiefly 
through parliament and regular elections but also through media scrutiny and public 
consultations and debate.’110 Secondly, the parliament is tasked with approving ‘security 
legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and 
provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and activities.’111 
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Thirdly, democratic governance of the security sector entails that the ‘security agencies 
execute government policy and carry out their mandates as prescribed by law.’112 Fourthly, 
‘independent courts perform judicial functions and various statutory bodies might have 
watchdog functions in relation to the security services.’113 Lastly, it is expected that 
‘individuals, the media and civil society organizations are free to engage in research, 
debate, advocacy and other activities’, even when they are critical of both the 
government’s and the security forces’ performance.114 This may seem self-evident to some 
readers but this conception of security sector governance is not universal. Also, all of this, 
of course, is in the abstract; the reality is that even where governments are strong, where 
state institutions are efficient and effective, where the separation of the three branches of 
government is clear, and where a healthy debate on security matters takes place, 
governments struggle with the very complex task of managing the different aspects of 
democratic security sector governance.
115
  
As discussed, the process of governance is one which involves a fragmentation of 
authority; therefore, governments are not in control of the entire process. Instead, SSR 
suggests a system of checks and balances from within and outside the confines of the 
executive. Such fragmentation, however, develops and spreads democratic norms across 
the system, which are hoped, in the long run, to lock-in stakeholders. The fragmentation of 
authority is met with cultural and normative integration – SSR is a ‘democratising 
project.’116 Therefore, SSR aspires not to be limited to institution-building and the 
restructuring of the security system; many claim that it ‘promotes the strengthening of 
norms in relation to the proper relationship between the security sector and society at 
large.’117  
The dysfunction that characterises developing, post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
countries
118
 often consists of one of two possibilities: a security sector which does not 
provide security in an efficient and effective manner, or a security sector which is 
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‘deficient in terms of democratic governance.’119 On this point, Edmunds notes that 
security sectors in need of SSR may suffer from ‘politicisation (…), the absence of a clear 
delineation of security sector responsibilities and democratic, civilian controlled chains of 
command,’ as well as from a lack of capabilities to provide security ‘in an effective and 
efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control’.120 The case study 
will show that this fits well with the state of the Lebanese security sector. 
Broadly speaking, SSR is a concept that underscores a process of rebuilding, reforming 
or transforming a security sector to function in accordance with sound principles of 
governance. Hence, it involves a wide range of activities designed to foster a ‘well-
functioning security framework.’121  
Security Sector Reform is a relatively new term that entered the development discourse 
in the late 1990s, when Clare Short, then UK Minister for International Development 
introduced it in her 1998 speech Security, Development and Conflict Prevention.
122
 It 
cannot be denied that Short and her team’s subsequent efforts at the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) championed the concept and launched it onto the 
agenda of international development.
123
 At the policy level, therefore, DFID was first to 
capture the conceptual and normative shifts taking place in the widening and deepening of 
the development and security spheres. DFID’s 1999 policy statement argued for a ‘more 
holistic approach to development that incorporates security sector concern;’124 DFID 
therefore ‘crossed an important threshold as a development agency’.125 Furthermore, 
DFID’s initial focus on the military as the key security sector actor – itself a venture into 
the Ministry of Defence’s sphere – later expanded to include the ‘whole’ security sector.126 
Subsequently, several other actors followed suit and adopted SSR, which became a 
‘“buzzword” within the international donor community.’127  
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This ‘rapidly emerging’ concept was soon accepted by actors involved in development, 
security, human rights, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. SSR, 
therefore, ‘increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, 
security cooperation, democracy promotion, and post-conflict peace building.’128 However, 
its adoption by actors working in varied fields, some traditionally distinct, has given rise to 
different interpretations of the term – at least in regards to its scope, actors, activities and 
priorities.
129
 UNDP’s interpretation focuses, for example, on ‘strengthening governing 
institutions, enhancing public sector management, and promoting sound governance in 
conflict affected and transition countries;’130 Ministries of Defence engage in, for example, 
operational training and doctrinal exchanges. SSR suggests that their work needs to be 
integrated and complementary, and is therefore concerned with the integration of 
‘contributions of military, diplomatic, development and security actors’131 at both the 
domestic and international level.  
SSR has also been referred to as security sector transformation, development, 
reconstruction, or governance. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
adopted the term Security System Reform;
132
 UNDP prefers a combined approach of 
Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR). While these terms might underscore certain 
nuances, they ‘are essentially the same’;133 they conform to the crux of SSR and are 
thereby often used interchangeably. As suggested above, definitions of SSR have varied, 
and have ‘ten[ded] to be dictated by the concerns of particular academic or policy 
communities.’134 Experts, practitioners and policy-makers are divided between two spectra 
of definitions.  
For Pugh and Cooper, SSR is a narrow term that does not encompass the wide range of 
important processes that have an impact on security. Their criticism is that SSR has mainly 
focused on disarmament and demobilization, on security forces and on civil servants, 
whereas in post-conflict settings or in war-torn societies, ‘the political economy of conflict, 
and (…) the socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations’ are at the heart of 
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security.
135
 Therefore, positive change requires ‘transformative strategies’, ‘beyond 
reformism,’ that take into account the interconnectedness of sectors.136 Hence, Cooper and 
Pugh speak of Security Sector Transformation in order to underpin a wider process of 
change. Their distinct contribution, however, is in the argument that wider domestic, 
regional and international sectors, actors and structures need to be reformed.
137
 Security 
Sector Transformation is increasingly used in an African context to ‘underline the need for 
fundamental change in governance processes in the security sector.’138 Hänggi suggests the 
use of the term Security Sector Reconstruction in post-conflict environments, reducing it to 
a specific context of SSR.
139
 The OECD-DAC, gathering the ‘world’s main donors’,140 
defines SSR as the: 
the transformation of the “security system” – which include[s] all the actors, their 
roles, responsibilities and actions– working together to manage and operate the 
system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound 
principles of good governance.
141
 
 
The UN takes a more flexible approach; the 2008 UN Secretary General’s report defined 
SSR as: 
a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, (...) that has as its goal 
the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, 
without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law.
142
 
This UN definition is one that is less “loaded” and less authoritative. It does not mention 
the term ‘democratic’ security sector governance, thereby avoiding some of the criticisms 
directed towards prescriptive Western-centric definitions. In addition, while donors and 
some countries in transition often want to emphasise the sweeping nature of the changes 
involved in the process through the use of words such as ‘rebuilding’, ‘reconstruction’, 
‘reform’, or ‘transformation’, which underscore a break from an earlier era, others are 
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uncomfortable with these labels and prefer a more subtle depiction of the efforts to 
improve the security sector. Similar to Ball and Hendrickson’s warning against the 
‘elevated benchmarks’ and the risk of ‘overkill’,143 there is a risk of antagonising key 
players; donors ‘should recognize that developing countries have been in the past and 
continue to be engaged in efforts to control and restructure their security services and 
agencies.’144 In the case of Lebanon, for example, authorities were apprehensive about the 
use of the term SSR, particularly because the Arabic translation connotes a break from a 
past malign condition; as a result, they preferred to depict the efforts as a smooth 
progression in light of recently available resources — they preferred security sector 
development.
145
 Furthermore, changes and efforts underway, although made in the spirit of 
SSR, often do not amount to a transformative process. In this sense, the latter definition’s 
use of the terms ‘process’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘monitoring’ may be more widely received.  
As Hendrickson and Karkoszka explain, SSR is contested because the actors, their 
relationships and the contexts differ from one case to another.
146
 Edmunds says that 
‘arguments about the definitional issue in SSR can be unhelpful’ and therefore suggests 
replacing the definitional or ‘institutional-driven approach’ with a ‘problem-driven one.’147 
Similarly, David Chuter prefers that definitions not be ‘paralyzed by details’ and adopts a 
more flexible approach to objectives and aims. He notes that the security sector should 
‘provide the security that people want, as effectively and efficiently as possible’ and that ‘it 
should be managed with procedures normally used in a parliamentary democracy’. He goes 
on to explain that if the security sector fails to fulfil the above expectations, efforts could 
be taken to redress the situation, thereby suggesting that SSR consists of ‘a generic name 
for measures which might be taken, often with international assistance, to improve the 
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effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, and to make its management more 
responsive to the requirements of a parliamentary democracy.’148 Chuter’s lenient 
approach is not shared by many; Edmunds and Malcolm Chalmers insist that SSR suggests 
an ‘explicitly normative direction’ and ‘specific types of reform.’149  
Nicole Ball, a leading scholar on SSR, agrees with Edmunds on the need to adopt a 
context-driven approach, and has elaborated a wide customizable model to better suit the 
individualities of contexts.
150
 Moreover, she insists that SSR has three components. 
Democratic governance of the security sector is a core category in the SSR agenda, but it 
‘does not by itself guarantee the existence of a safe and secure environment.’ Addressing 
the ‘operational effectiveness’ of the security sector and (for post-war countries) ‘the 
legacies of war’ are key elements in the security sector’s ability to provide security.151 
Bearing in mind the piecemeal tendencies of domestic and international actors, Ball 
strongly emphasises that democratic governance is ‘the unifying factor.’152 SSR takes place 
in democratic governance activities and at the intersection of these three categories. The 
emphasis on the former is linked to the distinctiveness of the SSR agenda from previous 
security assistance: its main contribution is to ensure that the security sector is concerned 
with the security of the population – an area which has ‘historically been ignored.’153 
Figure 1 illustrates the overlap between these factors and the core area of democratic 
governance. 
Most development actors argue that ‘by definition, SSR-related activities must be 
aimed at improving the governance of the security sector.’154 However, others specify 
different priorities; Chuter notes the necessity ‘to recognize that not everything can be 
done at once (...) before you have oversight, you first have to have something to 
oversee.’155 Nevertheless, as Cooper and Pugh rightly note, we must ‘be guarded against’ 
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traditional military aid packages’156 which often overshadow much smaller programmes of 
governance.
157
 This does not suggest dismissing aid and assistance to the armed forces, 
including at the operational level; instead, it suggests a deeper and more nuanced 
approach.
158
 
 
 
Security Sector Reform 
 
Figure 1: Security Sector Reform
159
 
 
SSR is, therefore, concerned with the provision of security, but also with the 
‘overriding’ concern of democratic governance.160 The effectiveness of the armed and 
security forces should not be pursued without consideration of the wider security and 
development contexts and, of democratic control and accountability. Civilian control has 
often failed to be a guarantee for fostering respect for the Rule of Law, Human Rights, 
public participation, development and human security. The experience from authoritarian 
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regimes has shown that civilian control may very well mean regime security and the 
undermining of individual and socio-economic rights. Hence, as Bryden and Hänggi argue, 
‘enhancing governance capacity should not be considered an option in the security 
dimension of the reconstruction effort.’161 And, activities aimed at enhancing the 
operational capacity of armed and security forces, on their own, cannot be considered 
SSR.
162
  
 
Having considered all of the above, SSR is undoubtedly complex; it ‘consists of a 
broad range of activities involving a wide variety of local stakeholders and external 
partners.’163 Donors may be engaged at various levels, with different actors and in different 
areas. Keeping in mind the governance and the operational aspect of SSR, as well as the 
legacies of conflict, activities may consist of: support to civil society groups in order to 
enhance their expertise in security matters; support to formal oversight mechanisms such 
as parliaments, audits and ombudsmen offices; support to the relevant civilian ministries or 
the armed and security forces. As mentioned above, however, it is essential that efforts in 
the three categories are integrated and complementary
164
 and that when multiple donors are 
involved, their efforts are coordinated. Information in figure 2 illustrates the range of SSR-
related activities suggested by the OECD to development actors.  
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A. Enhancing state capacity and policy coherence 
a) Security sector reviews 
b) Management of security expenditure 
c) Civilian expertise on security issues 
d) Regional confidence-building and peace-keeping capacity 
 
B. Reform and training of security forces 
a) Military and police reforms 
b) Training assistance 
 
C. Demilitarisation and peace-building 
a) Conversion of security resources to civilian use 
b) Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants 
c) Regulation of small arms 
d) Child soldiers 
 
D. Strengthening democratic governance and the rule of law 
a) Justice systems 
b) Civil society 
 
E. Building research capacity in developing countries 
Figure 2: Areas of Security Sector Reform for Development Donors
165
 
 
Despite the great currency that SSR has gained, it has been faced with many 
challenges, both at the donor level and within states undergoing change. Having recognised 
this, SSR is still an evolving concept and practical experience is still ‘scarce’; however, as 
it is increasingly ‘embedded’ into donor programmes,  both research and lessons learned 
will enhance its practical, normative and analytical coherence. The next few paragraphs 
discuss the principles and the main actors of SSR before problematizing this emerging 
policy concept. 
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c) Principles 
 
A political, context-driven, holistic concept 
 
SSR entails engagement with the domestic socio-political context. As discussed, for 
development donors, this was a radically new approach. However, SSR is ‘profoundly 
political’, as it deals with a fundamental public good – security, which is also ‘the most 
sensitive sector of the state.’  SSR brings together actors from the three branches of 
government as well as from the outside; it challenges existing ‘power relations, vested 
interests and dominant paradigms’; and affects the broader political, economic, and 
developmental environment.  As mentioned, donors have resisted engaging with the 
political character of SSR, but this has often proven to be counterproductive, as it risks 
exacerbating tensions and undermining the reform process; therefore, donors ‘have to 
gauge the risks and dangers of their interventions.’ By doing so, their approach needs to be 
sensitive (to power dynamics), pragmatic and supportive. It was subsequently recognized 
that SSR can only be an essentially political concept and a political process. However, 
development donors struggle to appreciate the complexities of domestic politics, and 
therefore ‘the apolitical approach to security expenditures has not yet disappeared’. 
Examples regarding the work of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are cases in 
point.
166
   
Closely linked to the above is the pillar to be context-driven.
167
  As the Security 
Council emphasises, the situation and the needs for SSR ‘will vary from one situation to 
the other.’168 A political concept can only be context-driven as it engages with the 
individual realities of countries undergoing change. As such, SSR needs to surpass its 
institutional-building objective, support its ‘technical measures’ with ‘contextual analysis’ 
to understand the positions of stakeholders, and recognize appropriate means to incentivize 
them to join the change process.
169
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SSR also suggests a holistic approach based on the overall context of a given 
country. A holistic approach integrates the governance and the operational aspects of SSR 
as well as the various actors involved in the security system.
170
  A holistic approach also 
requires that the political and socio-economic repercussions of any security reforms are 
recognized and addressed; this is particularly salient in disarmament and demobilization 
programmes requiring the reintegration of ex-combatants into the legitimate economy 
(DDR), or the reduction or increase in defence spending. Therefore, ‘close collaboration’ is 
needed between security and non-security actors: ‘no category of assistance, including 
security assistance, is able by itself to provide all the necessary inputs.’171 The holistic 
aspect of SSR is essential, as illustrated by the ‘ill-considered security sector 
reconstructing programmes [which] contributed to an increase in political instability and 
worsened civil-military relations (…) in Eritrea, the Central African Republic, the former 
Zaire and Sierra Leone.’172  Also, the holistic approach to SSR indicates that success in one 
area is dependent on success in other areas within the security system.
173
 For example, in 
the pursuit of human security, operational effectiveness is important, but it cannot be 
regarded as a success without democratic control, respect for human rights and an efficient 
use of state resources.
174
  As Edmunds notes, a holistic approach recognizes that the reform 
of the security sector is essential for wider political and economic reforms;
175
 Tanner 
speaks of a ‘triangular relationship between security, development and democratisation’, 
and argues that SSR should ‘go hand-in-hand with socio-political transformation’ in order 
to contribute to ‘conflict prevention and development.’176 In brief, a holistic approach 
situates SSR within a wider domestic context. Cooper and Pugh’s approach, however, is 
fundamentally more radical; they ‘recognize the interconnections between the security 
sector and other areas of the domestic, regional and global arena, most notably the 
economy’ and argue that only a more global approach at reforming the ‘global structures 
and agents that condition’ dysfunctional security sectors produces sustainable progress; 
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therefore, their approach puts ‘as much emphasis on healing the physicians as well as the 
patients.’177   
 
Domestic ownership 
 
There is widespread agreement that domestic ownership is ‘considered as a 
cornerstone of SSR.’178 It is seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable process of change; 
however, experience shows that ownership has been ‘very difficult to apply.’179 On the one 
hand, donors have not been as committed to local ownership as conceptually emphasised; 
and on the other, local ownership of reform has proved very difficult to spread.   
Local ownership has been operationalised differently by different experts. Alex 
Bellamy notes that ‘for SSR programmes to be effective they need to be owned and 
internalized by the groups most affected by them.’180 Others, like Laurie Nathan, add that 
ownership needs to extend beyond government actors in order to plant roots in society.  
The donor approach to local ownership has been particularly problematic. Donors 
are constrained by their own agendas; they work within short timeframes and require fast, 
detailed and tangible results. They therefore have unrealistic and rigid expectations.
181
 Ball 
and Hendrickson confirm that donor involvement has been characterized by a sense of 
‘urgency’ that overshadows and overrides domestic and local specificities and 
preferences.
182
 As Frene Ginwala, member of the Ministerial Review Commission on 
Intelligence and the first Speaker of Parliament in South Africa’s post-Apartheid era, 
states: ‘even where there is a genuine desire to help, many donors are both ignorant and 
arrogant, over-confident, impatient and intent on solving problems and designing policies 
on behalf of local actors.’ 183  However, Nathan’s title – No Ownership, No Commitment – 
suggests, efforts to adopt change will be in vain if local ownership is not fostered; in this 
sense, Bellamy notes that local actors would instead ‘pay mere lip service to reform.’184 
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Ginwala furthermore argues that ‘where there is no national commitment, then government 
and society become lethargic and stagnate.’185  
Therefore, as Wulf notes, ownership ‘entails that the reform process is shaped and 
driven by local actors.’186 Similarly, Eboe Hutchful and ‘Kayode Fayemi note that ‘a set of 
more modest core goals, such as gradual and monitorable improvements in transparency, in 
sensitivity to human rights issues, and in the quality of defence and security management, 
would be more realistic’ and would be perceived as truly locally owned successes.187 One 
can thus speak of a ‘process-oriented’ rather than a ‘product-oriented’ approach.188 For 
Nathan, therefore, local ownership does not simply mean widespread agreement on the 
programme, but rather entails a democratic process whereby ‘free and open contestation of 
politics and interests’ is part of the process, and which is extended to state actors and non-
state actors including ministries, the legislature, the judiciary, institutions, agencies, 
political parties, local, ethnic or religious leaders, NGOs, and academics.  In this sense, 
‘the overarching goal is national ownership rather than government ownership of 
security.’189  
The approach donors choose determines whether SSR will be locally owned or 
whether it will be seen as a neo-imperialist project, adds Chanaa. It is up to donors to 
identify opportunities and to ‘engage with the society to the extent that is possible.’190 It is 
also about ‘how to engage’ and how to ‘frame’ their engagement. Nathan suggests donors 
should ask how they ‘can (…) support local actors who want to undertake SSR’ rather than 
‘how [they] can (...) undertake SSR in partner countries’.191 Ideally, donors should ‘support 
locally-led processes of fundamental political change’; success will rest on society’s desire 
‘to support and maintain security change’.192  
For Nathan, a champion of ‘local ownership’, it specifically means that ‘the reform 
of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, 
managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors’. It should not be 
misconstrued to mean domestic support for donor efforts. Having recognised that, a 
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domestically crafted and driven process does not ‘preclude’ foreign influences, stimulation, 
encouragement, or participation.
 193
  
It is thus accepted that SSR and the process of transformation require domestic 
initiative and sustained support, legitimacy, and commitment. In South Africa, the process 
‘was driven by local actors without dictates from external actors,’ and the process was 
inclusive both horizontally and vertically.
194
 This meant that it enjoyed legitimacy and 
commitment which were in favour of sustainability and stability.
195
 However, the case of 
South Africa is one of very few examples where the process was locally owned in the 
sense suggested by Nathan. In fact, Nathan’s notion of local ownership seems to be radical; 
most donor involvement in SSR has been less concerned with a domestic agenda shaping 
or initiating a comprehensive process of change than with ‘outsiders (…) approach[ing] a 
situation with a set of preconceived ideas about what exists, how it functions, and what is 
required to ‘fix’ it.’196 However, if ‘the causes of insecurity are misperceived, then 
programmes or suggested remedies might be inefficient or even counterproductive.’197 
Furthermore, international assistance programmes are often attached to packages 
‘presented as a condition (…) for economic assistance,’198 thereby leaving less room for 
local ideas and structures.
199
  Of the many examples where a lack of local ownership has 
had negative effects on the SSR programme, one can cite ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo, Bougainville, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan.’200 The chapter by Susan L. Woodward asking In Whose Interest is Security 
Sector Reform?  illustrates the detriments brought about by the absence of local ownership 
and the discrepancy between donor and local priorities.
201
 Domestic ownership can mend 
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some of the factors that donors often identify as obstacles to SSR, including resistance to 
change, the lack of legitimacy, and support; for now, I conclude by noting that local 
ownership is an essential principle of the SSR agenda, but that its application has been 
problematic. 
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II. Problematizing SSR 
 
SSR was received with much enthusiasm; it was seen to encapsulate the concerns 
of various actors and was quickly adopted, not only by academics but also by international 
organizations, IFIs, donor governments, and NGOs.
202
 The concept ‘moulds [these 
concerns] into a conceptually presentable package.’203 At the macro level, through its 
association with the liberal model,
204
 SSR attempts to foster harmonization and integration 
among the actors of the international system – a ‘common language’ for global 
governance.
205
 At the micro level, SSR is seen to promote human security and provide an 
environment secure for development. However, this does not take place without resistance, 
problems in implementation and negative repercussions faced by host countries. 
Furthermore, there are a number of conceptual issues to highlight. Therefore, advocates of 
SSR must realize that the concept is ‘not unproblematic’; it suffers from ‘endemic’ 
problems pertaining to ‘practical implementation but also generic conceptual problems.’206 
With several cases behind them, there is a growing consensus among scholars as to SSR’s 
conceptual flaws and practical shortfalls, but practice continues to lag behind.  
 
 
1) Challenges for donors 
 
As the above demonstrates, SSR has been clearly recognized and endorsed by the 
international community. However, efforts to turn SSR into effective policy have been 
confronted by a number of significant challenges’,207and the convergence mentioned above 
did not manifest as envisaged.
208
 At the donor level, the implementation of SSR has been 
confronted with departmental difficulties, disjuncture with other members of the donor 
community, and with partner countries. 
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Within governments, the holistic approach has highlighted the need to create new 
mechanisms – departments or bodies for coordinating efforts undertaken under the SSR 
agenda. What is new about the agenda of SSR is its “soft” side, present in the governing of 
the security sector; however, some actors in various departments or ministries are still not 
convinced of, or do not appreciate, the importance of the dual-pillar base of the concept. 
There are also differences in working cultures, agendas and interests, timeframes, and 
budgets between the different government actors involved in the SSR agenda. The UK 
example illustrates that; despite having made the ‘most progress in terms of a “joined-up” 
approach to security and development,’ there are still problems coordinating between 
government departments.
209
 Further difficulties arise in translating this to ‘in-country (…) 
defence advisors, diplomats, trade missions and DFID governance advisors, and other 
relevant actors.’210 Furthermore, hindrances to pursuing an institutional base for SSR have 
been linked to ‘potential conflicts of interest between donor policies and programmes for 
SSR and government support for commercial activities in conflict-torn states, like arms 
sales or extractive industries.’211 Wulf notes that major donors still pursue distinct SSR and 
arms trade agendas: the former through foreign or development ministries, and the latter 
through the defence, ‘economic and foreign trade ministries.’212 The potential to work at 
cross-purposes is therefore a plausible expectation. These differences undermine the 
success of the SSR agenda.  
The OECD-DAC SSR principles have not, therefore, been widely incorporated into 
security assistance and development programmes despite growing recognition and 
awareness of their importance. Moving from endorsement to implementation did not take 
place swiftly. Furthermore, ‘each country is at a different stage in developing national 
policy frameworks for SSR and is pursuing work in this area in different ways’; of the 22 
member states of the OECD, many have not made the necessary arrangements to 
incorporate the SSR agenda – instead it ‘has barely penetrated even the development 
assistance ministries, let alone the foreign affairs or security-related ministries.’213 As Wulf 
notes, ‘many governments are still grappling with the concept, terminology and its 
integration into their overall policies.’214 Cross-departmental and cross-ministerial 
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cooperation and pooling remains difficult – not least between development, defence and 
security. Therefore, in the sense described throughout this chapter, donor ‘engagement in 
security sector reform is still relatively rare.’215 The discussions below showcase the ways 
in which these challenges have distorted the implementation of SSR. 
Hence, although donors have been ‘quick to embrace the paradigm of security 
sector reform,’216 ‘its institutional development has so far lagged well behind the 
vision.’217Furthermore, ‘resources made available are still far from being sufficient’ to 
build the infrastructure necessary to support the adoption of the concept.
 218
 SSR 
implementation has been slow
219
 and, as our discussions will show, it has been fraught 
with problems. 
These complications are also relevant between the different donors. Governments, 
IFIs, NGOs, and international organizations have often competed rather than cooperated; 
Wulf even speaks of ‘turf wars’ between the different actors involved in SSR.220 The 
difference in priorities and interests ‘reflects the formidable difficulties of harmonizing the 
policies and programmes’221 of actors, and has in some cases resulted in ‘discordant policy 
prescriptions.’222 A clear case in point is the Palestinian example, where IFIs, the US and 
the EU have worked at cross-purposes.
223
 Other examples highlighting the ‘incoherence’224 
of donor approaches are presented in later discussions.  
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2) Challenges for host countries 
 
The challenges facing host countries are of a different nature than those facing donors; 
more importantly, however, these two sets of challenges affect and often compound each 
other.  Like in Lebanon, states with weak, corrupt or abusive institutions imply that ‘the 
government might lack legitimacy; local actors might lack the expertise to prepare sound 
policies and plans; and they might be too divided and disorganised to reach consensus on 
policies and priorities.’225 Furthermore, it is likely that civil society will not be involved in 
security matters and the governance aspect of the agenda will not be a priority. In addition, 
there is likely to be an ‘absence of a democratic tradition’ and for ‘informal political and 
security actors’ to dominate the domestic environment.226 
In countries in transition and countries recovering from violent conflict, the SSR 
agenda is undermined by legacies of former eras. And, in countries undergoing reform 
there is an omnipresent problem of insecurity. The Lebanon chapters will show that the 
proliferation of weapons is one legacy and that Lebanon still undergoes waves of political 
violence.  These legacies, therefore, consist of ‘continued strife, criminality, ethnic 
cleavage’ (in Lebanon’s case, sectarian cleavage), and ‘warlordisms’; furthermore, 
authoritarian tendencies undermine the security of (for example) vulnerable groups, 
activists, politicians, and journalists.
227
 The security vacuum in some settings gives rise to 
a militaristic society (state and non-state actors). However, although the security sector 
may be part of the problem, the governance and the capabilities of the security sector are 
not ‘sufficient’ to address core problems.228 As argued in later chapters, it is essential to 
understand the root causes of insecurity; Nathan explains that ‘authoritarian rule, the 
exclusion of minorities from governance, socio-economic deprivation combined with 
inequity, and weak states’ – that is, a range of political, security, social and economic 
conditions – precipitate the rise of abusive, criminal, and violent options.229 Wulf notes that 
the security sector is ‘not a cause of violence but an instrument’; therefore, while it would 
be necessary to deal with the ‘symptoms’ of the problem, the long-term objective of 
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security—a people-centred security—can only be achieved if the ‘underlying causes of 
violence’ are dealt with.230 
 One factor associated with the legacies of past eras is the resistance to change. As 
mentioned earlier, SSR disrupts existing power relations; therefore, conservative actors are 
likely to obstruct and slow down the process.
231
 For example, in many cases where donor 
involvement is strong (such as in the former Soviet bloc), ‘political jargon is rich with 
imported donor phrases’, but the term is used without genuine commitment to reform. 232 
The 2005 OECD report Security System Reform and Governance speaks of “cosmetic” 
reforms; many Eastern bloc countries have been concerned with accession to NATO and 
the EU, and have tended to focus more narrowly on quick fixes in areas such as ‘border 
security, regional stability and civil-military relations.’233 
As Nathan points out in many of his contributions, donors often do not understand 
the difficulties of reform.
234
  While the lack of political will is a viable impediment, donors 
‘frequently underestimate the complexities and long-term nature of SSR in developing 
countries.’235 Governments with no, little or weak experience can be overwhelmed by 
managing a process of transformation which involves a number of policies simultaneously 
introducing radical changes.  
Moreover, the ‘problem of complexity is compounded by a lack of organisational, 
managerial, planning, financial and policy expertise;’ this is relevant to ‘political decision-
makers’ as well as parliamentarians.236 Wulf highlights the large expectations of SSR by 
asking: ‘how can a civilian government, which often lacks professional military or security 
expertise and experience, manage a professional military apparatus?’237 Nathan suggests in 
Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies that, in order to limit reliance on 
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‘conservative experts from the former regime’ and on possibly out-dated or regressive 
approaches, a number of domestic and/or foreign experts from governments, domestic and 
international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, centres and institutes, academics, 
and independent experts can be consulted. South Africa, for example, invited and set up a 
‘British military advisory team’ to assist the Minister of Defence in transforming its 
existing defence policy; the International Committee of the Red Cross, academics, and 
civil society experts were also consulted.
238
  
Added to that is the issue of capacity; in the absence of ‘the most basic civil 
institutions capable of carrying out reforms’, implementing an SSR agenda is difficult and 
problematic.
239
 Nathan gives two examples which resonate with the case of Lebanon. First, 
he explains that the South African army has continued to be involved in internal matters 
because of the lingering problem of an ‘inefficient, corrupt and poorly trained police 
service, unable to cope with widespread violent crime.’ Second, the problem of small arms 
and light weapons cannot be resolved by governments ‘unable to control their arsenal and 
borders.’ Therefore, setting aside the issue of political will, the lack of capacity in 
developing countries hinder the implementation of security and defence policies, making 
the transformation a ‘long-term’ process.240 Furthermore, finding a balance between state 
institutions capable of providing security and institutions capable of democratically 
governing the security sector is very difficult.  ‘Without the requisite institutional capacity, 
the values and principles of democracy cannot be ‘operationalised’’, states Nathan; 
therefore, when the ‘skills, expertise, infrastructure and resources’ are lacking, 
‘militaristic’ approaches become prevalent.241 One cannot expect adherence to democratic 
and human rights principles and to rule of law when the security services are not trained in 
these matters; furthermore, one cannot expect adherence to the rule of law when there is no 
‘competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system.’242 Therefore, 
security policies and legislation will not materialize if states do not possess the legitimacy, 
the power, the knowledge and the resources to implement them.  
The obstacles facing countries undergoing Security Sector Reform can be summed 
up as problems concerning insecurity, complexity, expertise, capacity, resources, and the 
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resistance to change.
243
 Many of the principles, norms, capabilities, and expertise 
embedded in Western approaches are often taken for granted, but are in fact ‘radical’ to 
developing countries. Donors often do not appreciate the complexity of the tasks expected 
from developing countries. In light of this, experts have recommended ‘a gradual 
approach’ to prevent an ‘overkill.’244   
 
3) Challenges to transformation: SSR’s conceptual limits:  
 
Advocates of SSR need to be cautious about the correlations that they draw and 
mindful of some of the pitfalls of their claims. As Alex Bellamy notes, while the 
contributions that SSR makes to democratization, human security and development may be 
significant, these contributions are ‘neither as self-evident nor always as wholly positive as 
[their] advocates suggest’.245  
There has been some concern over the juxtaposition of a human-centric notion of 
security with a state-centric policy (concern but not necessarily contradiction). Bruce 
Baker and Eric Sheye believe this to be ‘counter-intuitive to the idea of a “people-centred 
and locally owned approach” to providing security and justice’;246 the resulting problems 
in implementation due to this correlation are discussed below. 
There are also concerns over coherence. The wide scope of SSR has allowed 
various actors in traditionally distinct fields to shape and implement the concept 
differently.
247
 Wulf notes that SSR became a ‘catch-all phrase’248 and Chanaa adds that 
‘suddenly, but conveniently, SSR meant everything for everyone.’249 
Furthermore, SSR is based on a flawed assumption that the insecurity which 
undermines both domestic and international peace and development is traced solely to 
security sectors in developing, weak and war-torn countries. Cooper and Pugh are the 
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foremost scholars who strongly reject this assumption; they have highlighted the intricate 
web of domestic, regional and (most importantly) international factors that contribute to 
the cycle of conflict, and have gone one step further in suggesting a number of measures 
which would transform international structures responsible for the cycle of conflict.
250
 SSR 
cannot be viewed as simply a domestic issue. Policies adopted by developed states are 
damaging and are part of the problem; they sustain ‘the current global political and 
economic order.’251 Efforts of donor countries have been contradictory and therefore self-
defeating. Nathan explains that the legitimacy of donors is undermined by their own 
behaviour: in their support to authoritarian leaders or armed groups, they are themselves 
‘over-armed’, and continue to ‘export armament in a highly irresponsible manner.’252 
Furthermore, they have increasingly tended to prioritize the ‘Security First’ policy at the 
risk of ‘insecurity later.’253  
In its claim to foster a democratic environment, SSR, as argued Bellamy, can be 
linked to the Democratic Peace Theory.
254
 Indeed, the UNDP 2002 Human Development 
Report links the democratization of the security sector to Human Security and Human 
Development with reference to the Liberal Peace Theory.
255
 However, as Bellamy argues, 
criticisms of the latter apply to SSR. It is argued that the Democratic Peace Theory ‘simply 
does not exist’, and this assertion therefore challenges SSR’s ambitious claim to foster 
domestic, regional and international security.
256
  In noting many cases where non-
                                                 
250
 Among these measures, Cooper and Pugh suggest revisiting the role of IFIs (discussed briefly 
below); substituting ‘abstract’ policies in aid conditionality with more contextual policies; imposing 
‘embargoes on irresponsible arms exports’; ‘tightening the regulations of arms trade and military aid to 
governments; and, imposing an arms sales tax to fund DDR programmes. This study notes, however, 
that progress has (not surprisingly) been slow; nevertheless, there is growing recognition of the harmful 
effects of the lack of regulation in the area of arms sales, and there have been efforts to build a more 
tangible response. For example, the latest UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of July of 
2012 is part of efforts to prepare for a multilateral treaty to regulate arms trade. See Cooper and Pugh, 
2002; and "The Un Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty,"  http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/. 
Accessed on 17/7/2012.  
251
 Ebo, 2007, p 35. 
252
 Nathan, 2004, p 6. 
253
 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 34. 
254
 Bellamy, 2003, p 112. 
255
 UNDP, 2002, p 85-100. 
256
 With references to Bruce Russet, David Spiro, Christopher Lane, and Raymond Cohen, he argues 
that there has not been enough evidence to support the claim that democracies do not fight each other, 
that democracies are not less ‘warlike’ and that ‘the definitions of ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ are so vague 
that they can be manipulated to provide favourable evidence for any thesis.’ See: Christopher Lane, 
"Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (1994). David 
Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (1994). Raymond 
Cohen, "Needed: A Disaggregate Approach to the Democratic Peace Theory," Review of International 
138 
 
democratic militaries have impeded progress, Bellamy also cites the Turkish and Pakistani 
examples as ‘cases where non-democratic militaries that break international rules actually 
foster secularism, developmentalism, and at least a basic level of political and civil 
rights.’257 Wulf agrees by noting that militaries have often ‘intervened due to the 
incompetence, nepotism or corruption of the political elite.’258 There is, therefore, a need to 
start thinking ‘well beyond the classical understanding of civil-military relations’ and 
praetorianism,
259
 and to engage actively with the positive role the armed forces can play in 
societies—as even SSR claims.260 In addition, democratisation has been associated with 
high levels of violence and insecurity,
261
 leading in some cases to devastating 
circumstances; therefore, democratisation is not to be pursued above all other costs. 
Moreover, there is increasing agreement that the liberal model – in its economic and 
political dimensions
262
 – has in many cases accentuated inequalities, has reshaped conflict 
and elevated it to the international level.
263
  
Linked to the above is SSR’s Western label. Wulf reminds that SSR ‘clearly has 
British roots which are viewed with suspicion by some states.’264 Furthermore, Bellamy 
strongly notes that ‘SSR is an agenda imposed by the West and democratic ideals do not 
take root if they are imposed.’265 As SSR has been incorporated into the structures of 
security governance,
266
 it has also been stained by its association with Liberal 
democracies,
267
 and can be viewed as an imperialist agenda aiming at ‘strengthening (…) 
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international capitalism and Westphalian society of states in a Western European 
image.’268 Duffield famously critiqued the ‘new aid paradigm’ – a tool for the Liberal 
Peace – as a ‘political project in its own right’: a project with economic and political 
dimensions, intended to contain the instability stemming from the Global South while 
transforming it into a cooperative entity in order to protect the North’s politico-economic 
interests. In doing so, it also sustains the South’s ‘subordination’ and the North’s 
reassertion of authority.
269
 In addition, this association is reminiscent of colonialism; 
Bellamy refers to Barkawi and Laffey in arguing that ‘democratization and development 
processes (…) are intimately linked with colonization’;270 therefore, SSR is likely to be 
challenged by actors antagonistic to change into the Western model. The latter is not meant 
to argue that SSR, democratization and democracy are a “bad thing”, but that they are 
inherently tainted; and that, when presented as a packaged model, their credibility and 
appeal are undermined.  
The acceptance or rejection of the SSR agenda as an attempt ‘to transfer Western 
values to the South’ will depend, as Tanner notes, on the way donors frame their support to 
partner countries: ‘its chances for success depend on the political subtlety of the initiatives 
so that they would allow various countries to position security governance in their 
historical, political and cultural context.’271 However, Tanner here is not arguing for a 
transformation of donor approaches, but rather for a simple re-packaging of a one-and-only 
model. Having said that, if ‘SSR is sometimes imposed by Western donors, it also 
resonates strongly with’ domestic concerns and efforts.272  The security of individuals and 
communities alongside state security are not alien to people of the Global South. As 
Bendix and Stanley point out, ‘long before the concept of human security became common 
currency, a people-centred approach to security was being advocated in some African 
states that sought to distance themselves from the former colonial powers as well as from 
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the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War era.’273 Donors can build on this platform. 
Domestic efforts by what Kaldor describes as ‘islands of civility’ need to be supported,274 
and this support needs to accommodate indigenous structures within the confines of an 
egalitarian and participatory security.  
The ‘Islands of civility’ as defined by Kaldor are groups committed to peace. However, 
Cooper and Pugh reject Kaldor’s dichotomy, which differentiates between groups engaged 
in violence and those that are not, because the reasons that such groups choose one side or 
the other are not based on simple preference. Therefore, their transformative approach to 
SSR suggests that conditions and opportunities are created to encourage people or groups 
to join the ‘islands of civility’; this approach invites stakeholders to engage in the process 
of reform, rather than excludes them. Furthermore, foreign impositions, or in other words, 
donors’ attempts to engineer the reform process, undermine the efforts of the ‘islands of 
civility’ and tarnish the image of the process by presenting it as a foreign agenda, and 
thereby discourage stakeholders from joining in. The role of donors should therefore be 
limited to expanding and ‘empowering the ‘islands of civility.’275 This approach, however, 
is not deeply reflected across donor approaches.  
 
Having considered all of the above, it is this study’s view that existing security 
sector problems are caused by a combination of international liberal structures, regional 
circumstances, past legacies (colonialism, past-conflict, and authoritarianism), and 
attitudes of domestic actors.
276
 This study also argues that donor assumptions deserve to be 
re-defined. In addition, because of its conceptual and theoretical loopholes, SSR has been 
struck with harsh realities; therefore its success has undoubtedly been negatively affected. 
Furthermore, there are concerns pertaining to trends in the implementation of SSR.  
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4) Practical problems 
 
The SSR agenda can be criticized as being artificial because donors’ statist approaches 
do not fit many of the contexts of host countries. Therefore, at the other extreme of its 
laudable contributions, SSR has been viewed as a foreign policy, alien to indigenous 
traditions, alienating indigenous structures, and in some cases reinforcing structural flaws.  
When necessary, donors must accept wider approaches that accommodate the conditions 
and realities of countries they are involved in. 
In many developing countries, including Lebanon, state-centric models have been 
power-centric, exclusivist, and non-participatory (for and by the elites); practically, they 
have often been abusive, corrupt, and ineffective as well as lacking legitimacy and trust. 
An overview – although simplified – of the nature of the security sector in the African 
context is presented to illustrate the disconnectedness of and the challenges to SSR.  
Although the African example resonates elsewhere, notably in Lebanon, it is also 
hazardous to engage in generalization. Policy-makers as well as academics need to be 
vigilant against generic approaches which suffer from a shallow engagement with 
individual contexts. Nevertheless, one factor for endemic problems in the security sectors 
of many developing countries is the legacy of colonialism; Daniel Bendix and Ruth 
Stanley relate security problems to the fact that:  
The colonial state never achieved the same depth of societal penetration and support as 
the European state, (…) serving simply to further the economic and political interests 
of the colonisers (…) it remained simultaneously distant and oppressive.277  
Many states have preserved the colonial model: ‘the ruling political elites replicated the 
instrumental approach of their colonial predecessors to state power, and security forces 
continued to serve the interests of the ruling elites rather than the security requirements of 
the people.’278 Therefore, the security sector has often been ‘an object of fear and distrust; 
the view is widespread “that the security sector is incapable, useless and ultimately serves 
the rich”.’279 Rocklyn Williams notes security sectors’  ‘near mirror reflections of their 
former colonial security institutions (…) the doctrine has admitted to few indigenous 
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revisions.’280 To the detriment of over-simplification, this study notes that many 
developing and post-conflict states often maintain an elitist security sector which does not 
accommodate indigenous structures and grassroots. As in Lebanon, this implies that the 
security sector does not resonate in local communities; it does not fit the priorities and 
traditions of local contexts, nor do people trust and resort to it.   
Indeed, looking closer, one can note that, like in Lebanon, a monopoly over the use 
of force is seldom achieved ‘nor [has] this indeed [been] necessary for the purposes of 
extraction and military and political control.’281 Instead, an array of actors provides 
security in many developing and post-conflict countries; the state has been one and 
possibly the ‘minority provider of security and justice’.282 It has therefore, traditionally 
shared the role of providing security with ‘customary justice structures, informal anti-crime 
groups, religious groups, state approved work based associations, and commercial 
organizations’ but also with ‘local militias, guerrilla armies, warlords.’283  The former 
category has often been ‘more accessible, fair, affordable (…), understandable (using local 
language and culturally appropriate methods) and effective.’284 Uganda is one good 
example where ‘work based associations amongst taxi-drivers (…) are recognized by 
municipal authorities and are an important element of state approved civil guarding’; and 
in Rwanda, the ‘largely autonomous’ and ‘informal local government structures’ are 
considered a successful policing model and receive the support of the state and the police.
 
285
 Through other examples, Baker and Scheye also consider the fallacy that states are 
capable of providing security: such as in Lebanon during the civil war or in ‘Mozambique, 
where in 2002 there were only nine lawyers posted outside of the capital Maputo’. In 
Liberia, where anti-crime groups were first created and encouraged by the minister of 
justice, they were subsequently shut down in 2006, but ‘armed crime rose again, and public 
support of the government declined.’286 In many parts of the developing world, therefore, 
states simply have not had the resources, capabilities or the will to provide security.
 
 
These examples make a case for widening the donor approach to recognize and 
engage non-state actors more seriously in their role in providing security in fragile states. 
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As Adedeji Ebo notes: ‘while the concept of SSR has evolved to reflect this reality,287 there 
has not been a corresponding change in practice on the ground’. This undermines rather 
than maximizes the efforts of donors, as ‘SSR programmes may improve the efficiency and 
governance of state security institutions and still have little impact, because these are not 
the sole security providers.’288  
Having considered this, as the case of Lebanon shows, in both non-state and state 
provision of security there has been a tradition of abuse and exclusiveness; security has 
been provided ‘as a club good available only to a certain clientele, while increasing 
insecurity for others.’289 This will remain an omnipresent concern when dealing with 
corrupt security providers. 
As discussed above, SSR adopts a people-centric conception of security, but its 
approach remains largely state-centric. This contrasts greatly with the realities of non-
Western countries, and a large gap has tended to develop between the design, the 
implementation, and the success of SSR. In addition, the reluctance to engage with 
domestic alternatives shows the persistent level of Eurocentricism in donor approaches.
 290
  
However, ‘the external origin and orientation of SSR needs to be supplemented by greater 
local ownership and inclusion in SSR conceptualisation, design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation.’291 As a response to the ‘limitations’292 of the state-centric 
approach, experts have emphasised the need to go beyond it
293
 and have suggested a 
‘multi-layered’ approach.294 Donors are encouraged to learn from and build on ‘successful 
SSR endeavours conceived and executed without foreign assistance.’295 The multi-layered 
approach suggested by Baker and Scheye ‘recognizes the complexity of security and 
justice provision’; it seeks to ‘target the multiple points where service occurs’, and reform 
them while ‘strengthening the links between state and non-state providers.’296 This 
approach first considers who and what structures are providing security and justice, then 
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looks into ways to support these alternatives, instead of automatically ‘presupposing that 
security and justice can only be built through institutional capacity building.’297 This is 
valuable when considering that institution-building and reform can remain stillborn when 
exposed to other exacerbating factors, and when people continue to prefer local 
alternatives.
298
 Having said that, the multi-layered approach is not centred on 
circumventing the central role of the state; instead it is centred on a balanced approach 
which aims to support existing formal and informal structures. This approach provides a 
channel for donors’ efforts to trickle down to various segments of the population. 
For example, when ‘95 per cent of people access justice through non-state systems’ in 
South Sudan, there will be no viable ‘alternative to customary solutions’ in the near 
future,
299
 and therefore the case for a parallel process is convincing. However, this study 
also argues that the suggestion to widen the scope of SSR programmes complicates the 
process further. It would require a substantial increase in the commitment and engagement 
of donors; to what extent donors can afford this upgrade is a question to be asked. 
Furthermore, many other fundamental issues arise; as Graham Thompson recognizes, there 
are ‘many challenges and risks associated with supporting non-state providers.’300 An 
extreme case example is the militia order in Lebanon in which local state-like services 
were developed. Another example is the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, which were first popular 
and filled the vacuum that local authorities could not; however, as Ball notes, there were 
soon many ‘allegations of politically motivated activities’ and ‘increasing impunity.’301 
While recognizing that the same concerns apply to state actors, the support of non-state 
actors raises many questions and new challenges. Would donors be sustaining a flawed 
system? Would this prevent a transition to the modern state model? In addition, what about 
safeguards against impunity and human rights violations? Do these models conform to the 
value system promoted by donors? Are these models representative, democratic, and/or 
inclusive? What about training, equipment, weapons and the right to use force and detain? 
Regarding allegations of abuse and corruption – who monitors, controls and punishes? 
While there may be answers to these questions, some within the multi-layered approach’s 
suggestion to reinforce links between state and non-state actors, the task for all involved 
becomes more complicated. From a donor perspective, the current Western model seems 
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easier and simpler to standardize; it also involves less controversy regarding what groups 
and mechanisms they support. Nevertheless, the price, in many cases, has been a 
disconnected programme which risks being resisted or made redundant. This study notes 
that while a radical change in approaches is unlikely, building on local ideas and structures 
as well as seriously engaging with them is a sound and reasonable suggestion. Therefore, 
donors need to support ‘islands of civility’ before creating, implanting or empowering 
foreign-designed structures; this is a key factor in promoting ownership and sustainability 
of reforms. 
Furthermore, as mentioned, the tendency to focus on the ‘recipient’ country’s security 
sector weaknesses has tended to overstate its responsibility and to separate the security 
sector from wider factors affecting it. One example that builds on the previous discussions 
is the IFI’s approach towards developing and post-conflict countries. 
It has been argued that neo-liberal economic policies have contributed to undermining 
security and SSR. Traditionally these have not taken into account the power relations 
within society; macroeconomic stabilization has provided opportunities for powerful 
groups to control social and power relations, and for individuals to resort to criminal and 
informal alternatives for sustenance. Donors underestimate the extent to which 
privatisation and budget reductions ‘can foster divisions in society and strengthen local 
rentiers and warlords’; therefore, policies and the conditionality of aid – particularly by 
IFIs– need to be readjusted to take into account ‘issues such as social justice and 
criminality’ by providing socio-economic alternatives that ‘emancipate the populations 
from clientalism and mafia welfare.’302  Donors have often played a negative role in local 
political struggles; therefore, better arrangements need to be made to ‘sustain the most 
vulnerable parts of the population within the legitimate sectors of the economy.’303 This 
has proven to be difficult to design as well as to implement. Burundi is one of several cases 
where the reintegration of former combatants has been fraught with trouble, as socio-
economic variables have been underestimated.  
Furthermore, donor engagement with excessive defence spending has been 
‘simplistic’;304 both the IMF and the World Bank have identified spending ‘as a major 
barrier to development and democratization.’ However, firstly, as argued by Brian 
MacDonald, these institutions have not yet ‘identif[ied] what excessive military spending 
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actually is’.305 Secondly, the reduction in defence spending, when not appropriately 
managed, has led to ‘domestic social and political problems’ and unintended instability. 
Thirdly, a generic defence reduction policy is not appropriate in countries with ‘relatively 
significant security concerns’.306 Fourthly, the common request for a professional but also 
smaller military has proved to be ‘more expensive than larger conscript-based forces,’ and 
therefore armed forces required to accomplish tasks more effectively but with fewer 
resources have put strains on institutions and government.
307
 Seen from this perspective, it 
is this study’s view that current donor approaches may ‘inhibit’ rather than contribute to 
development and democratization.
308
 In this sense, the argument for a transformative 
approach is solid and helps practitioners keep issues in perspective. Pressingly, donor 
approaches need to be re-visited and synergized.  
In brief, to address the realities in host countries, the SSR agenda needs to be more 
flexible and pragmatic; it also requires wider as well deeper coordination between the 
various donors.  
 
5) Implementation 
 
While conceptually SSR suggests a comprehensive approach, examples from real 
cases illustrate otherwise.
309
 This is not to say all donor approaches are to be dismissed; 
however, there have been ‘considerable variations.’310 SSR in Sierra Leone, East Timor 
and Liberia represent these variations. The Sierra Leone SSR programme has been 
externally led and funded, and has been the donor community—particularly the UK’s—
proud contribution.
311
 This positive view stems from the comprehensive design of the 
programme and the responsiveness of stakeholders. The programme’s ‘holistic approach is 
clearly discernible’, it was ‘clearly coordinated, both among government departments and 
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donor nations’, and ‘local ownership in Sierra Leone includes group consultations, media 
coverage and broad citizen participation.’312 East Timor is another example of a 
comprehensive SSR programme. In Liberia, however, the programme has been less glossy. 
Like in Lebanon, it was restricted to DDR, military, and police reform. Moreover, there 
has not been substantial coordination between donors, and therefore the programme was 
seen to be ‘fragmented’. Furthermore, ‘no public/private dialogue on the content of the 
security review’ took place.313 The donor community has, therefore, ‘performed unevenly’ 
in its design of,
314
 commitment to and implementation of SSR. As the DAC Report notes, a 
more common approach has consisted of ‘discrete initiatives focused on one element or 
another of the security system which have been influenced by SSR principles’; the cases of 
‘Uganda, Mozambique, Serbia, and El Salvador’ as well as Lebanon are examples which 
‘fall short of a fully-fledged SSR programme.’315 Noting the absence of ‘government-wide’ 
mechanisms for cross-ministerial coordination in most donor countries, the ‘opportunities 
for being strategic (…) are missed’, and ‘much of the work carried out is ad hoc.’316 A 
process-based approach is therefore often replaced with short-term project-based 
approaches that can offer ‘concrete outputs (e.g. a defence white paper or human rights 
training for police officers).’317 
Building on the above, a 2003 Global Survey prepared by Ball and Hendrickson 
found that governance has not received the seriousness it deserves.
318
 Instead, as in 
Lebanon, stabilization through the operational aspects of SSR has been prioritized over 
democratic governance.
 In addition, the tendency for the ‘piecemeal and uncoordinated 
approach (…) traditionally adopted towards defence, policing and justice reform’ has been 
replicated.
319
 Therefore, there have been concerns that the support provided to the security 
forces ‘may merely make them more efficient at repressing the population.’320 As such, 
SSR programmes or projects have, at times, been compared to Cold War security 
assistance
321
 – the very policy SSR was meant to redress. The concern that SSR, like 
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human security, may be co-opted or ‘hijacked’ for traditional Defence Diplomacy is 
therefore valid.
322
 
As discussed, experts have not only converged on the centrality of internalizing and 
institutionalizing SSR, but also on the need for wider popular participation and support.
 323
 
Nevertheless, as in Lebanon, Bendix and Stanley note, support for SSR remains elitist, as 
‘local ownership is frequently reduced to (…) securing the agreement of local 
governments’ to donor-driven ‘projects’;324 deep civil and popular engagement remains 
very weak. Furthermore, aside from a sample of representative voices from the developing 
world such as Nathan Laurie, Eboe Hutchful, and ‘Kayode Fayemi, research has largely 
been commissioned and conducted by the donor side, and research has focused on donor 
priorities.  As a result, there is a major ‘weakness of research capacity in reforming 
countries’,325 but also little exposure to SSR. It is this study’s view that a wider circle of 
experts is necessary to reinforce the governance aspect of the SSR agenda;
326
 this wider 
circle would also provide donors with access to empirical research and contextual analysis, 
and would widen popular buy-in in host countries. In this respect, stronger alliances 
between ‘researchers and advocacy groups, both within countries in the South and between 
South and North’ need to be developed.327 
SSR is intended to be context-driven; nevertheless, it is often the case that donor 
priorities have not converged with domestic ones.
328
 SSR has therefore been criticised as 
being ‘normative’ and ‘prescriptive’.329 Donors have approached countries undergoing 
change with ‘unrealistic benchmarks’ for progress,330 using ‘“one-size-fits-all” approaches 
to countries facing very dissimilar situations.’331 Donors therefore still need to recognize 
the variability in situations, in means and in the pace of reform. As such, many experts 
have called for greater ‘synergy between donor priorities and interests on the one hand and 
local needs and priorities on the other.’332 
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On the whole, the interdependence of sectors, actors and factors has often been 
overlooked. Furthermore, the discrepancies between donor priorities and within host 
countries have resulted in flawed designs and implementation of SSR programmes. This 
has led academics to re-stress the importance of an integrated approach. Several 
recommendations to adopt an approach that reaches beyond stand-alone projects have been 
suggested by academics in order to internalize and sustain efforts at democratic or good 
security sector governance.  These, as Ebo stresses, have also been recognized as 
challenges for a successful SSR agenda.
333
 Nevertheless, in the end, this study highlights 
five priorities for SSR programmes. Ebo identifies five priorities for successful SSR 
programmes.
 334
 One, situating SSR in the regional context; in Lebanon’s case, this 
involves recognising the limits that the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional rivalry impose on 
the stability and ability of Lebanon to meaningfully engage in reform. Two, situating SSR 
in broader governance frameworks involves linking SSR to government or system-wide 
reforms; in our case, one needs to recognise that limited efforts are invested in this area. 
Three, situating SSR within the framework of human security, i.e. protection against 
threats to physical security and oppression; the study shows that the security sector is 
deficient in effectively protecting human security but that efforts to develop capabilities are 
underway. Four, linking SSR projects and programmes to popular and civil ownership; in 
Lebanon’s case this has been minimal. Five, engaging with existing formal as well as 
informal systems; in Lebanon, while engagement with the formal system is on-going, 
engagement with the informal system is more problematic and has not been formally or 
systematically adopted.
335
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III.  Tying the knots 
 
The previous discussions note that there are many conceptual and practical questions 
left unanswered, despite SSR establishing itself as part of the discourse of governments, 
development and security practitioners, as well as academics. Furthermore, efforts to 
mainstream SSR across the many actors involved, to adopt it and to implement it have 
been more difficult than anticipated. Enthusiasm has been bogged down with structural 
problems, coordination, and harmonization. Nevertheless, this study argues, as do Cooper 
and Pugh, that:  
none of this is to suggest that security-sector reform should be rejected. When set 
against earlier Cold War approaches to military aid, it represents a significant 
evolution, and the fact that it may have weaknesses in both conception and 
implementation should not detract from its many strengths.
336
 
SSR as a policy and as a concept is still being shaped; it will most likely continue to be 
so. Possibly, it will even be re-invented when the time is right. For now, it is concerned 
with raising the capacity of state institutions to provide security and justice to the wider 
population, as well as continuously re-adjusting the security sector to be governed 
according to democratic principles. In this study, this is understood as efficient and 
participatory civilian governance which is anchored in internationally recognized human 
rights standards. As suggested by several specialists, this is a process relevant to most 
states, developing or developed, democratic or democratizing.
337
 This is a process that 
yields pragmatic and practical wins; the critical security studies stance would suggest that 
this is not a banal contribution and hence deserves continued attention while other 
transformative projects are being explored.
338
 
It is this study’s view that the SSR agenda contributes greatly in refocusing attention on 
people-centred security; it also provides space for discussions on domestic as well as 
international structures, trends, and policies that contribute to the recurrence of conflict in 
various parts of the world. While the discussions also highlighted the need for a global 
transformative turn in order to effectively reduce the pervasiveness of conflict, and the 
                                                 
336
 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 22. 
337
 OECD, 2005, p16. And, Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 26. 
338
 E.g. revision to arms trade regulations, free trade, and IFIs’ roles. 
151 
 
lingering divisions between the insured and the non-insured, contributions in this regard 
have been limited.
339
 
There is strong consensus within the donor community that the SSR agenda ‘redefines’ 
the traditional security agenda in several ways. Although it would be wise to be cautious of 
any concept that makes such ambitious claims and that empowers states, SSR has made 
valuable contributions. For practitioners and scholars involved in the reformist institutional 
approach such as Ball and Hendrickson, they note that the shift registered since the 1990s 
is a ‘significant departure’ from traditional agendas; the traditional approach is being 
replaced with a ‘broad-based, people-centred security.’340 Along the same lines, the 
OECD-DAC’s Security System Reform and Governance (2005) maintains that security 
policy is increasingly ‘broadening beyond’ the narrow focus on state and regime stability; 
human rights and wider human security concerns have become part of the normative 
framework of security policy. Most notably, linking security and development has exposed 
security to public and political debate and ‘invited greater public scrutiny of security 
policy.’341 The spotlight has extended beyond the military, and the array of ‘state 
institutions involved in providing security are being re-evaluated’ including ‘legal, social 
and economic instruments’.342 Finally, the impact of security policy on other sectors is 
being re-examined. Clearly, the debate mostly consists of (a) reforming (or developing and 
in some cases transforming) existing institutions and (b) takes place only within a 
particular sector; therefore, we cannot claim that, on its own, SSR can achieve the 
transformation and emancipation that CSS suggests.  SSR can complete one part of the 
puzzle (so to speak). Like human security one element of SSR is inherently traditional: the 
reliance on the state (although not exclusively) to provide human security. However, 
although it may espouse a traditional approach, SSR should be judged on its ability to 
achieve concrete ‘on the ground’ progress in human security. It is not contestable to note 
that SSR has practical relevance and that it can positively affect the security of Lebanese 
and other people living under predatory or incapable security providers. 
Having recognised this, the reversal to more traditional forms of assistance is a concern 
shared by many scholars. Wulf, Ball and Hendrickson, Tschirgi and others have all warned 
against the impact of the so-called “war on terror”; and this study shares their concern 
about the re-militarization of security providers.  It can be argued that because of its 
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traditional statist approach, SSR can be co-opted and used for more malign purposes. 
However, in principle, when assistance does turn towards this direction, the process can no 
longer be called SSR. Having said that, when donors are involved in piecemeal assistance 
(as they are in many contexts including in Lebanon), military and hard security assistance 
will have a regressive impact if not balanced with soft reforms. This abuse hampers the 
SSR agenda. Although SSR takes a largely institutional approach, it is non-state-centric. 
The potential for abuse however, is omnipresent; the key is to exhort pressure to limit it. 
This study suggests that critical security studies and human security can exhort this 
pressure. Furthermore, it seeks to explain how critical security studies and human security 
allow us to analyse SSR in general and in Lebanon. Both critical security studies and 
human security help make sure that SSR projects don’t turn into purely traditional security 
policies: militarized and oppressive, consumed with national defence and overshadowing 
other human security concerns. Instead, both remind us of the greater concern for security 
assistance or national security policy to promote a security sector that is inclusive, 
representative of society and vulnerable groups. Both critical security studies and human 
security help assess what kind of security is being advanced: regime, national, people-
centred, sectarian (as in Lebanon), clan-based, or other? Is it at the expense of individual 
freedoms, civil liberties and human rights? Are the measures taken by SSR in supporting 
certain state security providers improving respect of rule of law and people’s security? Are 
SSR projects promoting space for individuals to contribute to the governance of security 
through oversight and accountability mechanisms as well through the provision of space 
for debating security issues?
343
 Crucially, the inclusive and responsive security sector that 
SSR envisages is not only committed to the security of the main segments of society (as is 
the case in Lebanon in securing confessional interests for example) but embraces 
vulnerable and marginalized groups. The provision of security for vulnerable groups takes 
place by providing space for the expression of their insecurities and by responding to their 
needs; this would require the enactment of favourable legislation, the development of 
mechanisms that protect the rights and address the security concerns of vulnerable groups, 
and the effective implementation of these mechanisms.
344
 Emancipation would require the 
ambitious aim of empowering vulnerable groups. From a human security perspective (the 
narrow), the state provides the first step in the process: it provides the safe space for 
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individuals and groups. Grassroots groups and movements, domestic and international 
NGOs, charities, the media, and higher education institutions are all key actors in 
empowering vulnerable groups. Chapter 6 highlights structural constrains imposed by the 
Lebanese system and efforts to achieving progressive change in Lebanon. In brief, while 
non-state progressive Lebanese actors documented in chapter 6 are drivers of 
transformation, state institutions such as those examined in chapter 7 are those that need to 
reflect and respond to the insecurities of people 
At the end of this first section, the reader is equipped with, at least, an institutional tool 
to advance a more ethical, people-centred, inclusive and responsive approach to world 
politics (by navigating between the local and the international or global). The tools that this 
study has so far advanced rest on adding a ‘twist’ on existing structures. The values driving 
this study have been drawn from critical approaches to world politics. In the absence of 
transformative alternatives, working with and steering existing structures fills the gap.  
To sum up, actors of global governance have long and continue to play a central 
role in Lebanese politics and security. The next chapters illustrate this. It is in this study 
view that the international community, through global governance, can contribute more 
positively to security in Lebanon. Also, while much can be said in regards to the failings of 
human security and SSR in terms of genuinely advancing a transformative agenda, both 
need to be examined as both have made contributions to the lives of individuals the world 
over, including in Lebanon. Hence, through global governance, human security has 
become a doctrine adopted by major powers, NGOs and international organizations. 
Human security has been operationalised through, among other things, SSR. I am choosing 
SSR because it is a policy that seems to be followed in Lebanon. I would like to examine 
how this is taking place and assess how it can contribute to improved security for 
individuals and society. 
The second part of this study therefore uses the tool-kit firstly to understand 
conflict and human (in)security in Lebanon and secondly to investigate and weigh what 
has been taking place in Lebanon against the conceptual claims set forth so far.   
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Chapter 5: Internal Struggles, Governance, and Human Insecurity in 
Lebanon 
  
‘Pity the Nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation’1 
 
Lebanon is a small country of 10,452 km2 on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean 
Sea; it shares its borders with Syria to the east and north and with Israel to the south. On 
the one hand, Lebanon is a country associated with Biblical references and modern ideals 
such as religious co-existence and democracy in the Middle East;
2
 on the other, however, 
the periodic crises that erupt in its territory tarnish its name with strife, civil wars and even 
‘lost hope’.3 Conflict, violence and human insecurity in Lebanon have been the result of 
intricate factors, both internal and external, and one should be cautious of simplifying the 
causes of conflict in a country which mirrors so vividly both its immediate surroundings 
and the international environment. This study argues that the underlying causes of conflict 
in Lebanon have revolved around two key issues: a heterogeneous society which invites 
foreign interference, and the abuse of power which is associated with socio-economic 
disparity, exclusion, and weak state institutions. This chapter exposes structural constraints 
and flawed policies that have been replicated by Lebanon’s ruling elites; these have 
prevented positive change and have severely undermined human security. Using the tools 
set forth in Part I of the dissertation,
4
 this chapter is divided into three separate sections. 
Section one, explores the legacies of Ottoman rule. Section two explores the specificities 
of the Lebanese system with an emphasis on the fragmentation of Lebanese society, the 
weakness of the State, the failings of political leaders, and Lebanon’s wars. And section 
three summarizes regressive policies that have locked Lebanon in a cycle of insecurity. 
These three sections achieve three important objectives: exposing regressive assumptions 
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and problematic policies, illustrating the pervasiveness of human insecurity, and the role of 
governance in managing (or mismanaging) Lebanon’s conflicts. 
  
I. The Seeds of Discord: Sectarianism and Foreign Governance as a 
Legacy of Ottoman Rule 
 
 
Understanding the root causes of conflict in Lebanon is essential to transforming the 
Lebanese system. This study agrees with Fawwaz Traboulsi’s attribution of the origins of 
Lebanon’s chronic structural problems to the sixteenth century, when Mount Lebanon was 
first recognized as a ‘polity’ under the Ottoman Empire as the Emirate of Mount Lebanon.5 
The two main communities in the Emirate were the Druze
6
  and the Christian Maronites.
7
 
The history of Mount Lebanon would be marked with the struggles of these communities 
for internal power, independence from the Ottoman Empire, and expansion.
8
 Several 
characteristics that developed under the Emirate would greatly define its future. One such 
characteristic is a regionally unique role for its religious minorities; another is an economy 
based on products designed for international trade.
9
 Lastly, a close relationship with 
European and regional powers planted the seeds for a long tradition of foreign 
interferences and influences.
10
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1) The Iqtaa 
 
As mentioned above, two confessional groups or sects
11
 established themselves as main 
actors in Mount Lebanon. The Ottoman Empire first ruled the Emirate through the Iqtaa or 
feudal system. Although under the overall control of the Ottoman Wali or governor, the 
Muqata’ji12 families were granted considerable autonomy in running their provinces.13 The 
Ottoman Iqtaa system had an important feature: divisions were drawn along religious 
lines. This Millet system
14
  established a hierarchy with the Muslim population occupying 
the upper level and ‘the ‘protected’ community’ of Christians and Jews occupying lower 
levels.
15
 Confessional groups, considered ‘the People of the Book’, enjoyed the freedom to 
run their affairs and practice their beliefs in exchange of a protection tax called the ‘Jizya’. 
These confessional divisions would play a key role in future revolts and in ‘transforming 
social and political conflicts into sectarian conflicts’.16  The power struggles amongst the 
ruling Muqata’ji families, or between these families and the Central Authority or with the 
commoners, would dominate the Emirate for generations to come.  
Although the Millet system was applied across the Empire, it turned out to be more 
problematic in Mount Lebanon because of the size of the Christian community in the 
demographic distribution, their gradual empowerment and their slow rise to positions of 
power. While one community resisted the relinquishing of power, the other would ardently 
seek to amass it.  
Three statements can be made regarding Lebanon’s Ottoman legacy: one, that the 
Ottoman Empire established Mount Lebanon as a unified semi-autonomous entity; second, 
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that sectarianism has since been institutionalized; third, that the tradition for requiring a 
foreign arbitrator emerged under the Iqtaa system. All of these developments can be traced 
back to the 16
th
 century.  
The rule of the Emirate moved from one family to the other until the weakening of 
the Ottoman Empire, its subsequent collapse, and its replacement by the French Mandate. 
The struggles over the governance of Lebanon during this phase are often recalled and 
romanticized as the ancestral sectarian conflict of Lebanon. However, this section tries to 
challenge the uni-dimensional explanations of conflict in Lebanon by highlighting other 
political and the socio-economic dimensions for political violence in Lebanon. 
During the Iqtaa the silk industry was launched. It brought exposure and openness 
to the West, but it also meant that the West developed vested interests in the unfolding of 
crises in the Emirate, which explains their successive interventions.  
Mount Lebanon had been going through a series of tribal rebellions throughout the 
Emirate, and the Druze had been fighting internally for successions. The first in a pattern 
of events took place: the first commoners’ uprising (1820) organized by representatives of 
the Christian, Druze, Sunni and Shia communities.
17
 The rebellion was led by wakils
18
 and 
represented an interesting milestone, whereby delegates were elected and could be held 
accountable by their villages.  
An additional event which represents a sharp turn in the Iqtaa ruling system was 
Shihab II’s (the Emir) conversion to Christianity.  For the first time, a non-Muslim would 
head the Emirate. The Maronite church was at first reluctant to support the rebellion 
because the idea of a Christian Emirate was too appealing. Furthermore, France was a 
supporter of both Shihab II and his ally Mohammed Ali Pasha.
19
 These two players, 
however, only delayed the inevitable. The situation in the Emirate had deteriorated to the 
extent that Ottoman, British and Austrian troops were sent to curb Pasha’s growing 
expansionist ambition. The community that gained most from the rule of the Shihab II and 
Mohammad Ali – the Christians – were a major player in their demise.20 After Shihab II 
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was sent into exile in Malta, clashes over ownership of land broke out. However, Ottoman 
and British support for Druze rights put an end to the matter.
21
 The various crises that the 
Emirate underwent show that the intricate relationships between society and politics in 
Lebanon were complex and often underestimated.  
By this time, the Christian community’s influence, particularly the Maronite Church, 
had grown remarkably. Trying to preserve some of the influence they had gained, Patriarch 
Hubaysh sent a list of reforms to the Porte in October 1840 which strongly aggravated 
tensions with the Druze community. In brief, the Patriarch had asked that ‘a Shihab 
Maronite Prince rule Mount Lebanon, that he be appointed for life by the Sultan and be 
assisted by a Maronite Mudabbir
22
 and 12 councillors representing the different sects, all 
elected for a period of three years’. More importantly, the Patriarch had asked for ‘the 
Sultanate to recognize France’s protection of the Maronite’.23 The reforms strongly 
belittled the historical role of the Druze and marked the official end of the Druze Emirate. 
In 1841 the Druze took up arms against Bashir Shihab III and fighting broke out 
throughout the Emirate. Druze Emirate or Christian Principality, the events of 1841 
brought about the end of the Emirate and ‘the end of the special status of Mount 
Lebanon’.24  These events represent the beginning of the sectarian discourse in Lebanon. 
 
2) The Qa’im maqamiya 
 
The Ottomans instated the Qa’im maqamiya in 1843 which divided Mount Lebanon in 
two. This phase is considered as the ‘troubled years’; it marked the pervasiveness of 
foreign governance and the introduction of the sectarian political representation.
25
 
Furthermore, under the new system, the struggle for the identity of Mount Lebanon 
intensified. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich proposed the idea of dividing the 
Mountain between Christians and Druze in order to reconcile British and French interests 
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in the area.
26
 As a result, two administrations were set up.
27
 However, this new system was 
doomed to failure, as the demographic composition of the Mountain was no longer 
statically divided. Kamal Salibi, George Corm and Traboulsi all agree that such a system 
could not have succeeded, particularly in the southern traditionally Druze district. Mixed 
villages had increased and the population in some villages had become predominantly 
Maronite.
28
 The appointed qa’im maqam was to be a Druze for the mixed southern area, 
while a Maronite was to be appointed for the northern district.
 29
 Both communities 
opposed this new system.
30
 
 Many historians have attributed the atrocities that were committed during these twenty 
years to the following mind-set: the Christians saw themselves as a threatened regional 
minority, whereas the Druze thought it to be outrageous to be ruled by a regional 
minority.
31
 Therefore they ‘considered themselves part of an oppressed Islamic majority in 
the Empire.’32 The events of the 1800s have been portrayed as manifestations of the threat 
perceptions of both communities.
33
 However, widespread violence should not be attributed 
to sectarian tensions alone. As will be discussed, conflict in Lebanon is a result of a 
combination of factors – internal and external, political and socio-economic. Corm 
identifies the ethnic and sectarian ‘mosaic’ composition34 as a factor that is complemented 
by a rival tribal mentality,
 35
 and a certain instilled defensive and introverted tradition in 
the communities inhabiting the Mountain which resisted the establishment of strong central 
authorities.
36
 Furthermore, Corm gives due attention to the poor socio-economic condition 
facing the masses, and attributes the exasperation of these tensions and the catalyst to the 
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violence to foreign meddling and sponsorship.
37
 Caesar Farah notes that, from the late 
1830s, the European powers had developed a ‘protégé system that reached ludicrous 
proportions.’38  
From 1845 to 1858 a series of violent outbursts spread across the Mountain and 
villages were destroyed in reprisal attacks. The Ottomans had to intervene, again, to stop 
the fighting in the mixed areas, but as it became apparent that the inhabitants of Mount 
Lebanon would not be easily pacified, they sent Shekib Effendi ‘to establish order, confirm 
the Ottoman occupation of Mount Lebanon and disarm its inhabitants.’ In his attempt to 
bring order back to the Mountain, Effendi reformed the qa’im maqamiya. It is in the 
Règlement of Effendi that ‘the legalization of sectarian political representation in Mount 
Lebanon’ took place.39 Tensions rose as harsh economic conditions led to the commoners 
and muqatajis taking up arms against each other in both administrations; in the South, this 
meant a confrontation between the Christian peasants and the Druze muqatajis. The crisis 
was a revolt ‘against the ruling classes, on all sides’, but this also meant a sectarian civil 
war in the south.
40
 The ‘Events of 1860’ therefore took a sectarian rather than a socio-
economic character. 
For this and other reasons, these events are often compared to Lebanon’s 1975-1990 
war. Violence spilled-over to Syria; the masses were also suffering from severe economic 
conditions and were angered by the Empire-wide Tanzimat, or the Ottoman reforms that 
established ‘equality between Christians and Muslims.’ The reforms marked new heights 
in European ‘penetration’, and Shehadi notes that they promoted separatism instead of 
loyalty to the Central Authority; they therefore defeated their own purpose.
41
 They were 
seen as a ‘European and Christian conspiracy against Islam’; after all, the Ottomans were 
meant to be representing a Muslim Empire. It was not until the Syrian ‘events’ took place 
that international actors decided to intervene. For fear of the riots getting out of control and 
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spreading across the area, the European powers pressured the Ottoman Empire to send in 
its troops, and those in charge were punished.
42
  
As mentioned, Britain and France were the two main Europeans powers with direct 
competing interest in and influence on the events. While the British were interested in the 
area as a market for their goods and for access to the road to India, the French were 
interested in sericulture as a raw material to import. Furthermore, Napoleon III sent 6000 
troops to contribute to the pacification of Lebanon. Interestingly, Napoleon’s emissary was 
tasked with ‘an assignment to investigate the country’s Phoenician past’ side by side with 
its military task to reinstate order in cooperation with the Ottomans, to protect the 
Christians, and of course to ‘get the silk workers back to work.’43  
The end of the ‘events’ came about with the appointment of a new qa’im maqam, 
with the leader of the rebels of the north –Shahin – fleeing to the French consulate, and 
with the withdrawal of the French troops .  
The end of this civil war put the role of the great powers in governing the Lebanese 
crises at the forefront. The British, French, Prussian, Russian, and Austrian consuls, with 
the Ottoman Foreign Minister, formed an international commission in Beirut. Its 
proceedings lasted from October 1860 until March 1861 in order to oversee Mount 
Lebanon’s post-conflict reconstruction phase – political, social and economic. Even a 
‘legal tribunal was set up’ to convict key individuals involved in the fighting.44  Later 
discussions will show the similarities between the governance of pre- and post- 
independence Lebanese crises. 
 
3) The Mutasarrifiya  
 
 
The Ottoman Empire then instated a new system called the Mutasarrifiya. It ran from 
1861 until 1915 and It was referred to as the ‘long Peace.’45 The post-war environment 
allowed for economic and socio-political changes to take place. The Mutasarrifiya was 
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seen as the new age for Mount Lebanon and as an era of change and reform – but to what 
extent, and in whose favour?  
The structural characteristics of the Mutasarrifiya reflected the influences of foreign 
powers. The Mutasarrifiya was to be governed by a Christian administrator, who was 
appointed by Istanbul ‘with the approval of the guaranteeing European powers.’46 The 
reforms of the ‘Règlement Organique’ of 1861 had merged the two qa’im maqamiyas to 
form the Mutasarrifiya. Although under foreign sponsorship –France, Great Britain, 
Prussia, Russia and Italy – it was granted a considerable degree of autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire. The initial Règlement equally divided the councillors between the 
Christians and the Muslims.
47
 The Christians had lost militarily during the ‘events’ of 
1860, but it was the intervention of the European powers that ‘transformed the Christians’ 
military defeat into a political victory.’48   
However, while the sectarian discourse was becoming increasingly ossified due largely 
to foreign interventions, a parallel process of national identity formation was taking place. 
The Administrative Council
49
 would soon rise to become a hub of authority, and it would 
give birth to a new socio-political middle class. Members of the Council worked 
independently from the historical enclaves of power, whether the Maronite Church (backed 
by France) or the muqata’ji families (Muslim and Christian alike). Their positions in the 
Administrative Council allowed them to challenge the Mutassarif and the old muqata’ji 
families. Members of the Council pushed for more autonomy and for more reforms; 
according to Traboulsi, it is amongst their ranks that ideas of nationalism and 
independence grew.
50
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Further, as mentioned, Mount Lebanon’s economic choices were problematic. As it 
built and expanded its sericulture industry at the expense of others, it became crucially 
dependent on the Syrian heartland for most of its subsistence needs.
51
 Mount Lebanon was 
not self-sufficient, it became dependent on the European market, and on Beirut as its sole 
outlet for export.
52
 Economic prosperity therefore came with a cost. The Mutasarrifiya 
developed the sericulture industry to new levels in terms of cultivation and production. 
Almost ‘half of Mount Lebanon’s population was engaged in the silk economy’ writes 
Traboulsi. However, while sericulture stimulated the economy, it was at ‘the expense of 
other sectors’and it meant that Mount Lebanon had to depend on the Biqa’ and Syria.53 
Furthermore, it soon became apparent that the local economy could not absorb the post-
war ‘baby boom’ of the 1860s. Restricted employment options coupled with the new 
dramatic increase in population led to the first massive emigration wave.
54
 Mount Lebanon 
became largely dependent on remittances, but despite covering ‘some 45 percent of total 
revenue (…) [they] hardly covered the commercial deficit.’55 As will be shown, these 
economic choices would leave legacies for the post-independence era.
56
 These legacies 
would contribute to the instability of Lebanon. 
 
This first section was intended to highlight the recurrence and complementarity of 
political sectarianism, foreign intervention, and dire socio-economic conditions in 
Lebanon’s cycle of conflict.  
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II- Threat Perceptions and Governance in Post-Independence Lebanon: A 
Recipe for Insecurity 
 
While the Ottoman Empire weakened and became the ‘sick man of Europe,’ 
national aspirations for independence, as well as foreign aspirations into the area, grew 
considerably. As the Empire was on the brink of collapse, the allies devised a plan to split 
the Ottoman territories. Earlier, however, in 1915, Britain had concluded an agreement 
with Sherif Hussein of Mecca, to assist the Allies against the Ottoman Empire through an 
Arab revolt in exchange for an independent Arab Kingdom.
57
 With the assistance of France 
and Britain, Sherif Hussein and his sons kept their part of the bargain; in 1916 they 
‘launched the Arab Revolt’, and in 1918 proclaimed the Arab Kingdom from Damascus. 
Soon, however, French troops landed in Beirut, marched to Damascus, defeated the army 
of Faysal (Hussein’s son) and instated the mandate.58  
The agreement in which the Ottoman provinces were distributed between France, 
Britain, Russia and Italy was called the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
59
 Russia and Italy were to 
take over the Turkish province,
60
 while France and Britain took over the Arab provinces. 
France took Syria and Lebanon; Britain took Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. US President 
Wilson’s grand ideals of self-determination and rights of peoples were gaining popularity; 
therefore, under the League of Nation’s sponsorship the mandate system came to replace or 
disguise the unpopular colonial system. Accordingly, these states were to be ‘subject to the 
rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they 
[were] able to stand alone.’61  
In 1920, France established Greater Lebanon under the mandate system. The 
tragedies of World War I, a famine, mass emigration, and the economic legacies of earlier 
rule had reinforced the need for expansion. France therefore annexed coastal and inland 
Syrian cities. The addition of Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli and the Beqa’a almost doubled 
the territory of Lebanon. Such additions were vital for the creation of a viable country, 
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including both ‘the Mediterranean ports, vital for commerce, and the fertile inland plain, 
ensuring a measure of self-sufficiency in agriculture.’62 A few years after France had 
annexed Syrian territories to the former Mutassarifiya, in 1926, the State of Greater 
Lebanon was transformed into the Republic of Lebanon. Finally, in 1943, at the height of 
World War II, Lebanon gained its independence from France.
63
  
 
Lebanon is a republic with a parliamentary system.
64
 It does not have a state religion 
but recognizes 18 sects.
65
 Contrary to widespread opinion, ‘Lebanon is not the only 
country in the region with a rich religious diversity’. Each of the religious communities 
found in Lebanon has branches in neighbouring Palestine, Syria and Iraq. The difference 
however, lies in the absence of an overwhelming domestic sectarian majority.
66
 The 
Lebanese system is based on a balance of power between these main confessional groups.
67
 
Furthermore, a particular custom, stipulates that the public service and high government 
functions, both civilian and military ‘are to be equitably distributed’ between the main 
sectarian communities.
68
 The sectarian distribution is further reinforced in the unwritten 
National Pact of 1943: the President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister to be a Sunni, 
and the Speaker of Parliament to be a Shia.
69
 The National Pact represented the consensus 
reached between the two main religious communities – that the Muslims would ‘renounce 
the aim of an Arab Union in return for Christian renunciation of Western Protection.’70 
Although the Lebanese political system was initially designed to ensure representation for 
a diverse population, it has many flaws and has prevented integration. The system 
periodically erupts into crisis; the most serious was the 1975 civil war that lasted almost 20 
years. Like the pre-independence period, the cessation of hostilities has required a 
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negotiated agreement between politico-religious leaders under the auspices of foreign 
actors.  
 
1) The identity discourse 
 
Looking at the matter from a ‘conventional’ point of view,71 two main parallel 
identities have dominated the Lebanese discourse: what some prefer to categorize as a 
Christian vs. a Muslim identity, or what others refer to as a Lebanese vs. an Arab identity.  
This traditional narrative explains that, on the one hand, the Maronites believed that 
Lebanon as we now know it – Greater Lebanon – was crafted by France for the sake of the 
Christians.
72
 In the words of Fuad Ajami: ‘Lebanon had always been, at its heart, a 
‘Christian homeland’’73. Therefore, not only should Christians be rewarded for it, but it is 
also up to them to make sure that Lebanon maintains its individuality in the region.
74
 
Furthermore, it was the Maronite presence in Mount Lebanon (with the Druze) that pressed 
the central government of the Ottoman Empire to grant non-Muslims equal religious status. 
Moreover, the ‘special status’ of Lebanon was believed to have been responsible for 
developing a culture of openness, coexistence, and an early form of democratic practice 
and representation. Accordingly, this attributed a pioneering role to Lebanon. However, the 
Maronites still felt threatened; they had been haunted by the fear of being sucked in the 
regional overwhelming Muslim majority; hence their traditional alliance to the Big Sister – 
France.   
In the opinion of the Muslim population (and, also, other Christians such as the Greek 
Orthodox), Lebanon is an artificial colonial creation and ‘the French were latter day 
crusaders (…) they had torn them away from Syria.’75 This partially explains the unrest 
that resulted from the occasions whereby the ruling elites broke with their neighbours and 
looked to the West.
76
 However, it was the combination of historical, regional, political, 
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cultural and socio-economic factors exacerbated by exclusivist sectarian identities which 
proved to be dangerous. When France cropped and added the extra provinces from Greater 
Syria to Mount Lebanon to create an arguably viable entity, it joined together unwilling 
groups. It is important to note that, despite the mainstream sectarian narrative, this 
unwillingness was not only sectarian-based. It was also ideological and cultural: the rural 
and urban/coastal dichotomy is one example,
77
 and the Syrian National Party (SNP)
78
 is an 
ideological example. Furthermore, struggles have not only taken place between religious 
communities; internal struggles aimed at defining their own respective boundaries have 
repeatedly occurred.
79
  Examples such as those from the civil war of 1975 as well as from 
the commoners’ revolt of the 1820s are cases in point. This new and artificial union 
spurred threat perceptions similar to the pre-independence period: one group feared 
disappearing within an overwhelming majority and losing its political, historical and 
cultural heritage; the other, forcefully detached from its roots, feared and resented being 
brought under the authority of a minority and of foreign influence.
80
 As a result, while the 
one felt disoriented, the other looked for and took pride in a non-Arab ancestry.
81
  
 
The sectarian narrative is related to the dominant place sectarianism occupies in 
Lebanese politics, and to its place in constitutional as well as legal private matters. 
However, Ussama Makdisi contends that sectarianism is an artificial practice and narrative 
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introduced under the Ottoman rule. The Ottomans, as well as the European powers, had 
transformed religion into the ‘only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic 
basis for political claims’ in the reforms of the Tanzimat.82 Domestically, sectarianism was 
locally adopted when ‘Lebanese society was opened, and indeed opened itself, to Ottoman 
and European discourses of reform’, and as the old regime, based on ‘elite hierarchy in 
which secular rank rather than religious affiliation defined politics, was discredited.’83 
Nevertheless, the institutionalization of sectarianism outlived the Ottoman rule, the French 
mandate, and the first republic. It should also be noted that sectarianism has also often 
been overstated and abused.
84
  
This study has been cautious about reproducing sectarian discourse, because I feel 
it depicts Lebanese complexity in a reductionist and simplistic manner. Nevertheless, it 
must be examined in engaging with mainstream narratives.  
Over the years, there have been many voices calling for the abolition of 
sectarianism. However, so far, academics have reported ‘Christians’ to have been against it 
– unsurprisingly, given the interest of some in preserving the status quo.85 Others have 
believed that sectarianism is the plague of the Lebanese system and had to be replaced by a 
secular one. Some have viewed these claims as intended to weaken the Maronite ruling 
establishment, particularly in the case of Muslim and Druze traditional leaders rather than 
the ideological parties such as the Syrian Nationalist Party and Communist Party members. 
The deep-rootedness of sectarianism may be traced to the Personal Status Law.
86
 Initially, 
this law was introduced to allow the Muslim communities to interpret the Sharia’ in 
personal and family matters, according to their respective sects, and by their respective 
courts.
87
 Personal status laws were then enacted by parliament for the Druze and the 
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Christians.
88
 Given that personal status matters can only be dealt with in religious courts, 
every citizen must be registered to one of the religious communities; otherwise no law 
would apply to him/her. Sectarianism is therefore at the core of one’s personal legal 
existence. For different reasons, Christian and Muslim ruling elites have not supported the 
abolition of sectarianism. Nevertheless, this study contends that the existence of sectarian 
personal status laws need not be an impediment to progress and assimilation if the option 
for a secular alternative is provided.
89
  
This study accepts that the dichotomous categorization often referred to in this chapter 
is problematic, and it is necessary to underscore the thinness of the sectarian narrative, as 
there are several factors that undermine it. First, most waves of violence which fit the 
timeframe of this study have also involved ‘intracommunal social violence;’90 therefore, it 
would be a fallacy to treat the sectarian groups as ‘uncomplicated and pure sectarian 
identities,’ and for that matter, to assume that sectarian identities have been static.91 
Furthermore, it is also a fallacy to assume that individuals would be willing to engage in 
what would be seen as an ‘explosion’ of social violence on solely sectarian grounds; as 
Makdisi argues, to do so is to assume that ‘sectarian identities and mobilization operate 
outside of history’ and social, economic, cultural and political realities.92 Having 
considered this, violence in Lebanon is often ‘treated as being the continuation of sectarian 
(confessional) politics by other means.’93 However, this discussion is intended to warn 
against reducing conflict to one of its dimensions; the danger of doing so risks treating 
sectarianism as the ‘disease that prevents modernisation’94 when there are other 
dimensions to be addressed—most notably, a static system based on rivalry and 
monopolization.  
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2) Weak state allegiance and the mirage of success 
 
During the early years of independence, traditional leaders of rural areas actively 
sought to maintain the status quo.
95
 They were successful in rallying people against the 
government while posing as the voice of the underprivileged. However, the 
underdevelopment of the rural areas was as much the responsibility of the government as it 
was of the traditional leaders. Nevertheless, successive governments did not have 
countrywide development strategies or policies; they neglected the rural areas and left the 
matter to an ‘unbridled capitalist initiative.’96 This allowed traditional sectarian leaders to 
maintain their hold on their respective constituencies, to the detriment of state allegiance. 
Patron-client relations or clientalism has long flourished in Lebanon.
97
 Since 
independence, the state largely failed to replace patron-client relations as the main mode of 
‘organization, interaction, and exchange’. Instead, the latter evolved and ‘crystallize[d]’ in 
more modern forms. In fact the political system in Lebanon reinforces clientalistic 
relations.
98
 It is a system which places leaders as politico-sectarian ‘local za’ims not 
national heroes (...) [that] serve the national purpose’;99 therefore, clientalism and 
favouritism underpin the system.  
Having considered this, many scholars have argued that “on the surface”, Lebanon 
after independence and throughout the 1960s appeared as the ultimate success story. The 
freedoms in Lebanon’s economic system and society were unparalleled in the region; its 
economy was service-oriented and benefited from readily available, trained and educated 
workers. Taking both these factors into consideration, it served as a depot for Arab and 
foreign capital and investments.
100
 Furthermore, the Lebanese had a pioneering role in 
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developing and promulgating the political trends that swept the Middle East.
101
 It also 
served as a hub for journalism, universities, trade and agricultural exports to the Arab 
markets, as well as serving as a primary tourist destination – Lebanon at the time was the 
uncontested avant-garde.
102
 These successes had reinforced the idea of “Lebanism” over 
“Arabism.” It finally seemed that Lebanon was playing a bigger role than merely that of 
the protector of Christians; it now served as the ‘natural intermediary between the Arabs 
and the West.’ Lebanon acted as a gateway between the East and West whereby cultures 
and ideologies from either side were screened into moderation; it was the place where the 
West could be delicately introduced to the customs of the Arab world, and the Arab 
world’s first line of exposure to Western culture.103  The Lebanese were ‘exposed, at the 
popular level, to every new idea or ideology, every religious, political or cultural current 
that [arose] and [spread] across the region;’ 104 the different ideologies brought in from all 
sides resonated in its diverse society. Nevertheless, one could argue that the lack of 
cohesion and satisfaction with the existing model made the Lebanese look elsewhere for a 
better example. This has been both a virtue and a flaw, making it at the same time free and 
easily penetrable and vulnerable. The new role espoused to Lebanon, however, did not 
stand on strong pillars; the image that was portrayed was inflated, as it did not extend 
across Lebanese territory. 
All in all, how long would this ‘success’ last? Many fundamental issues had not yet 
been addressed. How long could the government alienate the aspirations of the largest 
growing portion of its population? Although the fruits of this success were felt across 
sectarian lines,
105
 many felt they had been castrated from power and rallied their enclaves 
against the ruling establishment; taken from the sectarian angle, at the time, it was the 
Maronite elites. Relative stability had depended on the careful balance of the vital interests 
of the varied confessional groups. This meant that sectarian leaders (in the form of 
traditional families) rather than political parties had been the main actors in society, and 
consequently in the political system.
106
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In this sense, despite the apparent cultural and socio-economic successes of the early 
independent years, grievances were growing underneath the surface. As will be discussed 
in the section dealing with the 1958 crisis, regional disparity and inequitable development 
were stark. Furthermore, a sense of political exclusion compounded the socio-economic 
factors and gradually mobilized people – alas on a sectarian basis. According to Salibi, a 
scholar of the traditional sectarian narrative, ‘Muslims rightly saw themselves as being 
grossly underprivileged[;] they certainly had a share in government and administration; 
just as certainly, they had no direct say in ultimate decision making.’107 The Muslim 
community, however, took stances that ‘frightened the Christians’. Their allegiance was 
perceived to be more Arab and Syrian than it was Lebanese, as they actively adopted pan-
Arab causes despite ‘[compromising] the very sovereignty of the state, and even its 
territorial security and integrity’. This was illustrated by their vigorous desire in 1958 to 
join the Egyptian-Syrian union under Nasser; a decade later, in the Cairo Agreement of 
1969 and their support for and joining forces with the PLO.
108
 From the Christian point of 
view, they were ‘irresponsible and blatantly unpatriotic’ and therefore could not be trusted 
with ‘their rightful share in national decision-making at the highest level’.109 However, the 
Muslims, who by now had reached a demographic superiority, could no longer accept such 
a settlement.  
When, under the French mandate, the only census was taken in 1932, the Christians 
were the majority; and therefore, it was justifiable that at independence they were awarded 
with the presidency and other posts, such as command of the armed forces and a 6:5 ratio 
of parliamentary seats. However, by the 1950s that was no longer the case: the Muslim 
population was increasing at a fast rate while the Christians emigrated in large numbers 
and had a much lower birth rate. ‘Hardly anyone doubted’ that the Muslims outnumbered 
the Christians.
110
 According to Randal, this ‘further [eroded] their only marginal 
population edge, thus over time, the Christians began to wield a disproportionate amount 
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of power.’111 In other words, Muslim dissatisfaction was growing and was paving the way 
for a crisis. 
It was only a matter of time before the system needed to adapt or before a shift in 
power had to occur. The crisis developed into political violence, first in the 1958 armed 
revolt (or mini-civil war); then, almost two decades later, it developed into a full scale civil 
war in 1975. The latter would be the longest and bloodiest war that modern Lebanon went 
through; it involved many regional and international actors, to the extent that it was 
described as the ‘the war of others on Lebanese land’.112 Nevertheless, it is important to be 
careful not to remove all responsibility from the Lebanese; Lebanon has not always been 
the victim, it has often been an ‘agent too’.113 
 
3) Governance and insecurity in the war order of 1975–1990 
 
Although Lebanon has enjoyed the reputation of being a hub for religious, political, 
economic and personal freedoms, its post-independence formula proved to be 
problematic.
114
 As a result, Lebanon has suffered from waves of political violence. 
Lebanon’s 1975 internationalized war span a little short of two decades (1975–1990). In a 
territory no larger than a mere 10,452 km2 and a population of about three and a half 
million (in addition to some 500,000 Palestinian refugees), the violence affected nearly 
everyone—civilian and fighters alike. The war has left a grave imprint on Lebanon’s 
history: of forced and systematic mass displacement, indiscriminate killing and reprisals, 
rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearance, taking place on a sectarian, 
ethnic, and political basis. Estimates differ, but a reliable study by Lebanese statisticians 
Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou Rjeili notes that some 2.7% of Lebanon’s population was 
killed, 4% was wounded, 30% was displaced, and about one third of the population 
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emigrated.
115
 Moreover, 90% of fatalities and 86% of those injured were civilians; 0.36% 
of the population was permanently disabled, and 0.75% of the population forcibly 
disappeared.
116
  Reports have documented the dire human insecurity civilians have been 
subjected to from militias and armed groups, from Lebanese state actors,
117
 from armed 
Palestinian organizations, and from foreign state actors.
118
 The indiscriminate nature of 
war tactics and systematic targeting of civilians severely threatened individuals’ 
inalienable rights to life and physical integrity. War protagonists resorted to mass violence 
for revenge, for instilling fear and forcing inhabitants from the opposite camp to flee in 
order to homogenize areas;
119
 these were often described as necessary measures for self-
defence.
120
 There is widespread consensus that numerous massacres were committed.
121
 
Moreover, the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 is seen as the ‘single most violent incident 
of the war.’122 According to Theodor Hanf, it cost the life of at least 17,000 people and 
wounded some 30,000.
123
 Other tactics that indiscriminately took the lives of thousands of 
civilians became ‘“habitual” forms of mass violence.’ These consisted of ‘sniper fire, 
murder…kidnappings, road-block executions on the basis of people’s sectarian identity, 
revenge killings of civilians, torture, wanton shelling of residential areas’ and car-bombs or 
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other planted bombs.
124
 Civilians were caught in the midst of fighting between and within 
the main camps. A notable example of this is the heavy loss of civilian life between 1985-
1987 in the ‘War of the Camps’, which consisted of infighting between the former 
members of the opposition (see below LNM) to control the camps.
125
 Corm rightly 
therefore highlighted the difficulty to resist and escape the wars of the militias.
126
  
 
a) Going to War 
 
Oversimplification has often led to misunderstanding conflict in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, an overview of the events leading up to the war is required. The root causes 
of Lebanon’s war have had varied dimensions. The years leading up to 1975 were 
enmeshed with socio-economic and political unrest. Domestic unrest revolved around the 
failure of the system to absorb pressure stemming from demographic changes, popular 
aspirations, and socio-economic realities. Domestic factors as well as the regional 
dimension polarized the Lebanese largely along sectarian lines.
127
 Demands (expressed 
through a series of strikes and demonstrations) revolved around exploitation, social 
injustice, and system-wide detachment from popular needs. Greek Catholic Bishop of 
Beirut, Gregoire Haddad, noted that ‘it was not change that threatened security; rather the 
current conditions constituted the gravest threat to it.’ Bishop Haddad called for secularism 
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and reforms to reduce social inequality.
128
 Between pressures for reform and the status quo 
or aspirations for change and threat perceptions, the Lebanese system eventually broke.  
A central factor in the unfolding of events was the Cairo Accord of 1969 which 
formally authorized the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese 
territory.
129
 Palestinians fida’iyin (fighters) had been active in Lebanon. It was not long, 
however, until the conservative leadership grew increasingly anxious about the popular 
support for the Palestinian cause, calls for Lebanon to participate more actively in the 
Arab-Israeli wars, and Israeli reprisals.
130
 A number of confrontations between the 
Lebanese army and the PLO had escalated the tension on the streets. The government 
declared a state of emergency and the army clamped down on the Palestinian Fida’yin and 
the opposition leaving numerous casualties. Syria exerted pressure on the Lebanese 
government by closing its borders with Lebanon and imposing economic sanctions; an 
agreement was brokered by then Egyptian president Abd el-Nasser and was signed in 
Cairo between Yasser Arafat and General Emile Boustani (commander in chief of the 
LAF).
131
 The Accord was intended to regularize the Palestinian armed presence in 
Lebanon,
132
 to appease rising tension as a result of the curtailing role of the Lebanese 
Army’s Intelligence Bureau (the ‘Deuxieme Bureaux’), and end the confrontations 
between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian fighters. The Accord also established a 
‘form of extra-territoriality’ for the Palestinian camps, and as Corm notes, the Accord 
‘served as a pretext for the state of Israel to hold the Lebanese government responsible for 
Palestinian attacks from Lebanon’ and to justify its reprisal campaigns and its invasions.133   
The Palestinian arsenal and the relocation of the PLO headquarters to Lebanon
134
 
transformed the dynamic of confrontation between the conservatives and the opposition. 
As the latter forged an increasingly close relationship with the PLO, by the early 1970s it 
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became clear that the Phalange and the National Liberal Party
135
 were acquiring weapons 
and training—with knowledge of the army.136 Soon, the situation would spiral out of 
control. 
The Palestinian issue, however, only exacerbated an already precarious situation. 
The power-sharing system that Lebanon had adopted at independence had not evolved with 
demographic and political changes. Power was monopolized, the authorities resisted 
regional political currents mobilizing the Lebanese youth, and the ‘Deuxieme Bureaux’ 
was increasingly establishing a police state. Against this backdrop, the state was refusing 
calls for reform.  The Palestinian question was but the tip of the iceberg.  
 
That being said, two main camps developed in the years leading up to the war. The 
Lebanese Front formed the right-wing ‘Christian’ alliance and was led by the Phalange 
party; and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the leftist and ‘Muslim’ alliance, was 
led by Kamal Joumblat, head of Progressive Socialist Party. The two camps took opposing 
stances vis-à-vis the Palestinian armed presence. The LNM saw an opportunity to align 
Lebanon with the pan Arab Nasserite-Communist axis and to bring about long-awaited 
domestic reform. The Lebanese Front however saw the Palestinian presence as a threat to 
the status quo: to a Christian-favouring distribution of power, dissociation from the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and a Westward-looking Lebanese identity. As of 1973 confrontations 
between the Lebanese army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the main 
Lebanese protagonists intensified.
137
 It was not until 1975, however, that polarization, 
mobilization, and political readiness to spread the fighting aligned. The spark came on 13 
April 1975. What is known as the ‘Ain al-Rummaneh bus incident’ represented the official 
start of the Lebanese War.
138
 Members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) shot at a Phalange congregation leaving a church service in the eastern 
Beirut suburb of Ain al-Rummaneh, killing 3 persons including the bodyguard of 
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prominent Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel.
139
 In what seemed to be a retaliation 
operation, Phalange gunmen gunned down a bus heading to the Tall al-Zaatar Palestinian 
camp killing its 27 civilian passengers. Soon after, fighting broke out between the two 
main factions and spread across Beirut. What became known as the ‘Ain al-Rummaneh bus 
incident’ represents the start of Lebanon’s 15-year war. 
 
The war unfolded over a number of stages; actors multiplied and shifted alliances 
as the war progressed. The war consisted of ‘more or less related conflicts between shifting 
alliances of Lebanese groups and external actors’.140 An array of regional and international 
actors played an integral part in the conflict. Foreign protagonists consisted of the 
Palestinian factions, Israel, and Syria. International peacekeeping efforts consisted of a 
Multinational Force (MNF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); 
foreign support or even patronage extended from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, to the 
United States, France etc. This illustrates the role of regional and international actors in the 
‘governance’ of the Lebanese conflict—much of which would exacerbate rather than 
contain or dissipate the situation.
141
 
 
b) Phases of the war 
 
Broadly speaking, the Lebanese war can be divided into five phases. The first 
phase, commonly known as the two-year war, lasted from April 1975 to November 
1976.
142
 It was characterized by inter-sectarian violence. Following the “bus incident” 
indiscriminate collective punishment quickly spread. Checkpoints were mounted and sect-
based killing terrorised the population. In addition, a series of sectarian-based massacres 
took place.
143
  During this phase, threats to physical security were most prevalent in mixed 
areas and in what would become border areas or the front lines. The violence took the form 
of ethnic/sectarian cleansing and resulted in mass displacement and forced homogenisation 
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of regions.
144
 The ‘battle of the Hotels’ in central Beirut between the Lebanese Front and 
the LNM (with the PLO) resulted in demarcating the boundaries between the two main 
camps. These boundaries would last for much of the remainder of the war. 
The second phase spanned from November 1976 until June 1982. It started with the 
entry of the Syrian forces at the request of then president Frangieh (and the approval of 
both the US and Israel) to prevent the defeat of the government (dominated by the 
Lebanese Front) by the LNM and the PLO.
145
 Further, in 1978 Israel launched ‘Operation 
Litani’, marking its first occupation of the south of Lebanon where it established a 
‘security zone’ south of the Litani River of which its proxy, the South Lebanon Army 
(SLA), was given charge.
 146
 As a result, UNSC resolution 425 established the first 
generation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ‘confirm Israeli 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon’.147 A series of mediations and cessation of hostilities 
failed. The Syrian intervention was legitimized as an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF).
148
 The 
Lebanese Front and Syria, however, broke their alliance, the ADF’s mission ended, and all 
out fighting resumed. 
The third phase spanned from June 1982 to February 1984. It marked the 
substitution of Syrian governance of the Lebanese conflict for an Israeli one. The Israeli 
second invasion of June 1982 extended to a siege and a massive air raid campaign of West 
Beirut.
149
 The intensity but apparent futility of the violence prompted international action. 
US special envoy Philip Habib succeeded in August 1982 to negotiate the end of the Israeli 
siege and the withdrawal of the PLO.
150
 On 12 August 1982, the siege was lifted. On 21 
August, a Multinational Force (MNF) was deployed to oversee a peaceful withdrawal.
151
 
By the end of August, PLO forces had withdrawn from Beirut and the MNF had left 
                                                 
144
 Traboulsi, 2007, p 238. 
145
 Ibid, p 197. 
146
 The SLA used to be known as the Free Lebanon Army (before 1980); it is a splinter group of the 
Army of Free Lebanon which broke away from the regular armed forces in 1976. 
147
 See UNIFIL, "Unifil Mandate,"  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml.(accessed on 10/3/2013). 
148
 See below. 
149
 The invasion came in response to the attempt of assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the UK; ‘it 
made little difference to the Israelis that the assassination had been carried out by a renegade Palestinian 
group (…) a blood foe of the PLO’. Israel used this incident as an opportunity to destroy the PLO ‘and 
putting in place a pliant government in Beirut that would (…) enter into a formal peace agreement with 
Israel’. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007). p 33.  
150
 Traboulsi, 2007, p 215. 
151
 The Force consisted mostly of American and French but also of Italian contingents; a smaller British 
participation joined the MNF in 1983.  
180 
 
Lebanese soil.
152
 However, as the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel led to 
the massacres of Sabra and Chatila,
153
 the MNF was re-deployed. By the end of this phase 
the governance of Lebanese territory was effectively divided between the two, now 
opposing, spheres of influence: the Syrian and the Israeli.  
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beirut and later from the Shouf to the south 
was particularly violent.
 154
 The violence that accompanied the retreat of the Israeli forces 
was intended to re-establish the status quo prior the invasion.
155
 Fighting between 
Lebanese groups was indeed intended to regain lost turf but also took the form of reprisal 
to the force imposed by the Israeli-Lebanese Front axis.  
This period, however, also represented the start of a wave of attacks against Western 
targets.
156
 Most notorious were the April 1983 suicide attack on the US embassy in West 
Beirut, and the October 1983 twin suicide attack on the US and French headquarters of the 
MNF.
157
 As the presidential election of Phalange candidates was imposed by Israel and the 
US,
158
 the presence of the MNF, especially the American and French contingents, became 
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associated with the Lebanese Front. It would soon get ‘embroiled’ in the war.159 The MNF 
incurred heavy casualties and between February and March 1984, troops of the MNF 
withdrew from Lebanon.
160
 
The fourth phase spanned from 1984–1988. It mostly consisted of intra-group wars 
which attempted to consolidate hegemony over respective cantons. The fighting in the final 
phase, spanning between 1989-1990 was intended to establish a favourable status quo for 
the post-war period,
161
 and to expel the Syrian military presence.
162
  
 
c) Armed non-State Actors and the governance of Lebanon  
 
As mentioned above, both camps gathered a number of political parties that soon 
turned into militias. The composition of the two camps changed as the conflict mutated and 
intra-group fighting eliminated some or spurred new groups. I will briefly discuss four 
main parties/militias.   
The Phalange, one of the oldest ‘Christian’ parties of Lebanon, was formed in 
1936 as a ‘paramilitary organization.’ It grew in reaction to calls for re-incorporating 
Lebanon with Syria; it militantly advocated the protection of a Lebanese identity and an 
independent Lebanon.
163
 In June of 1976, Lebanese right-wing ‘Christian’ militias of the 
Lebanese Front launched an attack on the Palestinian camps of Tal al-Zaatar and Jisr el-
Basha. Following the attack, a number of these militias came together under the command 
of Bachir Gemayel
164
 and formed the Lebanese Forces (LF). In its efforts to fight the 
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Palestinian factions and their Lebanese allies in the LNM, the LF like the Phalange, forged 
a close relationship with Israel. Both would become central actors in Lebanon’s war. Of 
equal importance, although on the opposite camp, is the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP) which was formed in 1949 by Druze leader Kamal Joumblat. Like the Phalange 
party, it advocated for an independent Lebanon, but with an ‘Arab face’. It challenged 
Maronite hegemony, and called for reforming the Lebanese system.
165
 At the onset of the 
war, the PSP was calling for secularism and for Lebanon to participate more actively in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Amal (or hope), the acronym for Afwaj al-Mouqawama al-Loubnaniya or the 
Regiments of the Lebanese Resistance, grew as the military wing of Harakat al-
Mahroumin (or The Movement of the Deprived). Amal was formed by Imam Musa al-
Sader in the 1970s.
166
 The Shia community had been traditionally politically marginalized, 
‘impoverished and underdeveloped’.167 The Movement established a ‘network of schools, 
clinics, hospitals and charitable organizations’.168 As Sader challenged traditional Shia 
clergy
169
 and the traditional feudal za’ims, he would initially forge close relationships with 
personalities in the central authority.
170
 His discourse on the deprived and the marginalized 
initially gathered support from various confessional and social classes. The sectarian turn 
and regional-basis of his discourse, however, would mobilize and later radicalize the Shia 
community. Sader would ‘impos[e] himself as principle spokesman for the south and the 
Shia community’.171 As the government failed to respond to Shia demands and 
redistribution in favour of the south, his discourse warned of revolution and threatened 
civil disobedience.
172
 Amal was initially trained by Fatah and at the onset of the war it 
aligned with the LNM coalition. Its relationship with both Fatah and the LNM, however, 
was complicated and short-lived.
173
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The Shia ‘political awakening’ is largely attributed to Sader.174 In fact, in 1967, primarily 
as a result of his good relations with the ruling establishment, he succeeded in pressuring 
parliament to institutionalize the political presence of the Shia community.
175
 Article 1 of 
Law no. 72/76 of 19 December 1967, for example, ‘recognized the right of the 
representatives of the Shi’i community to act and express themselves “in conformity with 
the fatwas emanating from the supreme authority of the community in the world”’. This 
was not unprecedented as most other sects follow a “supreme” non-Lebanese religious 
authority.
176
 The ground-breaking development came in Article 5 for establishing the High 
Islamic Shia Council (HISC) with the role of ‘defending the rights’ of the Shia community 
and ‘improving its social and economic conditions’. Two years later, the HISC was created 
with Sader as its president and in 1970 the government ‘disbursed $10 million in aid for 
the south’.177 In 1978, on a trip to Libya for the commemoration of Gaddafi’s ascension to 
power, Sader disappeared and remains so till this day.
178
 His disappearance would cause 
splinters in Amal—over its leadership, ideology and role in the war. Despite starting out as 
an ‘adjunct militia’ and going through troubled years during the early 80s, Amal ‘expanded 
into a political reform movement’ which gathered mass support from Shia middle and 
lower classes that shared a disdain to traditional Shia za’ims (or leaders) and were looking 
for a place in the Lebanese system.
179
  
Hezbollah’s (or the Party of God) birth is often traced back to 1982—the year of 
the Israeli invasion and the start of attacks against Western targets. At the time, however, 
no coherent structure or organization grouped the founders of Hezbollah.
180
 Instead, a 
group of young Shia fundamentalists inspired by the Islamic Revolution, trained by the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and disaffected by Amal’s moderate reformist approach,181 
sought to launch military Jihad (or struggle) against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. 
Both Iran and to a lesser extent Syria had strategic motives for sponsoring Hezbollah. For 
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Iran, the Party of God was an opportunity to spread the ideals of the Islamic Revolution to 
the Shia communities, acquire regional presence and front-line access toward fighting 
Israel. Syria used Hezbollah to score points against Israel and the US, and, when needed, to 
‘keep its Lebanese allies (…) in line’. Syria’s support therefore ‘was ambivalent’.182 It 
wasn’t until 1985 that Hezbollah broke the cover of secrecy and shared its manifesto in an 
open letter emphasizing the groups’ association with the Islamic Revolution in order to 
liberate the oppressed from imperialism—whether it be from super powers, the corrupt 
international system, and the corrupt Lebanese system. Disenchanted with the prevailing 
system as it failed to end exploitation, occupation and violence, it stressed a self-help 
approach ‘under the banner of Islam’. It thought of the US and Israel as the main sources 
of ‘suffering’ for Lebanese. 183 Its aim was therefore to ‘expel the Americans, the French, 
and their allies (…) ‘putting an end to any colonialist entity’ in Lebanon.184 Theologically, 
it adopted Khomeini’s doctrine of the wilayat al-faqih (or the guardianship of the jurist). 
The combination of militancy and fundamentalism that Hezbollah called for have formed 
the basis for Hezbollah’s terrorist label.185  Judith Palmer Harik, however, stresses the need 
to forgo this ‘onerous’ label by differentiating the ‘unique politico-military situation’ in 
Lebanon and the tactics employed by Hezbollah (since its formal inception) from those 
employed by such groups as Hamas or the Islamic Jihad.
186
 Hezbollah showed pragmatism 
in choosing to participate in Lebanese politics. It would soon prioritize the fight against 
Israel and abandoned earlier discourses on an Islamic regime in Lebanon.
187
 At the end of 
the war, Hezbollah’s resistance role was legitimized by the Lebanese government, being 
the only group legitimately allowed to bear arms and fight the Israeli occupation. Between 
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the 80s and the 90s, Hezbollah therefore made the transition from a radical clandestine 
group to a mainstream movement, political party and a national resistance—a transition 
often referred to as ‘Lebanonization’. Although fears over radicalism remain, Hezbollah 
gathers much legitimacy in relation to its resistance and social roles.
188
 Hezbollah’s social 
services and successful reconstruction programs contrast with the corruption and 
incompetencies of the government’s efforts.189 That being said, Hezbollah remains a 
controversial actor to local, regional, and international stakeholders. In 2006, Lebanon saw 
deep polarization over Hezbollah’s operation against an IDF patrol which gave Israel 
reason to launch a devastating 33-day war—the July-War—on all of Lebanon.190 At the 
time being, Hezbollah is facing strong domestic opposition for its involvement in the 
Syrian war.
191
  
 To return to the 1975-1990 war, both Amal and Hezbollah’s substantial military 
involvement in the war came late. While Amal first joined the LNM, it would later fiercely 
fight the PLO and the PSP. Hezbollah, for its part, limited itself to fighting the Israeli 
occupation and Western presence in Lebanon. Later in the war, Hezbollah and Amal 
engaged in intra-communal fighting. To this day, neither ‘can claim an overwhelming 
majority following’ among the Shia. But in the 90s, ‘Hezbollah was certainly the best-
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organized political phenomenon and enjoyed the largest base of popular support’.192 
Despite their rivalry, both converged on Hezbollah’s resistance role for the post-war era. 
 These are parties/militias that survived and retained a strong presence in the post-
war era. It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the role of other parties/militias in 
the war and its aftermath. On the side of the Lebanese Front, other militias were the 
National Liberals Party, The Tigers, The Tanzim (the organization), and the Guardians of 
the Cedars. Although a loyal ally of Damascus and staunch opponent of the Lebanese 
Front, the Marada is a ‘Maronite’ party which survived the war. 193 On the side of the 
LNM, aside from the PSP, ‘there was a plethora of other small Nasserist, Arab nationalist, 
and socialist organizations — and their ubiquitous splinter movements — whose patronage 
was divided among the various radical states (Syria, Libya, and Iraq)’.194 The Mourabitoun 
(financed by Libya), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Army of Arab 
Lebanon and the Populist Nasserist Organization (trained by the PLO) are such groups.
195
  
In addition, the Communist Party and the Organization for Communist Action, played an 
integral part in the fighting. These are the fathers of resistance in Lebanon. Although active 
since the first 1978 Israeli invasion, in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 invasion, the 
Communist Party, the Organisation for Communist Action, and the Socialist Arab Action 
Party created the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) as ‘an umbrella for’ all 
groups fighting the occupation.
196
 As the influence and organization of these groups 
dissipated, the role of the resistance moved to Amal and eventually to Hezbollah. 
 It would of course also be wrong to underestimate the role of armed non-Lebanese 
actors, notably the various Palestinian factions, the Syrian forces and proxies, the IDF, as 
well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
197
 That said, some scholars have 
disproportionately attributed the war to foreign actors, notably to the Palestinian armed 
presence and the role of regional and foreign powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
198
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 With respect to the Palestinian factions, their allegiances, their positions and role in 
the Lebanese conflict vary considerably.
199
 Broadly speaking, Fatah, the armed wing of the 
PLO constituted the biggest fighting force; the pro-Syrian Sa'iqa came second. The 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its splinter group the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were radical Marxists. Another splinter group, 
the PFLP-General Command ‘was first under Libyan patronage, but then became a full-
fledged Syrian proxy and remains so to this day’.200 Another group, the Arab Liberation 
Front was ‘pro-Iraqi’ and the Palestine Liberation Army’s units ‘were under the command 
of the respective Arab armies in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan’.201 
 
d) Assessing the role of armed non-state actors: forced cantonization and 
human insecurity  
 
As the war increasingly entrenched the polarization between the Lebanese Front 
and the LNM, groups engaged in the purification of their areas of control from “intruders”. 
They soon succeeded in establishing separate cantons with more or less sectarian/ethnic 
homogenization. Fatahland, Marounistan, and the Druze Mountain are commonly referred 
to areas that witnessed the most severe homogenization—although West Beirut and some 
areas in the Bequa’ and south of Lebanon maintained some sectarian diversity.202  It has 
been argued that the proliferation of cantons or mini-states has been a reaction to post-1982 
(Israeli invasion) Phalange hegemony over the state. Each camp endeavoured to strengthen 
its hold on power either to emulate the “successes” of, or to protect against the 
expansionism of, the ‘Phalange state’. 
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Cantonization required that non-state actors develop an elaborate structure for 
‘public and social services’ within their districts to replace the vacuum left by paralysed 
state institutions.
203
 For example, owing to cantonization, state employees and civil 
servants from outside certain districts could not make it to work and they could not be 
replaced. Law provides that a certain quota of government functionaries needs to be 
‘Christian’, hence they could not be replaced by ‘Muslim’ functionaries and vice versa. 
Moreover, there was often no government to appoint new civil servants. Interestingly, 
many of the militias set up Popular Committees
204
 ‘that paralleled that of the state’s service 
agencies’ to provide services such as civil defence, garbage collection, schools, ‘public 
security and law enforcement’, shelter and reconstruction. Health committees and judiciary 
committees were also created.
205
  Yet, the services the state could no longer provide were a 
result of the militias’ war. As the state lost its monopoly over the use of force and its 
functions were substantially reduced, effective control of territory was in militia hands. 
 
These informal, yet state-like functions assured that some level of ‘normalcy’ in 
every-day life could be achieved, at least on non-violent days.
206
 Although, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, informal traditional mechanisms of governance can be positive, 
this was not the case in Lebanon. Though Patron-client relations had always been a feature 
of Lebanese society,
207
 I suggest that militia governance is not an organic traditional 
feature. Rather than considering militia governance as informal, local, and traditional 
mechanisms of governance, the state functions of representation, security and welfare
208
 
assumed renders them state-like entities (mini-states). The substitution of country-wide 
state governance with more local yet institutionalized forms of militia governance have 
taken form in the most regressive and predatory nature. It imposed an order where 
sectarian and national identities were exclusivist, defensive, introverted, militarized, and 
separatist. Furthermore, the imposed isolation of groups made sure these exclusivist 
sectarian identities are reproduced and ossified. In fact, soon after borders between the 
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different militias were demarcated, violence turned inwards. This imposed yet again more 
threats to human security. Violence turned from expelling ethnic (Palestinian) or sectarian 
“intruders” to an internal ‘bitter struggle for power’ in order to monopolize control and to 
establish a ‘unique political and military representation’.209 Once that was established, 
violence was channelled deeper towards quelling any civilian opposition to the militia 
order. This order (imposed by foreign forces and militias) trapped Lebanese in a cycle of 
insecurity. 
 
Commuting between the cantons was possible but difficult, as militias imposed 
state-like customs and border-control posts.
210
 This was clearly revenue generating but also 
a control mechanism. Further, ‘protection money and income taxes were imposed on 
economic activities such as agricultural enterprises, commercial and industrial firms, the 
liberal professions, and so on’; and consumer goods were taxed (from cigarettes to theatre 
tickets). The ‘militias took over most of the state’s income generating functions’. They 
taxed ‘the registration or transfer of land property, registration of cars, building permits, 
work permits and resident permits’. 211  Furthermore, state ports were almost entirely or 
partially under militia control. Illegal ports that first served for arms smuggling, soon 
turned into private ‘militia-owned enterprises’. In 1983, the dozen cantons hosted some 
twenty ports.
212
 Militias soon controlled almost all trade and the distribution of essential 
goods such as fuel and flour. They became as indispensable as they were predatory. 
Organized criminal activity such as piracy, arms trafficking,
213
 drugs trafficking,
214
 
contraband trafficking, pillage
215
 and thievery
216
 reached ludicrous proportions.
217
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As this new configuration of space was crystalized, militias, in the latter phase of 
the war, established cooperation networks between each other on profit-generating sectors 
and essential goods.
218
 This seems necessary to sustaining the militia order; but it also 
showcases the contradictions of the war order. As warlords they would fight each other. As 
politicians they would negotiate peace agreements. And as businessmen they would 
manage enterprises together. This class of warlords/bourgeois/politicians would form the 
ruling class of the post-war Lebanon. 
Therefore, I contend that militia governance took patron-client relations to 
unprecedented regressive levels. By ossifying their exclusivist sectarian basis, Corm, 
rightly argues that the militia order attempted to destroy ‘the inter-sectarian social 
fabric’.219 While militia rule did not eliminate all forms of and aspirations to 
coexistence,
220
 I contend that the legacy of militia rule has been a major impediment to 
reconciliation in post-war Lebanon, locking society in a regressive zero-sum struggle for 
power. 
 
e) Foreign governance of the Lebanese war 
 
Israel’s ‘defence’ of the Maronite minority and the French protection of the 
Christians from the Palestinians and Muslims; Iran’s relationship with the Shia community 
and promotion of Khomeinism through their support of Hezbollah; Syrian intervention on 
all sides, as well as Saudi, Libyan or Iraqi support and finances to the various groups 
fostered an intrinsic relationship between local and foreign actors.
221
 This has meant that 
regional and international powers cherry-picked actors that suited their regional agendas. 
Taking into account the broader international environment (i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the Cold War, and the first Gulf War), agendas of foreign actors changed as the conflict 
evolved. 
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As Corm points out both regional and international actors repeatedly chose militia 
representatives as interlocutors and partners.
222
 By doing so, they repeatedly ignored and 
overlooked actors that had a wide popular base and that rejected the war-order. By 
alienating reconciliatory and reformist figures, they ossified the militia hold on power. For 
example, while the Phalange party only had 5 representatives in Parliament, they were 
treated as the sole representatives of the ‘Christian’ camp disregarding thereby the 
diversity and complexity of the situation, and adopting instead a very problematic 
‘Christian’ label. Numerous ‘Christian’ leaders opposed the Phalange hegemonic agenda 
(e.g. Raymond Idde and Suleiman Frangieh). Also, figures in the opposition, for years, 
promoted cross-sectarian coexistence and/or secularisation (respectively Imam Musa al-
Sader and Kamal Joumblat). Moreover, numerous Christian figures occupied high 
positions in the so-called ‘Muslim’ alliance (such as in the Marxist parties and the 
SSNP).
223
 For example, during one of the peace talks, the opposition presented a proposal 
to form a ‘civil administration’ headed by Albert Mansour (Christian and independent MP) 
that would introduce some reforms; but the proposal was refused by Arab regimes in 
favour of a military solution imposed by Syrian forces.
224
   
Two main foreign state actors intervened directly in the conflict, essentially 
training, financing, arming and also directly participating in the fighting. Israel played a 
key role in supporting the Lebanese Front, acting as its life support for much of the war. It 
also fought the Palestinian factions across the Lebanese borders and launched reprisal 
attacks on Lebanese targets. It invaded Lebanon twice (in 1978 and 1982) which prompted 
the UN SC to establish the UNIFIL to confirm withdrawal and monitor the Blue Line 
separating the two countries.
225
 Since its two invasions, including after its withdrawal from 
Beirut to the south of Lebanon, Israel engaged in a protracted conflict with the Lebanese 
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resistance, which Hezbollah would soon monopolize. The occupation of the south 
remained until May 2000.  
Following Israel’s invasion of 1982, the IDF imposed the election of LF 
commander Bashir Gemayel.
226
 After his assassination, the IDF presence also oversaw the 
election of his brother Amin Gemayel. The latter would use international military presence 
and the state to expand Phalange hegemony over the country.
227
 That being said, he would 
also return on his pledge to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Israeli retreats facilitated 
mass sectarian reprisals as seen in the massacres in Sabra and Chatila in 1982, in the Shouf 
in 1983, and in Sidon in 1984. In its withdrawal, in 2000, ‘after 18 years of struggle,’ 
Hezbollah prevented such sectarian violence from being committed against the 
communities that collaborated with the Israeli occupation or joined the SLA.
228
  
The Syrian army also acted as a protagonist during much of the war and imposed 
an iron fist on any opposition to its role or presence in Lebanon. Syria’s role in the 
governance of the Lebanese conflict was complex yet inescapable. Syria’s recurring 
“pacifying role” or its intervention on either side has largely been designed to maintain a 
favourable and strategic balance of power. It first intervened on the side of the Lebanese 
Front to counter the Palestinian and LNM expansion (by doing so effectively being on the 
side of the Israelis). In May of 1976 it forced the election of president Elias Sarkis—the 
candidate advanced by Syria, Saudi Arabia and the US.
229
 Its forces then entered Lebanon 
en masse in June 1976. Its intervention was legitimized by forming the Arab League’s lead 
contingent in the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to establish a cease-fire.
 230
 As the cease-fire 
failed, and the Israeli invasion of 1982 followed, both forces shared the governance of 
Lebanese territory along the Litani ‘red line’.231 Then, as of 1987, its intervention was 
intended to stop the fighting between former allies in the LNM the PSP and Amal over the 
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control of West Beirut.
232
 It then focused on neutralizing the ‘Christian’ opposition to the 
return of the Syrian forces.
233
 Finally, its intervention regained international coverage by 
forcing an end to the hostilities, demobilizing militias and implementing the terms of the 
regionally and internationally brokered Ta’if Accord.  
 
Hence, the ‘governance’ of the Lebanese conflict was tossed between one or the 
other of Lebanon’s neighbours whilst regional and international stakeholders, on the 
ground or from a distance, fed the conflict. The international community took an 
irresolute
234
 stance vis-a-vis an armed conflict that was marked with collective punishment, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
235
 Almost all UN resolutions were ignored;
236
 
UNIFIL has been criticized for its weak and narrow mandate.
237
 Non-UN initiatives as well 
as Arab and American mediations failed.
238
 The ADF and the MNF failed.
239
 The 
international community was complicit on two consecutive occasions in the forced election 
of a Phalange warlord as president.
240
  
Also, both Israel and Syria were not held accountable for any of their international 
humanitarian law violations committed in Lebanon during the 1975-1990 war.
241
 For 
example, The Kahan Report of 1983 is the result of an Israeli Commission set up to 
investigate the IDF invasion of Beirut. It assigned direct responsibility to the Phalange 
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party and indirect responsibility over the Sabra and Chatila massacres to Israel.
242
 In 
addition, the UN MacBride 1982 Commission concluded that Israel’s actions during the 
invasion were ‘largely incompatible with the Geneva Conventions of 1949’.243 Other 
condemnations of violations by UN bodies failed to translate into action. Attempts to 
prosecute grave violations such as the Sabra and Chatila massacres under extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, failed.
244
 Similarly, violations of human rights law during Syria’s 
internationally brokered tutelage were disregarded.
245
  
The Lebanese war was inextricably linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cold War 
paralysis of the UN, and the international non-interventionist legal environment.
246
 
Nevertheless, the international community repeatedly failed to respond effectively to a 
violent conflict that stretched over 15 years. 
 
f) Ending the war and continued human insecurity  
 
By 1989, the regional environment was such that it was time for the Lebanese war 
to end.  Foreign stakeholders’ priorities largely converged and seemed adamant to 
conclude the Lebanese conflict. On 22 October 1989, Lebanese Members of Parliament 
gathered in the Saudi town of Ta’if, and signed the ‘Document of Lebanese National 
Accord’. Known as the Ta’if Agreement, the document laid the terms of the post-war 
phase and heralded the second Republic.
247
 The Accord was brokered by regional and 
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international powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United States; it involved the 
heads or representatives of most main Lebanese factions. As no parliamentary elections 
took place during the war, the Parliament’s term had been extended; the MPs that signed 
the agreement were those elected in 1972 in addition to 40 members appointed by the 
government in order to ‘ensure the representation of all the war factions’.248 In November 
1989, presidential elections and government formation took place under the Syrian forces’ 
guardianship and the approving eye of regional and international powers.
249
  General 
Michel Aoun, however, refused the terms of Tai’f.250 In January 1990 he led a ‘War of 
Elimination’ against the Lebanese Forces to “reclaim the authority of the state” (commonly 
viewed as an intra-Christian war).
251
 However, the attention of the international 
community had diverted towards the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. They therefore refused ‘all 
discussions of the Taif Accord’ and almost all regional and international actors cut their 
ties with the only remaining obstacle—Gen. Aoun.252 Although the Syrian Forces had just 
played its ‘usual balancing role’ by ‘discretely’ helping the army against the LF,253 
American and Israeli support would soon back a massive Syrian campaign to quell Aoun’s 
defiance of Ta’if and remove him from power.254 Aoun’s ‘War of Liberation’ would end 
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on 13 October 1990. He would go on to find refuge in the French embassy before going to 
exile in France.
255
  
 
The signing of Ta’if did not reclaim Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Syrian forces, 
which first entered Lebanon in 1976, left some 20,000 to 40,000 Syrian forces up until 
April 2005. Under Syrian tutelage, the Lebanese political scene was tightly controlled.
 256
  
Opposition was not tolerated; Gemayel and Aoun were exiled to France, and in 1994 the 
LF were banned.
257
 In 1996 demonstrations were banned.
258
 Arbitrary detention, torture 
and enforced disappearance were prevalent against activists.
259
 Furthermore, Israel and the 
SLA tightly controlled the south of Lebanon until May 2000. Israel and Hezbollah 
remained engaged in protracted conflict. On 25 July 1993, Israel led Operation 
‘Accountability’, a seven-day war in retribution for Hezbollah attacks against Israeli and 
SLA targets in south Lebanon. Between the 11
th
 and 26
th
 of April 1996, Israel led operation 
‘Grapes of Wrath’ causing mass displacement and severe civilian casualties as a result of 
air raids against, among other targets, the UNIFIL Fijian battalion.
260
 Further, between 
December 1998 and 5 May 2000, prior to the Israeli withdrawal, numerous raids and low-
intensity cross-fires incurred civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian 
infrastructure such as power stations, mobile telephone stations, and bridges. Finally 
between July 12 and 13 August 2006, Israel and Hezbollah fought another devastating 
war—the 33-days July War—leaving behind a high number of  civilian deaths and injuries, 
one quarter of the population displaced, country-wide destruction of civilian 
infrastructure,
261
 and ‘a shocking scope’ of landmine and cluster bomb contamination in 
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residential and agriculture areas.
262
 Therefore, even in the post-war period, hundreds of 
thousands of Lebanese have faced human insecurity. The period following the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri and the ramifications of the Syrian war 
represent the newest phase of human insecurity for Lebanese.  
 
The Lebanese war included an amalgam of actors, of changing alliances, and a 
series of interrelated conflicts. Aside from the humanitarian toll, the biggest loser was the 
state. It was side-lined, paralysed and overcome by the militias. Whatever legitimacy it had 
prior to the war (even if marginal) was lost. Ta’if was intended to restore the authority and 
legitimacy of the state. However, as protagonists formed the post-war political class, 
rivalries were reproduced.  The allocation of top public positions to former warlords 
reinforced sectarian-based clientalism as the backbone of state-society relations.
263
 State 
institutions were linked to zai’ms264 and sects; they were used for protecting or 
accumulating private and confessional interests.
265
 The state was hoped to reconcile 
warring interests and threat perceptions.  No transformation of the Lebanese system, 
however, was undertaken. Instead, power was merely re-distributed;
266
 and Lebanon’s 
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problematic system persisted. Ta’if’s cosmetic reforms,267 Syrian tutelage, and Israeli 
occupation of the south reproduced the 1976 status quo, instating a precarious peace.  
 
4) The Post civil war phase: the unsustainability of the 2nd Republic 
a) The post-war arrangement: Ta’if’s limited reforms 
 
The provisions of the Ta’if Accord were incorporated into the Constitution on 
September 21, 1991. Most importantly, the Agreement ended the war and paved the way 
for the second Republic. The document has been revered by some; others, however, rightly 
argue that Ta’if’s contributions are exaggerated.268  
On the one hand, Ta’if recognized that abolishing political sectarianism should be 
‘a fundamental national objective’ and requested Parliament to set up a ‘national council’ 
to formulate a ‘phased plan’ for that purpose.269 It proposed an interim period in which 
jobs in the public sector were to be allocated according to merit, but excluded top-level 
jobs which were to ‘be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any 
particular job to any sect’.270Also, Ta’if stipulated that the mention of sect and 
denomination on the national identity card be abolished.  
On the other hand, in order to address the pre-war grievance of disproportionate 
power being held by Christians, executive power was transferred from the office of the 
president (traditionally held by a Maronite Christian) to the Council of Ministers (notably 
the Prime Minister, who is by custom Sunni). It also established parliamentary mounassafa 
(parity) between Christians and Muslims until an election law ‘free from sectarian 
restrictions’ is adopted, and until a Senate representing Lebanon’s sectarian groups is 
formed to deal only with ‘crucial’ matters.271 Koch explains that the replacement of 
‘proportional’ with ‘equal’ representation of the communities is an agreement that the 
country would be shared by its two main religious groups, regardless of demographic 
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conditions.
272
 Many, however, are concerned that the redistribution of powers was 
brokered between the Maronites and the Sunnis, without giving due attention to other 
denominations—including what was now the largest minority, the Shiite community.  
In one sense, by adopting the equal division principle, the Lebanese elites 
committed themselves to coexistence. Having said that, the National Pact had informally 
specified which sects are entitled to hold specific posts. In doing so, the Pact classified the 
relative importance of not only the posts, but also the religious denominations entitled to 
occupy them. It is in this sense that one might say Lebanon ‘is the sectarian state par 
excellence.’273 Therefore, one may argue that the constitutional system in Lebanon has 
inherent contradictions.
274
  As Salim Al-Hoss had noted long before Ta’if: ‘the system has 
always had plenty of freedom but suffered from a lack of democracy.’275  
The document is thus insubstantial; the general principle to abolish sectarianism in 
time is present, but there are no authoritative clauses that lead in this direction. A secular 
election law has not been formulated, a Senate has not been formed, and no plan to phase 
out sectarianism is in place. While top-level jobs have been allocated equally between 
Christians and Muslims, they are allocated to specific sects, and the provision on public-
sector jobs has not been adopted. One may therefore observe that Ta’if further reinforced 
and institutionalized sectarianism.  
On another level, Ta’if recognized that ‘culturally, socially, and economically-
balanced development is a mainstay of the state’s unity and of the system’s stability’.276 
So, in order to address pre-war grievances of social injustice, Ta’if provided for 
strengthening the ‘central authority’ in order to implement ‘a comprehensive and unified 
development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially.’277 Ta’if 
also stipulated administrative decentralization to strengthen the capabilities of local 
authorities in achieving development. However, decentralization has not been adopted, 
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local capabilities remain marginal,
278
 and cases of starkly inequitable regional development 
remain a regular feature of post-war Lebanon.
279
 
In the spirit of reconciliation, Ta’if included a provision on the right ‘of every 
Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted’.280 The 
post-war government set up a reparation program for the internally displaced: the Ministry 
of Displaced and the Fund for the Displaced were established to plan and fund the 
program. However, the program is known for its selectiveness, flawed implementation, 
corruption, and abuse for political gains.
281
 The reparation program also included a 
reconciliation package. The latter was put in place in some 20 mixed massacre-torn 
villages in Mount Lebanon; the numerous conditions imposed on individuals and 
communities undermined reconciliation. The outcome remains limited and fragile. 
282
  
Similarly, Ta’if  identified education as a means to foster reconciliation and a 
national identity. It called for educational reform to build national cohesion, and stated 
that: ‘the curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national 
belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the 
subjects of history and national education.’283 However, scholars are not convinced that 
Ta’if provided for this clause to be implemented. The curriculum,284 for example, teaches 
‘equal rights to hold a job with no preference being made except on the basis of merit and 
competence,’ as well as the principle of ‘democracy of the majority’. These foster a culture 
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of majority rule rather than consensus and power-sharing. Therefore, a gap is created 
between the realities pupils live in and the principles they learn in school.
285
  
Maha Shuayb argues that ‘the Ta’if Agreement did little to tackle the authority of 
religious establishments in reforming education which is known to have contributed to the 
identity dilemma in Lebanon.’286 Importantly, only the heads of the religious and sectarian 
communities can call on the constitutional council to arbitrate legal matters pertaining to 
‘personal status, and freedoms of belief, religious practice, and religious education.’287 It is 
clearly not possible for political and secular actors to present their cases. Ta’if thereby 
closes the door on attempts to restrain sectarianism.
288
 The government has long had little 
influence on what history of Lebanon is taught in schools;
289
 instead, by controlling 
curricula, religious authorities continue to shape identities. This argument is illustrated by 
the Lebanese Parliament’s rejection of a comprehensive draft educational plan in 1994 
after pressure from the religious authorities. And, the new curriculum again failed to 
produce a ‘standardized history and religious textbooks accepted by confessional 
communities in Lebanon.’290 This issue continues to impede efforts to foster national 
cohesion. 
While Ta’if sought to address the major causes of the war and provide for urgent 
institutional reform, it failed to bring about the needed transformation. Ta’if failed to 
provide an authoritative plan to transform the Lebanese system and reconcile Lebanese 
communities: the reform plans were minimal, it failed to provide a timeline for reforms, 
and it conserved the problematic formula of sectarian power-sharing.  
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That being said, Ta’if did provide general guidelines for reforming institutions that 
can help Lebanon address some of the lingering socio-economic and political causes of 
instability; but little progress has been achieved since the 1990s. However, these are areas 
in which the Lebanese authorities can achieve successes.
291
 Lebanon should, at the least, 
begin taking decisive steps to implement and build on these provisions.  
 
b) Problematizing the Lebanese consociational model 
 
Lebanon has a long experience with consociationalism. It has been informally 
applied since 1943; however, the Lebanese version neither conformed to the consociational 
model nor to changing domestic conditions.  Consociationalism is a tool for conflict 
regulation and power-sharing in heterogeneous societies.
292
 
Consolidated democracies such as Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands are 
considered relatively successful examples of consociationalism. However, in many other 
cases, it has proven much more difficult for protagonists to peacefully coexist and 
overcome past legacies. In explaining the different types of consociations, Brendan 
O’Leary qualifies the Ottoman rule after the Tanzimat over the Middle East as an 
undemocratic consociation; one might argue that the same could be said regarding the 
subsequent Lebanese model. O’Leary notes that the model applied in Lebanon at the onset 
of the civil war was a ‘centrifugal democracy’ in which ‘politicians compete within a 
fragmented multi-cultural environment.’ The ideal consociational democratic model, 
however, requires politicians to ‘cooperate’ and accommodate.293 The previous two models 
are types of democracies identified by Arend Lijphart. By accommodation, Lijphart means 
‘the settlement of divisive issues and conflict, where only a minimal consensus exists.’ The 
parties involved need not agree on the same vision, but must share the conviction that an 
absence of settlement is detrimental.
294
 The challenge in consociationalism is to improve 
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the system without threatening the vital interest of any of the parties—to forgo zero-sum 
games. Based on Lijphart’s model, consociationalism has four basic tenets. The first tenet 
is that minorities are represented in the executive and that the elites are committed to 
cooperation; Lijphart emphasizes the role of the elite in engineering the success of power-
sharing.
295
 The second is that proportional representation, distribution of public offices, 
and allocation of resources are guaranteed. The third, that groups are granted the autonomy 
to run their own affairs. The fourth, the right of veto is granted to minority groups on vital 
issues. Michael Kerr further adds that a conducive regional and international environment 
plays a vital role in the success or failure of a consociational experience.
296
 While some 
claimed that the civil war in Lebanon was a result of consociationalism, it can be noted that 
the tenets above show that consociationalism in Lebanon has yet to be properly applied.
297
 
Crucially, both elite cooperation and a supportive regional environment have often proved 
to be scarce in the Lebanese context; on such occasions, Lebanon fell into instability. 
 
Although, consociationalism has had many merits including the guarantee of 
confessional freedoms,
298
 Lebanon’s version of power-sharing has institutionalized a 
problematic system.
299
  Samir Khalaf notes that Ta’if ‘consecrated’ the ‘sectarian and 
confessional logic’ above all other. Lebanon’s consociationalism has maintained the grip 
of politico-sectarian leaders on the masses; this has reinforced segregation and the identity 
crisis at the expense of an inclusive national identity.
300
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This study argues that consociationalism may be a valuable model in the short-
term, because it addresses threat perceptions and provides for groups to practice power-
sharing. Nevertheless, it remains a partial arrangement. This study is concerned that 
consociationalism locks groups in their differences without providing for long-term 
arrangements for integration.  
  
 
5) Recurring crises and lessons (not) learned: The 1958 Rebellion and post-
civil war era 
 
In an effort to understand persistent instability and insecurity in Lebanon, this section 
takes a historical-comparative approach by shedding light on another crisis Lebanon 
underwent—the 1958 mini-civil war, which can be regarded as a prelude to the 1975 war. 
A simplification traces the causes of conflict to faults in the system exacerbated by 
unilateral decision making, bad policies, corruption, and regional/international influences.  
The Rebellion took place during the term of Kamil Chamoun (1952-1958). His term 
was characterized by sharp contradictions: while on the one hand his policies were 
responsible for the famous clichés describing Lebanon as the Switzerland and the Paris of 
the Middle East, on the other hand he managed to alienate and upset most political and 
religious figures because of the rift he created between the different components of 
Lebanese society. As expected, the regional and international context played a significant 
role in the unfolding of the crisis. The international community was deeply sunk in the 
Cold War and regional events constituted its battleground. For the US, events in the area 
were particularly relevant for containing the Soviet threat.
301
 The rise of Abdel Nasser and 
the creation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, as well as the fall of the 
monarchy in Iraq, threatened the balance of power.
302
  
Many of the reasons behind the rebellion were structural: a ‘system (…) based on a 
static balance of power.’303 They were exacerbated by other contemporary reasons: 
Chamoun turning his back on his Arab neighbours and aligning instead too closely with the 
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West, nepotism, corruption, and individualism in a country based on the careful balance of 
power.  
Several regional factors contributed to this period’s economic growth:304 ‘the boom in 
the oil economies of the gulf and Saudi Arabia; the economic repercussions of the creation 
of the state of Israel; and the flow of Arab capital to Lebanese banks fleeing the first wave 
of nationalization in Syria, Iraq and Egypt.’305 Chamoun’s legacy was his success in 
turning regional circumstances to Lebanon’s advantage. His administrative and economic 
reforms laid favourable ground for foreign investment and a free market economy.
306
 
However, this prosperity was only felt by a section of the population,
307
 in specific areas 
such as Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and in specific sectors.
308
 The tertiarization of the 
economy came at the expense of other sectors.
309
 To illustrate: the percentage of people 
working in agriculture fell from fifty to twenty percent between the late 1950s to the early 
1970s.
310
 This in itself would not necessarily have been a dramatic transformation had it 
been spread to different communities.
311
 Odeh explains that the ‘laissez-faire [was] grafted 
on to a confessional polity.’312 As social, sectarian and regional disparities increased, 
tension followed. 
Therefore, as in the pre-independence period, although Lebanon’s economic model 
witnessed waves of prosperity, it was ‘extraverted,’ ‘imbalanced’ and ‘fragile’, and 
disparities ‘amplified’ other political, structural and foreign factors.313  
Four decades later, as the ‘Sunni’ community gained the upper hand, similar 
policies were replicated by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in the post-civil war reconstruction 
                                                 
304
 Labaki, 1988, p. 166.  
305
 Traboulsi, 2007, p 128. 
306
 i.e. banking secrecy law etc. Labaki, 1988, p 166. 
307
 For example, only five families controlled half of the country’s export/import trade. Ibid, p 157. 
308
 i.e. commercial and financial. 
309
 Labaki, 1988, p 166. 
310
 Traboulsi, 2007, p 159. 
311
 In this respect, Gregoire Haddad (Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut) warned: If it were again a 
question of the liberal economy in which the strong oppresses and exploits the weak (…) if it were 
finally the case of the Lebanon of the privileged few, we shall quickly see the positive security of the 
majority threatened by the gravest dangers and face a catastrophe from which Lebanon will not stand 
up. Emphasis added. Traboulsi, 2007, p 156. 
312
 A study done by Yusef Sayegh demonstrates the Christian control over the economy: it showed that 
in the late ‘50s the ratio of Christian to Muslim entrepreneurs working in industry was 10:2; in finance it 
was 11:2; and in services it was 16:2. Odeh, 1985, p 17; and Yusef Sayegh, Entrepreneurs of 
Lebanon(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962). p 69.  
313
 Labaki, 1988, p 178-179. 
206 
 
period. Successive governments continued to emphasize an extraverted tertiarized 
economy at the expense of balanced sectoral, socio-economic and regional development.
314
 
Moreover, Chamoun and Hariri, three decades apart, had both promised to fight 
corruption and to initiate administrative reform; both fell short of their pledges. The abuse 
of power by Chamoun was pushed to new limits.
315
 The president ‘exacerbated sectarian 
tensions as no other political leader had done before him.’316 He ruled through a 
consortium of friends, business men and ‘Nouveaux Riches’.317 With most traditional 
leaders left out, they started looking outwards.  
In the post-civil war phase, most of the powers of the President were transferred to 
the Prime Minister. Unlike Chamoun, Hariri was in tune with regional dynamics.
318
 
However, Walid Charara argues that Hariri chose to co-exist with the inherited system 
while creating his own ‘fiefdoms recruited from among his business associates.’319 The 
large support he received from Saudi Arabia and the United States allowed him to 
eliminate all competition and alienate traditional community leaders. As he ruled through a 
‘new class of merchant princes,’ he can be reproached with some of the same vices as 
Chamoun: unilateralism and nepotism.
320
 Similarly, the electoral law of 2000 was a Syrian 
imposition and was designed to guarantee the election of a pro-Syrian, pro-status quo 
Hariri coalition.  
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In terms of foreign policy, Chamoun defied the National Pact by joining the 
Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957, putting Lebanon at odds with its people and its 
neighbours.
321
 The last straw came when Chamoun refused to deny claims that he would 
not run for a second term.
322
 Therefore, the opposition (largely Muslim) rose up against 
him.
323
 In the aftermath of the civil war, the tables were turned; the so-called ‘reign’ of the 
Hariri family has left the Christian minority and many traditional leaders from across the 
spectrum marginalized and alienated.
324
 That being said, he accommodated well with the 
Syrian tutelage, with the Shia main parties, and Hezbollah’s resistance role; therefore, the 
ground was not yet set for another inversion of power. As the next chapter shows, the 
situation changed when regional and international dynamics changed.  
This short exposé of the crisis is meant to illustrate the similarities between the wars 
and the continued precariousness of the Lebanese situation which, with the right 
combination of factors, can deteriorate into a renewed protracted conflict — as is shown in 
the spill-over of the Syrian war.  
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III. Drawing Comparisons and Conclusions: Legacies from the Pre and 
Post-Independence Periods 
 
Understanding the pre-independence phase allows us to understand the foundation 
for Lebanon’s post-independence situation. The aim of the previous discussions, therefore, 
was to highlight trends and characteristics which developed under the Ottoman rule and 
persisted into more contemporary times.  The seeds of sectarianism might have been 
planted under the Ottoman rule, but it would grow to dominate the discourse on conflict in 
Lebanon.  
The sectarian discourse notes that since the Iqtaa, the Druze supremacy was 
replaced by a Maronite monopoly over the mandate and early independence, but only until 
it was itself replaced by the new Sunni Majority at the end of the 15-year civil war. Since 
the Shia community has become the largest minority in Lebanon, are we to expect another 
turn of power? Many claim that the events of May 2008 were one such attempt or the start 
of the Shia rise to power.
325
 Having considered this, at present the religious communities in 
Lebanon have all conceded to the Lebanese identity – but what has it meant for each 
community to be Lebanese? Salibi notes in House of Many Mansions that ‘the Lebanese 
will first have to reach a consensus on what makes of them a nation or political 
community’.326 
Many of Mount Lebanon’s characteristics survived to become the characteristics of 
modern day Lebanon. Due to its strategic location, and the possibility to capitalize on its 
diversity, it has also been part of regional plans. As Makdisi argues, the sectarian discourse 
can only be understood by equally acknowledging domestic as well as foreign roles. 
Therefore, France’s ambition to turn Lebanon into a “Christian model”327 as well as the 
Ottoman Empire’s complacency in showcasing its modernization efforts under the 
Mutassarifiya
328
 bring to mind contemporary aspirations for turning Lebanon into a model 
for ‘confessional coexistence’, a battleground for regional rivalry, or the front-line for 
resistance.   
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In addition to this geo-strategic consideration, the economy continues to cater to 
and depend on these foreign actors, to the neglect of comprehensive sector planning. It is 
striking how conflicts centuries apart can resemble each other. The need for a regional 
arbitrator and interferences of international powers repeat themselves in the unfolding of 
crises in Lebanon. The Ottoman Empire was replaced by Syria; and the role of regional 
powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria or Iran, as well as international ones continues to be 
relevant. Public figures have fled to the French embassy;
329
 special commissions and 
tribunals were set up,
330
 and foreign troops have landed on Lebanese soil to pacify the 
country.
331
 Similar to the Mutassarifya’s dependence on sericulture and Beirut as its outlet, 
post-civil war governments have relied on the service sector with intense centralization in 
Beirut. This comes at the cost of diversification, sustainability and equality. In addition, the 
dependence on remittances, although they are no remedy for the large deficit, have made 
the two cases – two centuries apart – even more similar. As Lebanon remains plagued with 
severely uneven socio-economic development, this study argues that lessons could, and 
should, be drawn from Lebanon’s history. 
Coupled with persistent disparity due to reproachable policy choices, the 
capabilities and legitimacy of state institutions remain weak. State authority and legitimacy 
remain weak as it largely fails in its three core functions of representation, protection, and 
welfare.
332
 Sectarian-based clientelism replaces the state in these functions. These 
conditions, in conjunction with these policy choices, have resulted in historical, social, 
ideological, political and cultural friction. This friction has been successfully capitalized on 
by regressive leaders, while nationwide societal cohesion remains fragmented. Odeh noted 
some time ago that the Lebanese model has ‘legitimized unequal relationships in politics 
and economics among the population and regions’;333 the staticness of the system 
continues to do so. 
Some would argue that the Hariri rule (post-1990s) had finally managed to get rid 
of many of the regressive traditional leaders, but this is not entirely true. Many powerful 
names joined in, controversially including former warlords; father and son alike cast aside 
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any old or new figures which had different façon de faire.
334
 This also took place in 2005, 
at the formation of the first government in the post-Syrian era.
335
 This trend illustrates how 
whenever the consociational tradition was abused, tension grew and eventually led to 
conflict.
 
 
Societal security is understandable, but a power-sharing system does not have to 
impede positive change and integration. As Ghassan Salameh notes, the system needs to be 
more flexible to allow for its own gradual ‘transformation.’336 In addition, the elite as well 
as its civil society must assume a more integrating role. Sectarian appeasement, however, 
is not the answer to conflict in Lebanon; the socio-economic and developmental 
dimensions of conflict need to be addressed concomitantly.  
It is an illusion and a fallacy to attribute political violence in Lebanon solely to 
sectarianism. When comparing the pre- and the post-independence periods, this study 
highlighted policy trends which have been replicated over the decades and which have 
been detrimental to Lebanon’s interest.  Importantly, this study emphasizes that the 
sectarian narrative has been thin and does not do justice to the complexity of conflict in 
Lebanon. The identification of broad religious communities is a reductionist approach, and 
does not take into account the diversity within these groups or the multi-layered 
interactions and relationships shared between them. This study therefore stresses that there 
has always been diversity within the broad sectarian groups that academics and mainstream 
narratives have portrayed. Anyone familiar with Lebanese politics would be able to name 
several outstanding public figures that have not confined themselves to a rigid exclusivist 
narrative.
337
 Indeed, the sectarian factor alone cannot explain political violence and civil 
war in Lebanon; it is the combination of manipulation or abuse of sectarian fears with 
various other factors that came together to escalate non-violent conflicts into armed ones. 
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As I borrow some words from Augustus Norton, I contend that as long as ‘power remains 
in the grip of a coterie of politicians on good terms’ with the regional hegemons and the 
‘government operates like a giant patronage machine’ rivalry and threat perceptions will 
block comprehensive reform.
338
 
 
To conclude, Lebanon’s crises can therefore be broken down to identity, socio-
economic, political, regional and international factors.  The flaws in the system render the 
Lebanese domestic scene vulnerable to manipulation — to a regressive form of 
governance. The Lebanese system therefore requires deep revisions, instead of quick-fixes 
that have so far only postponed the next crisis. The above discussions have showed that the 
ruling elites have actively sought to maintain the status-quo; also, that they have failed to 
create a system pragmatic and flexible enough to adapt to changing environments. They 
have, however, succeeded in largely mobilizing their constituencies on a sectarian basis; 
this has tended to take place in volatile and tense times because of the fragility of the 
system. Meanwhile, traditional political parties and civil society groups have largely failed 
to offer healthy alternatives, and their contributions have fed the dominant sectarian 
discourse.
339
 Non-traditional actors discussed in the next chapter are key to galvanizing 
progressive change. Critical security studies helped us see the regressiveness of the 
prevailing system. It is a system based on top-down, exclusivist, power-centric, militaristic 
and rival attitudes which continuously threaten human security. Critically, it is 
unsustainable as it periodically erupts into political violence.
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Chapter 6: Present-day Precarious Security in Lebanon 
 
The discussions in the second part of this dissertation have so far examined the varied 
factors and players contributing to Lebanon’s precarious human security. This chapter 
extends the discussion to more recent times. The first section contextualizes Lebanon’s 
security environment since 2004, the year the international community underwent a shift in 
policy towards Lebanon. The second section looks at the various Lebanese positions 
towards the Arab uprisings and the manifestations of the spill-over of the Syrian war on 
human security. The third section gives a voice to non-traditional groups exhorting 
pressure for the transformation of the Lebanese system. It sheds light on structural 
constrains to human security of vulnerable and marginalised groups, and argues for the 
progressive transformation of Lebanon’s traditional system. 
 
I- Post-2004 Security Environment: change and human insecurity 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the post-war phase was characterised with a 
Syrian tutelage and an Israeli occupation of the south of Lebanon.
1
 Largely, human 
security was threatened if one were active against the Syrian presence, if one resided in the 
south, if one were active against the Israeli occupation,
2
  or if one were caught in incidents 
of fighting between the various Palestinian factions or other armed groups.
3
 By 2004, 
Lebanon was still faced with the legacies of a fifteen-year civil war.
4
 However, aside from 
exceptional instances, a safe everyday life was common; human insecurity would escalate 
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as of 2004 as political violence returned to Lebanon with the deteriorating political 
situation.  
 
1) Political violence since 2004 
a) The context 
 
Priorities of regional, international, and certain domestic players aligned in Lebanon 
since 2004 to mobilize against particular ‘threats’. These are the spread of terrorism and 
the containment of Irano-Syrian influence.
5
  This was evident in efforts by France, the 
United States and the United Kingdom to ‘cut Lebanon from what [they] saw as the 
Syrian-Iranian axis and to eliminate Hezbollah’.6 SC Resolution 1559 (2004) targeted 
Syrian presence and Hezbollah; it called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, disarming 
all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extending the control of the Lebanese government 
over all its territory—including along the Blue Line, as well as calling for ‘free and fair 
elections’.7 Resolution 1559 led to a snowball effect of consecutive security incidents and 
political crises. These materialized in large scale demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations, a wave of political assassinations, bombings, clashes, and government 
deadlocks.  
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Hence, the US Congress passed in 2003 the ‘Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act.’ 
6
 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 89. 
7
 This and resolution 1680 (2006) were part of the escalating pressure on the Syrian government and its 
allies in Lebanon. In the words of the United States’ representative: ‘the Syrian Government had 
imposed its political will on Lebanon and had compelled the Cabinet and Lebanese National Assembly 
to amend its constitution and abort the electoral process by extending the term of the current President 
by three years.’ In addition, Resolution 1680 (2006) specifically requested the Syrian government to 
delineate its borders with Lebanon and establish normal diplomatic relations. As Russia, China, Algeria, 
Brazil, Pakistan, and Philippines abstained the resolution is seen as the start of Western pressure over 
and isolation of Syria. Russia and China also abstained in the vote on Resolution 1680. UN Press 
Release, SC/8181, 2/9/2004. From: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm (accessed 
on 24/4/2012) and http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8723.doc.htm (accessed on 1/8/2012). 
Also see: Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Stl): Impartial or Imposed 
International Justice?," Nordic Journal of Human Rights 31, no. 2 (2013). p182. 
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Following the Hariri assassination, attacks, mostly against anti-Syria figures,
8
 but also 
against pro-Syria ones,
9
 against Palestinian figures,
10
 and against purely civilian targets 
spread fear in society.
11
   
                                                 
8
 These also took the lives of many civilians. On October 1, 2004 Marwan Hamedeh survived a car 
bomb but his driver didn’t. In 2005: on February 14, former PM Rafic ‘Hariri and 22 others are killed in 
a huge blast in Beirut’; on June 2, famous anti-Syria journalist died in a car bomb explosion; on June 
21, George Hawi, former secretary general of the Communist Party died in a car bomb; on July 12, one 
civilian died but Defence Minister Elias Murr and nine civilians survived a car bomb; on 25 September, 
Journalist May Chidiac survived a car bomb placed under her car but lost her arm and leg. On 
December 12, famous journalist and MP Jibran Tueini, his driver, and a passer-by died in a car bomb. In 
2006: on November 21, Pierre Gemayel, MP and Industry Minister and his bodyguard were shot dead; 
on June 13, MP Walid Eido, his son and eight civilians died in a car bomb; on September 19, MP 
Antoine Ghanem and five civilians died in a car bomb. In 2007: on December 12, General François el-
Hajj (led the fight against the Fateh al-Islam fundamentalist group in and around the Palestinian camp 
Nahr el-Bared and was set to be appointed as chief of the army) and his bodyguard were killed in a car 
bomb. In 2008: on January 15 a car bomb targeting a US ‘diplomatic vehicle’ killed 4 Lebanese; on 
January 25, Senior officer at the Information Bureau of the ISF, Captain Wissam Eid and five civilians 
were killed in a car bomb. In 2012: on October 19, Head of the Information Department (Intelligence) at 
the ISF and eight civilians were killed in a car bomb. In 2013: on 27 December, Mohammed Chatah and 
eight civilians were killed in a road-side bomb. Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005, Al 
Jazeera, 19/11/2013. From: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/timeline-major-attacks-
lebanon-since-2005-20131119152136545938.html (accessed on 14/2/2013). 
9
 For example, on September 10, 2008, pro-Syria Saleh Aridi, head of the Lebanese Democratic Party, 
died in a car bomb. Aridi was mediating multi-party reconciliation; his party is allied with Hezbollah. 
Much later, on December 4, 2014, Hezbollah commander Hassan Lakkis was assassinated. Lebanese 
parties vow to work past Aridi murder, The Daily Star, 12/9/2008. From: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Sep-12/51457-lebanese-parties-vow-to-work-
past-aridi-murder.ashx#ixzz2ucfDm1gB (accessed on 18/2/2014) and Hizbullah Commander 
Assassinated Overnight in Hadath, Israel Denies Involvement and Warns against Attacks, Naharnet, 
4/12/2013. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/108412 (accessed on 19/1/2014). 
10
 For example, on March 24, 2009, Kamal Naji, deputy representative of the PLO and former 
intelligence chief was killed along with 4 people by a roadside bomb. Lebanon blast 'kills PLO leader', 
Al Jazeera, 24/4/2009. From: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/03/2009323123147929427.html (accessed on 
15/2/2014). 
11
 Bombs in purely civilian targets took place in: New Jdeideh (March 19, 2005), Kaslik (March 23, 
2005), Sad el Bouchrieh (March 26, 2005), Broumana (April 1, 2005), Jounieh (May 7, 2005), Monot 
Ashrafieh (July 22, 2005), Zalka (22 August, 2005), Jeitawi Ashrafieh (17 September, 2005). These 
civilian attacks were against ‘Christian’ towns, possibly with the aim of instilling old sectarian strife. 
This failed, but antagonism between the two new main camps grew (pro and anti-Syria camps-See 
below). Later, two bombs went off in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli (August, 13, 2008 and 
September 29, 2008) against busses that were transporting a mix of civilian and army soldiers. More 
recently, on August 15, a car bomb in Dahiyeh killed 27 and wounded around 336; on August 23, a twin 
car bomb in front of two mosques in Tripoli killed 42 people; on November 19, a double suicide attack 
at the Iranian embassy killed 23 people and wounded some 150. Timeline of explosions and targeted 
assassinations from 2004 to 2012, The Daily star, 20/10/2012. From:  
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-20/192095-timeline-of-explosions-and-targeted-
assassinations-from-2004-to-2012.ashx#ixzz2ucgSot4e (accessed on 10/1/2014). 
215 
 
Responsibility for many of the attacks since the Syrian war have been claimed by anti-
Assad Al-Qaeda linked Sunni fundamentalist groups such as the Abdulah Azzam Brigade, 
Al-Nusra Front-Lebanon, and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
12
 A teenager, who had 
commented on Facebook about her escape from the previous three explosions in 
Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold-Dahiyeh, did not live to survive the fourth on January 2, 
2014. Maria Hussein al-Jawhari had said: ‘this is the third bombing that I escape, I don't 
know if the fourth will kill me – feeling sad’.13 Such explosions have been targeting Shia 
areas, the Lebanese army, politicians, and other civilian targets. The country is not in an 
all-out civil war but the arbitrariness of these attacks certainly poses a threat to human 
security.  
 
b) UNIFIL II 
 
Since Syria withdrew its forces in April 2005, the Lebanese security sector has had to 
deal with a very complex and volatile situation on its own for the first time in about thirty 
years. Meanwhile, the international community’s involvement in the governance of 
Lebanon has sharply increased. Following the July War, Resolution 1701 imposed a cease-
fire and reinforced the mandate of UNIFIL.
14
 Pursuant to the Resolution, in August 2006, 
the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to the southern border region for the first time in 36 
years. The war was intended to eliminate Hezbollah, however, its resilience forced the US 
and Israel ‘to dramatically scale back their demands and expectations for the war’s 
                                                 
12
 Note that responsibility was not established for earlier attacks that occurred between 2004 and 2009. 
The Azzam brigade vowed to ‘turn Bekaa into ‘river of blood’ and claimed responsibility for the July 
2013 road-side bomb in the Bequa’; al-Nusra front claimed responsibility for a suicide car-bombing in 
Dahiyeh that killed 4 on January 21, 2014; and ISIS claimed responsibility for the January 4, 2014 
suicide car-bomb attack. ISIS has however been ‘disavowed’ by Zawahiri and al-Qaida. Al-Qaeda 
disavows ISIS militants in Syria, BBC News, 3/2/2014. From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-26016318 (accessed on 3/2/2014). Abdullah Azzam Brigades Claim Majdal Anjar Blast, 
Vow to Turn Bekaa into 'River of Blood', Naharnet, 18/7/2013. From: 
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/91040-abdullah-azzam-brigades-claim-majdal-anjar-blast-vow-to-
turn-bekaa-into-river-of-blood (accessed on 18/7/2013) and 4 Dead in Haret Hreik Suicide Bombing, 
'al-Nusra Front in Lebanon' Claims Attack, Naharnet, 21/1/2014. From: 
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/114990 (accessed on 2/2/2014). And ISIL Claims Responsibility for 
Haret Hreik Bombing, Naharnet, 4/1/2014. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/112573 (accessed 
on 2/2/2014).  
13
 Teen Dies in Dahieh Blast after Saying She Escaped Three Bombings, Naharnet, 21/1/2014. From: 
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/115054 (accessed on 25/1/2014). 
14
 Resolution 1701 can be found at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm (accessed 
on 28/2/2014). 
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outcome’; a seven-point plan devised by the Lebanese government ‘would decisively 
shape the cease-fire’ and prevent a resolution that would restrict the sovereignty of 
Lebanon.
15
 UNIFIL-plus or UNIFIL II was reinforced in number and weight.
16
 However, 
the force is prohibited from taking any action to disarm Hezbollah or other groups without 
the consent of the government.
17
 For UNIFIL or any peacekeeping force to succeed it must 
ensure it is not perceived as an occupying or biased force;
18
 the opposite would entail 
resistance from the local population and would put it in danger. Therefore, given 
Hezbollah’s popular support-base, it is unsurprising that UNIFIL’s mandate is not to 
disarm Hezbollah but to assist the Lebanese government in spreading its authority and to 
assist in making sure the area south of the Litani is free from weapons.
19
 Furthermore, as 
an institution, the LAF has long supported the “army, resistance, people formula”20 and 
almost half the LAF’s rank and file are Shia. Evidently, therefore, the LAF would adopt a 
non-confrontational policy in its deployment to the south. Therefore, what is actually 
taking place is all three main actors (UNIFIL, Hezbollah and the LAF) cooperating to 
make sure no visible display of weapons is tolerated. ‘Hezbollah has formally declared that 
any of its members who are found carrying arms may be detained and disarmed’ and in 
reality, a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy has been adopted.21  
UNIFIL-plus introduced the first maritime task force in a UN peacekeeping force. This 
‘prompted Israel to lift its naval blockade’ on Lebanon;22 however, although one of the 
core aims of the resolution is that of human security,
23
 Realpolitik come into play: 
Germany insisted its role in leading the maritime force is the protection of Israel’s 
                                                 
15
 Norton, 2007, p 140-141. 
16
 The force increased to up to 15,000 and involved ‘heavy’ European participation. UNIFIL had some 
2,000 troops at the onset of the July War. However, at the moment it stands at a little more than 10,000. 
17
 Its mandate is to ‘assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other 
entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. Emphasis 
added. UNIFIL website: http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11553&language=en-US 
(accessed on 28/2/2014).   
18
 In our case: towards Israel. 
19
 UNIFIL mandate is to establish south of the Litani river ‘an area free of any armed personnel, assets 
and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL’. Ibid.   
20
 The ‘Resistance, which has been supported by the government, the army and the civilians’ is 
legitimized by ‘internal agreements and the universal declarations [which]give all peoples the right to 
resist occupation and aggression’ says the LAF. Aram Nerguizian, "The Lebanese Armed Forces: 
Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,"(Center for Strategic  International Studies 
(CSIS), 2009). p 24. 
21
 Norton, 2007, p 141-142. 
22
 UNIFIL Naval Task Force: http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11584&language=en-US 
(accessed on 12/7/2013). 
23
 i.e. to ensure the peaceful return of civilians. UNIFIL Mandate. 
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security.
24
 That being said, UNIFIL II has more “teeth”, as it has been authorized to use 
‘all necessary action’, i.e. force, to make sure the area of its ‘operations is not utilized for 
hostile activities (…); and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment, and (…), to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.25 The 
latter is an upgrade from UNIFIL I which on a number of occasions was unable to protect 
civilians and its facilities against Israeli strikes.
26
 However, these “teeth” are rather 
rhetorical as it is unlikely that UNIFIL would attack an Israeli target
27
 and unlikely that it 
would use force on its own to confront a local hostile presence. In both cases using force 
would escalate rather than defuse a tense and potentially violent situation.  
That being said, UNIFIL has long and continues to be a major actor in the 
governance of security in south of Lebanon; furthermore, the south remains vulnerable to 
human insecurity.  
 
c) Nahr el-Bared battle 
 
The Lebanese Armed Forces led a three-month military campaign starting from 
May 19, 2007 against the Islamist militant group Fateh al-Islam in Tripoli's Nahr el-Bared 
                                                 
24
 German Chancellor Angela Merkel ‘sparked controversy (…) when she cited Germany's historic 
responsibility for Israel's existence and said Germany's contingent to the UN peace-keeping presence 
aimed to protect it’. In fact Merkel said: ‘If the commitment to safeguard Israel’s right to exist belongs 
to the German Reason of State, we cannot simply say: if Israel’s right to exist in this region is at stake—
which it is—then we simply keep out’. Lucy Fielder, An unenviable task. The UN peace-keeping force 
in Lebanon finally receives its rules of engagement, to the disquiet of many Lebanese, Al-Ahram 
Weekly online, 12 – 18/10/ 2006, Issue No. 816. From: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/816/re52.htm 
(accessed on 10/3/2014) and Merkel’s quote in: Oz Aruch, Reevaluating Germany’s Commitment to 
Israel’s Security, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013), 45-57, p 51. Also, Kaldor and 
Schmeder, 2010, p 91. 
25
 UNIFIL Mandate. 
26
  Most famous are the strikes during “Operation Grapes of Wrath” on a UN compound in Qana  that 
occurred on April 18, 1996 (where some 800 civilians had taken refuge): known as the “first Qana 
massacre”, the strikes killed 106 Lebanese civilians and 4 Fijian personnel; or incidents that occurred 
during the 2006 war. See: The Report of the Secretary-General’s Military Adviser concerning the 
shelling of the United Nations compound at Qana on 18 April 1996 at: 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/62d5aa740c14293b85256324005179be?OpenDocument 
(accessed on 28/2/2014) and U.N.: Israeli airstrike hits U.N. observer post, CNN, 26/7/2006. From: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/25/mideast.main/ (accessed on 28/2/2014).   
27
 Also the force does not have air defence capabilities. 
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Palestinian camp.
28
 The armed conflict started as the ISF followed assailants of a bank 
robbery and fought in Tripoli what turned out to be Fateh al-Islam.
29
 From the Nahr el-
Bared camp, other members attacked an LAF checkpoint outside the camp and took over 
the position.
30
 The LAF retaliated in force by attacking the group’s positions in the camp. 
As the LAF suffered heavy casualties and the group resisted, the battle intensified. The 
LAF pounded and took over the camp until the group announced a unilateral cease-fire on 
September 2, 2007. This was the LAF’s biggest military operation since the war. Although 
the operation rallied strong popular support, it brought to light the camps’ extraterritoriality 
and highlighted the weakness of the LAF in its ‘inability to quickly overcome a small, 200-
strong jihadi group’.31 The LAF lost 169 men;32 much of the camp was turned into rubble 
and some 27,000 Palestinian refugees fled into neighboring areas.
33
 The LAF’s operation 
was viewed as an ‘aggression’ as violence was excessively and indiscriminately used; it 
also broke the long-standing non-intervention norm in the camps.
34
 
The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) has led the 
relief program. Reconstruction only started in 2010, and thus far only 600 families have 
returned.
35
  Funding shortfalls have complicated the process as some $157 million are still 
needed to complete the reconstruction.
36
 Moreover, the reconstruction process has been 
slow and corruption has impacted its delivery.
37
 UNRWA notes that the scope of the 
program offers unprecedented challenges for the agency.
38
   
                                                 
28
 The camp site is at the outskirts of the northern city Tripoli. 
29
 It is argued that Fateh al-Islam is a result of the arch enemies Syria and March 14’s unintended 
policies: Syria’s traditional policy of supporting armed non-state actors and March 14’s support of 
Islamist groups in the north for winning elections; the group turned out to be ‘inimical’ to both Syria’s 
and March 14’s interests. Neguizian, 2009, p 13 and Bilal Y. Saab, "Al-Qa‟Da‟S Presence and 
Influence in Lebanon," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 12 (Nov. 2008). p. 7. 
30
 Killing all 16 soldiers. 
31
 International Crisis Group, "Lebanon’s Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle over Nahr Al-
Bared,"(1/5/2012). p 1. 
32
 LAF website: http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/martyrs/?16441(accessed on 19/1/2014). 
33
 ICG, 2012, p 1. 
34
 Which had been in effect since the 1969 Cairo Accord. Former LAF soldier justified this: ‘we had no 
hesitation about going into the camp because 25 soldiers had been killed. Every Lebanese saw the 
images of the slain soldiers on TV. If we did nothing about this, we never would have been able to go 
on another mission again’. That being said, such excessive and indiscriminate use of force is not 
condonable. Ibid, p 4.  
35
 See the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) website: 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=661 (accessed on 18/5/ 2013). 
36
 UN humanitarian chief visits Nahr el-Bared camp, UNRWA, 16/4/ 2013. Found at: 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1717 (accessed on 18/5/ 2013).  
37
 Yazan Al-Saadi, "The Sluggish Reconstruction of Nahr Al-Bared," Al-Akhbar 27/8/2012.. Found at: 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11490 (accessed on 18/5/ 2013).  
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Furthermore, Lebanese authorities have maintained a strict militarization of the 
camp;
 the camp has been declared a ‘military zone’ and since the conflict ‘scores of 
Palestinians have been victims of extended arbitrary detention and restricted movement by 
Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese Army.
 39
 A 2010 study by Taylor Long and Sari 
Hanafi noted the increasing resentment among Palestinians towards this securitization and 
constraints imposed on their human security.
40
  
 
d) 2008 Clashes 
 
Over the pro-West government’s unilateral initiative to dismantle Hezbollah’s 
telecommunication network, serious clashes erupted in the capital and across the country in 
May 2008. These threatened a relapse into civil war and required yet again foreign 
sponsorship for an accord between the Lebanese factions to end the crisis. As pro and anti-
government forces fought each other and attacked civilian targets,
41
 some 110 people lost 
their lives.
42
 A National Dialogue session was held in Doha, Qatar between May 16 and 
May 21, 2008.
43
 In order to safeguard Lebanon’s coexistence formula and civil peace, 
participants pledged to end the political stalemate by forming a national unity government. 
They pledged to refrain from using sectarian rhetoric, from resorting to weapons to achieve 
political gains, and reaffirmed their commitment to respect the state’s sovereignty.44 The 
Doha Accord ended another round of fighting and renewed the commitment to power-
sharing but it clearly did not reconcile the strategic interests of both camps or provide a 
transformative alternative. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
38
 Ibid.  
39
 ICTJ, 2013, p 110. 
40
 Taylor Long and Sari Hanafi, "Human (in)Security: Palestinian Perceptions of Security in and around 
the Refugee Camps in Lebanon," Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 5 (Nov. 2010). 
41
 Such as TV stations and civilians in busses. 
42
 Lebanon: A Year Later, No Accountability for Killings, Human Rights Watch, 7/5/2009. From: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/07/lebanon-year-later-no-accountability-killings (accessed on 
10/10/2013). 
43
 The Doha Accord was formulated under the sponsorship of Qatari Prime and Foreign Minister 
Hamad bin Jassem, at the Arab League Ministerial Committee. 
44
 The Doha Agreement, 21/5/2008. From: 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowspecials/the_doha_agreement (accessed on 18/2/2014). 
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2) The International Independent Investigation Commission and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
A non-military challenge which has exacerbated tension and polarization is the 
international community’s reaction to the Hariri assassination.  While the assassination is a 
serious crime, the international community’s reaction contrasts with the passiveness it 
showed during much of the July War.
45
 The war had left landmine contamination that 
would probably take an estimated 40 years to clear, it destroyed much of the progress in 
terms of the previous post-war reconstruction, killed over 1000 civilians, injured and 
displaced several thousands, and destroyed the livelihood of many; nevertheless, it took 33 
days for the UN to impose a cease-fire.  
Unlike crimes committed during Lebanon’s civil war or its wars with Israel, following 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, the 
international community (more accurately the West) spearheaded  a Security Council (SC) 
response and established international jurisdiction over this and other subsequent crimes.
46
 
First, SC Resolution 1595 (2005) established the International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to assist the Lebanese government in its 
investigations.
47
 SC Resolution 1636 (2005) determined that the act was a threat to 
international peace and security; it therefore invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
48
 SC 
Resolution 1664 (2006) negotiated an agreement between the UN Secretary-General and 
the Lebanese government to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to prosecute 
perpetrators of the Hariri and related crimes. The agreement however was not ratified by 
the Lebanese Parliament because of political stalemate over the Tribunal. Then-Prime 
Minister Fouad Siniora, supported by 70 of 128 parliamentarians, signed a petition asking 
the SC to adopt the Tribunal; Chapter VII Resolution 1757 (2007) ‘authorize[d] the 
establishment’ of the STL.  
                                                 
45
 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 90. 
46
 Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi identify four factors that came together for internationalizing the 
investigation and the prosecution of this case: the stature of Rafic Hariri as an international statesman 
with close connections to leaders in France, Saudi Arabia, the US and other countries; a targeted suspect 
(Syria); ‘an interventionist political climate’; and the ‘novel’ introduction of ‘internationalized 
tribunals’ to international criminal justice. Knudsen and Hanafi, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): 
Impartial or Imposed International Justice?", 183. 
47
 Fourteen other crimes found to be connected to the assassination of Hariri and/or found to be of a 
‘similar nature and gravity’ were added to the UNIIIC’s jurisdiction. 
48
 Chapter VII allows the SC to take all necessary and enforcement measures. 
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The Tribunal is the first treaty-based tribunal established pursuant to a Chapter VII 
resolution; it is a hybrid (or internationalized) tribunal but with the ‘narrowest’ mandate 
among international tribunals.
49
 Controversially, it is the first and only tribunal established 
to try a crime of terrorism rather than international crimes.
50
 Furthermore, the STL adopts 
Lebanese criminal law, using the domestic definition of the crime of terrorism rather than 
an internationally recognized one. The STL's Statute binds only Lebanon ‘to cooperate’ 
with the Tribunal; third-party state obligations for cooperation with the Tribunal are less 
explicit; however the Tribunal may refer to the SC to compel third parties into 
cooperating.
51
 That being said, the tribunal provides for victims’ participation and is the 
first international tribunal that establishes an independent Defence Office.
52
 
Many in Lebanon had originally assigned symbolic significance to the STL, 
particularly in regards to its role in curbing impunity. Nevertheless, the STL has also been 
a polarizing factor in Lebanese politics.
53
 Many are skeptical about the Tribunal’s 
legitimacy, objectivity, and purpose.  
First, the STL was established by ‘bypass[ing]’ Lebanon’s legislature.54 Second, the 
STL’s limited mandate and jurisdiction are seen as an example of selective justice.55 Third, 
a portion of the public is weary of political intervention in the local judicial system, and is 
skeptical that the purpose of the STL is to end impunity.
56
  It is seen as a Western tool to 
further encroach on Lebanon: to pressure ‘Hizbollah, blackmail Syria and weaken Israel’s 
                                                 
49
 For more information see: Nidal Jurdi, "The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon," Journal of International Criminal Justice 5, no. 5 (Oct. 2007). p 1125, 1128 and Marieke 
Wierda et al., "Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,"(New York: ICTJ, 2008). p 10. 
50
 International law recognizes four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and aggression. 
51
 Wierda et al., 2007, p 32-33. 
52
 The ‘unique features’ of the STL can be found on: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/unique-
features/the-creation-of-a-defence-office (accessed on 10/2/2013). And for an assessment of the STL 
see: Nidal Jurdi, "Falling between the Cracks: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Jurisdictional Gaps 
as Obstacles to Achieving Justice and Public Legitimacy," Journal of International Law and Policy 17, 
no. 2 (Oct. 2011). p 257. 
53
 Causing ministerial resignations and government paralysis. Knudsen and Hanafi, 2013, p 189. 
54
 Amnesty International, "The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Selective Justice?,"(2009). p 4. And see: 
Choucri Choucri Sader, "A Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon," Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5, no. 5 (2007).. 
55
 AI, 2009.  
56
 On the politicization of the STL see: Omar Nashabe, "The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Stl): 
International Justice Dissected.,"(Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs: 
Working Paper Series no. 10, Sep. 2012). p 8. 
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enemies’.57 Furthermore, 49% of the STL’s expenses are borne by the Lebanese 
government, making Lebanon’s contribution ‘several million dollars more than the yearly 
budget of its entire Justice Ministry’.58 Fourth, the STL’s image has been tainted by 
‘repeated leaks of confidential documents and witnesses interviews, and weak public 
outreach over false testimonies before the UNIIIC’.59 And the fifth blow is its association 
with the controversial performance of the UNIIIC, including the four-year detention upon 
the recommendation of the Commission of the heads of four security agencies.
60
 Their 
detention was considered ‘arbitrary’;61 and until recently, all of them had been denied 
access to information in regards to their detention.
62
 Having said that, ‘one of the first acts 
of the STL was to order the release’ of the detained Generals.63 Furthermore, several 
‘safeguards for independence’ against domestic and international interferences were 
incorporated into the Statute of the court.
64
  
In short, the UNIIIC and the STL have been fraught with legal, political and procedural 
setbacks. However, the Tribunal is the first major effort to establish accountability for 
serious crimes in Lebanon. Proponents hope that the tribunal opens the door for future 
prosecutorial action in response to serious violations; that it invigorates Lebanon’s judicial 
system; and that its hybrid character contributes to the development of Lebanon’s judicial 
capabilities.
 65
  As the STL raises awareness of the importance of accountability, it is hoped 
that pressure mounts on the authorities to provide justice for a variety of other cases.
66
 
                                                 
57
 Are Knudsen, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Either Peace or Justice?," Chr. Michelsen Institute 
(CMI Brief) 10, no. 1 (2011). p 3. 
58
 AI, 2009, p 8. 
59
 Quote from: Jurdi, 2011, p 253; and for the witness list leak see: STL Leaks: The Prosecution’s 
Surprise Witnesses, Al-Akhbar, 15/1/2013. Found at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/14665 (accessed 
on 10/5/2013).   
60
 Head of the General Security service Major-General Jamil Sayyed, head of the Internal Security 
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However, in the future, Lebanon will need to take a more comprehensive and de-
politicized approach to providing justice to victims of political violence.
67
  
 
Since 2004 security challenges have been compounded and the role of foreign actors 
has been ambivalent. The main actors of global governance have been biased, 
confrontational, but also supportive towards Lebanese stakeholders. The implicit support 
of the Israeli assault on Hezbollah contrasts with the mobilization for aid and 
reconstruction. Similarly, the support for the 2006-2009 pro-West government and the 
creation of an international accountability mechanism contrasts with later support for a 
Hezbollah-dominated government and the current call for the formation of a unity 
government.
68
 That being said, global governance has made contributions in terms of 
human security;
69
 it is expected, however, to play a consistently more constructive role.  
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II- Lebanon and the ‘Arab Spring’: Syrian spill-over exacerbates 
human insecurity 
 
The Arab uprisings have been received with enthusiasm, support and optimism 
across the whole spectrum of the Lebanese political leadership and society. Many have 
even gone so far as to say that the ‘Arab Spring’ had originated and was inspired by the 
2005 Lebanese ‘Independence Uprising’ which successfully ended a 30-year Syrian 
occupation.
70
 Nevertheless, even in the earlier stages, voices of concern over minority 
issues were heard.
71
 While Lebanon had long been the centre of attention, it seemed to be 
watching the events sweeping across the region from afar. Was Lebanon to glide through 
the regional instability? and, was Lebanon not to have its own radical Spring? For some 
time, different media outlets hypothesised as to why Lebanon seemed to be unaffected by 
the regional events.  
As the uprisings reached Syria, anxiety soon took over the political rhetoric in 
Lebanon. The uneasy relationship that binds these two countries would only aggravate an 
already precarious situation. The two leading political blocks in Lebanon had been in a 
stand-off since 2005.  Simply put, Lebanon has been at a crossroads, and the direction 
forward has been fiercely fought over. As regional showdowns continue to be vividly 
mirrored in Lebanese politics, the Syrian events were seen as the perfect opportunity for 
the two leading blocks to entrench their positions and escalate their mobilization.  
Repercussions of the regional situation were felt in Lebanon when the uprisings 
appeared to take over Syria; this section, therefore, focuses on the impact of the Syrian 
                                                 
70
 Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel: ‘The Cedar Revolution changed the face of Lebanon, and the 
people of the region [looked up to it](…) so they decided to take our path.’ March 14 leaders express 
solidarity with Syrian people. NowLebanon, 15/2/2012. From: 
http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=364919 (accessed on 17/2/2012). Also, Mischa 
Benoit-Lavelle, "Robert Fisk Gives Talk in Tunisia, Says Arab Spring Started in Lebanon," Tunisia 
alive 18/2/2012. From: 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/02/18/robert-fisk-gives-talk-in-tunisia-says-arab-spring-started-in-
lebanon/ (accessed on 19/2/2012). 
71
 Particularly following the violence against Copts in Egypt, Lady of the Mountain Christian gathering 
announced their stance towards the Arab Spring. It reiterated their support for the quest for justice, 
freedom and democracy, reiterated their belongingness to and their role in the region, rejected their 
association with the ‘oppressive regimes’, and emphasised their common destiny with their Muslim 
compatriots. Lady of the Mountain Gathering Rejects 'Bids to Link Christians Fate to Oppressive 
Regimes'. Naharnet. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/18308-lady-of-the-mountain-gathering-
rejects-bids-to-link-christians-fate-to-oppressive-regimes (accessed on 27/10/2011). 
225 
 
events over Lebanese politics and security. In doing so, it highlights the mobilizing effect 
of religious identity; through the lens of critical security studies, it also highlights the 
intricate relationship between identity and security.  
 
1) Background 
 
As mentioned, the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri had 
seismic effects on a long-stagnant domestic political scene. Armed with international 
support, Lebanese marched the streets in protest at the prolonged Syrian presence.  What 
was then dubbed the ‘Beirut Spring’ was soon met with counter-demonstrations in support 
and recognition of the stabilizing Syrian role and in rejection of Western influence. This 
created a schism in Lebanese society and gave birth to what would become known as the 
March 14
th
 and the March 8
th
 blocks. The Lebanese political scene has since been deeply 
polarized. This polarization has had important socio-economic, political and hard security 
effects; these have manifested themselves though one stalemate after another, government 
paralysis, politicization of every aspect of the public sector, and unresolved remnants of 
war and occupation. As the whole public service seems to have been put on hold, justice 
and development have slipped further down the priority list;
72
 and as illustrated above, 
clashes and security incidents have maintained a relatively steady presence in everyday 
life.  
In the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal, several ‘historical’ and long overdue 
reconciliations necessary in war-to-peace transitions have taken place.
73
 The 
‘Independence Uprising’ brought together an unlikely alliance between Hariri, Gemayel, 
Geagea, Jumblat, and for a brief period of time Michel Aoun.
74
 For many Lebanese, it 
finally seemed that the civil war was behind them. Moreover, in spite of the rift with other 
factions, the 2006 ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between Hezbollah and the Free 
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Patriotic Movement was another important step in this direction.
75
 Christian representation 
in both camps meant that the divide was no longer between Christians and Muslims as 
clearly as it had been in the case of the civil war; the tension was more visible in Shia-
Sunni relations.
76
 However, that is not to say that the Arab uprisings did not spur old threat 
perceptions.
77
 The dividing lines were merely redrawn between two divergent political 
paths: those of March 14
th
 and March 8
th
.
78
 That being considered, the concerns, 
representation and the mobilization remained largely sectarian.  
By examining the different Lebanese reactions to the ‘Arab Spring’, this section 
highlights the endemic attitudes and fears which have prevented a break from traditional 
politics. Traditional politics in Lebanon have focused on sectarian identities
79
 and, as 
discussed, sectarianism has long been institutionalized.
80
 Security, for each of the 
communities, had been equivalent to a zero-sum game. Securing sectarian identity 
continues to be the main referent.
81
 However, since 2005, the reconfiguration of power 
conceded to alliances which recognized the dynamic between interests and identities. It has 
been argued that ‘identity and interests (…) are dynamically interrelated’ and ‘cause each 
other’;82 the new alliances illustrate this argument, as the rallying of different sectarian 
groups with some and against others consequently created new umbrella identities – March 
14
th
 and 8
th
.  
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2) New Wars as old wars 
 
Many scholars have spoken of Lebanon’s ‘mosaic composition’83 and Corm has 
written of a ‘torn identity’.84 The fragmentation of the Lebanese identity has meant that 
allegiances and individual identities in Lebanon have been extensions of transnational 
regional ones.
85
 Hassan Krayem noted that ‘polarization among the Lebanese and their 
efforts to defend or promote their interests invited and facilitated external intervention.’86 
Throughout the years, it has required the intervention of the same foreign powers that 
supported the crisis in the first place, in order to put the ‘Lebanese “Humpty Dumpty” back 
together’.87 The different sects have required outside powers to support their position in the 
distribution of power, and have survived as extensions of larger regional and international 
forces.
88
 Since 2005 the cards have been reshuffled; as Lebanon is ‘in the middle of a 
showdown’ between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and most of the international 
community on the other hand,
89
 these unlikely alliances changed the face of the power 
composition – giving way to a more complex and diverse one. That is not to say that 
sectarianism is withering; Karim Knio speaks of neo-sectarianism where ‘it is clear that 
“old/new” cleavages that characterise Lebanese politics is omnipresent.’90 Fawaz Gerges, 
however, disagrees with the one-layered depiction of Lebanese politics. He notes that ‘far 
from being sectarian-based or driven, the power struggle in Lebanon is multi-layered and 
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complex. Sectarianism is used and abused to mask vested interests and differences.’91 
Nizar Abdel-Kader also underscores the complexity of the Lebanese system, but he 
reminds us of its duality: feudal and sectarian.
92
 In any case, sectarianism is undoubtedly 
part of Lebanese political discourse; as part of identity politics, since 2005, it has been 
fused with new political labels. Therefore, constellations of sectarian identities make up the 
two main factions struggling over the future of Lebanon: one representing the so-called 
‘axis of moderation’, the other representing the ‘axis of resistance’.  
In her discussion of the ‘New Wars’,93 Mary Kaldor sheds light on the 
manipulation of identity politics in the conduct of conflicts. This study argues that identity 
politics is an entrenched characteristic of the Lebanese context. We can appropriate her 
depiction of identity politics to conflict and mobilization in Lebanon. According to Kaldor, 
‘New Wars’: 
are fought in the name of identity – a claim to power on the basis of labels. These 
are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels (...) 
Labels are mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security (...) 
They provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or 
capture power, (…) nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these 
sentiments  (…) that is the immediate cause of conflict.94  
Conflicts based on identity are globalized and unregulated, dependent on ‘support from 
neighbouring states, diaspora groups’, and not bound by ‘time and space’95 or actors. 
Therefore, as in the Lebanese case, they are protracted conflicts. Linked to this is the 
failure, as Saoud Al-Mawla says, of the Lebanese parties to break from the traditional 
feudal-sectarian system and to create a national project.
96
 Farid Khazen has the same view 
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regarding post-war political parties: that is, they contribute to the status quo and fail to 
provide alternatives to traditional politics.
97
 This opinion has spilled to grass-roots levels; 
despite the dynamism of Lebanese civil society, several groups have lamented that, many 
Lebanese ultimately still favour sectarian politics.
98
  
Despite the many years of conflict and the many attempts to patch the domestic 
‘mosaic’,99 it is not contentious to note that the Lebanese domestic canvas remains 
incomplete. Pinning this to threats to identity is no novelty; nevertheless, this section 
examines how the ‘Arab Spring’ further exacerbates the already precarious stability of 
Lebanon.  
 
3) Perceptions and the quest for power 
 
There is a long-standing belief that Lebanon is ‘affected positively or negatively by the 
regional situation’; Interior Minister Marwan Charbel warned that the ‘repercussions [of 
the Arab Spring] will not be easy on Lebanon’.100 March 14th member and head of the 
Phalange Party Amine Gemayel distanced himself from the coalition by stating that ‘we 
sympathize with the Arab people calling for freedom, but we believe Lebanon should not 
be involved, other parties’ interferences in our affairs affect our country [negatively].’101 
There have been many positions of caution regarding the situation in Syria, expressing the 
idea that any spillover could spiral out of control. Charbel reminded both camps to be 
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‘aware that we are on the same boat together and if the boat sinks all of us will drown.’102 
Weakness, orders, a political choice, or a security measure: the March 8
th
 government 
initially took several tangible steps to dissociate itself, as it claims, from any role in the 
Syrian crisis.
103
 However, these moves were not popular across the spectrum of Lebanese 
society – that is, the opposition,104 and a large portion of the Lebanese population – not the 
least for humanitarian reasons. Druze leader Walid Jumblat, although part of the 
government, has consistently condemned Assad’s regime and called to intensify assistance 
to Syrian refugees.
105
 The scene in Lebanon is nuanced and complex and the dividing lines 
are unclear. It is worth to note that March 14
th
 initially took an opposite stance. For Sunni 
leader former PM Saad Hariri, the Lebanese have ‘a national duty and a responsibility’ to 
stand by the Syrian people. Furthermore, as he noted that the regime in Syria is ‘engaged in 
the last battle to defend a regional axis’,106 he called on the international community and 
Arab countries to ‘take practical steps beyond condemnation, and even beyond imposing 
economic sanctions.’107 His alliance recognized the Syrian National Council ‘as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people.’108 March 14th alliance was very optimistic 
as to the fall of the Syrian regime. Hariri believed that ‘the establishment of a pluralistic 
democratic system in Syria will give great immunity to the Lebanese democratic 
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experience.’ The head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, agreed; it ‘means a stable 
Lebanon that has demarcated borders and its arms limited to the state (…) ‘A democratic 
regime in Syria supports Lebanon’s independence.’109 However, Amal and Hezbollah, the 
two main Shiite parties, did not agree; they accused the international community of 
targeting Syria because of its support to the Palestinian and the Lebanese resistance.
 110
 
Furthermore, Hezbollah was convinced that March 14
th’
s manoeuvring was aimed at 
changing the distribution of power.
111
 The two camps have taken two opposite but concrete 
stances; this reduces chances for near-term stabilization.  
Media leaks exposed the concrete role March 14
112
 was playing in supporting the 
Syrian rebels.
113
 But, as the war in Syria progressed and optimism dwindled, the tables 
have turned. In an interesting turn of events, Hezbollah first interfered militarily in border 
villages to protect fellow Shia Lebanese from fundamentalist rebel groups; its involvement 
however has since expanded considerably.
114
 It is now focused on helping the Syrian 
regime fight the new takfiri
115
 threat in order to prevent chaos and violence from spreading 
to Lebanon as well as to prevent militant groups from sabotaging Hezbollah’s resistance 
project.
116
 March 14 is now calling for withdrawing all Lebanese involvement from the 
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Syrian war to deny these groups reason to continue targeting Lebanon.
117
 Both, obviously, 
claim that their positions are intended to bring security and stability to Lebanon; both 
accuse the other of using the Syrian war to hold power in Lebanon.  
In brief, all parties were initially excited about the Arab Spring.
118
 Categorization and 
the sectarian narrative are both too simplistic and reductionist a method. That said, 
mainstream assumptions identify Sunni-Shia tension as a standing issue;
119
 therefore, the 
Syrian events, and to a lesser extent those in Bahrain, have received contradictory 
responses. In addition, ‘Christians’ have expressed some concerns over unintended 
repercussions of the Arab Spring.
 120
 However, there have also been many reassurances. 
Hariri
121
 and Nasrallah
122
 reiterated their keenness for civil peace,
123
 and both singled out a 
common foreign enemy but no domestic one. Having said that, both camps continue to 
slam each other as the Syrian events magnify the political rift.
124
 Hence, in the face of 
regional changes, perceptions of identity threats are spreading. 
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4) The governance crisis and human insecurity 
 
The heightened political tension has manifested itself on the ground through an 
increasingly worrying number of security incidents. Since the start of the uprisings, a 
number of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations have been staged and have gone 
through peacefully. However, in the South, Tyre has been the site a number of bomb 
explosions; the UNIFIL force was targeted, a number of rockets were launched by 
unknown groups into northern Israel thus threatening the cessation of hostilities, and the 
Palestinian camps have witnessed a number of serious clashes.
125
 On the north-eastern 
borders, arms smuggling raised concerns over the role that Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
factions could be playing in the Syrian crisis; the Defence Minister’s warning that Al-
Qaeda members have crossed over to Syria raised fury.
126
 Whether and to what extent 
these incidents were orchestrated one cannot say; nevertheless, compounded with a 
divisive and accusatory rhetoric,
127
 a large part of the population is increasingly mobilized 
along what seem like apocalyptic lines.  
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Meanwhile, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s call for Muslims to support the Syrian revolution 
has received concerns despite questioning its timing and the possible role the Syrian 
intelligence might have had in it.
128
 The north of Lebanon, in particular, is mirroring a 
flared version of the domestic and regional political polarization. Fears that Syrian 
instability is spilling further into Lebanon have been escalating. ‘Residents [are] 
increasingly seeing themselves as part of the conflict’; in Tripoli, anti-Assad Sunnis and 
pro-Assad Alawites fought several rounds of armed battles along what is conveniently 
called ‘Syria Street’.129 Furthermore, a special report by Al-Akhbar newspaper has 
investigated border cities such as Wadi Khaled used as a safe house for the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA)
130
 and Arsal for fundamentalist groups such as al-Nusra. The issue of Syrian 
incursions into Lebanese territory, cross border shelling, Syrian defectors and refugees,
131
 
kidnappings,
132
 and the extension of security events to various other parts of the country – 
including Beirut and the Palestinian camps – are also part of the polemic. Both blocks, 
March 8
th
 and 14
th
, have called for the deployment of the army along the Lebanese borders. 
The request by the former was aimed at preventing arms smuggling, fighters crossing and 
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using Lebanon as a ‘launchpad’133, while the latter’s request was aimed at protecting 
refugees, defectors, the FSA and preventing further incursions.
134
 
Now that involvement of both sides in the Syrian war has been made public and 
both camps’ positions have been reversed, but settled, the security situation is increasingly 
volatile. Lebanon has witnessed a return to a state of precarious human insecurity. Clashes 
in Tripoli and border villages have become a constant.
135
 More worrying in terms of 
civilian life are road-side bombs and suicide attacks against the army, Shia and Iranian 
civilian targets, as well as other public and political targets.
136
 These do not fail to take the 
life of innocent by-standers; embassies have issued travel warnings,
137
 and Euronews has 
dubbed this craze of terrorism as: “Messages by Bombs”.138 Hariri’s Future Movement 
initiated material support to rebel groups and facilitated the training and transfer of fighters 
to and from Syria; but since Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria, attacks in Lebanon 
have skyrocketed. Militant groups such as those mentioned above have announced 
Lebanon as a land of Jihad until Hezbollah withdraws from Syria;
139
 Hezbollah, on the 
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other hand is relentless in quelling the spread of takfiri groups in the region and their 
taking root in Lebanon.
140
 
 
5) Formal alternative voices 
 
As events are unfolding, and amid fears that the Syrian crisis further exacerbates 
Lebanese politics and security, there have been calls to renew dialogue between the two 
camps. The Muslim-Christian Summit urged ‘officials in Lebanon to be in agreement for 
the sake of peace and stability in Lebanon and the unity of the people’, and it called ‘for a 
unified stance and a nationalistic rhetoric at a time when Lebanon and the region are going 
through these difficult and complicated times.’141 Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi 
called for a ‘new National Pact to neutralize Lebanon’, stressing that the ‘advancement of 
Lebanon is a joint mission.’142 President Michel Suleiman has tried to bring the two sides 
back to negotiation, noting ‘Lebanon is in dire need for dialogue.’143 Suleiman succeeded 
in sponsoring a dialogue session which led to the Baabda Declaration on 11 of June 2012 
whereby all parties pledged to dissociate themselves from the war in Syria: ‘the country 
cannot be used as a base, corridor or starting point to smuggle weapons and combatants’ 
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said the Declaration.
144
 Although initially endorsed by both sides, given the involvement of 
both camps in the war, the declaration is still-born. 
While the Lebanese public seems to be divided along two broad lines, this study 
argues that the image is much more nuanced. There are voices trying to break free; left on 
their own, however, they might wither or be co-opted. Pockets of light can be seen in MP 
Tueini’s words: ‘it is time to start thinking of the rights of the individual ahead of the rights 
of minorities.’145 In a sense she is referring to human security concerns. Despite 
enthusiasm over the ‘Cedar Revolution’, Lebanese youth have not emulated their 
neighbours in standing up en masse against socio-economic development as well as 
political injustices. Sectarian mobilization continues as a manifestation of segregation, 
underdevelopment and manipulation. That being said, the next section discusses some of 
the progressive contributions of a growing number of grassroots groups from outside the 
traditional establishment. 
 
6) Reinventing identity and security: a domestic and international 
challenge 
 
Over the past few years, Lebanese society has been involved in many forms of 
resistance and protest, ranging from the armed to the peaceful. However, authority and 
power in Lebanon are fragmented; therefore, aside from the Syrian occupation or the 
Israeli occupation, the Lebanese have not had a centre to rally against. There has not, 
therefore, been a unified large-scale movement for change in Lebanon. 
For most Lebanese, threats to identity
146
 or societal security
147
 are the main 
impediment to organized and wide-scale calls for change. Lebanese society remains highly 
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entrenched in a traditional security discourse that has monopolized Lebanese politics since 
and before independence. Despite widespread acceptance of the unsustainability of the 
system, Lebanese society remains subordinate to traditional leaders and imprisoned by a 
stringent identity discourse. It is in this respect that Samir Khalaf reiterated the central 
feature of primordial ties in Lebanese society. While they have provided a safety net or a 
‘cushion’ for members of society, these ‘ties that bind’ have increasingly become ‘ties that 
divide’ and have increasingly enclosed confessional groups.148 As such, one recurring 
theme in political discourse is societal security; in Lebanon, sectarian identity—neither 
‘national nor civic’149 identity—continues to be the main referent to secure by the 
prevailing system.  
  Needless to say, a state as weak as the Lebanese one struggles in managing a 
common national identity when its legitimacy and its monopoly over the use of force is 
contingent on sectarian leaders. Although, as some claimed, ’the very weakness of the 
centre has protected the country from replicating the regional unrest’,150 it could also be 
argued that this same weakness hampers genuine progress and replicates survivalist 
strategies and threat perceptions. 
May Chidiac
151
 said ‘today’s protests across the Arab world echo the spirit of the 
Lebanese model’; that is fair until she alluded that Lebanese, like ‘Arab youths have 
abandoned traditional ramblings (…) for legitimate demands: economic opportunities, 
political freedom, and an end to corruption and regime exclusivity.’ Sadly, the day has not 
yet come where Lebanese youth put these ‘legitimate demands’ ahead of their sectarian 
and political affiliations. In the February 2005 demonstration, in a bid to showcase the 
diversity of groups taking part against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, ‘sending out “shout 
outs” to the shiites, the Sunnites, the Druzes, the Maronites, and the Greek Orthodox 
Lebanese’ was part of the rally.152 While noting that the masses remarkably and 
unprecedentedly rallied around a common cause, their identification remained sectarian, 
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and when leaders diverged, so did the youth.  It is the construction that the different groups 
are a threat to each other’s existence that is hampering progress towards a common goal 
and identity.  
Fear or insecurity is not unjustified given the history of conflict in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that identities are social constructs,
153
 and even 
though they seem to transcend other considerations, they are not the only value worth 
securing.
 154
  Although they seem structural and embedded in the system, they can be 
deconstructed and reconstructed, and eventually reinvented in an inclusive and 
comprehensive manner.
155
 Identities and security that refer to the individual do not have to 
be individualistic, exclusivist or restrictive. Such an approach emphasises the reciprocity of 
rights and the reverence of the individual above all.
156
 The corollary to this is that the 
security of other collectivities – society, groups, minorities and the state – can be 
guaranteed. Drawing from critical security studies, it is possible to put forth a vision of 
security that is deeper, wider, and non-deterministic. 
The role of international and regional powers is essential. The Lebanese cannot do 
it alone.
157
 As in the Northern Ireland peace process, and in European integration in the 
aftermath of WWII, they will require an enabling environment.
158
  Instead, Arab action has 
intensified pressure on the government’s stance;159 it also contributed to fears that the 
situation in Lebanon is increasingly volatile and that there is danger of a vacuum resulting 
from the government’s failure to cope with the crisis.160 There have been calls for domestic 
reconciliation, and the president’s visits to Gulf monarchies as well the revival of the 
National Dialogue are meant to dissuade the boiling tension and buy time for the 
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immediate regional situation to unfold. These steps, however, remain symbolic in light of 
the larger regional context.
161
 The international community needs to take a more coherent 
and supportive stance in favour of stability in Lebanon: the international community can 
no longer ‘take the side of one of the camps to the detriment of the other’.162 On the 
regional level, the international community cannot continue to support Israel while at the 
same time supporting the reconstruction of Lebanon; it cannot expect concessions if 
alternatives do not exist,
163
 and if ‘the prospects of genuine gain are not offered’.164 As 
long as regional and international powers do not support, push, finance, and provide the 
appropriate atmosphere to dissuade tension, the Lebanese quest to climb out of the cycle of 
identity threats will remain a marginal effort. International pressure was instrumental in 
2005 in pressuring Syria out of Lebanon. Subsequently, however, foreign intervention 
aggravated the rift between the Lebanese and created two opposing blocks contending for 
the future of Lebanon. A different type of regional and international role is required: not 
impositions or Chapter 7 resolutions, not isolation or an ultimatum between a Western vs. 
an Iranian axis, and not a widening of the divide between the two groups by setting them 
against each other. The strategy currently adopted is reminiscent of the Cold War– one of 
standoffs and proxies. It is unsustainable but unlikely to change in the near future. This 
study instead advises engagement, rapprochement, incentives and a common vision – ‘a 
seduction model.’165 This new strategy needs to address deeply rooted fears and identity 
threats, while identifying common interests and shared values for the purpose of 
reconstructing a common national identity.
166
 Instead, Lebanon is locked in the midst of a 
fierce regional and international showdown – even construed as an existential one – which 
places the prospects of such a project one step further away. 
This being said, the domestic scene is dynamic, and there is room for continued 
effort at the individual, societal, and state levels. Initiatives at the grass-roots level 
contribute to the transformation of society, making sure that the time is ripe for change and 
that the social infrastructure is receptive and capable of supporting a new vision for 
security. Eventually, it will rest on, not the state as such, but on individuals in the ruling 
establishment – both sectarian, state, and social – to champion this cause, for it might be 
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the least costly path to sustainable security. The most difficult task, however, is for the 
youth of Lebanon to liberate themselves from the grips of traditional leaders, and to 
recognize that their interests are intertwined. Bill McSweeney noted that ‘security depends 
on how we choose our identity and interests’;167 the Lebanese can choose a more inclusive 
conception of security, based on a long-term vision that their future is shared and their 
security mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Change can start through a bottom-up 
approach until leaders are convinced there is no safer or long-term alternative. This study 
does not claim to suggest a detailed plan to overcome some of the structural and historical 
obstacles to stability in Lebanon; however, it suggests a ‘process by which participants 
(…) come together actively to transform it, and in the process transform themselves.’168  
 
7) Running the extra mile 
 
The Arab uprisings have exacerbated an already precarious situation by providing 
the two political camps in Lebanon with more reasons to ossify their positions. In light of 
the two camps’ fixation on political gains to secure their separate identities, the Lebanese 
system is unsustainable. The current situation prevents wide and narrow human security 
concerns such as development, access to justice, rule of law, social injustice and security 
from being addressed. Having considered all this, the Lebanese experience is not one to 
dismiss entirely. Lebanon remains the most democratic state in the region, with periodic 
elections, free media and an open opposition.
169
 Furthermore, the system has been flexible 
enough to thwart several near fatal relapses.
170
  UK ambassador to Lebanon—Tom 
Fletcher—tweeted that the Lebanese experience could be seen as ‘an enabler for the region 
rather than a disabler’.171 Those who are optimistic, such as another Western diplomat in 
Lebanon, noted that the Lebanese are used to grey shades rather than black and white.
172
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Lebanon’s power-sharing experience and its relatively consensus-based approach 
constitute a valuable base.
173
 Some of the pillars for cooperation and integration are there; 
now the Lebanese need to run the extra mile. 
 
  
                                                 
173
 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 92.  
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III- Progressive and Emancipatory voices: The Struggle for Human 
Security 
 
In the midst of this polarization and resurgence of sectarian politics, the landscape 
at the grassroots level is not uniform. This section sheds light on non-state actors that are 
engaged in a struggle to foster human security. 
As mentioned, since independence, sectarian groups have been identified as the 
main referent of security in Lebanon. In attempts to, at the same time, construct a republic 
that is “progressive” by identifying liberal and democratic ideals as the backbone of the 
republic, Lebanon’s constitutional arrangements have been contradictory; Traboulsi even 
goes to say schizophrenic.
174
  The problem lies in the priority given to confessional groups’ 
interests and their considerable autonomy from the state.
175
 While the Constitution tadmon 
or guarantees confessional personal status laws and confessional groups’ interests, it also 
commits to universal human rights regimes, equality before the law and non-
discrimination, and in 1990 it committed to abolishing the confessional system.
176
 
However, while existing personal status laws and confessional interests restrict personal 
freedoms and the civil rights of certain groups in society,
177
 universal human rights 
regimes set out to protect them. Lebanon’s confessional system, as will be illustrated, has 
proved to be a hegemonic one as vulnerable groups face numerous structural constraints on 
their human security.  
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As discussed, sectarian-based clientalism has been made the basis of state society 
relations. One can only resort to the state as a member of a sectarian group thereby 
excluding all other facets of one’s identity. Since the primary concern has been the defence 
and accumulation of confessional and personal interests, non-confessional and non-profit 
aspects of public and private life remain ostracized.
178
 
As a result of the State’s bias towards sectarian politics, it has largely been 
unresponsive to and even oppressive of vulnerable groups and non-confessional interests. 
Secularists, workers, women, the LGBT community, refugees, migrant workers, persons 
with disabilities, and victims of the war are all groups that have been marginalized by the 
state.  
However, the space is always available, as Booth says, to challenge mainstream 
regressive and hegemonic policies.
179
 With globalization the space has increased; and in 
Lebanon, as will be illustrated, activism to pressure for a more inclusive and responsive 
system is clearly visible. 
Voices that challenge the prevailing Lebanese system have long been present in 
Lebanon; since the end of the war these have increased especially as phases of insecurity 
subsided for a while, as opportunities to draw new policies for post-war period arose and as 
awareness in society grew. These voices have particularly increased in the last few years as 
society has been disenfranchised by the transition period; it has had time and opportunity 
to mobilize and amass support against the system but also as the country seems to be 
falling back into instability.  While failing to transform the system; small scale successes 
have been accomplished. This section demonstrates the efforts and the achievements of 
these emancipatory voices.  
Civil society in Lebanon has long been vibrant.
180
 On the one hand, traditional civil 
society has long contributed to and fed the status quo;
181
 on the other hand, counter-
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hegemonic civil society has also long denounced and challenged the system. This study 
does not argue that traditional groups based on feudal, sectarian, or clientalist loyalties no 
longer mobilize the Lebanese public; as Richard Norton noted back in 1993, ‘they are not 
about to be eclipsed’.182 However, all efforts mentioned in this section are by grassroots 
Lebanese groups;
183
 they are non-traditional or non-mainstream in the sense that they are 
non-confessional and not affiliated to traditional parties, families, religious institutions and 
other charitable associations. Instead, all these groups challenge, in one way or the other, 
the traditional discourse and the traditional Lebanese system; all these groups voice 
emancipatory objectives—seen as freedom from structural injustices and empowerment of 
vulnerable groups. These groups are the key to transform the Lebanese system into a more 
inclusive, egalitarian, tolerant, reconciliatory and just system—a more progressive system. 
 
1) Activism during and since the war 
 
 Lebanese war has often been reduced to a war between irreconcilable sectarian 
identities (Muslims vs. Christians). Popular perceptions have often been quick to assume 
that these identities largely define Lebanon’s public sphere; and more so, that the Lebanese 
individual can be solely defined by his/her sectarian identity. Of course, these popular 
perceptions have been challenged in certain academic circles but generalizations and 
stereotypes of the war and of Lebanese are common.
184
 
As of 1985, civil society started successfully mobilizing against the war. In 1985 the 
Women against War movement marched to parliament; then, in 1986, a demonstration by 
‘the secular and multi-confessional trade union confederation’ followed.185 A lasting 
example of Lebanese overcoming sectarian identifications during the war is the coming 
together of university students from across Lebanon’s social and sectarian backgrounds to 
form in 1986 the PPM - Permanent Peace Movement which grew to become a prominent 
                                                                                                                                                    
notes that civil society in Lebanon has acted as ‘as patronage vehicles to protect community interests’. 
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NGO promoting reconciliation and peace in Lebanon and throughout the region.
186
 Then, 
more protests were organized in 1988 by the trade unions.
187
 In 1992, also ‘secular strikes 
and demonstrations’ were organized to protest the ‘currency crisis and inflation’; they 
toppled the government and the protests developed into a political ‘popular uprising with, 
in many places, anti-Syrian slogans’.188 One can note that anti-war movements developed 
quite late.
189
 Theodor Hanf and Michael Johnson noted that this happened when the 
Lebanese finally realized the futility of the war. The popular movements were facing an 
estimated 10 percent of the population
190
 which held on to the violence because of their 
continued motivation by vengeance and victory.
191
 They reflected the Lebanese proverb 
Ad-Dam ma bisir may (blood doesn’t turn into water); the anti-war movement was also 
facing those domestic, regional or international actors benefiting from the instability and 
the war economy. Together, they hijacked everyday life with their funding of militias, with 
the proliferation of weapons, and with the fighting. For the rest of us (or the Lebanese) the 
situation was often different. We were of course threatened, influenced, shaped, and 
trapped by the conflict which pervaded almost every aspect of life, but there were also 
common peaceful intra-communal interactions in many spheres, ranging from the personal, 
social, educational, business, public and political.
192
 Hence, as Norton argues, despite the 
reign of sectarian militias, ‘participants in civil society (…) resisted (…) the war system 
and worked to thwart the fragmentation of Lebanon into sectarian enclaves. Large-scale 
public demonstrations for peace challenged the militias’ claim to represent authentically 
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the Lebanese’.193 Some even go as far as to argue ‘that only the resilience of civil society 
during the war saved the future existence of Lebanon as a country’.194 
Jumping in time, between 2012 and 2013, despite the intense polarization that has 
paralyzed public life, the Union Coordination Committee (UCC)
195
 grouping workers from 
all of Lebanon’s social, sectarian and political affiliations have organized demonstrations 
then an almost two-months-long strike calling on the government to adopt the wage scale. 
The UCC and its usual foe, the controversial Economics Committees (ECs)
196
 coordinated 
a strike in the name of ‘civil peace’ and ‘national unity’;197 they called on political leaders 
to overcome their political differences and for government to address the deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions of Lebanese people.
198
 After months of efforts, the government 
accepted to adopt the wage scale.
199
 Unfortunately, the new wage-scale law still includes 
controversies over the rights of workers and given the political stalemate, it is unlikely that 
parliament will adopt the law and that Cabinet implements it. The government has since 
resigned and political leaders have failed to agree on the formation of a new one—Prime 
Minister Miqati is currently the longest serving acting prime minister.
200
 Progress in the 
matter is pending, that being said, the UCC has ‘succeeded in building a movement that 
could become a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon’.201 
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Since 2005, following the March 8, March 14 mass demonstrations, and the withdrawal 
of the Syrian forces, activism seems to have been revived.
202
 Local groups representing 
causes from across the spectrum (new and old issues) seem to have been given a new lease 
on life. Although renewed international interest in Lebanese stability undoubtedly 
encouraged and supported the rise of many such groups,
203
 many have had a purely 
Lebanese genesis and have grown independently from foreign donors.
204
  
Emancipatory voices have taken various forms, ranging from grassroots groups loosely 
expressing their concerns to others making the leap to becoming NGOs and cooperating 
with state institutions. A case in point for critical voices is the feminist collective Nasawiya 
(feminists). Nasawiya has been a forerunner in introducing critical and emancipatory 
activism in Lebanon. Nasawiya is self-funded and its members refuse to turn into a 
‘traditional NGO structure of boards, staff, and volunteers’; its mission revolves around 
social justice and gender equality: its members strive against ‘sexism and all other forms of 
exploitations and discrimination.
205
 Nasawiya has had a leading role in voicing foreign 
domestic workers’ human insecurity and has excellent outreach in Lebanese universities. 
Its large and active base of young volunteers and the campaigns on Lebanese streets, 
universities and social media have turned the collective into a visible actor in Lebanon’s 
emancipatory movement. 
Other voices remained even looser as they have consisted of campaigns that spurred 
organically on social media. As in countries across the world, social media has become the 
first medium for the youth to express themselves. Groups and activities are organized on 
Facebook pages, reactions and opinions are voiced on twitter etc. Although, traditional 
voices are ever-present on social media, this study is interested in critical voices that are 
calling for change—voices that are self-reflective, inclusive, tolerant and progressive. One 
such campaign is #NotAMartyr campaign. An increasing number of bombings and suicide 
attacks in the second half of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 have taken the life of many 
Lebanese. Dead civilians are usually referred to as ‘martyrs’. Following the December 
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2013 explosion that targeted and took the life of a prominent politician Mohammed 
Chatah
206
 and a number of civilians, a group of young Lebanese started a campaign 
expressing their outrage at dubbing a dead 16 year-old passer-by ‘a martyr’.  Hamed Sinno, 
lead vocals for a Lebanese rock band and outspoken homosexual, explained the frustration: 
‘I think it's really important that we stop referring to political victims as martyrs, because I 
think the label almost resolves any criminality about the murder and reduces it to this 
political abstraction, which isn't the case. You have real people dying for absurd 
reasons’.207 The campaign is about a portion of Lebanese society that is fed up with the 
normalization of violence but also about the denial of agency, and the normalization of 
passiveness. Instead of submission to the status quo, they are calling on others in Lebanon 
to reject the prevalent fatalism and inaction of the majority of Lebanese. Most Lebanese 
when asked about the explosions, suicide attacks, assassinations, clashes, even electricity 
cuts,
208
 inflated mobile bills, and corruption,
209
 they respond: ‘this is Lebanon’, ‘it has 
always been like this’, ‘nothing new’, ‘we are used to it’, ‘it makes us stronger’. While all 
these excuses reflect genuine attitudes, including a desire to escape or deny some of the 
dark realities of Lebanon, these attitudes have locked Lebanese in a dangerous standstill. 
Many young Lebanese are increasingly outraged with the fatalism that is preventing 
progress. The campaign asks Lebanese to start reflecting on our situation, express 
frustrations, and take pro-active stances against the regressive assumptions in society and 
the regressive policies of our leaders. The campaign involves young students, artists, 
young university professors etc. and has recently gone viral on social media.
210
  
A more issue-specific and action oriented recent campaign is Ana (me). A group of 
young Lebanese set up a platform on social media to advocate for individual rights. Ana, 
again, is rightfully concerned that a growing number of people in Lebanon are not heard as 
they are constantly overshadowed by strategic zero-sum sectarian battles. Like many 
frustrated Lebanese, Ana members want ‘tangible, feasible change in everyday Lebanese 
citizens' lives, and [they] want it now’. Ana aims to be ‘truly secular, truly independent, 
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and will care about the issues that matter to (…) normal people’.211 Ana is not an NGO, 
not a political party; it is a movement ‘for everyone and by everyone’ calling on Lebanese 
to exert pressure where possible on changing regressive policies. Ana’s mission statement 
clearly reflects an alienated youth; it is a ‘reaction to the age-old excuse of "now is not the 
time" or "we'll talk about this when the situation is better"’.212  For some, its aims might 
seem naïve or ambitious but if the platform is on social media and as Nasawiyya proved, 
activism can take place without the institutionalisation that NGOs require, Ana and others 
like it will form a valuable platform for critical and emancipatory politics to spread in 
Lebanon.  
It is the interest of this study to show that Lebanese progressive activism challenging 
the mainstream discourse—Lebanon’s confessional, patriarchal, and hegemonic system—
existed during and has increased since the end of the war. More importantly, it is the 
interest of this study, through the voices of these activists, to uncover some of the 
structural injustices of the Lebanese system, to adopt their plight, and advocate for 
transformation. The next few pages continue with documenting issue-specific efforts. 
 
2) The Missing and the Forcibly Disappeared 
 
Alternative voices and groups representing vulnerable and marginalized groups have 
repeatedly succeeded in overcoming sectarian and social cleavages in their struggle to 
instil progressive change in Lebanon’s system. Notably, the members of the Committee of 
the families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon have tirelessly joined their 
voices since 1982 to pressure the authorities to acknowledge their plight. Later, another 
group SOLIDE – Support of the Lebanese in Detention and Exile was formed in 1990.213 
The two groups have partnered with the Lebanese NGO Act for the Disappeared to 
pressure governments to establish independent commissions of inquiry to investigate the 
whereabouts of their family members and to take measures to release the detainees or their 
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remains.
214
 Ten years after the end of the war, the government set up in 2000 the first 
commission of inquiry.
215
 The findings of the commissions however have been rejected by 
the families.
216
 In 2005 a mass grave close to the Ministry of Defence was exhumed and 18 
remains were identified.
217
 With the assistance of an international NGO (the International 
Centre for Transitional justice-ICTJ) and Lebanese human rights lawyers, a law on the 
missing and the forcibly disappeared has been drafted. The government has pledged to 
finally seriously address the issue but instead of adopting the draft law, the minister of 
Justice has drafted a less comprehensive decree which is awaiting the end of the political 
stalemate to be discussed in cabinet. To date, however, the state’s ‘handling of the matter 
(…) has been characterized by reluctance and concealment’.218 
Like calls for a broader truth commission on the causes and the events of the war, ‘it is 
unlikely that current political leaders, who are allegedly responsible for some atrocities, 
would establish a commission to look into their own acts’.219 Lebanon instead has 
repeatedly failed to deal with the legacies of the past conflict: amongst other things, it has 
failed to establish a historiography of the war including the events that took place, 
discussing the different perspectives of the war, and engaging in meaningful reconciliation. 
Lebanon’s approach to transition has instead marginalized victims and exacerbated popular 
mistrust in state institutions.
220
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3) Secularism 
 
Grassroots efforts from outside the ruling establishment have already led to tangible 
change.
221
 Following intense lobbying and a popular ‘National Campaign’ beginning in 
2009, the Lebanese gained the right to remove their sect from their identity cards.
222
 This is 
an achievement that should not be underestimated in a context where confessional politics 
occupy such a long-standing primordial position. An article in NowLebanon captures 
sentiments shared by a growing number of Lebanese: ‘I’m here today to say that I am 
aware of what sect on ID means’ said 87-year-old Nader Jaafar.223 The campaign, 
however, has not been received with much optimism: ‘some saw the move as purely 
symbolic, others saw it as the beginning of a wider change in Lebanese attitudes, 
conceding that it will take time for the full benefit to be felt.’224 Even this campaign was 
eventually politicized as groups affiliated with different coalitions refused to work 
together. 
Another symbolic voice comes from the popular movement ‘Laique Pride March’.225 It 
is an annual march held since 2010 in protest against Lebanon’s sectarian system.226 As 
one journalist said, ‘you probably didn’t hear news of this demonstration, though.’227 A 
number of reasons can explain this: no violence ensued from either the state or 
demonstrators, and it did not represent any of the major and traditional parties, oligarchs or 
leaders. Although phrases such as “revolution against the regime” and “people want the 
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fall of the regime” were chanted, as in Egypt and elsewhere across the region,228 it was not 
seen as a threat to the ruling establishment. 
That being said, in April 2013, the Ministry of Interior finally succumbed under the 
pressure of civil society, the President, and a small number of progressive MPs. The first 
civil marriage was formally recognized in Lebanon.
229
 While there is still a long way to go 
for a civil personal status law to be formulated and adopted,
230
 one can appreciate the 
progress. 
 
4) Women’s rights 
 
Although Lebanese women gained the right to vote in 1953 (19 years prior to 
Switzerland) and many have been fierce advocates of social change, progress in terms of 
women’s rights has been limited.231 
Despite hopes for transformation, the post-war transition process did not incorporate a 
gender dimension either in its process or its content, missing an opportunity to bring about 
institutional, political and societal change, and entrenching Lebanon’s broader patriarchal 
and sectarian tradition. As a result, women still occupy a subsidiary place in Lebanese 
politics and society; they are seen as second-choice political candidates.
232
 Women have 
taken part in public office but as mothers, sisters, daughters or wives of men from long 
established political families; they have generally been advanced as candidates when the 
male option was not available.
233
 Further, although the Association of Banks in Lebanon 
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began allowing Lebanese women to independently open bank accounts for their minor 
children in 2009,
234
 only a few private banks have since adopted this policy. 
Unsurprisingly, women’s rights are closely linked to the primordial preoccupation in 
the mainstream discourse: sectarianism.  As personal status laws in Lebanon are regulated 
by religious courts, they resist civil encroachment.
235
  As a result, draft laws on issues such 
as violence against women and nationality have been unable to get through parliament.  
Moreover, women's issues have been secondary to concerns of maintaining the sectarian 
balance.
236
 It is safe therefore to say that progress in women’s rights has been hindered by 
the sectarian scarecrow.  
A more inclusive and responsive democratic system in Lebanon requires that women’s 
rights be advanced by (among other things) fulfilling Lebanon’s legal human rights 
obligations, by establishing a parliamentary quota, by supporting women’s associations, 
and encouraging candidacies in local and municipal elections. These will be stepping 
stones for women to fill positions with higher decision-making responsibilities, and to 
transform socio-economic and attitudinal obstacles to gender-sensitive governance;
237
 this 
institutional approach would contribute to the empowerment of women. Civil society has 
long only taken a soft approach to activism, and many women’s groups have long been co-
opted;
238
 it is high time for civil society to adopt a more critical approach to induce rather 
than wait for transformation. As evidenced by the next discussions, new women’s groups 
seem to have stepped up to the task; domestic violence and the nationality campaign are 
cases in point. 
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a) The Nationality Campaign 
 
Lebanon has long prided itself for being the region’s forerunner in adopting liberal 
and democratic ideals. Upon and since independence, consecutive governments have 
reiterated Lebanon’s commitment to individual freedoms, social justice, and equality of 
rights.
239 
In addition, since its independence, Lebanon has committed itself to international 
human rights regimes:  ‘Lebanon is (…) a founding and active member of the United 
Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas 
without exception’.240 This as well as article 2 of the Civil Procedures Codes establish ‘the 
supremacy of the provisions of international treaties over those of ordinary law, 
international treaties ratified by Lebanon are considered as applicable laws, upon 
publication in the Official Gazette’ 241. 
Within this framework, Lebanon has long been considered a pioneer in women’s 
rights in the region.
242
 However, the “emancipation” of the Lebanese woman is deceiving. 
Lebanon has legal obligations to all international regimes governing the rights of women. 
Aside from the UN Charter and the Universal declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
establishing equality between men and women, Lebanon has ratified in 1972 the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) without reservations. 
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Lebanon therefore is legally committed to grant ‘equal enjoyment by men and women of 
all civil and political rights set forth in this covenant’ and has obligations to protect ‘the 
family as the natural and fundamental group in society’.243 Lebanon also ratified in 1972 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
undertaking therefore to ensure ‘equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social, and cultural rights’.244 Linked to women’s rights is the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which Lebanon also ratified in 1991.
245
 Lebanon thereby 
committed to guarantee children’s ‘right to acquire nationality’, to preserve family 
relations, and to recognize the responsibility of both parents in raising a child. 
Lebanon also ratified but made reservations to the 1979 UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
246
 The 
reservations pertained to ‘equal rights for men and women with respect to citizenship and 
nationality’ and to state responsibility to ‘eliminate discrimination against women in 
matters of the family and marriage’.247 These reservations clearly need to be rescinded. 
This study argues that what is seen on the street is merely a façade.
248
 The problem 
lies in Lebanon’s Nationality Law.249 The latter severely undermines gender equality and 
has had negative impacts on various levels: education, work and residence permits, 
healthcare, inheritance, and socio-economics.
250
 In Lebanon, the ‘bond by blood’ is 
restricted to men.
251
 The Nationality Law (1925) in Lebanon is shameful and regressive: a 
women married to a foreigner cannot extend her nationality to her spouse or children but a 
foreign woman can become Lebanese one year after marriage. Women married to 
foreigners are stripped of some of their entitlements as Lebanese citizens as they cannot 
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provide the safe environment of basic rights to her family. Foreign husbands and children 
of Lebanese women have no access to public education, to public healthcare, to political 
rights, and require residency and work permits even if the children were born and have 
lived in Lebanon. Basically, this law tells women that it is best to stay abroad should they 
marry a foreigner.   Not only does it ‘plac[e] women in a subordinate “second class” 
position’, it also ‘undermines access to all other rights’, ‘has direct impact on children, 
spouses, voice and political representation’, ‘leads to marginalization and social 
exclusion’.252  
A 1994 amendment of the law had opened up a small window for children to 
acquire Lebanese citizenship. However the condition remains appalling: ‘the child must 
marry a Lebanese citizen and live continuously in Lebanon for at least five years, including 
one year after marriage’.253 
In an unprecedented move, in 2009, in a lawsuit against the state, a number of 
judges, referred to the Lebanese constitution
254
 and the interest of protecting the integrity 
of the family unit by ruling in favour of granting the children of a Lebanese woman, whose 
foreign husband had died, Lebanese citizenship. The Judges’ decision was based ‘on the 
fact there was no law prohibiting a Lebanese mother from passing on her nationality to her 
children after the death of her husband’.255 The judges capitalized on this legal loophole by 
interpreting the law in this favourable manner. However, in this and other similar cases the 
ruling has been overturned.
256
 That being said, the judges’ rulings have pierced the wall 
imposed by the authorities and the complacency of public opinion. The injustices of this 
law are increasingly being publicized and pressure is mounting on the authorities to 
respond to the voices of the many families, organizations, associations, and movements 
calling for the review of the law.  
Hence, a ministerial commission was set up on March 21, 2012 to review the 
Nationality Law. Not surprisingly, the commission refused to amend the Law. It justified 
the failure to comply with Lebanon’s human rights obligations on the basis of protecting 
the country’s ‘supreme national interests’; it is believed that the current but discriminatory 
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Nationality Law preserves the ‘sectarian balance’ and therefore averts further confessional 
tension.
257
 Sectarianism and obsession with confessional interests have therefore been the 
root impediments to advancement in women’s rights and particularly in abolishing this 
discriminatory rule. 
It is believed that the naturalization of Palestinian refugees would fatally undermine 
the Palestinian struggle for the right of return. More importantly, as discussed, Lebanon’s 
stability rests on a delicate balance between its confessional groups; as Palestinians are 
predominantly Sunnis, it is feared that their naturalization would tilt the balance in the 
favour of the Sunni minority. It is commonly feared that reforming the Lebanese 
Nationality law would pave the way for thousands of Palestinians married to Lebanese 
women to be naturalized and would provide an option for Palestinian men to abuse the law 
for acquiring citizenship. Hence, Lebanon’s constitution, as amended in 1990 in the 
aftermath of the war, states that ‘there shall be no (…) settlement of non-Lebanese in 
Lebanon’.258 
The Lebanese authorities have introduced “facilities” for children and foreign 
spouses of Lebanese women. Decree 4186 of May 31, 2010, ‘grants courtesy residence’ 
consisting of ‘a three-year residence permits, provided they have been previously living in 
Lebanon for a year’.259 Furthermore, Labour Regulation 122/1 of September 23, 2011 
grants spouses and children ‘work permits without the need of a sponsor’ and allows them 
to ‘renew their residence permits without having to pay fees, even if they hold no job’.260 
But as mentioned above, ‘if the children born to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers 
subsequently marry non-Lebanese citizens, they are not permitted to stay in the country 
even if it is the only country they have known’.261 To further compound the discrimination 
against women, on December 12, 2011 the cabinet approved a draft law granting Lebanese 
                                                 
257
 See: Women’s group laments nationality law failure, The Daily Star, 15/3/2013. Found at:  
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Mar-15/210166-womens-group-laments-
nationality-law-failure.ashx#axzz2qHxbRAUA (accessed on 17/1/2014). And, Lebanese Women’s 
Right to Nationality and Full Citizenship facebook page: 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=144824882142&story_fbid=10151174460452143 
(accessed on 17/1/2014). 
258
 Paragraph I of preamble.  
259
 Mansour and Abi Aad, 2012, p 11. 
260
 Ibid. 
261
 Ibid. 
259 
 
citizenship to ‘descendants of expatriates of Lebanese origin with documents supporting 
their Lebanese ancestry’; this was of course to be restricted to ‘patrilineal descent’.262 
Crucially, the status of women can only be transformed when Lebanon finally 
rescinds its reservations to CEDAW, reforms its Nationality Law, and conforms to its legal 
obligations towards human rights treaties. The pressure of civil society is pushing in this 
direction. 
My Nationality is a Right for me and My Family Campaign has led the way in 
trying to change public perceptions and in mounting pressure on authorities to consider a 
revision of the law.
263
 The Campaign is engaged in promoting ‘active and inclusive 
citizenship’ and at ‘mobilizing interest and concern in women’s right to nationality’; it of 
course aims at ‘reforming’ Lebanon’s nationality law; but although the campaign started as 
a Lebanese grassroots movement, it has as embraced transnationalism by extending its 
activities to Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Bahrain.
264
 Notably, the campaign 
mirrors the bottom-up, inclusive, egalitarian, emancipatory, and transnational conception 
of security discussed under CSS.   
 
b) Domestic Violence 
 
Domestic violence is another issue that human rights and feminist activists have 
taken to heart in the last few years. Groups from both sides of the spectrum have amassed 
support to maintain the momentum of their pressure.
265
  
KAFA (enough) Violence and Exploitation is one organization that had a leading 
role in this. Kafa is a Lebanese ‘non-profit, non-political, non-confessional civil society 
organization’ that works ‘towards the eradicating all forms of gender-based violence and 
exploitation of women and children’. KAFA advocates for legal reform and change of 
policies and practices, influencing public opinion, and empowering women and 
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children’.266 It has set up a helpline—a first in Lebanon, and provides social, legal and 
psychological services for women. KAFA’s intense and now famous lobbying and 
advocacy efforts have led to the group being invited to join the ISF in launching the 
women-specific campaign: “We have a mission. If you’re threatened, do not hesitate to 
call 112”.267 Notably, it also led the campaign to lobby for removing domestic violence 
from the realm of the private and from the authority of the various religious courts. It is 
increasingly accepted that although these sectarian codes claim to protect the sanctity of 
family life and the integrity of the family unit, they fail to guarantee the protection of 
women. The publicized statistic/slogan that at least one woman in Lebanon dies every 
month from domestic violence
268
 and the long rejection of parliamentarians to challenge 
religious authorities in adopting a national law criminalizing domestic violence have 
mobilized grassroots women’s movements.  
On KAFA’s initiative, the drafting of a law for the protection of women from domestic 
violence started in July 2007; 41 organizations later joined KAFA’s initiative and formed 
the “National Coalition for a Law to Protect Women from Family violence”.269 Although 
cabinet had approved on April 6, 2010 the Law to Protect Women from Family violence, 
progress towards parliamentary adoption faced a three year standstill. However, civil 
society’s consistent activism raised the pressure. On July 4th, 2013, KAFA organized a 
press conference ‘to launch the campaign "I haven't died, but many others have"’; the 
dramatic testimonies of two women, ‘survivors of murder attempts by their husbands’, 
directly called on the speaker of parliament to place the law on the parliamentary agenda.  
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A day later, the law was placed as the first item on the agenda.
270
 And, on July 22, 2013 
the joint committees in parliament approved "The Bill for the Protection of Women and 
Family Members against Domestic Violence". Progress was certainly made.
271
 However, 
problematic amendments were introduced to the draft proposed by civil society. The Bill 
fails to criminalize marital rape and fails to include minor children under the protection 
order; these amendments therefore constitute dis-incentives for women to report abuse and 
constitute impediments for the effective protection of women.
272
 It is clear that without the 
efforts of grassroots women’s movement, domestic violence would have remained the 
taboo it has long been in Lebanese society. Member of the joint committee studying the 
law, MP Shant Janjanian, admitted that ‘NGOs and activist work had played a key role 
(…) the demonstrations and all the pressure have made an impact.’273 
 
5) Migrant domestic workers 
 
Migrant domestic workers constitute a sizable vulnerable group in Lebanese society 
that has, for decades, been exposed to unnoticed legal, social, economic, and physical 
discrimination and abuse.
274
  Lina Abu-Habib wondered back in 1998 ‘why their increased 
vulnerability does not appear to be a cause for concern on the part of local or international 
NGOs.’275 The International Labour Organization (ILO) published in 2013 a study rightly 
titled Tricked and Trapped. Human Trafficking in the Middle East to document (among 
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other things) the exploitative situation migrant domestic workers face in the region.
276
 
Domestic workers are often faced with ‘deceptive  recruitment in the country of origin’ 
whereby ‘agents, relatives, and friends (…) mislead them about the nature of the job’; if 
they are aware they are signing up for domestic work, they are often also simply deceived 
by the exploitative working and living conditions. These include ‘forced overtime, lack of 
rest periods and severe limits on communication and freedom of movement’, being 
‘prevented from leaving by various forms of penalty and threats, including the retention of 
passports, the withholding of wages, and the use of psychological, physical and sexual 
violence’.277  
The Kafala or sponsorship system adopted across the Middle East (including in 
Lebanon) entails that the employer is legally responsible ‘for the residency and 
employment of their domestic workers’.278 The visa is therefore only granted for one 
specific employment. Migrant domestic workers therefore are restricted to this one 
employer: should the conditions not suit them, only should the employer accept to forfeit 
his/her legal right and financial investment, can the worker leave before the end of the 
contract. Note however that staying in the country would still incur legal responsibility on 
the employer; hence should the worker decide not to complete his/her contract they are 
usually sent off back to the country of origin. But, this only happens in rare situations as 
employers make a ‘significant cash outlay (…) to recruit’ them.279  
The domestic worker rarely has access to the outside world, hence rarely has access to 
justice. They are often isolated ‘in private homes, which are not inspected by labour 
inspectors or social workers’. In Lebanon, domestic workers are not covered by Lebanon’s 
Labour code meaning employers do not have to abide by the minimum wage, maximum 
working hours, social security benefits etc.  It is therefore safe to say that migrant domestic 
workers are extremely vulnerable to exploitation.
280
 Because the recruitment fee,
281
 the 
wages, and the maintenance fees are incurred on the employer; in addition, because of the 
legal responsibility for the migrant worker’s residency and work permit, the Kafala system 
breads a ‘sense of entitlement over the worker’282 that produces a master-slave like 
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relationship. It is in this respect that Ray Juriedini and Nayla Moukarbel argue that 
Lebanon goes as far as ‘meeting the conditions of modern slavery, and more particularly of 
‘contract slavery’, which is defined as ‘a person held by violence or the threat of violence 
for economic exploitation’.283  
The phenomenon of employing migrant domestic workers can be justified. On the one 
hand, ‘many of the families who employ domestic workers in the Middle East are of very 
limited means, but where public, affordable support for the care of children and elderly 
relatives is lacking they have little choice but to hire external help’.284 Furthermore, 
migrant domestic workers ‘provide an indispensable contribution to society that allows 
many Lebanese women to leave their homes, gain economic independence and develop 
their careers’.285 On the other hand, there are numerous ‘positive effects whereby 
individuals, families and the country of [domestic migrant workers] as a whole benefit 
from the improved financial opportunities afforded by the incomes remitted from these 
workers’; that is why countries like Sri Lanka, for example, have ‘actively encouraged the 
‘export’ of domestic labour as it has become the largest single source of foreign revenue 
for the country’.286  
However, the exploitation of domestic workers and the lack of access to justice 
mechanism that the Kafala system supports
287
 violate numerous basic human rights.
288
 
Five groups—KAFA, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre, Insan Association (or Human), 
Amel International, and the Anti-Racism Movement  coordinated  to Launch a campaign 
Fi Shi Ghalat (there is something wrong) calling for the ‘abolishment’ of the sponsorship 
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system of Migrant Domestic Workers.
289
 The sponsorship system places the employer in a 
position of power that is not counter-balanced by rights and effective mechanisms to 
protect the migrant worker from abuse. The Fi Shi Ghalat campaign indeed recognizes that 
‘there is something wrong’ and insists that ‘the law and the mentality have to change and 
that starts with the individual and then the government, we must change the Kafala 
System!’290 The campaign is therefore lobbying for granting domestic workers ‘basic 
labour rights, particularly to guarantee a day off outside the house and set hours of rest, the 
right to break their contract, and change employers’. In addition groups are rightfully 
calling for the government to ‘review and increase monitoring of the current processes of 
recruitment (…) and decrease recruitment fees’; crucially, ‘the employer’s responsibility 
for the legal presence of the worker’ should be removed. The campaign is increasing 
awareness by publicizing heart-breaking testimonies of migrant domestic workers’ verbal, 
physical, sexual abuse leading up to suicide from desperation and entrapment.
291
 
After a number of countries temporarily banned their nationals from travelling to 
Lebanon,
292
 the Lebanese government signed memorandums of understandings with 
several of these migrant-worker exporting countries. In 2009, the Lebanese government 
introduced a standard contract for migrant domestic workers which guarantees respect of 
such basic rights as ‘weekly breaks, private rooms, a minimum wage, and freedom from 
physical or emotional violence’.293 
Deputy Director of Human Right Watch’s Beirut office, Nadim Houry recognized 
‘slight increase in sensitivity toward the issues migrant domestic workers face’.  For 
example, the union of workers’ recruitment agencies have reached out to civil society 
groups to consider ways to improve the recruitment process;
294
 and, recently a number of 
employers have been tried after their physical abuse was recorded and went viral on social 
media. That being said the migrant domestic workers have little access to justice and the 
Penal code is still not widely upheld in cases of abuse. Houry strongly emphasises that no 
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‘real structural progress’ has been made.295 These recent changes are only cosmetic 
because the Kafala system is still in place and because no monitoring mechanisms have 
been established. 
Progress in the conditions of life and work for migrant domestic workers remains 
piecemeal as it fails to redress the master-slave relation that the Kafala system instils. 
Nonetheless, this vulnerable group has finally been given a voice by a coalition of human 
rights groups. 
 
6) Refugees and migrant workers 
 
a) The Syrian refugee crisis 
 
 Lebanon has long been a host for refugees. Aside from the historical Palestinian 
refugee presence, in 2012 for example, 80 percent of non-Palestinian refugees registered 
with the UNHCR were Iraqi.
296
 However, it is the influx of Syrian refugees that has been 
stirring tension. ‘One of five people living in Lebanon’ is a refugee from the Syrian war 
said the UNHCR;
297
 up to January 23, 2014, it registered 841,892 Syrian refugees. Of 
course not counting the almost 50,000 awaiting registration and thousands of other non-
registered Syrian refugees.
298
 WHO is expecting an additional ‘1.5 million refugees’ to 
enter Lebanon in 2014.
299
 This influx is increasingly becoming a burden that Lebanon 
struggles to manage with.The UN has ‘announced its biggest ever appeal’;300 just the same, 
                                                 
295
 Ibid. 
296
 Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: Lebanon." From:  http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/world-report-2012-lebanon (accessed on 17/1/2014). 
297
 U.N. Says One in Five Lebanon Residents Syria Refugees, Naharnet, 16/12/2013. From: 
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/110066 (accessed on 17/1/2014). 
298
 UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response. Inter-Agency Information Agency Portal,"  
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122. (accessed on 23/2/2014). 
299
 WHO: 1.5 million refugees expected in Lebanon, The Daily Star, 23/1/2014. From: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jan-23/245063-who-15-million-refugees-
expected-in-lebanon.ashx#axzz2rX9u2vzj (accessed on 7/1/2014). 
300
 Although this appeal is not limited to Lebanon. Syria crisis: UN Launches record $6.5 bn aid 
appeal, BBC, 17/12/2013. From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25398012 (accessed on 
7/1/2014). 
266 
 
Lebanon appealed for ‘a record amount of cash’.301 Many pledges have been made, but 
funds are failing or are slow to arrive; UNHCR feared funding shortfalls may lead to a 
‘breaking point’.302 Severe repercussions on the humanitarian, socio-economic, and 
political levels have piled up both on the refugees and the Lebanese population. Strain and 
competition over the infrastructure, the health sector, the education sector, and the labour 
market are taking their toll.
303
 The Lebanese government refuses to set up formal camps; 
the Syrian refugees live on 1,588 locations across Lebanon.
304
 Aside from the minimum 
requirements of humanitarian relief, the Syrian presence is increasingly facing opposition 
from the Lebanese population. Syrian refugees are faced with xenophobic reactions from 
both the political elite and the wider public. Some of Lebanon’s ‘Christian’ parties have 
expressed their rejection of a prolonged presence of the refugee population. Jebran Bassil, 
caretaker energy minister and Free Patriotic Movement MP, has been particularly vocal of 
his movement’s concern over the refugee crisis: with ‘more than quarter of the Lebanese 
population’ as of August 2013 made out of foreigners, he repeatedly argued that the high 
influx of refugees is an ‘existential matter’ that ‘threatens the Lebanese entity’.305 He has 
been arguing that the services provided ‘encourage them to’ keep on coming to Lebanon 
and he has been calling on the government to accept only ‘extraordinary cases that need 
healthcare to enter the country’.306 Bassil proposed a comprehensive plan to deal with the 
influx: he called on the government to stop its open door policy and (in cooperation with 
the Syrian regime and international organizations) to create facilities on the Syrian side of 
the border to contain and secure the presence of refugees rather than allow a scattered 
presence in the country.
307
 Furthermore, Bassil suggested that municipalities adopt a 
‘unified guiding policy to count the number of refugees, watch their movements, locate 
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their whereabouts and control any suspicious acts or violations they might commit’.308 
Bassil’s statements have been dubbed as racist and xenophobic by many; nevertheless, 
speaking for a party with the largest predominantly ‘Christian’ base, his statements do 
resonate popularly.
309
  That being said, the Lebanese government has sent out warnings to 
the international community that it is no longer capable of managing the continued influx 
of refugees. Prime Minister Mikati recently called on the UN, regional and international 
powers to ‘step up’ and assume a more proactive role; he described the crisis as ‘not an 
internal Lebanese crisis’ rather ‘a universal disaster and a threat to regional stability’.310 He 
emphasised that the international community needs to react to ‘prevent the collapse of a 
small country’. Aside from the strain on the various sectors and the political tension, he 
warned of serious ‘risks of epidemics of waterborne disease, measles and tuberculosis’ 
which at least should be cause for serious action.
311
 Although, originally apprehensive of 
Bassil’s rhetoric, the government is finally calling on the international community to help 
secure ‘safe zones for refugees within Syria’ to avoid another case of ‘permanent camps in 
Lebanon’.312  ‘The big dilemma in Lebanon is how can a resource-poor, debt-ridden and 
cash-strapped country cope with the impact of the refugee tragedy that has hosting 
communities under immense economic and social stress?’ asked the World Bank.313 In 
cooperation with UN agencies, the EU and the IMF, the World Bank has prepared an 
Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon showing 
the ‘alarming’ strain imposed on Lebanon; the International Support Group for Lebanon 
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(ISG) was subsequently formed;
314
 Lebanon has set up a Crisis Management Strategy; 
pledges have been made, but progress will rest on the international community.
315
 
 
b) Discrimination, Syrian refugees and migrant workers 
 
The political and crisis management aspects aside, a campaign was launched in 
July 2013 by the Anti-Racism Movement aimed at challenging racism directed against 
Syrian refugees in specific and migrant workers in general.
316
 Migrant workers in Lebanon 
constitute a ‘massive presence’.317 Migrant workers amount to almost 5 percent of 
Lebanon’s population; 92 percent of them have no qualifications.318 Aside from female 
domestic workers discussed above, migrant male workers are predominantly from Syria, 
Egypt, and Sudan, and they are mostly involved in construction and other low skilled 
jobs.
319
 They have long been subjects of exploitation and discrimination; however, the 
Syrian crisis has stimulated civil society to respond to regressive attitudes and policies they 
are faced with. The Anti-Racism Movement is ‘a grassroots movement created by young 
activists in Lebanon, in collaboration with migrant community leaders’ from across the 
spectrum.
320
 For example, in the midst of discriminatory reactions to the influx of Syrian 
refugees, activists hung huge posters on bridges across Beirut saying: ‘Welcome to 
Lebanon Syrian brothers’, ‘We shall not forget the support the Syrian people provided to 
Lebanese during the 2006 war’, ‘Welcome to the Syrian refugees and workers-we 
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apologize for the actions of the racists amongst us’. This campaign came as a response to 
certain towns implementing curfews for migrant workers such as Sin el-Fil, Kahhaleh, and 
Mkalles. The movement has been engaged in ‘documenting, investigating, exposing and 
fighting racist practices and mentalities, through various initiatives and campaigns’; along 
with other groups involved in human rights activism, more light has been shed on these 
and other issues related to structural as well as societal injustices imposed on Lebanon’s 
non-Lebanese population. The efforts of the Anti-Racism Movement and other groups 
remain very limited; however without such grassroots efforts, migrant workers would have 
remained voiceless and the injustices imposed on this faction of society would not have 
been exposed. Awareness is slowly rising. By pressuring for necessary institutional and 
legislative change, the work of these groups slowly builds the ground work for the 
progressive emancipation of vulnerable groups in general in Lebanon.
321
  
 
c) Palestinian Refugees 
 
The Syrian refugee crisis is a serious manifestation of the spill-over of the Syrian 
war to Lebanon and is exacerbating the precarious instability in the country. But it can only 
be read in light of Lebanon’s experience with the Palestinian refugees. 
The situation of Palestinian refugees is a complex and controversial topic. In the 
interest of space and scope, this section only briefly documents the legal discrimination 
that marginalizes the Palestinian community.
322
 Although the status of Palestinian refugees 
occupies a central place in domestic politics, the humanitarian side of Palestinian refugee 
crisis is still on the margins. The issue of naturalizing Palestinian refugees haunts political 
actors from across the board.
323
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According to UNRWA, there are some 404,170 registered Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon,
324
 about ‘11.5 percent of Lebanon’s population’.325 Most of the refugees live in 
12 refugee camps across the country. Lebanese lawmakers and governments have long 
taken many measures to prevent the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Lebanon 
therefore institutionalized the marginalization of the Palestinian community. As 
mentioned, The Lebanese Constitution bars the Tawteen—the nationalization or permanent 
settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.  
Lebanon has chosen a stance that on the one hand denies Palestinians born and 
living in Lebanon basic rights accorded to it nationals, and on the other hand refuses to 
guarantee them refugee rights. Lebanon is also not a party to the refugee Convention and 
Lebanon chooses to consider Palestinians as foreigners not refugees. Furthermore, despite 
a ‘protracted residence in the country’ Lebanon’s Labour law does not offer ‘separate’ or 
‘preferred’ legal status to ‘foreigners’ (or Palestinians) that ‘have resided in Lebanon for 
more than three years’.326 Being considered foreigners, Palestinians have to obtain a work 
permit (competing for low skilled jobs with Syrian workers that do not require a permit), 
and are barred from jobs that are restricted to Lebanese nationals. They are barred from 
some ‘25 professions requiring syndicate membership, including law, medicine, and 
engineering’ and do not enjoy social security benefits.327 Palestinians ‘have no access to 
Lebanese government hospitals or other related health services’328 but they have access to 
public schools and the Lebanese University.
329
 Palestinians are also barred from registering 
property.
330
  
In doing so, Lebanon deliberately marginalizes the Palestinian community and has 
imposed dire humanitarian conditions on a population that has lived in Lebanon since 
1948.  
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In doing so, Lebanon also violates a number of its international legal obligations.
331
 
When in 2011 the ‘UK-based lobby groups the Palestinian Return Centre and the Council 
for European Palestinian Relations’  visited three camps in Lebanon, British MP Michael 
Connarty noted that he has been ‘in many camps (…) but none which gave [him] such a 
feeling of unease as those [he] saw in Lebanon’.332 And Sir Gerald Kaufman described one 
of the camps as ‘the worst single place [he has] ever seen’.333 The situation of the 
Palestinian refugees is worse in Lebanon than in any other host country. 
MP Mikati had expressed the government’s willingness to amend legislation to 
alleviate the situation for Palestinians should the Palestinian Authority issue ‘passports or 
equivalent identity papers’. But the ‘Palestinian factions rejected any suggested 
improvement that was likely to diminish leverage of the demand for the right of return’.334 
Although cautious about this generalization, it is safe to say that the continued 
victimization serves both the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. From the Lebanese 
side, we have repeated confirmations; for example in 2008 MP Ghassan Mokhayber 
candidly noted that the ‘official policy is to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, 
precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalisation or permanent settlement. 
Our economic and security measures are guided by this’. 335 That being said, the authorities 
increasingly accept that the situation is unsustainable. Former PM Hariri had asked: 
‘should we deprive Palestinian refugees in Palestinian camps of their rights, so that they 
become terrorists in the future?’336 
Hence, the challenge is how ‘to reconcile rejection of naturalisation and acceptance 
of the need to grant Palestinians their rights and improve their living conditions’.337  
Lebanese parliament passed a law that, as Ziad Sayegh noted,
338
 ‘for the first time 
(…) gives [Palestinians] some legal rights’.339 The law would allow Palestinians to ‘claim 
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free work permits’ for the private sector, ‘claim cover for work-related accidents and 
retirement indemnities from their own social security fund, to which they will pay 
contributions while working’.340 The law certainly does not grant Palestinians their full 
basic rights, but it does address some of the criticisms the Lebanese government is 
bombarded with. The law does not lift the Palestinians from the abject situation they are 
faced with, however, as Sayegh pointed out, as rudimentary as it seems, if treated badly, a 
Palestinian employee ‘can now go to the court and complain’.341 
The Centre Libanais des Droits Humains (CLDH) which ‘fights against enforced 
disappearance, impunity, arbitrary detention, and racism’ confirms that the Palestinian 
refugee population in Lebanon is ‘a vulnerable group’.342 The Centre has documented 
widespread systematic ‘discrimination and racism’ as well as a particular vulnerability to 
arbitrary detention and torture by Lebanese security agencies; this is based on the prejudice 
that Palestinians are associated with armed groups.
343
 CLDH’s work is not restricted to 
Palestinian refugees; it has opened a rehabilitation centre for victims of torture—The 
Nassim Centre; it often however provides legal representation to Palestinians.
344
 
Aside from piecemeal initiatives by international organization, NGOs, and the 
Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee marginal progress has been achieved. Given the 
complexity and strategic importance of the Palestinian refugee file,
345
 issues pertaining to 
the status of Palestinian refugees have simply been shelved. And, voices challenging this 
stance remain dim. Although awareness is increasing along with human rights campaigns, 
this issue has yet to reach the high profile others have achieved. 
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7) LGBT rights346 
 
In Lebanon homosexuality is criminalised. Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code 
stipulates that ‘sexual intercourse contrary to nature’ is punishable by a prison sentence of 
up to one year. This has been interpreted as applying to same sex relationships. Like the 
Nationality Law, this article conflicts with Lebanon’s obligations under the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Like the Nationality law, article 
534 is a legacy of the French mandate.
347
 But this law also reflects cultural, societal, and 
religious condemnation of homosexuality. Societal rejection and article 534 have imposed 
a repressive reality on the LGBT community: it is faced with discrimination, 
marginalization and societal exclusion. The LGBT community has also been a target for 
abuse by the security forces. A 2013 Human Rights Watch report documented that 
vulnerable groups such as homosexuals (but also sex workers and drug users) being 
subjected to mistreatment including physical violence and torture.
348
 That being said, 
‘homosexuality is generally only prosecuted in cases in which it is otherwise morally 
difficult to mount a defence’, and while harassments and raids often take place, no legal 
proceedings usually follow.
349
 Nevertheless, until recently, the LGBT community has 
therefore only existed underground. 
Helem (dream) is the Arabic acronym for ‘Lebanese protection for Lesbians, Gays, 
Bisexuals and Transgenders’. This Lebanese NGO has been formally active since 2004.350 
The NGO is the ‘first above-ground LGBT association in the MENA’ region.351 
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While homosexuality has long been a taboo, it seems that the situation is changing. 
Partly due to the campaigns launched by this and other human rights groups, above the 
ground activities are multiplying and there has been a visible rise in the number of people 
participating in public events organized around LGBT rights. The periodic organization, 
popularity and coverage of these events are testimony that the public sphere is opening up 
to voices from the margins. Public perception is increasingly accepting that the legal and 
violent discrimination against the LGBT community is unjust and contravenes human 
rights.
352
  
Given the positive albeit challenging and controversial contributions of Helem, its 
work has recently received support from various directions.
353
 Helem is now expanding 
beyond the Lebanese borders; the organization for example ‘is launching the “Homophobia 
Monitor”: an online tool which collects information and resources related to the conditions 
and situation of homosexual community across the Arab world’.354 
Helem is raising awareness and is involved in advocacy campaigns;
355
 it operates a 
community centre and a helpline offering services to ‘LGBTIQs and other persons with 
non-conforming sexuality or gender identity’.356 Its goals is the decriminalization of 
homosexuality, ‘countering the AIDS epidemic and other sexually transmitted diseases’, 
and ‘combating stigma’. Notably, it is also engaged in activities that promote reforms for 
‘a legal framework that protects the personal freedoms of individuals’; to that end it 
participates in other campaigns related to human rights, individual freedoms, equality, 
social inclusion, and empowerment of vulnerable or marginalized groups.
357
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Helem started prudently as a grassroots local group raising awareness and giving a 
voice to the LGBT community in Lebanon.
358
 Its campaigns were first received cautiously 
by the media and society in general; although public perception remains largely hesitant in 
embracing the LGBT community, support for the group slowly escalated.
359
 Notably, given 
Helem’s high profile and outreach, The National AIDS Control Programme and the 
Ministry of Public Health also cooperate with Helem in the area of HIV prevention.  
Hurriyyat (liberties) is another Lebanese NGO worth mentioning that advocates for 
individual rights and challenges the Lebanese regime which ‘interfere[s] in private affairs 
while restricting participating in public affairs’.360 Hurriyyat is broadly involved in human 
rights issues. It has tended to subtly introduce gay rights alongside other issues; for 
example under the topic of marginalized identities, both war victims and homosexuals are 
discussed.
361
 Its members are high profile human rights lawyers, activists, journalists and 
artists. Following a successful conference on human rights in Lebanon, they have been 
invited to send recommendations for reforming the penal Code to the parliamentary 
Human Rights Committee. Nizar Saghieh, famous human rights lawyer and founding 
member of Hurriyyat talks of an emerging gay subculture; given the absence of a local or 
regional alternative, this emerging subculture is largely influenced by the West. However, 
this leaves the gay community in Lebanon excluded from society and deepens the internal 
struggle between the gay identity and other facets of the individual’s identity.362 Hurriyyat 
wants to reconcile homosexuals with their society and vice versa; the group believes 
therefore in developing a local gay subculture that can support the gay community.
363
 The 
group is also ‘very concerned with its independence vis-à-vis all kind of power, in 
particular the problem of donor-driven agendas’; so although they do not rule out 
cooperation with foreign groups, Hurriyyat is primarily concerned with the local context 
and with creating ‘a network for private liberties in the Arab world’.364 Hurriyat has been a 
key team member in promoting activism and advocating for emancipatory politics. 
                                                 
358
 This can be seen by Helem’s concern not to shock society with their new presence as it was 
explained for example in its choice to open office in a non-residential area of Beirut.  World Bank, 
2008, p 20-21. 
359
 They have been receiving popular and private support from local and international organizations. See 
World Bank, 2008. 
360
 Scalenghe, MER 230. 
361
 Ibid. 
362
 Apparently the confessional, Lebanese and Arab facets of identity remain prominent. 
363
 Starting by and building on Arab history, literature, proverbs, music, ‘laws, practices, poetry’. Ibid. 
364
 Ibid. 
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On the one hand, there has been outrage from religious institutions and calls to shut 
down the organization; on the other hand, there has been increased interest in speaking 
about and understanding issues related to homosexuality.
365
 At the time of writing, a judge 
made an unprecedented ruling in favour of a transgender woman on the basis that law does 
not clearly specify what is considered “unnatural” and that gender is much more 
complicated to be based on ones ‘personal status registry documents’.366 This was made 
possible by relying on a 2009 ruling that dismissed article 534 on the basis that ‘man is 
part of nature (…) so it cannot be said that any of his practices (…) goes against nature.367 
There is a chance, like the nationality case, that this ruling will be reversed by the court of 
appeal. Also, there are still numerous legal, institutional and societal hurdles for the 
emancipation of the LGBT community in Lebanon. However, this is still a breakthrough as 
the judiciary is increasingly taking stances in favour of individual rights. Hence, work in 
this realm contributes to the emancipation and empowerment of the LGBT community. 
More generally, it promotes and expands the values of toleration, diversity and individual 
freedoms in society; in addition, it builds up pressure on the state to open up and respond 
to marginalized groups in general. 
 
Looking at their respective mission statements, it can be noted that most of the above 
groups support each other. Although there is inherent friction between groups representing 
the same or different causes, to a large extent their campaigns have complemented each 
other. We can see support between the campaign for secularism, civil personal status code, 
women’s rights and empowerment, nationality campaign, anti-discrimination, migrant 
workers etc. Vulnerable or marginalized groups and human rights organizations have to a 
large extent often joined forces and formed a common front. This may very well explain 
the increasing number of people that initiatives attract. 
  
                                                 
365
 World Bank, "Helem. A Case Study of the First Legal, Above-Ground LGBT Organization in the 
Mena Region 
"(2008). Found at: http://helem.net/sites/default/files/WB-HELEM_CaseStudy2009_0.pdf (accessed on 
3/2/2014). 
366
 See: Erin Kilbride, Lebanon Just Did a Whole Lot More Than Legalize Being Gay, Mouftah, 
9/3/2014. From: http://muftah.org/lebanon-just-whole-lot-legalize-gay/ (accessed on 9/3/2014).  
367
 Venetia Rainey, Landmark ruling rubbishes anti-gay law in Lebanon, The Daily Star, 5/3/2014. 
From: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Mar-05/249261-landmarkruling-
rubbishes-anti-gay-lawin-lebanon.ashx#axzz2vUXzuF2K  (accessed on 9/3/2014). 
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IV- Conclusion: 
 
Grassroots efforts to limit the hegemonic sectarian grip on society have always had 
a place in Lebanon; and recently, more efforts advocating for a wide array of progressive 
issues are burgeoning. Such groups pushing for change are slowly attracting attention; they 
should be given more exposure and a bigger role to promote a reformist, pacified and 
tolerant public opinion. Many of the issues raised by these groups are recurring themes in 
this section of this study, showing that a growing number of Lebanese converge on 
peaceful activism, individual rights, and secularism. A critical, counter-hegemonic, and 
progressive sub-culture is slowly mushrooming.  
In keeping with critical security studies, this section provided space for progressive and 
emancipatory voices. They are voices that are often, in the midst of Lebanon’s complexity 
and volatility, overlooked by other studies. However, they are a positive sign: they are 
evidence of movement and progressive change. These voices and the pressure they exhort 
on the prevailing system are the key to change in Lebanon, particularly in order to achieve 
tangible, albeit slow and limited, improvements to everyday lives of marginalized groups. 
By providing this platform, this study embraces the political agenda that underscored 
critical social research and joins voices with these groups in calling for the transformation 
of the Lebanese system into a more inclusive and responsive system. 
 
Using the tools of governance, human security and critical security studies, these 
two chapters deconstructed and clarified many factors responsible for the precariousness of 
Lebanese security. Chapter 5 attempted to expose flaws in the Lebanese system as well as 
recurring regressive policies. Chapter 6 presented a brief overview of the current security 
and political situation in Lebanon for the purpose of contextualising the next chapter – the 
Lebanese security sector. Importantly, this chapter shed light on alternative voices 
struggling for progressive change and for the transformation of the traditional Lebanese 
system.  
278 
 
Chapter 7: Lebanon’s Security Sector: Dealing with Change, 
Governance, and Human Security 
 
The previous chapters have shown the persistence of conflict in Lebanon and the 
precariousness of human security. The weakness and militaristic tendencies of Lebanon’s 
security sector have been a factor in the pervasiveness of human insecurity. Its inability to 
guarantee freedom from fear by protecting society from threats of political violence and by 
guaranteeing human rights undermines human security. However, it is this study’s view 
that the weakness of the security sector is a symptom of Lebanon’s precarious political 
environment. The extension of political crises into the security sector has prevented the 
latter from developing into a capable and people-centred service. That being said, there is 
value in addressing this symptom; this chapter is a good first step to suggesting tangible 
and real changes to individuals facing insecurity in Lebanon. This chapter takes an 
institutional approach by weighing the performance of the security sector; a critique from 
within will help us build on and move beyond the prevailing conditions.  
Non-state actors have often been covered by academic studies;
1
 however, state security 
providers have until recently been largely overlooked. Given the recent heightened donor 
attention to Lebanon’s main state security providers, the role of these state actors is 
brought to the fore.  This study attempts to assess the contributions of these state security 
providers and of donors to human security. It is interested in examining how the security 
sector can be more effective and people-centred. This chapter therefore examines 
Lebanon’s security sector from the prism of SSR. It starts with contextualizing the 
governance of security in Lebanon by discussing the role of state and non-state actors. It 
moves on to mapping the security sector; it then discusses the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in more detail. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of observations and some suggestions for the process of positive change. 
 
                                                 
1
 Particularly those that have built over the years a more developed structure and an elaborate network 
of services such as Hezbollah, Amal and the PLO, even the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange. More 
recently, Islamist social movements and Jihadi groups have also received attention. See: Bernard 
Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon(MA & London: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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I. The Governance of Security in post-war Lebanon: State and Non-
State Security Providers 
 
Post-war Lebanon saw the dissolution of mini-states, the re-unification of the country 
(except the south), and the reconstruction of state institutions. Following Ta’if, parliament 
ratified a General Amnesty Law on August 26, 1991.
2
 The Amnesty law pardoned all 
political crimes committed prior to March 28, 1991. It thereby legitimized the 
transformation of former warlords into Lebanon’s post-war political class. As noted by 
then president Elias Hrawi, this was necessary for achieving peace.
3
 That being said, 2 
articles in the General Amnesty Law are worth highlighting. Article 3.3 stipulated that 
political crimes committed against political and spiritual leaders, foreign diplomats, or 
those referred to the Justice Council are not covered by the Amnesty law.
4
 Also, Article 2.3 
stipulated that amnesty is not granted for ‘continuing crimes and crimes repeated by 
perpetrators after the date of the promulgation of the law’. Article 2.3 was seen as a legal 
window for the families of the missing and forcibly disappeared to acquire information on 
their loved ones. However, both articles failed to establish justice for victims and their 
families. Article 3.3 is discriminatory as it blatantly placed crimes committed against 
political and sectarian leaders above of those committed against “ordinary” citizens. 
Furthermore, the judiciary largely failed to interpret article 2.3 in favour of victims.
5
 The 
two articles would also legitimize the only prosecution of a former warlord: the head of the 
LF Samir Geagea who had taken a stance against Tai’f and against the Syrian tutelage.6 
Hence, as ICTJ notes, ‘the amnesty law was shaped in such a manner that prosecutions 
were still possible and were indeed practiced against those who were deemed threats to the 
newly established order’.7 In addition, the near blanket Amnesty did not include provisions 
                                                 
2
 Republic of Lebanon, "Law No. 84 of 26/8/1991, Granting General Amnesty to Crimes Committed 
before March 28, 1991,"(Beirut: Dar al-Manshourat al-Houquouquiya-Matbaat Sader).p 3532. 
3
 Aïda Kanafani-Zahar, Liban: La Guerre Et La Mémoire(Rennes: Press Universitaire de Rennes, 
2011). p 90. 
4
 Justice Council is one of three special courts in Lebanon (the other two being the Military Tribunal 
and the High Court of Justice). The Justice Council only tries cases pertaining to national security, it 
only tries cases that the Cabinet of Ministers refers to it, and its decisions cannot be appealed. Mansour 
and Daoud, 2010, p 32.  
5
 See: Nizar Saghieh, Zaou Al-Mafqoudeen Aza’ Siayassat Al-Samit Wa Al-Inkar: Ay Abwab Li-Naqel 
Matalibahom Ila Halbat Al-Qada’? (Families of the Disappeared in the Face of Policies of Silence and 
Denial: What Doors to Transport Their Demands to the Judiciary?)(Beirut: al-Matba’a al-‘Arabiya, 
2012).  
6
 For the assassination of Prime Minster Rashid Karame in 1987 and for a number of crimes committed 
after March 1991. 
7
 ICTJ, 2013, p 177. 
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for acknowledging responsibility, for apology, or for establishing the events of the war. 
The approach adopted has been referred to as a “state-sponsored amnesia” whereby 
political elite and consecutive governments evade inclusive and serious debates and 
investigations into the war. Lebanon chose immediate peace at the expense of justice. 
While the political elite reached a consensus — a consociational pre-requisite — meager 
efforts were made to reconcile society and to address the sacrifices of the thousands of 
victims.
8
 
Ta’if stipulated ‘spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese 
territories’, disbanding all militias,9 as well as strengthening the ISF and the LAF. As most 
militias complied with the deadline set by the state, civilian life soon resumed.
10
 However, 
the official disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) program in post-war 
Lebanon would turn out to be partial and weak.  
Although heavy weaponry was ‘officially handed over’, several Lebanese groups ‘hid’ 
weapons,
11
 Palestinian groups retained their weapons in the camps,
12
 the SLA was still 
operating in the South, and Hezbollah was recognized as the de facto resistance against the 
Israeli occupation.
13
  That being said, Hezbollah returned barracks in Baalbalk to the army, 
training took place ‘in remote valleys’, and in Beirut’s suburb—Dahiyeh, ‘weapons were 
no longer visible’.14 An offer to re-integrate into the LAF was also extended to the SLA; 
however, as the Israeli occupation persisted, the SLA’s role in “securing” the security zone 
south of the Litani continued. Hence, demobilization was certainly incomplete. Not only 
would Hezbollah and the South Lebanon Army not be part of the process, but as Picard 
notes, ‘all continued to shelter ex-militiamen with a suspect past, all persisted in training 
                                                 
8
 The study conducted by Smaira and Cassehgari shows how a subordinate judiciary failed to effectively 
prosecute cases of enforced disappearances (as per article 2.3 of the general Amnesty law pertaining to 
‘continuing crimes’) and failed to try cases of massacres referred to the Justice Council. In addition, 
consecutive governments failed to effectively investigate the whereabouts of thousands of missing and 
forcibly disappeared, failed to establish an inclusive narration of the war to balance selective and bias 
alternatives (memory initiatives by the main political parties remained exclusivist and politicized), the 
reparation process in Mount Lebanon failed to provide effective remedy to victims and to achieve 
popular-based reconciliation (the process was fraught with problems and conditions), and reconciliation 
was limited to political and community leaders. 
9
 Non-Lebanese militias referred to Palestinian militias, and the Iranian Pasdaran ul-Islam involved in 
training Hezbollah fighters. Picard, 1996, p 5.  
10
 The streets were cleared from militia checkpoints or weapons. 
11
 DeClerck, 2012, 24. 
12
 And in a few remote locations outside the camps on the Syrian-Lebanese eastern borders. 
13
 Ta’if maintained Lebanon’s right to fight the Israeli occupation by all necessary means and Hezbollah 
was the only militia that was not asked to disarm. Ta’if, Third(C). 
14
 Picard, 1996, p 18. 
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fighters - scouts, vigilantes or 'karate teachers' - and all continued to adopt their own local 
strategies for self-defence in an uncertain domestic and regional environment’.15  
Some 40,000 fighters were expected to be re-integrated into the public service;
16
 that 
being said, the government had pledged to rehabilitate some 20,000 fighters. Law 88 of 
1991 only integrated some 6,000 fighters into the ISF and the LAF;
 17
 later another 2,000 
were integrated into the civil administration. The state therefore only rehabilitated some 
8,000 fighters. Given estimates that place the percentage of militia fighters between 1.25 
percent and 3 percent of the population,
18
 one can argue that the formal DDR was minimal. 
In addition, restricting the formal approach to assimilation into state institutions limits the 
scope for rehabilitating fighters into civilian life and into the formal economy. Also, the 
program was politicized; groups such as the Lebanese Forces were soon ostracized.
19
 
Indeed, the LF’s re-integration was most problematic. The process first faced resistance 
from the militia; then the state antagonized and excluded LF fighters.
20
 Hundreds of 
fighters, who could not benefit from the Amnesty, left Lebanon. The majority stayed; 
through its network of supporters and contacts, the militia tried to arrange for work 
placements for its former fighters.
21
  
Fighters that were integrated into state institutions owed their positions to militia 
leaders’ success in negotiating a share in the deal. The rest either benefited from militia 
services or had to transition on their own—many therefore did not take part in the process. 
In any case, state allegiance did not substitute traditional or militia allegiance. I would 
argue that rehabilitation and civilianization were relinquished and that, implicitly, 
militancy endured.  
While Ta’if stipulated spreading the authority of the state, it also instated an open-
ended tutelage. Syrian tutelage or the Pax Syriana was institutionalized by Ta’if, the 
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, and the Defense and Security 
Agreement of 1991. Ta’if stipulated that the ‘Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, p 25. 
16
 Ibid, p 8. 
17
 Republic of Lebanon, "Law 88 of 12/9/1991 "(Beirut: Official Gazette).p 628. 
18
 Percentages taken from: DeClerck, 2012, 24.  
19
 Picard, "The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias."p 20-26. 
20
 See Picard for military and political obstacles to re-integrating the LF. Ibid, p 21-26. 
21
 It established ‘an employment agency that canvassed friendly businesses (…) for assistance in placing 
militiamen’. Furthermore, in a phone interview conducted in Beirut on 24/5/2013 for another study, 
Toni Darwich, Head of Martyrs, Casualties and Detainees of the Lebanese Forces confirmed that the LF 
continued providing social services and work placement for fighters injured or detained during the war; 
and in 2006 Cross Roads Association was formally established for that purpose. Picard, 1999, p 23. 
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of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State’.22 It also 
stipulated that the Syrian forces shall re-deploy to the Beqa’a within two years but left full 
withdrawal to be later agreed by the two governments; this did not take place. The Treaty 
of Brotherhood emphasized the ‘common destiny and common interests of the two 
countries’.23 Article 1 stipulated that ‘the two States shall endeavour to achieve the highest 
degree of cooperation and coordination in the political, economic, security, cultural, 
scientific and other fields’; article 3 emphasised the interdependence of the two countries’ 
security and article 5 stipulated they coordinate foreign policy.
 24
 Given the power relations 
between the two countries it is not difficult to identify which held the upper hand.  
The association of the state with the repression and abuses of the Syrian tutelage would 
further reinforce distrust in state institutions. Both the judiciary and security forces were 
seen to be subservient to Syria. In 1994, the LF were disbanded by the post-war Hariri 
government, its leader Samir Geagea was sentenced for crimes committed during and after 
the war, and he was jailed in solitary confinement until his release 11 years later.
25
 
Although Geagea is responsible for numerous crimes (including war crimes) and this study 
in no way advocates impunity, it is also important to note that the trials have been 
considered as unfair and politicized.
26
 Opposition to the terms of Ta’if and the Syrian 
tutelage was not tolerated; many would agree with Bassel Salloukh in saying that 
opposition ‘was smashed’.27 Former president and head of the Phalange Amine Gemayel 
and General Michel Aoun were in exile in France; Syrian and Lebanese security forces 
harassed, detained, tortured, transferred to Syrian detention centres, and in some cases 
                                                 
22
 Ta’if III-second (D). 
23
 Article 5 (2). 
24
 The document notes that ‘the interdependence of the security of the two countries shall require that 
Lebanon shall not, under any circumstances, be made a source of threat to the security of Syria, or Syria 
to the security of Lebanon’ .The English version can be found at the UN treaty series: 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-
SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf.  
25
 Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Geagea was released by special presidential amnesty. The 
amnesty was made possible by an outrageous deal to liberate Geagea in exchange for a similar amnesty 
for the Dunnieh and Majdal Anjar group, a militant Sunni Islamist groups which had clashes with the 
LAF between December 1999 and January 2000 taking the life of 14 soldiers and 24 militants. 
26
 The “unfairness” of the Geagea trials are related to selectiveness, unfair proceedings, detention and 
conditions of imprisonment. Amnesty International, "Lebanon. Samir Gea’gea’ and Jirjis Al-Khouri: 
Torture and Unfair Trial,"(Nov. 2004).Found at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE18/003/2004 (accessed on 13/3/ 2013). 
27
 Bassel Salloukh, "Democracy in Lebanon: The Primacy of the Sectarian System.," in The Struggle 
over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies, ed. Nathan J. Brown and 
Emad Shahin(London: Routledge, 2010). P 137. 
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killed activists.
28
 In 1992 the main Christian figures boycotted the elections and in 1996 
demonstrations were banned. The gerrymandering of elections between 1992 and 2000 
‘served to manufacture a political class subservient to Syrian dictates’.29 This phase was 
referred to as the Ihbat (depression or despair);
30
 it lasted until 2001 when the opposition 
revived its defiance to the Syrian presence.
31
  
In the post-war phase, Syrian and Lebanese authorities repeatedly denied that Lebanese 
were detained in Syria. This claim was falsified in 2000 when 48 Lebanese detainees were 
released from Syrian jails;
32
 since 1998, records have shown that ‘more than 150 Lebanese 
detainees have been released from Syrian prisons’.33 Reliable information indicates that 
while many died, some are still alive. The families want information as to their 
whereabouts and have led a relentless effort since 1983 to pressure the authorities for 
serious investigations. The judiciary and security forces were clearly seen to be complicit 
in the Syrian oppression. Even in the aftermath of the Syrian tutelage, the media, human 
rights activists and vulnerable groups continue to be subjected to mal-treatment by security 
forces.
34
 Human Rights Watch has documented the abuse of homosexuals, sex workers, 
drug-users, and migrant workers by the ISF.
35
 The Custom Service has recently shown the 
security sector’s militaristic and authoritarian colours by assaulting a group of reporters 
calling over a megaphone for an interview over corruption charges.
36
 The LAF has been 
accused of harassing and abusing Sunni Islamists;
37
 and the Judiciary has been seen as 
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 ICTJ, 2013, p 177; AI, 2005; and HRW, 1997. 
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 Salloukh, 2010, p 137-138 
30
 The term was coined to refer to ‘Christian’ Ihbat. 
31
 Salloukh, 2010, p 139. 
32
 And ‘some of whom had in fact been declared dead by Lebanese authorities’. Centre Libanais des 
Droits Humains (CLDH), "Lebanon: Enforced Disappearance and Incommunicado Detentions,"(2008). 
p 20, 40. 
33
 Act for the Disappeared at: http://www.actforthedisappeared.com/what-you-need-to-know.php 
(accessed on 14/11/2013). 
34
 See: Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: Lebanon." From: http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/world-report-2012-lebanon (accessed on 10/2/2014). 
35
 Prisoners have reported being beaten ‘with fists, boots, or implements such as sticks, canes, and 
rulers’’ they reported being denied ‘food, water, or medication (…) reported being handcuffed in 
bathrooms or kept in extremely uncomfortable positions for hours at a time (…) forced to listen to the 
screams of other detainees’. Women reported being subjected to ‘to sexual violence or coercion, ranging 
from rape to offering them “favors” (…) in exchange for sex’. Other violations consist of denying 
detainees ‘phone calls to family members, access to lawyers, and needed medical care’. HRW, 2013. 
36
 Al-Jadeed Crew Freed after being Beaten, Detained by Customs Agents in Downtown Beirut, 
Naharnet, 26/11/2013. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/107314 (accessed on 27/11/2013). 
37
 Omayma Abdel-Latif notes that the LAF’s ‘continued targeting, arrest, and torture of young men in 
the north under the pretext of tracing extremists’ has increased ‘the sense of victimization and 
persecution among these groups’. Famous hardline Sunni cleric with a big following in Tripoli, Sheik 
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complicit in clamping down on Islamists.
38
 Bernard Rougier explains that Islamists 
increasingly resent their political and strategic exclusion as well their stigmatization as 
Lebanon’s main internal threat. This marginalization has been seen as discriminatory. 
Other groups have maintained some of their arsenal and the Shia, through Hezbollah, have 
been assigned the prestigious and exclusive role of fighting Israel. In addition, unlike 
Islamized Sunni communities, Hezbollah has been able to freely ‘develop its “Islamic 
society” (…) beside—state institutions’.39 
The repeated clashes have indeed exposed the limitations of Lebanon’s transition. The 
prevalence of sectarian politics mixed with the weakness of Lebanon’s central institutions 
have allowed political violence to resurge and have severely undermined human security. 
The string of terrorist attacks since 2005, the 2007 Nahr el-Bared conflict, the clashes of 
May 2008, the spill-over of the Syrian war,
40
 and the kidnapping “spree” that has swept the 
country illustrate this.
41
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Daii al-Islam Chahal, has noted that ‘the army is infiltrated by Iran and the Syrian regime and is under 
Hezbollah domination’. Mari Abi-Habib and Rima Abushakra, "Sunni Islamists in Lebanon Accuse 
Army of Siding with Shiite Hezbollah Increasing Attacks on Soldiers Latest Phase of Spillover 
Violence from Syrian Civil War," The Wall Street Journal 16/12/2013.From: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579262053322901962 (accessed on 
10/3/2014) and Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists—A Growing Force Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Omayma Abdel-
Latif, Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists—a Growing Force, Carnegie Papers, Jan. 2008,," in Carnegie 
Papers(Jan. 2008). p 21. 
38
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Daily Star 19/6/2013. From: http://dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-19/177358-nine-
islamists-detained-since-2007-to-be-released.ashx#axzz2va2rSU1e (accessed on 10/3/2014). 
39
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Afghanistan and elsewhere. Rougier, 2007, p 242-246. 
40
 In the form of clashes, incursions, cross-border shelling, bombs, and targeted assassinations. 
41
 The string of kidnappings has been linked to simple financial gains (ransom), to the Syrian war, and 
other disputes. The Lebanese Miqdad clan for example kidnapped some 20 Syrians and a Turkish 
businessmen as leverage to release a family member that had disappeared in the Syrian war. Also, the 
families of 9 Lebanese Shia pilgrims kidnapped by a rebel group in the Syrian town of Azzaz (on the 
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(accessed on 8/3/2014); Radwan Mortada, "The Business of Kidnapping in Lebanon," Al-Akhbar 
30/3/2013.From: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15394 (accessed on 10/11/2013); and Turkish pilots 
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Predictably, Hezbollah’s arsenal and role as the sole ‘resistance’ actor has led to 
opposing factions justifying their own need to maintain arms. Fuelled by the conflict in 
Syria, Hezbollah’s sectarian basis and role in Syria has reached its toll with certain 
communities. Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmad Assir's call to his supporters to take up arms is 
one example. In June 2013, clashes between Assir’s supporters and the LAF in Sidon led 
to the death of 16 soldiers and 20 gunmen.
42
 
In this context, state security forces are inherently fragile, and without the necessary 
political coverage from Lebanon's openly sectarian leadership, they are unable to act 
decisively. Concerns of disintegration and relapse into civil war prevent the state from 
intervening effectively or disarming factions. The cessation of hostilities hence continues 
to depend on the informal approach of “consensual security” between politico-sectarian 
leaders. However, in post-war Lebanon, since the Syrian withdrawal, as domestic 
polarization increased, state authority and monopoly over the use of force are once again 
challenged. This being said, vigilantism and groups claiming “self-defence” have 
proliferated. 
43
 As a result, lawlessness is increasingly rampant in the country.
44
 The 
protracted armed conflict is increasingly visible and hundreds of civilians have fallen 
victims. “Consensual security” has entailed elite consensus, however it has also entailed 
impunity for acts of political violence and no grassroots reconciliation. Sadly, as noted by 
late Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah, the price for the failure to effectively deal with these events 
has been to ‘la[y] the ground for all the violence that we see in Lebanon’.45 In other words, 
while elite may temporarily reconcile, society has remained fragmented and mobilized—
leaving the door open for resorting to violence when tension rises.  
The discussions so far show that the security sector in Lebanon suffers from two 
problems pertinent to human security: it is too weak to effectively protect society against 
                                                                                                                                                    
detail abduction upon return home, The daily Star, 20/10/2013. From: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Oct-20/235138-turkish-pilots-detail-abduction-
upon-return-home.ashx#axzz2vCpuA3w7 (accessed on 10/11/2013).  
42
 Army Storms Asir's Security Zone, Cleric Disappears after 16 Troops Martyred, Naharnet, 24/5/2013. 
From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/87984 (accessed on 17/8/2013).   
43
 Adib, 2012, p 
44
 Aside from the above security incidents, of the many examples, one can mention the daytime 
assassination of a father of a suspect in the bombing of two Tripoli Mosques (twin bombing on August 
23, 2013) which lead to sniper and rocket propelled grenade attacks between the two infamous Tripoli 
neighborhoods. The army intervened by evacuating children from schools. Arab Democratic Party 
Official Shot Dead in Tripoli amid Flare up, Naharnet, 20/2/2014. From:  
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/119446 (accessed on 20/2/2014) 
45
 Author’s extrapolation from Sheikh Fadlallah criticism of the General Amnesty Law quoted in 
Wierda et al., 2007, p 1071. 
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major threats to physical security but it also abuses the “legitimate” use of force. In light of 
this, what can the security sector do to improve human security? Given the political 
deadlock, conflict in Lebanon will persist; it is unlikely that the state can curtail the 
proliferation of weapons and disarm Hezbollah, the Palestinian factions, and other groups. 
Therefore, this study argues for an institutionally limited approach. It argues for 
transforming the security sector into a people-centered, efficient, and effective service that 
protects society against threats to physical security and that guarantees human rights.  
Two factors have prevented the Lebanese security sector from maturing: the country’s 
history of conflict and its government policies. Nevertheless, the Lebanese people have 
also inherited a number of characteristics that challenge allegiance to a central national 
authority. Lebanese society has traditionally relied on informal channels for the provision 
of security. In fact, a long tradition in Lebanon has been informal local rule by qabadayat 
or 'strongarm men' which serve as the middlemen between community leaders and the 
public.
46
 These qabadayat are the basis of patron-client relations as they enforce the 
authority of leaders. However, while they would distribute patronage they would also use 
force and engage in illicit activity; nevertheless as they guaranteed the well-functioning of 
the system, they ‘received protection from the security agencies and the justice system, 
forming an entire social group that was, to all intents and purposes, above the law’.47 The 
state had long acquiesced the role of the qabadayat as it maintained the informal power-
sharing arrangements between traditional community leaders. In that respect, aspects of the 
rule of the militias—use of force, protection, services—was not alien to Lebanese society, 
nor is post-war clientalism and informal local governance.  
Local- and community-level mechanisms therefore have long replaced and continue to 
replace state authority in many parts of Lebanon. Many Lebanese communities are closely 
knit through clan ties or ‘extended families’ and are feudally based; they are also 
traditionally ‘defensive’48 and militaristic.49 Although these characteristics are no longer at 
                                                 
46
 Michael Johnson, "Political Bosses and Their Gangs: Zu’ama and Qabadayat in the Sunni Muslim 
Quarters of Beirut," in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies ed. Ernest Gellner and John 
Waterbury(London: Duckworth, 1977). p 211-213 or  1986 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in 
Beirut. The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State, 1840-1985(London: Ithaca Press, 1986). 
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 Oren Barack, The Lebanese Army. A National Institution in a Divided Society(Albany: State 
University of New York, 2009). p 109. 
48
 Historically, at various stages, Mount Lebanon served as a refuge for the Christians, Druze, Shia, and 
Arab farmers and nomads fleeing the Roman conquests; they have traditionally been ‘conservative and 
on the defensive’. Picard, 1996, p 3. 
49
 Massoud Daher notes that the militaristic tribal and feudal system preceded but was reinforced under 
the Ottoman rule: ‘feudal families and at their head the Emir did not resort to the Ottoman forces to 
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the peak they reached during the civil war when they produced sectarian-based mini-states, 
it is not contentious to note that communitarian, political, and tribal allegiances 
overshadow state allegiance. In fact, the state continues to take a secondary role in the 
various Mouraba’at Amniyeh (security quarters). This takes place in the Druze enclave in 
the Shouf, the Maronite enclave in Becharreh or Ehden. More infamously, this takes place 
in Tripoli’s Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods,50 and in border towns 
such as Wadi Khaled and Arsal;
51
 the district of Akkar
52
 and the city of Sidon
53
 have also 
witnessed armed resistance to state security forces.
54
 Of course, in Hezbollah’s strongholds 
in the suburb of Beirut Dahiyeh, the south or the Beka’a the group has long taken primacy 
over the state. The non-state actor with the more elaborate state-like functions developed in 
the aftermath of the 2006 war a corps called Indibat (discipline) in charge of public order.
55
 
Furthermore, since the string of attacks against Shia targets in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah stepped 
up security measures in and around Dahieyh.
56
 In an interview with Marcel Ghanem, 
Hezbollah MP Fadlallah explained that given the state’s capabilities, the measures they are 
                                                                                                                                                    
collect the taxes but to their own forces’ (this was a privilege granted to the feudal families of Mount 
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 Indibat became a phenomenon as Hezbollah’s reconstruction wing Jihad al-Bina planned and 
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 It manned check-points, searched cars, and registered vehicles entering the area; however, the post-
war policy of no public display of weapons was followed.  
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taking are merely meant to fill the vacuum.
57
 However, as tight measures started causing 
tension between inhabitants of Dahiyeh and Hezbollah, it “invited” the state to fulfil its 
duties. The Ministry of Interior has devised a security plan for the ISF, the LAF and other 
security forces to take over the security of Dahiyeh.
58
 That being said, clearly, there are 
informal “red lines” for what access security forces have in Dahiyeh.59 As General Pierre 
Nassar, head of the ISF Strategic Training Unit noted: coordination takes place to a certain 
extent, then they draw a line.
60
 In Lebanon, it is not uncommon for the state to coordinate 
its presence and operations with local actors and politico-sectarian leaders;
61
 it also often 
mediates the resolution of conflicts between these actors.
62
 In such cases the state is 
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viewed as an impartial third party. Against the traditional sectarian exclusionary non-state 
actors, the state can be an inclusive and reconciliatory alternative. However, as will be 
shown below, state security providers are increasingly seen as biased; the positive role the 
state can play is therefore seriously undermined. Nevertheless, this study intends to suggest 
developing the constructive and positive role these actors can play. 
Lebanon’s security predicament is not one which can be blamed entirely on recent 
events and regional or international actors. The failure of Lebanese politics to overcome 
the feudo-sectarian system, with its by-product of feudo-sectarian competition, and the 
fatalistic attitude of the political leadership towards regional and domestic unrest has led 
consecutive governments to adopt a policy of “negative neutrality”. Threat perceptions and 
rivalry had prevented the elite from agreeing on a precise role for the military and the 
security organizations.
63 Consecutive ‘policies of neglect’ have resulted, since 
independence, in the failure of Lebanese governments to adopt a strategy to develop a 
capable and effective security sector;
64
 one capable for the least of curbing threats to 
physical security and respecting political rights and individual freedoms.  
In short, the 1989 Ta’if Agreement included provisions to unify and reinforce the 
security sector and subsequently spread the government’s authority over all Lebanese 
territories. Equally, however, it instated fragmentation and subjugation to Syrian tutelage. 
And although the latter prevented the development of the Lebanese security sector, as will 
be discussed, subsequent Lebanese leaderships also failed to overcome the legacies of 
weakness.  
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 On the one hand, leftists resented the submission to the Maronite establishment, and on the other, 
conservatives feared dragging Lebanon further into the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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 Founder of the Phalange Party, Pierre Gemayel’s famous statement illustrates this mind-set: 
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II. Mapping Lebanon’s Security Sector: a proliferation of state security 
providers and the fragmentation of authority 
 
This study espouses the wide definition of a security sector and will briefly highlight 
what Nicole Ball referred to as the ‘security community’65 – actors that contribute in one 
way or the other to the governance of security in Lebanon. However, for scope 
considerations, the focus of the following discussions will be restricted to the two main 
state actors mandated with providing security—the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Limiting the discussions to these two actors is a limit to 
the scope of this study but this allows us to have a deeper understanding of their role in the 
governance of Lebanon’s security.  
 
1) Governance by state actors 
 
In regards to state actors: three ministries and two offices are directly concerned with 
the Lebanese security sector. The Ministry of Defence houses the Lebanese Armed Forces. 
The Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities gathers the Internal Security Forces (ISF), 
the General Security (GS), and the Civil Defence. The Ministry of Finance has the 
Customs Services under its jurisdiction and is further involved in security sector 
governance through its role in elaborating the state budget. The Office of the President 
heads the High Council on Defence, and the Office of the Prime Minister has jurisdiction 
over the State Security (SS).
66
  
As an extension of the political system, the leadership of the security and defence 
forces is traditionally distributed between the main sects. The LAF is traditionally headed 
by a Maronite; although the General Security Directorate is traditionally headed by a 
Greek Orthodox, a Shia General Director has become the norm in post-war Lebanon. The 
Internal Security Forces is headed by a Sunni Muslim, and the State Security Directorate 
was formed to appease Shia demands.
67
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 Ball, 2002b, p 1. 
66
 See figures 4 to 7. 
67
 See: Nizar Abdel-Kader, "National Security Reform in Lebanon," in The Role of the Parliament in 
the Development of a National Security Policy(Montreux, Switzerland: UNDP and DCAF, Apr. 2007). 
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The High Council on Defence: Article 6 of the National Defence Law (section 2) 
stipulates that the Council of Ministers formulates, decides and oversees the 
implementation of the Defence and Security Strategy. However, Article 7 stipulates the 
formation of a High Council on Defence—headed by the President and with the Prime 
Minister as its Vice President—to ‘decide on the necessary measures to implement the 
strategy as specified by the council of ministers,’ to ‘distribute tasks on the relevant 
ministries and agencies,’ and ‘to monitor implementation.’68 The High Council on Defence 
clearly is intended to guarantee civilian involvement in the Defence and Security Strategy. 
However, the delineation between the role of the President and the Cabinet in the 
implementation of the Strategy is not clear. 
The General Directorate of State Security (SS) is in charge of protecting security and 
public institutions.
69
 It is ‘a mixed organization consisting of 1,226 officials transferred 
from the Internal Security Forces, General Security and the Ministry of the Interior.’ It is 
tasked with ‘intelligence gathering related to the security of the state,’ ‘the surveillance of 
foreigners as to activities that touch upon state security,’ and ‘counterintelligence’ as well 
as periodic reporting to the High Council on Defence.
70
 The State Security is ‘the 
executive body’ of the High Council on Defence;71 it is directly linked to the President’s 
office but is headed by a Director appointed by the Prime Minister.
 
The National Defence 
Law stipulates information sharing and coordination with the other agencies, but the 
specificities of this need to be decreed by the council of ministers.
72
 The reader will notice 
that many of the functions of the State Security are also performed by the bigger and older 
agencies like the ISF, the LAF and the General Security Directorate. The State Security 
can be seen as a redundant agency created in 1985 to appease Shia demands.
73
 
Furthermore, like the High Council on Defence, the dual authority of the President and the 
Prime Minister is potentially problematic.  
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The General Security Directorate (GS) has a threefold role; it is in charge of applying 
laws pertaining to immigration, the media, and intelligence gathering on political, 
economic and social matters.
74
 However, with a force of 3,600 personnel, it is 
‘understaffed’ and largely ‘fulfils a bureaucratic role.’75 The GS was the forerunner among 
the internal security agencies in accepting women. While the latter was a progressive move 
taken by the agency in the late 1990s, the agency is infamous for its political intelligence, 
media and cultural censorship.
76
 Also, note that this is second intelligence service so far, 
and that like the State Security, it is in charge of monitoring foreigners.
77
 Its role in 
political intelligence has allowed the agency to overstep onto the ISF’s internal security 
and policing mandate.
78
 
The Civil Defence is tasked with the protection of people and property; it prepares for 
and responds to natural or man-made disasters.
79
 It is the smallest and the least funded of 
the agencies—with 270 men and 4,700 volunteers. 80  
The Customs Services is another severely understaffed and underfunded organization. 
It is tasked with ‘surveying the borders to prevent human and goods trafficking;’ but given 
cross-border villages with Syria, ‘82 illegal crossing points,’81 and cross-border 
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paramilitary pro-Syrian Palestinian infrastructures,
82
 the Customs agency finds itself 
severely restricted to the four official northern crossing points, the airport and the port.
83
  
The Lebanese security sector is characterised by a proliferation of intelligence services: 
The GS, the ISF, the LAF, and the SS have their own intelligence services. There are also 
secondary intelligence services within the Airport Security, the Presidential Guards, and 
the Government Guard (office of the Prime Minister).
84
 The most significant is the 
Intelligence Directorate of the LAF; more recently the Intelligence Branch of the ISF has 
emerged as a contending actor. However, my observation from the National Defence Law 
and the mandate of the respective agencies is that no overarching or coordinating authority 
regulates their activities. Executive Director of CESMO, Mrs Flavia Adib, confirms by 
adding that there is no ‘information showing cooperation’.85 Also, the norm of each being 
tied to different politico-sectarian affiliations is enshrined; Adib and Senior Advisor at 
NICO Jonathan McIvor confirm. McIvor highlights that Lebanon’s ‘confessional 
consociationalism’ has embedded a ‘client-centred’ approach to the functions of the 
agencies.
86
  
As noted in the ISF’s 2008 Strategic Review, since 1958, the LAF has been given 
‘primacy’ over internal security and law enforcement including ‘border protection, 
conventional police patrols as well as criminal investigations’. This is attributed to LAF’s 
better ability to ‘police areas where the ISF cannot, to better resources, to being a more 
acceptable organization to the public’.87 However, by mandate, the ISF is the main agency 
in charge of internal security and policing. Furthermore, the State Security is mandated 
with protecting against threats to national security (this would include internal security and 
terrorism). In addition, the GS, the ISF, the SS, and the LAF (and subsidiary agencies) all 
engage in internal intelligence. Tai’if stipulated that military intelligence should be 
‘reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively,88 and the Strategic Review 
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emphasised that the ISF’s Information Bureau (Intelligence) should be limited to criminal 
intelligence only.
89
 Both reforms have not been adopted.  
Lebanon has no border strategy, no border force, and no institutional mechanism for an 
integrated or a coordinated approach to border management. 4 agencies share the 
responsibility of border: these are the LAF, the ISF, the GS and the General Customs. As 
mentioned above, on its territorial borders with Syria, Lebanon has 4 formal and some 82 
illegal crossing points. Pursuant to article 14 of Resolution 1701 calling on the Lebanese 
government to ‘secure its borders and all entry points to prevent the entry (…) without its 
consent of arms’ and at the request of the President of the SC to ‘dispatch at the earliest 
(…) an independent assessment mission to fully access the monitoring of the border’ a 
Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) was dispatched to Lebanon 
between May and June 2007. The ‘UN team of border police experts’ found that little 
‘cooperation and coordination’ took place between the agencies in charge of border 
control; they had little experience in border management and that little ‘inter-agency 
information sharing and joint planning’ took place. It also found that the ‘traditional 
military’ border doctrine was inappropriate;90 it was noted that ‘not a single on-border or 
near-border seizure of smuggled arms had been reported to the team’ and that several 
improvements could be made with and without international assistance.
91
 Soon donors 
rushed to assist the Lebanese government in controlling its borders. The Northern Border 
Pilot Project led by the German Border Police Mission in northern Lebanon trains and 
equips the forces controlling the 4 official border crossing points.
92
  In the aim of preparing 
for an integrated border management plan, the UK funded a Common Operation Centre 
and a multi-agency mobile force was formed.
93
 Multi-agency mobile units were a central 
element in the project’s aim ‘to restructure and institutionalize a cohesive Lebanese civil 
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police border force’. However, despite the many contributions, the project has had limits. 
Although as EU delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché Duccio Bandini 
notes, the agencies overlap,
94
 UK Stabilization officer confirms that it was ambitious to 
expect ‘4 agencies that never worked together’ to overcome the legacies of poor 
coordination, cooperation and communication as well as competition; donors were putting 
forward recommendations that were ‘closer to a European rather than a Lebanese model’.95  
In terms of lessons learnt, from the perspective of the LAF, it is best to ‘reconsider the 
structure of the joint task force (…) as it is best for each agency to work within its 
responsibilities and coordination could take place in a joint operations room’.96 From 
conversations with Mirco Hintz, advisor to LIBAT from the German police mission, it 
seems that the task is rather enormous. He highlights the difference between the area of the 
Northern Pilot project and the eastern border region. In the former, the border is shorter, 
largely demarcated, and villages on either sides share the same confessional denomination. 
The eastern border is very different; the population is not homogeneous, the border is not 
demarcated, and the socio-economic landscape is complex. The informal economy sustains 
the border villages; further, they rely on Syria for services such as electricity and 
healthcare. Therefore, a border strategy needs to take into account the socio-economic 
realities of the border region; ‘work, hospitals, schools, services’ and livelihood need to be 
secured on the Lebanese side before a change is imposed on the people.
97
   
A border strategy requires a multi-sectoral approach and a long-term commitment. 
Aside from the need for equipment, training, decisions on technical and doctrinal issues as 
well as the structure of the force, demarcation and the socio-economic infrastructure are 
key standing issues. Are Lebanese stakeholders and foreign donors capable and willing to 
invest multi-dimensionally and long-term? The political stalemate and deteriorating Syrian 
crisis have shelved advancements in border management.
98
  
As can be noted, the Lebanese security sector has blurry distinctions between its 
various security agencies. Head of the Strategic Planning Unit at the ISF, General Pierre 
Nassar for example, noted that there is ‘no overlap in responsibilities between the agencies 
                                                 
94
 Interview held in Beirut on 17/8/2010. 
95
 Interview held in Beirut on 25/8/2010. 
96
 LAF communications, 2010. 
97
 Interview held in Beirut on 15/9/2010. 
98
 At least in terms of formulating and adopting a strategy, in terms of negotiating with Syria on 
demarcation, in terms of addressing the socio-economic requisites for success, and overall, in terms of 
civilianizing the border management approach. 
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in texts’ but admitted that it does happen ‘in practice’; however, he insisted that this is 
‘sorted by coordination’.99 Also, the Communications Department of the Ministry of 
Defence insisted that there is 'no overlap or conflict between the mandate of the LAF’ and 
other agencies.
100
 Observations made by studying the texts refute these claims and assert 
instead that opaque boundaries, overlap, working at cross-purposes and rivalry underpin 
the relationships between the different agencies. Duccio Bandini uses the terms 
overlapping, duplication, conflicting, and confusion to describe the relationship between 
the agencies. McIvor in the Strategic Review notes that ‘there are clearly overlapping 
mandates and reporting chains’.101 Bandini, Adib and UK Stabilization Advisor all agree 
that the agencies ‘compete not share info’;102 the latter confirms a similar observation I 
make regarding the legacies of the Syrian tutelage: that competition is expected as the 
agencies were ‘created to compete against each other’.103 Belloncle also notes that by 
‘dividing and ruling the Lebanese intelligence apparatus, Damascus had a priceless tool of 
control over Lebanon’s political life.’104  
 
The justice sector is a key actor within the security sector. A well-functioning justice 
sector upholds human rights, the rule of law, and the constitution. The judiciary includes 
the courts, prosecutors, and defence lawyers; the penal system and the Ministry of Justice 
are also part of the justice sector. The latter shares a symbiotic relationship with the 
security sector, and controls the military and security forces by being part of the system of 
checks and balances. An effective justice sector provides impartial resolution of disputes; it 
sentences offenders, prevents impunity, and protects the vulnerable; it contributes to 
fostering a secure environment.
105
 Approaches to SSR increasingly adopt a combined 
security and justice approach; the UNDP and more recently DFID have adopted this 
approach. Ta’if sought to enhance the judiciary's independence by establishing the High 
Judicial Council (HJC) mandated with trying presidents and ministers and specifying that a 
number of its members be elected by the Judiciary; it also established the Constitutional 
                                                 
99
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100
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101
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102
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Council.
106
  However, Ta’if’s plan for empowering the judiciary is minimal. Only two out 
of the HJC’s 10 members are elected by the judiciary and few opportunities were provided 
for the justice sector to develop its capabilities. Indeed, experts and NGOs have noted the 
lack of institutional arrangements to uphold respect of human rights; they deplored the 
jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians,
107
 the problem of excessively lengthy pre-
trial detention, and the untenable conditions of the prisons system.
108
 Number of experts, 
including from the within the judiciary, have themselves lamented political interferences; 
the first president of the HJC, Judge Antoine Khair noted the ‘subordination to politicians’ 
and, former president of the HJC, Judge Nasri Lahoud noted that the judiciary’s 
‘independence (...) is a pure utopia’.109  
The legislature may include ‘national, provincial, and municipal 
legislatures/assemblies, their committees and commissions.’110 It is a key actor in the 
successful control and monitoring of the security sector; and the Lebanese parliament 
should be involved in a number of ways in the governance of the security sector. It has the 
duty to debate and investigate security matters in both general sessions and the Committee 
of National Defence and Interior; it approves relevant legislation; its role spreads over the 
defence and security forces as well as the relevant ministries. The Parliament voices the 
concerns brought by parliamentarians’ constituencies; it votes on the state budget, and 
thereby on the resources allocated to the security sector; and it ratifies treaties and aid 
agreements. However, ‘it can only exercise these responsibilities if it has access to 
information, the necessary technical expertise and the power and intention to hold the 
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 Ta’if III-B (1-3). 
107
 The ISF review conducted by NICO notes that the military court’s jurisdiction over terrorist crimes 
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government to account.’111 That being said, the legislature has not ‘performed [its] 
constitutionally assigned tasks and jurisdiction over’112 the security sector; political as well 
as technical considerations underpin this failure.
113
 Lebanon has not had a Defence and 
Security Strategy for it to be approved or overseen by the parliament.
114
 UK Stabilization 
Advisor notes that the parliament effectively does not ‘oversee’ security policy. Although 
political interference has a ‘long tradition’ as admitted by General Nassar, political 
leadership, as UK Stabilization Advisor notes, is too ‘fragmented’ and partisan. Each 
agency develops its own direction and priorities. Therefore as McIvor notes, the LAF for 
example is ‘its own boss’;115 in order to perform its mandate it tends to insulate itself from 
political rambling.
116
   Of course, this means that the various state actors may work at 
cross-purposes, compete, and duplicate resources and efforts. Although used in a slightly 
different context,
117
 we can appropriate the argument made by the ISF review by noting 
that the lack of unified political direction exacerbates the above mentioned lack of clarity 
in the mandates of the agencies. It has led to ‘competition for the policing functions which 
often leads to confusion, duplication and ineffective investigation’.118 This confusion is an 
impediment to accountability and the agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness in protecting 
human security.
119
 
 
I add the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) to 
the security community as it has been tasked with government-wide governance reforms, 
including but not limited to: e-government and access to law, modernization of legal texts, 
automated system for the customs services as well as for the courts, and a government 
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 ISF Review, 2008, II. 
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wide anti-corruption role.
120
 Although OMSAR is not part of the security sector, it is 
involved in institutional modernization, management and civil service training, thereby it 
enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of relevant ministries. In this sense, OMSAR is 
part of what Ball and her colleagues call the ‘economic managers’ within the security 
community.
121
 I would argue that OMSAR’s recent work has opened access to legal texts: 
to the rights of citizens and the duties of state institutions. OMSAR bring transparency to 
the public service; and through the automation programme, it also provides easier and 
efficient access to public services including security and justice-related ones. This puts the 
security sector in the public eye and acts as a reminder that it remains just as much a public 
service as any other state institution. 
 
Lebanon has made little progress in terms of establishing independent mechanisms for 
oversight. In 2005 parliament passed Law 664 of 4/2/2005 on the establishment of the 
position of a National Ombudsman.
122
 Law 664 intends for the ombudsman to be an 
‘independent figure that does not receive instructions from any authority’ (article 1).123 
Number of articles show that an attempt was made for the position to be autonomous, 
protected from political interferences, and accessible to the public.
124
 However, his/her 
findings are not authoritative as the ombudsman only formulates ‘recommendations’. Also, 
despite overcoming the initial phase of formulating and adopting the law, no consensus 
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over a candidate has been reached.
 125
 Nine years later, Lebanon still does not have a 
national ombudsman.  
In brief, so far one can argue that the confusion, competition, fragmentation, lack of 
leadership, and oversight undermine the aim of developing a security sector more effective 
and efficient in protecting human security. 
 
2) Governance by non-State actors 
 
Many of the non-state actors that play a role in the governance of security have 
already been discussed. To briefly reiterate, the governance of security is shared between 
the state and a number of armed and non-armed actors.
 126
  On the one hand, in the south, 
the ISF only has ‘minimum deployment’ for criminal activities. Resolution 1701 stipulated 
the deployment of the LAF to the south and the upgrade of UNIFIL; with the presence of 
12,500 troops in 2010, UNIFIL is a major security actor in the south of Lebanon. As 
UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer, Omar Abboud notes, the ‘very high level of cooperation 
and coordination’, and the joint-activities between the LAF and UNIFIL make the force the 
second formal provider of security in the south (after the LAF).
127
 Hezbollah, on the other 
hand, as mentioned before, maintains an informal although largely uncontested presence. 
In the rest of Lebanon, Hezbollah, other political parties or ‘former’ militias, and social 
movements maintain informal authority in their respective enclaves.
128
 Traditional Sunni 
Islamic movements also have long had a following in Lebanon.
129
 The stricter Salafi 
130
movement has consisted of ‘a loose grouping of religious, social, educational, and 
charity organizations that focus on the Islamization of society’. The movement has tended 
to peacefully coexist with the system; although it ‘operates only tangentially in politics’, it 
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has developed ‘into a significant political force'. 131 That being said, several militant groups 
have developed from the Salafi movement;
132
 the more radical, al-Qaeda inspired Jihadi 
groups, have engaged in terrorist activities and clashed with the authorities.
133
 These have 
converged ideologically and practically with some militant groups in the Palestinian 
camps.
134
 
In relations to the Palestinian armed presence, following Ta’if, weapons outside the 
camps were turned in except for the military bases of Syria’s proxies the PFLP-GC and 
Fatah al-Intifada. The Lebanese government did not endeavour to confiscate arms inside 
the camp.
135
 That being said, three categories group the Palestinian factions. First, the PLO 
led mainly by Fatah, then the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (and a number of other smaller factions). Formal 
relations between Lebanon and the PLO ‘were restored in May 2006’.136 The second 
significant coalition of forces is Tahaluf al- Qiwa al-Filastiniyya or ‘the Alliance of 
Palestinian Forces’. They oppose the terms of the Oslo Peace Accords and the PLO’s 
recognition and negotiations with Israel. The factions that make up the Tahaluf are close to 
Syria and they are: ‘Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
– General Command (PFLP-GC), Fatah al-Intifada, al-Saiqa (Lightning), the Palestinian 
Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Palestinian Revolutionary 
Communist Party’. The third category is made up of Islamic Jihadi groups; they are loosely 
organized groups and accommodate with the other factions and the Lebanese authorities; 
such groups are as ‘Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami 
(Islamic Party of Liberation), al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida (Fighting Islamic 
Movement) and Ansar Allah (God’s Partisans)’. The more radical of these groups such as 
Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Greater Syria) and Usbat al-Nour (The League of Light) have 
been more problematic as they ‘reject dealing with Lebanese institutions or Fatah’.137 
Conflict within and between these categories is not uncommon and often leads to the use 
of force within and on the outskirts of the camps. In efforts to improve relations between 
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the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian factions, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue 
Committee (LPDC) was formed in 2005;
138
 it is an inter-ministerial committee tasked with 
‘achiev[ing] progress on all levels related to living conditions, legal issues, security, 
services and development in order to enhance the living conditions of Palestinian refugees 
and strengthen the brotherly relations’ between the two people.139 As Resolution 1559 
called in 2004 for the disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and in 2005 Syria 
withdrew its forces, the issue of Palestinian weapons was placed on the negotiations table. 
In 2006, in a National Dialogue meeting, political leaders agreed on the ‘need to remove 
military bases run by pro-Syrian factions outside the camps and “reorganise” the arsenal of 
weapons that exists within them’.140 However, no action or progress has since been 
achieved.  Although, the LPDC has acted as a successful channel for lobbying for refugee 
issues, its achievements have been limited as its work has been ‘significantly hampered by 
both Lebanon’s political instability and Palestinian divisions’.141  
All of the above, in addition to Private Security Companies and self-defence 
groups, make up the bulk of Lebanon’s armed non-state actors.142 
It is important to remember that civil society, community leaders, sectarian and 
political leaders are part of the wider security community. Civil society is understood as 
voluntary associations, activities and groups that function outside the authority and the 
control of the state.
143
 Civil society, from the Western donor perspective, helps ‘develop 
norms of democratic behaviour’, it provides ‘technical input’, and acts as a ‘watchdog’.144 
Despite the contributions of such groups (mentioned in the previous chapter) and other 
international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, experts such 
as Abdel Kader express their frustration with the neglect of the intellectual elite and their 
inability to address security matters seriously in the decades leading up to our day.
145
 My 
own field-work has also shown that only one Lebanese civil society group (CESMO) is 
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dedicated primarily to the study of the security sector.
146
 The Stimpson report also notes 
that the military and security establishments have restricted their discussions to closed elite 
circles and are reluctant to seriously engage with civil society groups.
147
 As experts note, 
this is not uncommon.
148
 However, the civilianization and democratization of the security 
sector will require the engagement of and debate between all these actors. If and when 
stability returns to Lebanon, an inclusive transformative political process will require the 
participation of all these actors in formulating a security strategy. This chapter however 
does not discuss options for a comprehensive political process. This is a limitation that has 
been recognised in the methodological chapter and justified at the start of this one.  
   
 
Below I provide a graphic illustration of Lebanon’s security actors:  
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The Security Community and the Security Sector in Lebanon 
 
 
State actors I: The Executive:  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Executive 
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Figure 4: High Council on Defence and the General Directorate of State Security 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Ministry of Interior 
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Figure 6: The Ministry of Finance 
 
 
State Actors II: the Legislature:  
 
 
Figure 7: The Legislature 
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State Actors III: The Justice Sector: 
 
 
Figure 8: The Justice Sector 
 
 
Non-State Actors: 
 
 
Figure 9: Non-State Actors 
 
  
Justice sector 
penal system 
Judiciary  
Ministry of Justice 
•Hezbollah 
•UNIFIL 
•Palestinian Authority 
•Palestinian Factions 
•Private Security Companies 
•Other arm bearing groups 
Armed non-State 
Actors 
•Civil society (Academics, experts, NGOs, Media, 
charities etc.)  
•Religious/sectarian and community Leaders 
•Parties 
Civilian Non-
State Actors 
308 
 
The following few sections will further argue that the security sector in Lebanon is 
impaired because it suffers from an entangled constitutional framework. Security 
organizations are ‘subject to multiple and potentially conflicting authorities’. 149 This is 
seen by the dual authority of the President and the Prime Minister in the High Defence 
Council and the Directorate of State Security, in the dual authority of the President and the 
Cabinet over the LAF,
150
 and more broadly in the different politico-sectarian affiliations of 
the agencies. Furthermore, mandates overlap (in the realms of internal security, public 
order, investigations, intelligence and border management), and the constitutional 
framework fails to provide provisions or mechanisms for information sharing, cooperation 
and effective tactical coordination (notably between the ISF and the LAF). Lebanon has 
also inherited a fragile security sector which is based on an equally fragile balance of 
power. Following the Syrian withdrawal, the Lebanese security sector has been overcome 
by the consecutive crises and has struggled to maintain and provide security. Lingering 
issues have resurfaced as the struggle for the future of Lebanon has prevented the political 
leadership from agreeing on a National Defence and Security Strategy to set parameters for 
the post-Syrian phase. This has had ‘deep repercussions on the security sector and its 
development.’151 Saoud al-Mawla agrees, and adds that without a domestic Lebanese 
project, ‘there will not be a National Defence Strategy’.152 Elias Hannah, retired General in 
the LAF and independent researcher laments the absence of a sector-wide strategy;
153
 on 
the donor side, so does Bandini.
154
 However, a national Defence and Security strategy ‘is 
needed to restructure the sector in order to perform its role.’155 Flavia Adib stresses the 
negative implications of an absence of a ‘global strategic vision’;156 the absence of a 
strategy undermines the efforts at developing the desired capabilities of the agencies and at 
seeing human security improve. Abdel Kader also notes that Lebanon is facing a ‘serious 
security predicament, and the most serious is the lack of vision and decision to deal with 
the issues of sovereignty and national security in all their facets, domestic and external’.157 
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Advisor to now former Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Gr Pierre Salem confirms 
that ‘the essence [for sustainable progress] is in a strategy’.158  
                                                 
158
 Interview held in Beirut, on 11/1/2011. 
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III. The Lebanese Armed Forces  
1) The governance of security and the LAF: colonial legacies and national 
assertion 
 
 
The roots of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are traced back to 1916, when the 
Allies formed the Legions of the Orient to fight against the Ottoman Empire.
159
 The French 
bankrolled the forces until 1924, when Lebanon and Syria started contributing to the 
expenses. In 1943, the Lebanese Special Forces were separated from the Syrian forces; and 
on August 1
st
, 1945 the French completed the final stage in the transfer of authority to the 
Lebanese government.
160
 
The forces formed under the mandate did not constitute a national army; the French 
would have been cautious against an alliance with domestic political oppositions. 
Therefore, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, their role was seen as repressive.  
That being said, the Homos military school had a significant role in training a number of 
Lebanese and Syrian generals who would play an important role in the struggle for 
independence. These generals would be tasked with the formation of the Lebanese army at 
independence.
161
 Colonel (at the time) Fuad Chehab, for example, was head of the 
Lebanese Special Forces at their separation from the Syrian Forces, and later led the army 
in its support for the politico-civilian struggle for independence.
162
  
The 1936 treaty with France stipulated the formation of a Lebanese army under the 
supervision of a French commission in charge of its training and equipment.
163
 As Hassan 
Mneimneh notes, the French authorities resisted and postponed the transfer to the Lebanese 
authorities.  
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When the Second World War broke out, the Forces fell under the authority of the 
Vichy government and fought the allied forces of the British and the Free France forces.
164
 
However, beginning in the 1930s, the political struggle to achieve independence had now 
taken root. When news broke out that the French planned for the Lebanese national forces 
to fight in Europe, the Lebanese Generals held a meeting in Zouk Mkayel in 1941 and 
issued what was known as the ‘Historical Document’; the Lebanese Generals pledged their 
‘refusal to obey any authority other than the Lebanese’, ‘swore not to fight under any 
banner (…) other than the Lebanese’, and ‘refuse[d] for the Lebanese army to play any part 
in the war between the Vichy government and the Free France and its allies’. It was argued 
that the document came to ‘support and complement’ the political efforts for liberation. 
Two years later, a similar stance was taken. In 1943, the struggle between the French 
authorities and the Lebanese political leadership had intensified; the president, the prime 
minister and a number of ministers were detained in Rachaya. The Lebanese Generals held 
a secret meeting and decided to march to Beirut, in order to support the people and join the 
national government. The Generals’ stance, Lebanese popular and political pressure, as 
well as international opinion, forced the French to release the Lebanese leaders and to 
ratify the Lebanese Constitution. The separation of the Lebanese forces from the French 
army was finalized on August 1, 1945;
165
 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were born 
and the complete withdrawal of the French troops took place in 1946.
166
  
The LAF therefore played a significant and symbolic role in Lebanon’s 
independence. This role gave the LAF lasting credibility and legitimacy.
167
 It is argued that 
the ‘architects of the army’ sought to overcome some of the negative legacies of French 
and Ottoman rule. They rejected the idea of regional, sectarian, ethnic and tribal units, 
which were promoted under the Ottoman Empire and the French and endeavoured to form 
a “national” representative army.168 It has also been noted that the architects of the army 
‘refused to employ the army in internal political feuds.’169 Indeed, General Chehab is 
quoted to have reiterated: ‘this is none of our business. Let [the politicians] wrack their 
brains!’  
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It is widely accepted that the army’s neutral stance spared Lebanon from 
deterioration on a number of occasions. Most notably, the army remained impartial during 
the ‘white revolution’ which overthrew the rule of Beshara el-Khouri in 1952 and during 
the ‘mini-civil’ war of 1958.170 As a result, the army built a reputation for impartiality; it 
was perceived as a “national” army concerned with national unity, ‘as holder of the 
balance’, and a guarantor of the power-sharing system.171 The army had, in fact, 
recognized the fragility of its composition.  Indeed, the army in Lebanon is ‘not 
homogeneous and is linked by kinship ties’ to the various confessional groups.172 Taking 
sides in political disputes would risk rebellion, defection and civil war.
173
 Widespread 
perception also maintained that the heads of the military institution steered away from 
military coups, which were common in neighbouring countries. Aside from the isolated 
attempt by a number of politically affiliated officers in 1961, there is no established 
tradition of military coups or rule.
174
  
When General Fuad Chehab was elected president following the 1958 crisis, the 
move even appeased many concerns and brought relative stability. Chehab’s term is known 
for its far-reaching political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms. Unlike previous 
presidents, his term was characterised by a comprehensive and coherent program based on 
good regional relations, social justice, and modernization says Corm;
175
 his term reflects 
the role of militaries in state-building. However, that soon came at a cost; the military’s 
Deuxieme Bureau would develop a pervasive political role.
176
 The Lebanese soon objected 
to the implicit military rule, therefore, opposition to what became known as Chehabism 
developed.
177
 Chehab would not attempt a second term; during the 70s, governments 
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slowly dispensed with Chehabi remnants in the administration,
178
  and a return to 
traditional civilian rule subsequently took place  
Having said that, between 1960 and 1975, the army was too weak to face domestic 
and regional pressures. It failed to maintain a monopoly over the use of force and 
widespread insecurity became prevalent. As mentioned before, domestically, the leftist and 
Muslim parties were in support of the Palestinian role against Israel, and thought of it as an 
opportunity to challenge the state; there was also Arab pressure to transfer and restrict all 
Palestinian resistance to Lebanon.
179
 In addition, the government did not provide the army 
with political or budgetary support. Had it done so, it is not certain that the army would 
have reacted more firmly; the concern over its unity has long paralyzed it – the mixed 
sectarian composition of the army threatens disintegration should it decide to challenge 
popular demands from either end of the spectrum. However, in the years leading up to the 
war the LAF diverted from its traditional neutrality. While it used force against the 
Palestinian and leftist forces, it turned a blind eye to Christian militias’ weapons smuggling 
and training.
180
 This led to antagonism from the Muslim and leftist street and to numerous 
casualties as confrontations turned violent.
181
 A year after the civil war broke out in 1975, 
and under domestic, Israeli, Palestinian and Arab pressure, the army disintegrated for the 
first time in 1976.
182
  
It was reunified in 1977 after the intervention of the Arab Deterrent Force, but it 
was clear that the situation would not allow a strong military to develop. Some 
organizational adjustments were made pursuant to Defence Law No. 3/97 but as the 
governance of Lebanon’s security was shared between the Palestinian factions, the Israeli 
and Syrian forces, and Lebanese militias, the LAF did not withstand the pressure.
183
 As the 
LAF was further used to crush the opposition,
184
 it disintegrated again along sectarian 
lines.
185
 In 1988, the split was between loyalists to the appointed head of the transitory 
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military government and to the Prime Minister.
186
 Despite that, in the post-war period there 
was consensus to reunite and reinforce the army at the expense of “self-security”.187 In 
1990, the LAF was finally re-united.  
Back in 1946, Lebanon had inherited from the French a force of 2,676 men; by 
1975, despite the numerous upheavals it had witnessed and escalating regional pressure, 
the force had not surpassed 20,000 at the onset of the civil war. Furthermore, ‘its 
equipment and armament had evolved very little, and in a way that did not match all the 
challenges and the threats it was facing.’ This, as many argued, was a political choice 
rather than a financial or an economic one.
188
 Although a heavy price was paid, the LAF 
had been intentionally paralysed: on the one hand, this prevented the ‘Christian’ ruling 
establishment from monopolize power by force, and on the other hand,  ‘Christian’ elite 
sought to avoid effective participation in the Arab-Israeli war—‘negative neutrality’. As 
long as no monopoly over the use of force is established, the local context would entail that 
the military stays deployed outside the barracks.
189
 The militarization of Lebanese society 
suggests that the LAF is needed to prevent political violence from escalating and to act as a 
broker as it often does. I would argue that the LAF is therefore indispensable at this stage 
for maintaining a level of freedom from fear. Indeed, as McIvor notes, the priority is for 
stabilization.
190
  
 
2) Contemporary obstacles to an effective and efficient force: 
The Ta’if Agreement stipulated the strengthening of the Lebanese security sector. It 
called for the reunification of the LAF
191
, which took place in October of 1990.
192
 Ta’if 
was thought to have ‘opened the door for the 2nd republic to modernise and reform the 
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security sector’ said Abdel Kader.193 However, in regards to the LAF, ‘post-war 
reconstruction of the Lebanese military [simply] focused on making it more representative 
of Lebanon’s socio-political and sectarian make-up.’194 
Ta’if stipulated that the president be the ‘supreme commander of the armed 
forces’195 which are subject to the authority of the cabinet.196 The dual authority in this 
provision, in line with Ta’if’s redistribution of the powers of the president, could be seen 
as an impediment to decision-making and a ‘potential source of deadlock.’197 Ta’if also 
reiterated that: 
the fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland and, if 
necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the 
internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own
198
 
that 
the armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving 
security under conditions determined by the cabinet
199
 
And that 
When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the 
armed forces shall return to their barracks
200
 
Ta’if therefore reiterates that the LAF would temporarily support and assist the ISF. 
However, it is not clear at all how the LAF supports rather than takes primacy over the ISF 
(as is the case) and how the LAF cooperates and coordinates with the ISF and other 
agencies. No timeline, criteria or mechanisms are specified for when the LAF no longer 
needs to support the ISF; instead it is clear this is a political decision to be taken by the 
cabinet in negotiation with the security forces. This open-ended mandate is problematic; 
further clarifications and stricter criteria are needed to delineate its role from that of the 
other agencies. The ISF Strategic Review suggests protocols for cooperation in crime 
scene management and public order to prevent confusion in responsibilities and 
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competition.
201
 Over the years the LAF has become the de facto state security actor, and its 
Intelligence directorate has been known to ‘imping[e] upon the civil domain.’202 As noted 
above, Ta’if stipulated that its intelligence be restricted to military matters but no such re-
direction has been taken. 
The LAF has received the largest share of state attention within the security 
apparatus. Nevertheless, consecutive governments have not adopted serious defence 
policies and budgets.
203
 Only one attempt to do so took place. In the immediate aftermath 
of Ta’if, under President Elias Hrawi, General Emile Lahoud (commander of the LAF) 
appointed Riad Kahwaji as head of a military committee to prepare a plan to reconstruct 
the army.
204
 The submissiveness to Syrian tutelage led the Lebanese government to forego 
the plan. Abdel Kader talks of a ‘strategy aborted by the state.’205  
The LAF subsequently received (‘old’) weapons from Syria;206 afterwards, between 
1991 and 1994, ‘all foreign assistance to Lebanon was frozen,’ Syria was the only partner 
to the LAF.
207
 Some security assistance resumed, but the army stayed in this state for 
another decade and a half, and did not exceed a force of 50,000 at any stage.
208
 Currently 
the LAF is a force of 72,000; however, it has limited capabilities due to a shortage in 
funding, in armament and equipment
209
 – many of which are dilapidated, and for which 
spare parts are too costly or difficult to acquire.
210
 Omar Aboud, UNIFIL Political Affairs 
Officer confirms that some of the main challenges that the LAF faces is lack of equipment; 
some are as basic as a shortage in means of transportation and supply.
211
 
Nevertheless, the LAF (and its Intelligence Directorate) has long proved that it was 
the only capable state security institution.
212
 However, since the withdrawal of the Syrian 
troops, the LAF has been severely over-stretched and has had to deal with numerous 
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internal and external threats.
213
 Communications with the LAF emphasise the ‘increas[ed] 
burdens’ on the LAF.214 As Aboud notes, most armies focus on training and defence 
whereas the LAF is also deployed for internal security and performs policing functions. 
The deployment to the South and recent deployment over the borders with Syria, in 
Dahiyeh, as well as its needed presence in Tripoli, in Beirut, and around certain Palestinian 
camps have highlighted the need for outsizing. Furthermore, in its ‘first military operation 
in 60 years’ against the militant group Fateh al-Islam in Naher al-Bared,215 the 
‘weaknesses in capabilities, training, coordination and intelligence etc. were unravelled’; 
the Naher el-Bared events were a “wake-up call” to the need for reinforcing the army.216 
That being said, the LAF is ‘operating on a shoestring budget’ says Aram 
Nerguizian.
217
 Between 90 to 98 percent of its budget is allocated to salaries, pensions, 
medical expenses and maintenance.
218
 This leaves little room for equipment, training and 
operations, a situation which has prevented modernization and development of the army.
219
 
The LAF admits that the impediments to development are financial; budgetary constraints 
have prevented the LAF from fulfilling mandate.
220
 However, it should be noted that the 
LAF is already the public institution that receives the largest share of public funds for 
wages and salaries;
221
 given the public debt, it is unlikely that the LAF will receive a 
bigger share of state funds.
222
 Therefore, the LAF is highly dependent on foreign 
assistance.
223
 However, even if the LAF receives newer systems, at this stage, it does not 
have the funds to maintain them.
224
  
Since 2006, donors have adopted an ‘an informal “division of labour.”’225 
Nerguizian’s 2009 article conveniently summarizes some of the aid and assistance 
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provided for the LAF. The US, the bigger contributor, has focused on transport vehicles, 
training, ammunition, and ‘fighting capabilities.’ US aid has been ‘crucial’ in revitalizing 
the LAF. France has been offering training to the LAF since the end of the Civil War; it 
continues to do so and has occasionally provided equipment.
226
 Germany has focused on 
improving the LAF’s ability to manage the maritime and territorial borders;227 its 
contributions have been particularly significant in the German-led Northern Border Pilot 
Project, which is preparing for an integrated border management.
228
 Belgium contributed 
tanks and vehicles.
229
 The UAE has focused on pilot training, and offered 9 Gazelle 
helicopters and 10 patrol crafts. On a different front, Russia has focused on the 
Engineering Support Brigade.
230
 Syria has long shared a close relationship with the LAF, 
and was the main provider of ammunition and parts during the 2007 battle with the group 
Fateh Al-Islam. 
Having said this, aid has been very slow to be delivered, some pledges were not 
met, there has been hesitance, reluctance and conditionality – especially by the US231 – and 
concerns have been voiced over the suitability of some of the aid.
232
 Furthermore, there is 
widespread agreement that the amount and type of aid provided cannot incur substantial 
changes, and donors are reluctant to answer some of the LAF’s ‘immediate needs’.233  
Another underlining issue is internal governance. Given the privileges granted to 
the higher ranks of the LAF and budgetary constraints, it is unreasonable for a force of 
72,000 to have 400 generals.
234As one expert noted, the command structure is ‘overly 
generous’ and the entitlements provided border on corruption. Aid alone, therefore, will 
                                                 
226
 Such as Gazelle helicopters offered by the UAE.  Ibid. 
227
 Germany has provided training and offered three large patrol crafts. Ibid. 
228
 A common Border force and a Border Security Committee have been established between the LAF, 
the ISF, the GS and the General Customs. See "Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team 
Ii,"(2008). Found at: www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/.../LIBAT%20II%20Report.pdf. 
229
 40 Leopard tanks and 32 armoured infantry fighting vehicles. Nerguizian, 2009, p 56. 
230
 It has donated mobile bridges, trucks and bulldozers and training in the disarming of IED’s and traps. 
231
 Although also by France. US ambivalence has been linked to the close relationship between 
Hezbollah and the LAF, to US ‘domestic wrangling’ and to other major events such as outcomes of 
elections, the Naher el-Bared fight with Fatef al-Islam, and stances of governments towards the STL.  
Sayigh, 2009, p 9-10. 
232
 Compatibility with existing system, heavily used, difficulty to acquire spare parts, high cost of 
maintenance etc.  See Kahwaji, 2010. 
233
 Nerguizian, 2009, p 56. Also see Kahwaji, 2010. 
234
 While the US army has about  400. The numbers are contested but the argument is accepted by a 
number of other experts. Interview held in Beirut on 23/8/2010 with Mr Ted Kontek, Director of the US 
Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programs. 
319 
 
not solve the LAF’s weaknesses. As number of experts noted, Good governance is central 
for the development of the security sector in general and the LAF in particular.
235
  
Over the years, the institution has grown more autonomous. On several occasions, 
both as mentioned above and when accounting for another two contemporary occasions,
236
 
the LAF ‘did not carry out orders from the civilian authorities.’237 However, that is not to 
say that these decisions have been malign. Nevertheless, the LAF has not been able ‘to act 
decisively;’238 the failure of the political leadership to back the LAF and continued 
political coverage of security incidents has inhibited the LAF from clamping down on 
protagonists involved in the latest clashes. The LAF instead has tended to broker cease-
fires and separate belligerents.
239
 Mustafa Adib notes that since 2008, the LAF has been 
losing ‘the confidence’ of some communities, which have increasingly turned towards 
arming themselves and to forming self-defence groups and militias.
240
 As mentioned 
above, the LAF is seen to be unjustly targeting Sunni Islamists and is increasingly seen to 
be subordinate to Hezbollah. 
Noting lingering issues in the mandate of the LAF, resource allocation, the 
availability of resources, and its structure, it is safe to say that the reform process will 
require political, governance, ‘legislative, organizational and structural changes.’241 This is 
confirmed by Ted Kontek (Director of the US Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Programs), Bandini and Adib.  
 
3) Prospects for a more effective role in the governance of Lebanon’s security 
 
This discussion notes that the LAF historically enjoys credibility; it is perceived to 
be the most ‘reliable and competent national institution’242 and is uniquely considered a 
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unifying national symbol.
243
 All interviewees accept that the LAF is the most capable and 
popular security actor. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the civil war, and even after the 
Syrian withdrawal, Lebanese governments did not make serious attempts at developing the 
security sector. Abdel Kader describes governments’ approaches to the security sector as 
‘policies of neglect.’244  These have damaged the ‘readiness and the authority of the armed 
forces.’245 Therefore, the LAF is also recognized to have weak capabilities because of the 
legacies of war, governmental neglect, bad governance, and foreign pressure. Aboud and 
Hintz both converge on this.
246
 Furthermore, the LAF is inherently fragile; this is 
inescapable given its reflection of Lebanese society.  However, I argue that given the 
symbolic role it plays in Lebanese society, there is good cause to develop the institution 
that successfully unites the different Lebanese communities. Even Secretary General of 
Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly affirmed that his party is ‘with arming the 
army’;247 as the only remaining unifying national institution, should support for the army 
wither, ‘everything would be lost’.248 Despite the inherited challenges, most experts have 
argued in favour of this. At a workshop organized by the Institute for Near East & Gulf 
Military Analysis (INEGMA), which gathered a number of Lebanese military and security 
experts, participants agreed that the legacies of neglect do not suggest that Lebanon is 
incapable of building an army capable of implementing an ‘effective’ and ‘reasonable’ 
defence strategy.
249
 Proponents suggested formulating a mid to long-term Defence and 
Security Strategy to face domestic and even foreign threats.
250
 This will of course entail a 
political decision, to be followed by brave action as well as foreign assistance. The last few 
years have witnessed emerging discussions and suggestions by both military experts and a 
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very small niche of civil society groups.
251
 Georges Boustani, former ISF Brigadier 
General and current consultant for the Interpol, notes that:  
reforming the security sector requires a thorough understanding of the politics and 
the dynamics of security in Lebanon; this requires setting a new framework which 
defines security in a wider manner, reinforcing the image of the people in the 
sector, specifying its mandate and tasks better, re-assessing the resources and the 
sectors, and making real efforts in military, budgetary planning and better 
management.
252
  
Boustani rightly stopped at four aspects to the reform process. His emphasis on 
wider security can be read as human security rather than traditional regime and state 
security. Improved popular perception and trust in the sector are preludes for a more 
inclusive and responsive security sector. The clarity of mandate establishes clear lines of 
responsibility and enables accountability. Finally, better governance promotes a more 
efficient allocation of resources for a more effective security sector. Boustani is essentially 
describing a democratically governed security sector. Informed and coherent voices like 
Boustani’s are few; however, they reflect well the vision of security outlined in previous 
chapters. 
The catalyst for this revival was the withdrawal of Syrian troops, which also 
exposed Lebanon to a multitude of threats and foreign interests. In addition, although ‘the 
doors for dialogue are practically shut,’ there are two factors to consider. Firstly, relative to 
the pre-Syrian withdrawal phase, there is common ground to work on.
253
 Secondly, while 
comprehensive reform of the security sector is unlikely in the near future,
254
 there are 
continuing threats to national and human security which require capable security 
institutions and considerable work can be done to enhance the performance and the image 
of the LAF and the rest of the security sector.  
In the past, parties had long disagreed over the doctrine of the LAF and over its 
domestic role. This had obstructed the adoption of a ‘clear defensive strategy’ and a 
capable army. Nowadays, this disagreement has disappeared.
255
 Based on this “national 
consensus,” I argue that efforts to strengthen the army can be hastened and can serve as a 
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basis for a future strategy. However, this consensus is ‘fragile.’ The role of Hezbollah in 
and Lebanon’s relationship with Syria are current contentious issues;256 these would 
preclude a DDR approach to organized and unorganized armed groups. It is therefore 
unlikely that the state will be able to achieve monopoly over lethal force or that it will be 
able to regain unconditional cross-sectarian popular support. That said, incremental 
development
257
 and balanced de-politicization of the role of the LAF are immediate 
priorities.
258
 In light of the many obstacles to comprehensive SSR, Adib for example, 
talked about a ‘Strategic Management of Security’.259 In that same respect, McIvor, UK 
Stabilization Advisor, and Bandini reaffirmed the importance of stabilization at this 
stage.
260
 However, in the interest of human security, stabilization should not come at the 
expense of democratic governance.
261
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IV. The Internal Security Forces 
 
Although the Internal Security Forces (ISF) shares its role with a number of other 
actors, it remains the main policing agency in Lebanon. The ISF has been a hot topic in 
Lebanon since 2005. It has inherited endemic weaknesses, which have helped shape an 
image of corruption and irrelevance that a large part of Lebanese society shares. Since the 
Syrian withdrawal, however, it has received increasing support from international and 
regional actors. This section attempts to problematize government, institutional and donor 
approaches to the reform process. This study argues that the changes the institution is 
undergoing are considerable and have yielded some positive results; nevertheless, the 
process has also played a part in exacerbating existing tensions.  For many, the ISF has 
become an actor in the domestic divide. Therefore, it will also be argued that in light of the 
domestic deadlock, donors need to revisit and re-adjust their approach to supporting the 
ISF. 
The Internal Security Forces is considered one of the oldest Lebanese public 
institutions.
262
 It was first institutionalised in 1861 when Mount Lebanon became a 
Moutassarifiya under the Ottoman Empire. However by the time the French mandate was 
instated, the duties of the force were still not prescribed by law, it was unorganized and its 
number had declined.
263
 The French set up a special committee to re-structure the force; in 
1920 the Darak or Gendarmerie ‘was identical to the regional French Gendarmeries of the 
time.’ By 1943, at independence, ‘the Darak was at its best condition in terms of 
organization, discipline and effectiveness.’264 Since independence, the Darak has suffered a 
series of setbacks. It has had to share the responsibility of internal security with a number 
of agencies, most notably the Lebanese Armed Forces. Furthermore, it has been negatively 
affected by successive government policies, as well as domestic and regional crises. 
Law No. 17 of 1990—passed at end of the civil war—determined the new mission 
and the structure of what is now called the ISF.
 265
 It falls under the authority of the 
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Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and is composed of 10 main bodies;
266
 a number of 
them have a role which will be highlighted.  
The Command Council is linked directly to the Minister of the Interior and 
Municipalities. According to article 20 of law 17/1990, it is in charge, among other things, 
of establishing new departments and formulating plans for increasing the number of the 
force and for the purchase of arms and equipment. Strategies and changes within the ISF 
are therefore decided by the Command Council. 
The Inspector General is also directly linked to the Minister (article 12). It is tasked 
with monitoring the service and investigating complaints transferred by the Minister 
(article 13).  
The Council on Internal Security is a permanent council within the Ministry of 
Interior and Municipalities, headed by the Minister to oversee the work of all agencies 
involved in internal security. As mentioned above, there is also the High Council on 
Defence, which is directly tied to the Office of the President. Both allow for periodic 
reporting to and involvement by the President or the Minister in security matters. 
Therefore, civilian control is taken into account.  
One may assume that Lebanon’s security sector is ‘relatively developed (…) in 
terms of formal legal framework and institutions, established chain of command, and 
subordination (…) to civilian government.’ Nevertheless, I argue that there are indeed 
many loopholes, and as Sayigh notes, ‘reality is different.’267  
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1) Flaws and realities 
a) Flaws  
 
Many have criticized law 17 as a reason for the weakness of the ISF.
268
 As 
mentioned above, it came into force in 1990, which is at the start of the Syrian tutelage. 
Law 17 can be viewed as intentionally designed to impede decision-making. Since the 
Syrian withdrawal, it has proved to be extremely difficult to pass any decisions or make 
any changes; the Command Council was paralyzed from the second half of 2005 until 
2011. Law 17 prescribes for decisions in the command council to be passed either 
unanimously or by a vote of 8 out of 11 – requiring more than a two-thirds majority. The 
ISF is the only security institution in Lebanon with such a rule. The Director General of the 
ISF expressed his frustration by noting that ‘constitutions are changed by a two-thirds 
majority and laws by simple majority;’ he wondered how ‘amending a constitution is 
easier than taking decisions in the Command Council?’269 Indeed, the Strategic Review 
noted that ‘the Council cannot and does not function effectively as a strategic command 
team’.270 Despite the 6 year paralysis however, many changes have been adopted de facto. 
The Command Council has been side-lined by the General Director in order to accept aid 
and to introduce changes to the structure of the force. However, the General Director’s 
unilateralism has been equally problematic.
271
 
In regards to the Inspectorate, its role is undermined by the fact that the Inspector 
General is also a member of the command council; therefore, he is not ‘independent from 
the leadership of the institution he is supposed to inspect.’272 A 2005 French report 
emphasised the need to reinforce the Inspectorate in order to effectively sanction 
corruption and misconduct, and to build a culture of accountability within the institution.
273
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In short, one can say that decision-making mechanisms and those set up to 
guarantee accountability are by default self-defeating and simply ineffective.
274
  
 
b) Realities 
 
While viewed as one of the oldest public institutions, the ISF is also considered one 
of ‘the most neglected security agencies during the first 30 years of independence and the 
Syrian tutelage.’275 The subsequent creation of the LAF, but also government policy of 
cantoning it to internal security because of the regional environment,
276
 meant that the LAF 
would take over the role of internal security and policing.
277
 Two things resulted from this: 
that the ISF has been considered a second rate agency, but also that the ISF was dealt with 
as an ‘auxiliary force of the army.’278 This reinforced its links with and its dependence on 
the latter. The ISF is therefore highly militarized, and has adopted a model similar to the 
LAF in terms of structure, personnel, and training.
279
 The ISF Review indeed notes that the 
agency does not have adequate training facilities and that officers are trained in the military 
academy for 3 years.
280
 The militarization of the ISF is also visible to the public in the 
personnel’s behaviour, uniforms, vehicles and weaponry.281 These are clearly ‘limitations’ 
to civilianizing the police.
282
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The withdrawal of the Syrian forces left a serious vacuum which the security 
agencies could not fill. The aftermath of the withdrawal was characterised with stark 
political instability, a wave of political assassinations and bombings. As explained by the 
General Director of the ISF, they ‘tried to the best of [their] ability to face these terrorist 
incidents (…) unfortunately [they] did not get to the result [they] wanted (…) [their] 
resources were hardly sufficient to deal with normal criminal activity, let alone with 
organized or terrorist crime.’283 The ISF was a ‘traditional police’284 that did not have the 
capabilities to perform its tasks; so as it was custom, the ‘LAF and its intelligence 
Directorate held centre stage in the national security duty.’285 Most experts agree that the 
ISF is undertrained, ‘underresourced and underequipped’286 Nassar, Salem, Bandini, and 
Kontek confirm that the agency was overstretched and lacked both the capabilities and 
expertise to react.
287
 The agency was on the doorsteps of a new phase; but the ISF’s 
inherited weaknesses prevented it from performing its mandate so it turned to Western and 
Arab donors.  
 
2) Post-2005 changes 
 
Since 2005, donor support has ‘increased in quantity and quality.’ The ISF currently 
receives assistance from the US, France, Germany, UK, the EU, UAE, KSA etc. The 
General Directorate had identified two immediate priorities: increasing the number of the 
force and fighting terrorism.
288
 As Nassar notes, in four years, from 2005 to 2009, the force 
increased by 10,500.
289
 In addition, there has been a concerted effort both by donors and 
the ISF leadership to develop its intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities by 
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reinforcing particular units such as the Mobile Forces (SWAT team in charge of 
counterterrorism and public order) and its intelligence service.
290
 The rapid expansion of 
the IB and the Mobile Forces has ‘been at the expense of effective training and 
organization’.291 Kontek agrees; hence, the US increased its funding of training.292 
However, expansion, allocation of resources, and donor attention came at the expense of 
other units, which led to ‘resentment in other departments’.293 
The ISF’s internal intelligence service, called the Information Branch (IB), is at the 
heart of the controversy surrounding the ISF. In light of the priorities identified, an existing 
intelligence bureau was expanded into a branch. The move was taken despite the failure of 
the Command Council to agree on it; this led to the subsequent deadlock of the Council. 
Furthermore, given the sectarian affiliation of the agency and a trend in recruitment for the 
Branch, the ISF has increasingly been viewed as ‘a pseudo-Sunni militia.’294 MacIvor 
confirms this public perception; he notes that the IB is perceived as ‘partisan’.295 
Moreover, most aid provided by donors was not based on a plan which laid down the 
needs of the various departments; instead, projects were launched and aid dispersed in an 
ad hoc manner. Aside from the pouring of aid into the field of intelligence and specialized 
forces, other departments received ‘whatever was made available’ said Nassar.296  The ISF 
found itself to be a passive recipient and much of the aid was disconnected from actual 
needs. This meant that there was a considerable amount of duplication, waste, and gaps.
297
 
Soon, therefore, a strategic plan seemed essential.  With the support of the UK, this 
decision initiated a limited yet unprecedented process of consultation and discussions. A 
public survey was commissioned in 2009 for ‘the first time in the history of the Lebanese 
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Police.’298 The survey was an important wake up call for the ISF, as only 13% of Lebanese 
voiced their satisfaction with the performance of the ISF.
299
 Salem notes that the results 
were ‘very disappointing’ and the institution set a goal to improve its image as a policing 
service.
300
 The agency hopes to be able to deploy across Lebanon without resistance and 
the need to use coercion to perform its role; it also hopes to become the primary security 
provider at incidents of public disorder and at usual policing tasks.
301
 Since then, a 
Strategic Planning Office was established and a Draft ISF Strategic Plan was 
formulated.
302
 Furthermore, a Traffic Division was created, and a newly formed Human 
Rights Department oversaw the formulation of the first Code of Conduct.
303
  Also, the 
Review had criticised the absence of women in the ISF;
304
 in 2012, the first all-women 
police unit was launched.
305
 This represents important progress: it promotes gender 
sensitivity and encourages wider accessibility to the police.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that 60% of the sample surveyed chose “improved police conduct and integrity” 
as a driver for satisfaction, but counter-terrorism remains, in effect, the agency’s and some 
donors’ priority.306 
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3) Problems 
a) Problems at the institutional level 
 
A number of institutional flaws can be noted, and the legal aspect is one which 
should be strongly emphasised. The ISF and its Information Branch are overstepping legal 
boundaries to an unprecedented extent. The efforts invested in the changes within the ISF 
are taking place outside the Command Council; these unilateral decisions are therefore in 
violation of the ISF law. The status of the IB is unlawful; people are being arrested by a 
Branch non-existent under the law and evidence against them is accepted by the judiciary. 
McIvor, confirms, it ‘has no authority to hold people but does so’.307 The legal status of the 
ISF needs to be addressed if the reform campaign is to gain any legitimacy. One might 
concede to the argument that the combination of insecurity and political deadlock dictate 
such a response; but it remains to be said that such an aggressive, imbalanced and partisan 
approach is counterproductive in the long run. It undermines the democratization and 
civilianization process; it also reduces buy-ins to “democratic” security sector governance.  
In addition, Lebanese security personnel working with Western donors are ‘talking 
the talk,’ 308 but they have yet to ‘walk the walk’.  As one of the critics of the Community 
Policing project in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared has noted: ‘community policing 
and human security, the two buzz words, (…) the people who use these terms don’t exactly 
know what they mean.’309 Community Policing in Nahr el-Bared is a pilot project funded 
by the US following the 2007 clashes there.
310
 Rifi confirmed his willingness to extend this 
approach to the rest of Lebanon. However, what I gather from Kontek’s interview is that 
Lebanese stakeholders have failed to commit to their end of the bargain: the ISF has not 
yet defined the scope of its mission in the camp, the LPDC has taken a back-seat role, and 
no public outreach to prepare the community for a Lebanese police presence has been 
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done.
311
 Instead, the strict militarization of the camp by the LAF has soared tension rather 
than promoted acceptance of Lebanese authorities.
312
 
Furthermore, although donors have been providing human rights training and have 
been engaged with civil society, Human Rights Watch noted that ‘France, the US, and the 
European Union (…) have not fully used their leverage to push Lebanon to adopt concrete 
measures to improve its human rights record.’313 Lebanon has ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture but has not made much progress in establishing 
mechanisms to curb abuse.
314
 Instead, there have been an increasing number of reports of 
security forces using torture techniques on detainees
315
 as well as increasing incidents of 
harassment of activists.
316
  Furthermore, the condition of prisons has become an untenable 
and a highly publicized matter: ‘prisoners rioted on multiple occasions to protest their 
conditions of detention,’317 the authorities have failed to manage the Islamist detainees, and 
a number of prison-breaks have been reported.
318
 Another issue that the government has 
failed to deal with is ‘lengthy pre-trial detention.’319 There are therefore several problems 
to focus on: the lack of institutional arrangements to uphold respect of human rights by the 
security forces, the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, and pre-trial detention. A 
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fair and capable justice system is an indispensable aspect of law enforcement and the 
reform of the security sector. Given the track record of intelligence and security services in 
human rights, the donor-approach needs to be re-evaluated and adjusted.  
 
b) Problems at the donor level 
 
As discussed, critics of donor approaches have talked about cherry-picking, lack of 
coordination, piecemeal and short term projects.
320
 In the Lebanese case, the imbalanced 
support given to particular units within the ISF allowed the agency to play an increasingly 
political role. It has empowered the agency enough to challenge civilian authority and has 
contributed to the erosion of the agency’s legitimacy.321 Furthermore, the emphasis on 
counter-terrorism and militarization have become a threat to human security and civil 
liberties.
322
  
As noted by Bandini, ‘the technical aspects of the reform process are favoured to 
the detriment of more political/reform-oriented dimensions.’323 Nassar and Salem also 
converge on this.
324
 However, although the priority since intervention has been for 
stabilization,
325
 by 2009, donors slightly shifted their approach. This is particularly clear in 
the EU Security and Rule of Law project (SAROL), which focuses on the Judicial Police 
and has led to the formulation of the first comprehensive Practical Guide for Criminal 
Investigations by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with the ISF.
326
 Another example 
is the 2009 public survey and Review of the ISF that the UK commissioned. This initiative 
led to the creation of a Strategic Planning Office, the Draft Plan, and a number of other 
achievements mentioned above. All of these changes might be basic, but they are essential 
elements in developing a people-centric agency. Having considered this, if one looks at the 
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funding of the different projects, the EU’s $4 million SAROL project contrasts well with 
the US $80 million in support of the ISF, focused on training, equipment and 
infrastructure.
327
  
That being said, Bandini, strong advocate for wide SSR, argues that that donors 
need to ‘broaden the spectrum of [their] interlocutors’.328 It is important to stress that the 
reform campaign needs to reach out more actively to the political class, civil society and 
the wider population. As in other SSR contexts, the efforts that the donors have put in to 
encourage popular buy-in have been minimal, if worth mentioning at all. The discussions 
remain elitist and behind closed doors.
329
 
 
c) Problems at the political level 
 
The ISF is caught in the domestic struggle between pro- and anti-Western forces. These 
forces compete for the security sector and paralyze decision-making.
330
 This constitutes an 
obstacle for change and progress, as it ‘undermines the formulation of policies and sector-
wide planning’ as well as the adoption of policies.331 Therefore, ‘assistance is of limited 
value so long as the political authorities are unprepared to devise [and adopt]’ strategies.332 
Two words sum up the attitude of the various stakeholders towards the effects of the 
political crisis on the reform of the security sector: frustration and hopelessness.  
Nevertheless, the key to the deadlock and in seeing a capable people-centric security sector 
develop remains political.
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4) Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the legacy of institutionalized sectarianism present in Lebanon since the 
Millet system of the Ottoman Empire lives on; therefore, the sectarian politicization of the 
ISF is an inherited problem. Lebanon also maintained the militarized model passed on by 
the French, and the Syrian imprint has been the proliferation but also the castration of the 
security agencies. In addition, the Lebanese government has not, since independence, 
produced any strategy to develop a strong security sector.
334
 The political dimension and 
the prospects for comprehensive change are the responsibility of the civilian authorities, 
and therefore many elements remain outside the control of the ISF.  
However, in terms of its future model, the current leadership does not seem to be 
aiming for a transformation of the force. Rifi’s public statements have stressed that one of 
the institutions’ objectives is ‘complete harmonization with the LAF’—there is certainly 
urgency for coordination and cooperation between the two main agencies tasked with 
internal security, but this is also indicative that the militaristic character of the force will 
persist. Furthermore, to many of its high-ranking members, militarization remains an 
important asset to gain ground in what could be viewed as its turf struggle with the LAF.  
One must admit that, without US assistance and without the contributions of other 
donors, there would not have been a revival of the security institutions in the post-2005 
era. The donors have, to some extent and after revision, divided the labour amongst 
them;
335
 and no doubt this assistance has been valuable. Now that things have jumpstarted, 
however, ideally Lebanon needs to take better ownership of the process.
336
 Moreover, the 
next phase is critical to overall prospects for democratization; there should be a concerted 
effort for the security sector in Lebanon to be governed in accordance with democratic 
principles. SSR, despite its many flaws,
337
 can support a participatory and inclusive model 
which balances hard security priorities with soft ones. The security agencies should not be 
further empowered and militarized without a parallel process to the relevant ministries, the 
judiciary, the legislature and civil society.  
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Therefore, in light of the domestic actors’ failure to agree on a national strategy, it is up 
to donors to emphasise the governance aspect of the security sector and to strengthen their 
coordination. 
  
336 
 
V. Reform and Aid: Observations and Recommendations.  
 
Resolution 1559 provoked a string of security events in Lebanon. These highlighted the 
precariousness of Lebanon’s security. The 2006 war, culminating in resolution 1701, came 
to solidify the renewed interest in Lebanon’s stability. The international community has 
since made efforts to fulfil its obligation to assist the Lebanese government in spreading its 
authority over its territory by raising the capabilities of state institutions. Since 2006 the 
efforts to develop the Lebanese security sector have multiplied. However, the track record 
has been inconsistent. Based on interviews conducted for this study, it can be concluded 
that many aspects have been valuable but the reform process has been fraught with 
problems. The main actors involved in Lebanon’s security sector development—the UK, 
the US, France, the EU and the UN—are main actors in global governance and in 
mainstreaming SSR. Looking at their projects in Lebanon tell us the extent of their 
commitment to SSR.    
There is widespread convergence that donors’ substantial involvement in Lebanon is 
traced to resolution 1701 which focused on the Lebanese government’s control over its 
territory and controlling the flow of weapons beyond its consent.  Indeed, UK Stabilization 
Advisor, Aboud, Kontek, Bandini, Hintz, the LAF, confirm that donor involvement is in 
line with their obligations towards Resolution 1701;
338
 that ‘stabilizing the Lebanese state 
is key for regional stability’.339 As can be noted, the rationale for intervention is driven 
foremost by strategic interest not human security concerns. Despite that, their involvement 
is shaped, according to Maouad, Kontek, and UK Stabilization Advisor, by the concern to 
promote the democratization of the sector and respect for human rights.
340
 Bandini, alone, 
stresses that his institution’s revised programme is led by the concern to promote human 
security.
341
  
Although the framework for involvement has often been labelled as SSR, the different 
actors converge that what is taking place in Lebanon does not amount to it. Each, instead, 
presents his/her own preferred label of security sector activities in Lebanon. UK 
Stabilization Advisor notes that SSR is possible ‘only under certain conditions’. However, 
‘a robust political process that absorbs the tension and energy of SSR programmes’ is non-
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existent in Lebanon’; in fact, ‘there is no political will, no parliament to oversee, and no 
grassroots asking for reform’. Although, ‘the process’ is not present, both donors and 
agencies are involved in projects that may fall under SSR.
342
 Passoti is less dramatic but 
still critical. Simply, he does not consider that the Lebanese sector is necessarily in need of 
“reform”. The ‘pillars exist whereas reform suggests creating new ones’; generally ‘the 
infrastructure is present and good (…) therefore what is needed is modernisation’. From 
his perspective, 90% of what is taking place is ‘normal formation’ and 10% is reform. In 
terms of reform, it is applicable in limited cases such as: the creation of a crisis room at the 
Ministry of Interior for the management of elections, the central traffic management room 
at the ISF, the transfer of the prisons system from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of 
Justice, the on-going digitization of the judiciary. Otherwise however, we are looking at 
‘train and equip’ kind of assistance. For the French embassy, training has focused on such 
activities as interrogation techniques, the riot police, mobile forces, detection dogs, 
demining dogs, aerial control, airport security, and fire-fighting. The other aspect has 
consisted of equipping units they work with, refurbishing and modernizing facilities. 
Local stakeholders agree with Pasotti, especially in terms of the deadlock preventing 
the creation of new structures. They also agree that the term ‘sounds negative’;343 
therefore, the government and agencies strongly oppose the term “reform”.344 The LAF 
prefers the term Tatweer or development.
345
 The ISF agrees; General Nassar notes: ‘we 
improve, we develop’ therefore as an institution the preferable term is SS development. He 
jokingly commented that the term ‘reform’ suggests mistakes whereas the ‘mentality does 
not permit to admit’ that.346  
It is therefore, also safe to note that transformation is not on the table.  An overhaul of 
Lebanon’s security sector is not seriously debated and is currently not realistic. Although, 
since the Syrian war, calls for integrating Hezbollah’s forces into the LAF have intensified, 
both local and foreign stakeholders do not see a political will or a need for sector-wide 
transformation.
347
 Passoti insists that Lebanon needs modernisation more than reform or 
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transformation, and insists that the general legal and institutional infrastructure is sound. 
Independent expert/researcher Hannah to a certain extent agrees; ‘it is all there (…) the 
problem in Lebanon is in politicizing security, in individualizing the agencies, and in 
implementation’.348 McIvor, however, rightly disagrees by arguing for a need to clarify the 
constitutional mandates and for re-organizing the agencies.
349
 Although reform and even 
transformation are recommended, at the moment, stabilization should remain the priority; 
instead protocols that do not require legislation can fill the gaps in the realm of cooperation 
and coordination between the agencies, especially between the ISF and the LAF.
350
 
Bandini on his part suggests that while at the moment the format is restricted to security 
sector governance or development, ‘the future is for broadening engagement’ and talking 
about Lebanon’s ‘system’ rather than ‘sector.351 Representing the EU, Bandini certainly 
mirrors the OECD broad approach. Similarly, Adib does not refer to any ‘transformation’; 
and while substantial reform is ‘unfeasible’, she suggests continuing with a ‘security sector 
management’ approach.  
In short, the situation does not allow for a comprehensive SSR programme in 
Lebanon.
352
 As UK Stabilization advisor notes, SSR should not be pursued if it leads to 
deterioration and insecurity. However, all actor involvement is shaped by the SSR 
‘doctrine’. SSR is also certainly part of the discourse. While actors disagree on the label, 
they agree on the essence of a security sector that is effective, efficient and democratically 
governed. Also, while strategic priorities underscore donor involvement, most affirm that 
their work promotes a people-centred sector. 
353
 Having said that, the below observations 
will show that despite the good intentions, donors, like Lebanese stakeholders, have 
learned to talk the talk but not so much walk the walk. 
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1) General findings and remarks 
a) Lebanese Stakeholders 
 
The process of development that the Lebanese security sector is undergoing has been 
chaotic. Both UK Stabilization Advisor and McIvor note the ‘mess’ within the agencies 
and in receiving the aid. Indeed, in the absence of a plan and ‘with the rush of donors’, the 
Director-General of the ISF has tended ‘to say yes to all’; the concern was to say no to one 
of the donors but then needing them a few months later.  
Also, many efforts have been stand-alone projects and have suffered from a lack of 
continuity;
354
 indeed, advisor to former Minister of Interior, General Pierre Salem notes the 
lack of commitment and ‘enthusiasm that quickly fades away’ as was seen in the plan to 
create a crisis management room.
355
  
The political paralysis has been obstructing intentions and the solidification of efforts. 
Therefore, security institutions suffer from a lack of an overarching vision and strategy;
356
 
and although a draft plan was elaborated for the ISF, no long-term strategy has been 
adopted yet. Hence, local stakeholders’ approach to reform or development has been one 
of short-term ‘patching’ rather than sustainable change as noted by Salem.357 Notably, as 
change threatens the delicate balance, Nassar, Bandini and Adib note that, institutionally, 
there has been a fear of and resistance to change.
358
   
The institutions and agencies however still suffer from long-standing governance-
related (organizational and managerial) and institutional weaknesses.
359
 They are 
understaffed and suffer from a lack of resources and equipment, and a lack of 
modernization.
360
 They suffer as well from lack of adequate training and expertise. 
361
All 
interviews and many secondary sources mentioned throughout corroborate this 
observation.
362
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Furthermore, there has not been proper coordination and cooperation within and 
between the agencies; there is therefore an overlap of efforts and a waste of resources.
 363
 
As discussed, the mandates of the security agencies overlap, leaving room for increasing 
rivalry and duplication. They are therefore in need of further clarification. 
Moreover, professionalization, respect for human rights and a culture of accountability 
are still missing. In fact, there are no effective institutional mechanisms for monitoring and 
holding security forces accountable.
364
 Existing mechanisms—the ISF inspectorate, 
national ombudsman, and the military tribunal—are largely a façade. Although the 
military, more than other agencies, sanctions and tries its men for abuses and mistakes,
365
 
there is a general atmosphere of deference towards the LAF and a complicity not to tarnish 
its image. Recently, attempts to question the LAF over its operations in Sidon against 
Sheikh Assir were met with concealment and reluctance.
366
 Harassment, arbitrary 
detention,
367
 and torture are still applied by the security forces with impunity.
368
 Civilian 
ministers have limited authority over their institutions, and as UK Stabilization Advisor 
notes, the parliament does not effectively oversee the work of the security sector.
369
 
Former Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud promised accountability and meritocracy. But as 
Nassar notes these ‘were big promises’ that could not be fulfilled;370 Salem, the minister’s 
advisor notes that ‘there is no discipline within the institution’ (i.e. the ISF) and that 
‘authority is almost non-existent’, except to politically backed individuals. 371Towards the 
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end of his term, the Minister found his authority being side-lined by the director-general of 
the ISF.
372
  
To illustrate: in May 2011 an incident between the head of the ISF Ashraf Rifi and the 
Minister of Telecommunications Charbel Nahas led to the resignation of then Minister of 
Interior Baroud. The Telecommunication Minister decided to shut down an informal 
mobile network used by the IB. The network had been donated by Japan but was not meant 
to be functioning. The ISF prevented the Minister from entering the building and 
dismantling the network despite repeated attempts by the Minister of Interior (then by the 
president) to order the ISF’s IB to stand down. The minister of Interior subsequently 
resigned for refusing to ‘be reduced to a minister that signs mail’ and despite the reporting 
of the incident no measures were taken against the head of the ISF.
373
 Another incident 
involving the ISF’s IB and the Minister of Telecommunication is the refusal of the 
Minister to grant the agency full open access to the national telecommunication data after 
attempts on the life of a number of March 14 members. Although the Minister’s stance was 
backed by a decision from a judicial committee, the stance of the ISF and its supporting 
block maintained: ‘what is more important, people’s security or privacy?’ These stances 
highlight the fragility of rule of law, accountability and democratization in Lebanon.
374
  
The lack of central political direction and positive contributions to push the process 
through continues to be a major impediment to setting strategic objectives, to maximizing 
both domestic and donor efforts, and to establishing civilian control over the agencies. 
Most importantly, political interference and politicization of the agencies is prevalent. As 
Maouad notes, political intervention traps the security sector in a vicious circle; it ‘kills’ 
positive efforts and prevent institutions from maturing.
375
 Salem and Nassar, on their part, 
lament the individualization of the agencies and therefore the fragility of progress. 
Abdel Kader blames the authorities for not acting at the ‘required level of 
responsibility’; their ‘partial plan’ to support the security sector ‘ended with a series of 
administrative nominations and an increase in the number of personnel.’ He goes on to 
argue that ‘the authorities hid behind international decisions, the Investigative Commission 
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and the project of the Special Tribunal.’ A recurrent theme in Abdel Kader’s work is the 
division, weakness and fatalism within Lebanon’s political leadership.376 One may talk 
about a lost opportunity as a result of the ‘aborted’ reforms. 377 McIvor agrees; ‘agencies 
and ministers can do more’ without touching on controversial political issues.378 Boustani 
however, is more positive as he focuses on the improved ‘capabilities of the security 
agencies and the deployment of the LAF to the South in 2006 after an absence of 30 
years.’379 One can also add the 2009 ISF deployment to Beirut’s southern suburb380 to the 
list of positive developments. Kontek shares this, as he notes a visible improvement at the 
level of ‘no go areas’.381 Nassar, despite the obstacles, is not entirely pessimistic. He is, at 
least, proud of setting the building-blocks of strategic planning. McIvor, Nassar, Abboud 
and Maouad emphasise the role of ‘champions’ in spearheading reform within the 
institutions.
382
 Indeed, there is perceived enthusiasm by figures in key positions, as well as 
by lower-ranking personnel eager for progress. Aside from individual champions, public 
statements from a few of the highest political figures have been supportive of reform (the 
President and Ministers of Defence).
383
 Despite ‘some discouragement’ from the political 
deadlock, these champions have been ‘creatively’ working around the obstacles and the 
challenges within the security community—what Pasotti described as ‘bricolage’.384 
Moreover, there have been several success stories, and the number of projects is 
increasing. The move towards more strategic planning on behalf of the agency receiving 
the bulk of the aid and in its cooperation with donors has already achieved sustainable 
wins.
385
 In brief, there is a growing will to achieve progress. As Maouad notes, the ‘tools 
are here, now we are waiting for action’.386 
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b)  Foreign Stakeholders 
 
As the Strategic Review notes, donor support has been somewhat fragmented’.387 
Adib and Nassar also note donors have tended to compete and their efforts overlapped.
388
 
Donors have been criticized for their inconsistency, piecemealing, cherry-picking and ad 
hoc approaches.
389
 Indeed, Nassar criticises the lack of ‘follow up’ and ‘continuity’ with 
certain donors.
390
 Furthermore, as UK Stabilization Advisor notes, donors have tended to 
‘tick items off a shopping list’ but despite their good intentions they have tended to make 
the situation worse.
391
 This, either by providing equipment without training, equipment that 
requires costly maintenance, aid which has been provided by others (e.g. training), or even 
aid that reinforces the militarization of the force. Nassar confirms: donors have often given 
‘what excess they have (e.g. vehicles, chairs and computers) but this has not always 
coincided with our needs’.392 McIvor notes that donors have ‘wanted to contribute what 
they do best but this has not always been what is needed. For example: the ISF review 
stressed that in the realm of public order there has been a substantial increase in personnel, 
however, the units lacked training and ‘non-lethal force equipment’.393 This, clearly, 
should be a priority for donors. Should they not be able to provide such equipment, then it 
‘may be sensible to fund other areas thus releasing the small discretionary budget the ISF 
currently has for such purchases’.394 Worthy to note is that these flaws do not entirely fall 
on donors; the Lebanese government and the respective agencies have not established any 
mechanism for coordination, nor have they provided donors with a plan to work on. That 
being said, both the ISF review and the new Strategic plan can now serve as basis for 
donor involvement.  
Observations made in Lebanon have shown that, like the OECD-DAC Survey had 
noted, donors have mostly prioritized operational assistance at the expense of the 
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governance aspect of reform.
395
  However, success in one area is contingent on success in 
others.
396
 Both Nassar and Salem criticised the emphasis on al-Hajjar la al-Bashar, on 
stone rather than human beings.
397
 UK Stabilization Advisor notes that the ‘shopping list’ 
approach is easier,
398
 and as McIvor notes, even profitable for donors.
399
 However, while 
‘boots and machines are needed (…) this approach does not change much in terms of the 
overall capabilities of the agency’.400 Indeed donors are encouraged to invest more in softer 
issues related to governance such as strategic planning, management, institutional 
capabilities for independent analysis, leadership, transparency, accountability, and human 
rights; most of all in human-centric values. As argued, democratic governance ‘should not 
be considered an option’.401  Indeed, a security sector that is effective but that is not 
participatory, transparent, and accountable to the executive, the legislature, and the wider 
public does not fulfil the normative criteria of security sector governance. Not only should 
we be ‘guarded against’ traditional aid packages that overshadow the civilianizing aspects 
of SSR;
402
 but ‘activities aimed at enhancing the operational capacity of armed and 
security forces, on their own, cannot be considered SSR.’403Mirroring some of the 
literature on learning-by-doing rather than prescription,
404
 UK Stabilization Advisor, 
McIvor, and Maouad note that the ‘process’ is more important in order to promote local 
ownership and for Lebanese stakeholders not to be vulnerable to ‘solutions imposed’ from 
outside.
405
  The convergence of these 3 interviewees may reflect the UK’s sponsorship of 
the ISF’s Strategic plan but it is also shared by domestic stakeholders. That said, Nassar 
notes that the ‘human component’ has been mouhmal or overlooked.406 Salem emphasises 
the need to enhance confidence in the ISF and Nassar stresses that 86% of people thought 
the human variable is key for satisfaction in the ISF.
407
 Salem therefore insists that the ISF 
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needs to promote 4 values: respect for human rights, justice and equality, leadership, and 
layaka (courtesy or professional behaviour). With McIvor, both agree that change ‘trickles 
down’; while donors are expected to sponsor champions in key positions, they are also 
expected to further sponsor projects that promote rule of law and human rights.
408
 
Donors have tended to fund particular agencies and units at the expense of others. 
Donors prefer the ISF because it is the primary policing agency and because of its daily 
interactions with the people. This was the explanation provided by Kontek, Adib, Salem, 
and UK Stabilization Advisor. However, as Bandini, rightly and rhetorically asks what is 
the value of focusing on one agency when ‘it is not the only player’ on the scene?409 For 
example, the GS receives hardly any donor attention;
410
 however, through its political 
intelligence and censorship mandate the agency repeatedly threatens human security and 
freedom of speech.
411
 To illustrate, on March 14, 2014, on a live morning show called 
Naharkom Sai’d412 on the Lebanese Broadcasting Agency-International (LBCI), the 
presenter Dima Sadek staged a scene whereby she kept interrupting her guest Imad 
Bazzi
413
 at every attempt to start talking about the 9
th
 anniversary of the Independence 
Uprising.
414
  At every interruption she asked—satirically—first not to criticize religious 
matters, then religious institutions, the judiciary, the President, MPs, ministers, certain 
political parties, Hezbollah’s weapons, security services, etc. arriving to a stage where 
there was nothing to talk about. In protest of the political pressure imposed on the media 
by number of political figures and state institutions, the show ended only a few minutes 
later with the following slogan covering the screen: ‘this is the image they want, this is the 
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image we refuse’.415 That being said, continuing to support one agency at the expense of 
the many other actors of the security system will not improve human security for a wider 
range of people. It would instead reinforce claims of partisanship and politicization.  
Donor involvement has, however, been largely revisited; an Informal Security Sector 
Donor Group chaired by UNIFIL has been set up.
416
 Donors have recognized the need to 
readjust their approach; so there has been increased attention to softer issues.
417
 
Nevertheless, lack of coordination with Arab donors continues; selectiveness and 
duplication are still setbacks, and, the governance aspect of the process remains 
underfunded. 
In retrospect, SSR in Lebanon has had mixed outcomes: many contributions have been 
made but many gaps and mistakes have surfaced. Trial and error largely underscore 
donors’ and local stakeholders’ approach to reform or development. This is unsurprising, 
since, as mentioned previously, SSR is a concept-in-the-making; furthermore, SSR is 
shaped by local specificities. Donors and local actors share therefore the responsibility to 
positively shape SSR or security sector development. Given the experience gathered in 
Lebanon since 2006 (but also experiences of other countries), the direction forward is 
clearer. Many contributions to human security can be made should the security sector be 
more effective, efficient, inclusive, impartial, civilianized, and democratized.  
  
                                                 
415
 The show can be seen on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ant9XPOu_KU (accessed on 
15/3/2014).  
416
 As well as 3 sub-groups on border control, rule of law, and the LAF. Aboud interview, 2010 
417
 Bandini interview, 2010. 
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2) Some recommendations 
 
This previous discussion is a critique for understanding what is taking place in 
Lebanon and for suggesting (below) concrete measures for improving the capacity of the 
security sector to provide human security.  
 Despite the recognition of its slim chances, the foremost and most obvious 
recommendation is the agreement on a National Defence and Security Strategy. 
The Strategy should set a clear people-centric framework and a long-term vision for 
the steps that have been taking place, as well as for the steps that need to be taken 
in the future.  
 A clearer constitutional framework could be the first step to regulate the entangled 
and opaque responsibilities of the security sector. This would entail detailed and 
distinct mandates for the security agencies, provisions for independent and civilian 
mechanisms of oversight and control, and stricter criteria for the role of the army in 
internal matters.
418
  
 A government coordinating body could be created to manage and channel the aid 
according to prioritized and balanced needs. This could take place within the 
President’s or the Prime Minister’s Office, or even the High Council on Defence.  
Alternatively, this task could be assigned to a Minister of State (a similar 
arrangement to the Minister of State for Administrative Reform). Nevertheless, in 
considering inherited bureaucratic and institutional obstacles in the Lebanese public 
sector, as well as sectarian political considerations, this suggestion may need to be 
studied with caution.  
 The support for the capabilities of the civilian authorities (in the ministries of 
Defence and Interior) in organizational, planning and managerial, leadership, and 
security matters will allow them to perform their oversight role and will allow the 
security establishment to perceive their civilian partners as legitimate partners.   
 It will be important to widen and increase the scope of engagement with other state 
actors, including the justice sector, the Parliament, and the Ministry of Finance. The 
                                                 
418
 The clarification of mandates would stop confusion and overlap (pertinent to effectiveness and 
efficiency); it would also establish clear lines for accountability. 
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latter has been receiving consistent support, but support to the judiciary as well as 
the Parliament is lagging far behind.
419
 
 The support, activation and empowerment of the Parliamentary Defence and 
Security Committee needs to become a priority. The legislature needs to fulfil its 
oversight and monitoring roles. Therefore, support staff, experts, facilities and 
capabilities need to be provided.  
 Investment in civil society is necessary in order to prepare for future civilian 
involvement, monitoring, participation, and deliberation in security matters, as well 
as to inform the civilian authorities of grassroots concerns. 
 Maintaining consistent efforts to modernize the ISF are important, but it is equally 
essential to make efforts to transform the ISF into a non-militaristic and a non-
politicized institution. 
 In the long term, as the capabilities as well as the legitimacy of the ISF slowly 
increase, the LAF would need to retreat to the barracks as stipulated by the Ta’if 
Agreement.
420
 
 The LAF requires the collaboration of the international community in order to 
facilitate its upgrade into a strong national defence institution which could replace 
traditional and competing informal and militaristic security providers. This would 
also garner legitimacy for the institution as well as the state.
421
  
 Although this study recognizes that intelligence reform is the most resilient of 
reforms in the security sector, the number of intelligence services and most notably 
their mandates would need to be addressed.
422
   
These recommendations can develop the three essential components of a 
democratically governed security sector: capability, cooperation, and control.
423
  Having 
                                                 
419
 Bandini interview, 2010. 
420
 See Appendix. 
421
 Abdel Kader notes that the failure of the state to provide security further erodes its legitimacy. Abdel 
Kader, 2009, p 146. 
422
 ISF Review, 2008, p 7. An option on the table is the suggestion proposed by Riad Kahwaji to form a 
central intelligence agency in order to pool information. Kahwaji, "Mouqaraba Jadida Li-Mafhoum Al-
Amen Al-Watani Wa Moutaratibataha Al-Mouassassatiya (a New Approach for National Security and 
Its Institutional Requisites) ". p 197. 
423
 As discussed in chapter 4 by Ball, 2002 and Bellamy, 2003. 
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said all this, this study recognizes the enormity of such a reform process given limited 
donor engagement, regional circumstances, and the domestic divide.  
Therefore, waiting for these three priorities to align has been like waiting for Godot.
424
  
  
                                                 
424
 A play by Samuel Beckett (1949) in which the two main characters wait in vain for Godot to arrive. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In light of this study’s quest for security as established in critical security studies, SSR 
is one policy-option that can be studied in its claim to promote human security. It helps us 
see how actors of global governance (those of which have espoused human security and 
SSR), engage in security governance in recipient countries. Crucially, SSR can make 
contributions to security in Lebanon as it promotes an inclusive, accountable, and people-
centred alternative to formal and informal exclusivist security providers.  
A limitation of this study is the failure to empirically address armed non-state actors. 
This is justified by a post-field-work shift in the theoretical framework, which was 
followed by constrains in scope, time, and accessibility. However, the focus on state-actors 
still fits within critical security studies’ pragmatic approach to engaging with existing 
structures in order to expose structural constrains and suggest alternatives for change. 
Critical security studies is after all about achieving progress in the life of ‘ordinary’ 
citizens; if SSR claims it can achieve that, it therefore is a legitimate subject of study.  
In conclusion, SSR as prescribed in the literature is not the exact umbrella for what is 
taking place in Lebanon.
425
 It also cannot engender a system-wide transformation that can 
dissipate conflict in Lebanon; conflict in Lebanon is attributed to deep rooted structural, 
political, socio-economic and identity problems. However, SSR is one of very few options 
available to critique what is taking place in Lebanon in order to shape or steer towards 
progressive change. SSR provides us with a pragmatic approach to achieving tangible 
successes in promoting human security. As discussed in chapter 4, the label SSR may be 
abused for regressive policies;
426
 it can, therefore, exacerbate rather than alleviate freedom 
from fear. That risk is present in Lebanon. However, SSR has also led to substantial 
progress both in terms of the involvement of donors and in terms of setting the building 
blocks for a more people-centred security sector. That said, the security sector in Lebanon 
is overburdened by lingering security challenges. There is no process of political 
transformation and no stability to transform the security sector. An opportunity arose in 
2005 with the withdrawal of the Syrian troops but that soon turned into another governance 
crisis. Indeed, since 2005, donors have surged to support state security institutions but the 
process has been controversial and at times part of the domestic crisis. 
 
                                                 
425
 Broadly, as a comprehensive process of reform or transformation. 
426
 i.e. top-down, militarized, bias, exclusivist, and abusive. 
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In short, this study finds that Lebanon’s security sector maintains weak capabilities; 
yet, it remains largely militarized, politicized, and authoritarian. The process of change 
needs to move towards a more effective, efficient, representative, civilianized, and 
accountable sector. Although, SSR is limited in its transformative claim, it has merits in 
terms of improving human security. Therefore, donors and Lebanese actors need to further 
commit to the soft aspects of SSR.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
1) An SSR Approach for Lebanon 
 
This study clearly set the case for the need for a wide approach to 
understanding the security sector and Security Sector Reform. Nevertheless, in its 
Lebanon case, it only empirically examined the ISF and, (to some extent) the LAF. 
Therefore, on some levels, it falls short of its stated aims. The initial rationale behind 
choosing the ISF and the LAF was linked to where the highest level of foreign 
engagement was and to the formal and popular constructions that these two 
institutions are the main actors charged with providing security in Lebanon. However, 
this is not a strict prioritization, as other state and non-state actors contribute in 
providing security in diverse contexts and areas. The intention, therefore, was not to 
argue for the restriction of security providers and security sector governance to 
specific state institutions. Donor involvement and the high profile of these two 
institutions encouraged this study to begin there, but time and other constraints 
restricted further investigation.  As a result, this study admits to being partial in 
examining Lebanon’s wider security sector and is aware that it has had to confine 
itself to a relatively narrow examination.  
Having considered this, there is a strong need to continue work started in this 
study. This entails studying the remaining state actors – notably those organizations 
tasked with security – and also those civilian and judicial authorities responsible for 
their management and control. Furthermore, this study recognizes the role of non-state 
actors as legitimate participants in security sector governance. This includes non-state 
actors such as civil society (media, academics, experts, & NGOs), but also the various 
informal security providers such as Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, and other arms-
bearing groups. However, engaging with the latter will require radical regional as well 
as domestic changes which address the status of the Palestinian refugees, the war in 
353 
 
Syria, the conflict with Israel, as well as the divide between the two main domestic 
and regional axes. 
 
This study has set out to weigh the performance of Lebanon’s security sector. 
By examining the reform process and showcasing the prevalence of human insecurity, 
this study has shown that the security sector fails to effectively reflect and 
respond to people’s security. Domestic obstacles to SSR, as depicted by Nathan, 
resonate as factors which have hampered progress in the case of Lebanon. The ‘lack 
of vision, expertise and resources; an abiding tendency to view security in an 
authoritarian, militarist and secretive fashion; resistance to reform from politicians 
and/or security officers; manipulation by foreign powers and neighbouring states; and 
the on-going politicisation of the security services’1 describe well the challenges 
facing the reform process from the domestic side. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
stabilization in response to, among other things, the ramifications of the events taking 
place in Syria, has shown that ‘the higher the level of instability and violence in the 
national or regional arenas, (…) the less likely it is that reforms with an anti-militarist 
orientation will be introduced.’2 
However, these remain symptoms of a deeper problem: the lack of a common 
identity for Lebanon and the ensuing problematic socio-political system, a system 
which has been moulded, adapted and reshaped since independence but which 
requires radical transformation.  
A transformation encapsulates economic, social, judicial, and political 
dimensions. However, this study cannot comprehensively address these issues, 
because its remit is the security sector in Lebanon and therefore it should not overload 
its claim. 
Furthermore, transformation is a complex process, and it cannot be claimed 
that a study or a strategy can articulate a specific, comprehensive and successful 
programme for change. The actual process will undoubtedly diverge from a 
prescriptive document. The process will be challenging, long, and non-linear. No 
                                                 
1
 Nathan, 2004, p 2. 
2
.Ibid. 
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matter to what extent the literature stresses normative dimensions, reality will show a 
wide disjuncture between conceptualization or generic policies and the actual 
process.
3
 Despite successful efforts for progress illustrated in the chapters system-
wide transformation remains unlikely. 
 Research led this study to accept that the precarious status of the security 
sector is a symptom of a dysfunctional political system, which can itself be traced to 
wider and deeper core issues. Further research, as well as future strategies and 
policies, could deconstruct divisive assumptions and construct integrative ones. The 
cycle, which has prevented Lebanese politics and security from overcoming polemics 
instated since the 19
th
 Century, needs to be broken. Nevertheless, the ground is not yet 
set for such change; as mentioned, forging a better future will require a concerted 
effort from the top and from below in order to reformulate popular attitudes and 
identities—notwithstanding regional and international influences.  
 
a) In light of this, what does the future hold for Lebanon?  
 
The future of Lebanon will remain largely the same so long as the Lebanese 
continue to support existing power structures at the social and political levels, and as 
long as regional confrontations are mirrored in Lebanese politics.  
Nevertheless, there is a valuable role for SSR despite the stagnation of the 
overall situation. But since the dysfunction of the security sector is a symptom of a 
larger political crisis, SSR in the Lebanese context is inherently restricted to patching 
rather than curing the main issues.  
Many view SSR as an entry point for peacebuilding, democratisation, and 
wider good governance.
4
 This can be true where a parallel process of reconciliation 
and transformation is taking place; this is clearly not the case in Lebanon. Therefore, 
                                                 
3
 This is in term of the number, the sensitivity of the tasks involved, and the timeframes. We can 
extrapolate from Ball and Hendrickson’s as well as Nathan’s SSR experiences to the wider 
context: the former note that it is ‘important to be realistic about what can be achieved’ and the 
latter argues that managing a radical transformation often proves to be ‘overwhelming.’ Ball and 
Hendrickson, 2006, p 16; and, Nathan, 2004, p 2.  
4
 Bellamy, 2003, p 109-110, also OECD, 2005 etc. 
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this study is not convinced that SSR can fulfil peacebuilding and transformative goals 
without a wider political process of change.  
That said, as ‘unprofessional or poorly regulated security forces often 
compound rather than mitigate security problems,’5 SSR can contribute to enhancing 
security.
6
 Such efforts are much needed given the endemic and inherent weaknesses 
of both security and civilian institutions. More importantly, security assistance outside 
the framework or spirit of SSR may have been exacerbating authoritarian tendencies 
and contributing to tension. Therefore, an SSR programme or simply projects in the 
spirit of SSR (the latter not being the ideal option) are useful.  
This study, does not envisage an externally-driven SSR approach as in Sierra 
Leone; it supports a process similar to that of South Africa, whereby domestic actors 
invite foreign ones to assist them in the transformation. In Lebanon, it can only be a 
domestically- rather than a donor-driven process; to do otherwise would suggest a 
deteriorating situation, the need for intervention by the international community, and 
the de-legitimization of local actors. In the current atmosphere, any large-scale foreign 
intervention would receive harsh and even violent opposition. 
But a comprehensive approach cannot take place in light of the severe political 
schism, the stringent legacies of conflict, the on-going state of war with Israel, and the 
nearby civil war in Syria. The Arab Spring certainly revitalized populations across the 
Arab world, including in Lebanon, and the changes that the uprisings will incur may 
change the landscape of the region, which may allow for positive progress. 
Nevertheless, time is not yet ripe for change in Lebanon; it will require brave stances 
by the ruling elite and by the wider population which, at this point, neither seem ready 
for. Therefore, there is currently no tangible hope for a national transformative 
process or simply for security sector transformation.   
The absence of a government strategy has been a setback to domestic and 
donor-driven efforts to improve the performance of the Lebanese security sector and 
to establish ownership. Bryden and Hänggi note that ‘comprehensive and inclusive 
                                                 
5
 Hendrickson, 1999, p 9. 
6
 These include threats and confrontations with organized crimes such as drug and human 
trafficking, kidnappings, terrorism, controlling or managing demonstrations, security incidents and 
clashes, criminality etc. 
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national security reviews [are] a precondition and a catalyst for successful SSR.’7 This 
has not taken place in Lebanon; instead, efforts have thus far grappled with a lack of 
coordination, planning and direction. Due to the lack of political direction, the 
security agencies have filled the vacuum and acted as autonomous institutions, while 
the civilian ministers either play along or have been at odds with the heads of the 
security agencies.
8
 However, as Bellamy notes, ‘an illegitimate, non-transparent, 
politicized or cadre-controlled armed force acts as a powerful impediment to 
progressive change.’9 In that respect, Edmunds’ depiction of security sectors in post-
conflicts societies well describes the Lebanese case. Aside from problems in 
effectiveness, the security sector suffers from the ‘politicisation of security sector 
actors’, lack of democratic civilian control,10 and lack of legitimacy.  
The biggest challenge is for the security forces (referring particularly to the 
ISF) to ‘accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian and democratic) 
government.’11 As professional and accountable security forces, they need to be open 
for dialogue with civil authorities and society.
12
 In addition, it is necessary for the 
civilian authorities and civil society to develop the knowledge and expertise to 
participate in security debates and the democratic governance of the security sector—
the LAF, the ISF and beyond. 
Insofar as the military and security forces are ‘outsized and a substantial drain 
on state resources,’13 the Lebanese case is nuanced. With the expansion of the military 
presence over the entire Lebanese territory since the Syrian withdrawal and since the 
Israeli war in 2006,
14
 as well as the increasing role of the ISF in domestic security, 
there was a need for outsizing. Having said that, the security and armed forces need 
restructuring, better financial management and efficiency. Together with the 
redundant security agencies, they do cause a drain on state resources.  
                                                 
7
 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 28. 
8
 Former Interior Minister Baroud resigned whereas current Minister of Defence Ghosn and 
Minister of Interior Charbel are viewed to be weak. Adib notes that ‘Ministries of Defence and of 
the Interior have great difficulty in imposing their will upon the different organizations, the army 
less than others.’ Adib, 2012, p 6. 
9
 Bellamy, 2003, p 110. 
10
 Edmunds, 2002, p 25. 
11
 Forster et al., 2001, p 11. 
12
 Ball et al., 2006. p vii. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Pursuant to Resolution 1559 and 1701. 
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It cannot thus be claimed that SSR is the answer to Lebanon’s security, but the 
search for better security is after all a process; with SSR, this process can move 
forward towards a more effective, efficient and democratically governed security 
sector.
15
 This study also emphasises that SSR needs not conform to the prescriptive 
and demanding static model often offered by donors; rather, it suggests modest and 
gradual progress at a pace set by local conditions.
16
  
In the absence of the conditions for comprehensive SSR – a national 
consensus over a process of change – Lebanon could still benefit from projects in line 
with the SSR spirit. SSR could be a ‘catalyst’, at least, for democratization and good 
governance.
17
 At the micro level, this would require number of achievements: a 
clearer constitutional framework, capable and strong civilian authorities,
18
 and 
oversight mechanisms. This would also require the restructuring and 
professionalization of the armed and security forces as well as the internalization of 
democratic values and human rights. In addition, this would require training of civil 
society in security matters, and its active participation in oversight. Alongside all this, 
a well-functioning justice and penal system would complement the work of the 
security sector.  
In brief, the above feed into the objective of fostering an effective, 
participatory, and responsive security sector. In that sense, SSR can have positive 
effects on human security. 
  
b) What role for donors? 
 
The case of Lebanon tells us that even when there is no comprehensive SSR 
initiative, subtle donor engagement can be valuable. Donors have been able to identify 
                                                 
15
 At least in the every-day sense and in dealing with security incidents.   
16
 This has been suggested by a number of sources but has not been reflected in many prescriptive 
approaches to SSR. Furthermore, in Lebanon’s case this was seen in the unsuccessful experience 
of the Northern Border Pilot Project. See chapter 6 and for literature on the prescriptive 
approaches see:  OECD, 2005, p 62; Nathan, 2004, p 5 and in Hutchful and Fayemi, 2005, p 83. 
17
 Bellamy, 2003, p 109 
18
 This involves efficient planning and management – including financial – by civilian authorities. 
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pro-reformers and work within the system carefully without stirring much trouble.
19
 
The observations made by this study allow us to argue that although the benefits of 
donor efforts may seem minimal to an outside set of eyes, they are contributing in 
building the groundwork for positive change. Most notably: the creation of a Strategic 
Planning Department, a Human Rights Department and human rights training, the 
formulation of a Code of Conduct, the introduction of women to the ISF, ID numbers 
and badges for ISF members, a crime scene investigation laboratory, 
professionalization etc. Having said that, as the previous chapter shows, the process 
has also been fraught with problems; immanent balance and coordination of the aid 
provided to Lebanon is essential to avoid the traditional approach to security 
assistance and the overriding prioritisation of hard over soft security. The Lebanese 
security agencies have a long way to go in terms of democratic governance, i.e. 
transparency, accountability, participation of, and subordination to civilian authorities. 
Likewise, the security sector needs to build a culture of respect for civil liberties and 
human rights, and to promote human security. SSR can help in this regard, but donors 
need to revisit their approaches to strengthen the soft and governance aspects of the 
security sector. 
While discussing Palestinian state-building efforts, Beverley Milton-Edwards 
early on noted that ‘militarization (…) [is] to be avoided at all costs.’20 The price is 
for the ‘“culture of violence” [to be] perpetuated’.21 Donor engagement has at times 
been problematic but SSR can still contribute to the desired ‘civilianized, accountable 
and open internal security.’22 The reward is people-centred security and the 
cultivation of process-based rather than violence-based coexistence. Donors have a 
key role to play in this and in helping legitimize the state, but more importantly in 
readjusting the relationship between the state and the people. 
As mentioned, some projects in Lebanon are in the spirit of SSR; others focus 
too narrowly on traditional assistance. The Lebanese experience shows that 
standalone projects may be useful in themselves at the very micro level; but their 
contribution may not add to the overall picture at the macro level – in some cases they 
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 Except, occasionally, the US. 
20
 Milton-Edwards, 1998, p 118. 
21
 Sayigh, 2009, p 25. 
22
 Milton-Edwards, 1998, p 118. 
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might even detract from the overall progress. In this sense, success in one area is 
dependent on success in other areas within the security system, in order to fulfil the 
essence of the security we aspire for.
23
 Operational effectiveness is important, but is 
not a success without democratic principles in our pursuit of an egalitarian, just, and 
inclusive security.  
Equally, improvement in operational effectiveness should be accompanied 
with a parallel process in the judicial and penal systems. The ‘parallel process’ needs 
further attention in Lebanon. The UK involvement is the closest to security sector 
governance or to the SSR spirit,
24
 and small projects by France, the US or the EU 
within the Justice sector are valuable; but these do not balance the substantial projects 
the US and other donors are investing in the realm of operational and professional 
support to the LAF or the ISF.  
A comparison with other contexts is applicable: emphasis has been on 
stabilization, therefore, the ‘defence and police reform are given more attention than 
other sections of the security sector’ while ‘transparency and accountability are not, in 
practice, treated as centrally important.’ 25  Furthermore, local ownership ‘is 
frequently reduced to (…) securing the agreement of local governments’ to donor-
driven’ projects.26 Effective ownership will require that the civilian authorities, the 
legislature, the judicial system, and even civil society play a more proactive role in the 
governance of security; nevertheless, they lack the expertise to do so. Therefore, 
donors need to expand their engagement in order to ‘enlarge the space for 
participation in security governance’;27 they need to provide the opportunities to 
expand and ‘empowe[r] the ‘islands of civility’’.28 Extending donor engagement 
beyond the state would be essential in promoting a participatory and responsive 
security sector. 
                                                 
23
 Edmunds, 2002, p 19-20. 
24
 The UK sponsored the ISF Review, the Code of Conduct etc.; it supports a local research 
centre—CESMO, and plans for a Master’s degree in Security Sector Management at the Lebanese 
University. 
25
 Bendix and Stanley’s depiction of SSR in Africa resemble trends observed in Lebanon. Bendix 
and Stanley, 2008, p 29.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ebo, 2007, p 46 
28
 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 23-24. 
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Lastly, this study reminds both domestic and foreign actors that the process for 
improved security will remain suspended if Ball’s third category of SSR is not 
addressed. The legacies of war in Lebanon have not been seriously dealt with. In the 
aftermath of the civil war,
29
 of the 2006 war with Israel
30
 and, the 2007 internal war 
with Fateh al-Islam,
31
 a number of measures have been taken; nevertheless, these 
remain partial.
32
 The camps and their vicinities are still highly militarised and 
grievances are escalating;
33
 furthermore hostility between Lebanese groups is steadily 
intensifying. While acknowledging that the spread of weapons is a highly contentious 
issue at the time being, the soft and human aspects of the legacies of war need to be 
addressed. A policy of ‘state-sponsored amnesia’ was imposed in the aftermath of the 
civil war,
34
 but if hearts and minds are not reconciled and trust is not fostered at the 
popular level, Lebanon will fail to move from ‘negative’ to ‘positive peace’;35 
progress made and measures taken can be reversed. Having considered this, a report 
by Conciliation Resources argues for a move towards conflict-prevention instead of 
post-conflict recovery — an approach which is increasingly accepted as essential for 
dealing with the instability in Lebanon.
36
 Indeed, Lebanon is undergoing a phase of 
human insecurity by witnessing various manifestations of political violence. In fact, as 
Kaldor and Schmeder noted back in 2010: 
risks of new conflict are very real. Almost all conditions that can be identified 
as increasing the susceptibility to conflict are present in Lebanon: previous 
                                                 
29
 A partial DDR programme took place. 
30
 This includes extensive de-mining and a no visible ‘armed personnel, assets and weapons other 
than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL’ south of the Litani river. See parag. 8 
of Resolution 1701. at: http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/res/1701(2006) (accessed 
on 10/3/2012). 
31
 This includes clearing and rebuilding the Naher al-Bared camp. 
32
 See: Elizabeth Picard and Alexander Ramsbotham, ed. Reconciliation, Reform and Resilience. 
Positive Peace for Lebanon, Accord. Issue 24 (Conciliation Resources, 2012). 
33
 See ICG, 2012. 
34
 Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012, p 8. 
35
 The absence of violence in contrast to multi-dimensional conditions that sustain peace. Albrecht 
Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges and 
Problems of Security Sector Reform," in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart(Tokyo/NY/Paris: United Nations University Press, 
2005). P 4. 
36
 Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012. 
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conflict, weak state, availability of weapons, social divisions, frustrated groups 
and youth, financial support from outside support and the diaspora 
37
 
A peace-building effort is needed, one which is not strictly elitist. Aside from 
the socio-economic, political and security aspects of peacebuilding, the ‘psycho-
social’ dimension needs to be given due attention.38 Donors and local actors need to 
make tangible efforts to halt the escalation of tension in order to move towards a more 
“civilianized” society. Although this study examines a largely institutional approach 
to providers of security, in order to move forward, it is essential that a parallel non-
state process continues to address long-standing as well as recent structural and socio-
political constrains on human security. Engaging with progressive voices outlined in 
chapter 6 is a good starting point. These are supported by solidarist and emancipatory 
pressures on the rise in world politics. 
 
2) Assessing the tool-kit for progress 
 
This study is concerned with security in Lebanon. This concern has led to two 
research questions: What is the debate on security? And how can it be linked to, or 
how can it contribute to Lebanon’s security? To answer these questions, a tool-kit was 
constructed for studying security from a theoretical, conceptual, institutional, and 
practical perspective. This concern first led this study to a theoretical discussion on 
security and subsequently to choose the individual as its referent. It is this study’s 
view that the provision of security for the individual is not only an ethical choice, but 
also the base for the security of communities and societies – even the state and, to 
some extent, the international system.  
Then, the previous discussion was situated within the context of world 
politics; hence the chapter on governance, which highlights a changing environment 
and changing norms. This chapter helped me understand the complexity of 
governance, mainly the nexus between the global and the domestic, the formal and the 
informal. Governance, in other words, helped me understand power dynamics and the 
relationships between the different actors at different levels. The governance of 
                                                 
37
 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 92. 
38
 Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005, p 2. 
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security in Lebanon cannot be understood without taking into account the role of the 
main actors of global governance. They are not only mainstreaming human security 
and SSR but they also shape Lebanon’s security. 
Once security was contextualised and discussed at the theoretical level, the 
discussion moved on to the concept of human security – a concept which, since the 
1990s, has become a key topic in policy circles and has mirrored – not without 
problems – the widening and the deepening of security. Human security is the closest 
translation to the policy world of the vision of security envisaged. This study chose 
the narrow (more coherent) version of human security as a lens for security in 
Lebanon. Hence, this study looked at freedom from fear as a framework for its 
analysis. From this lens, this study found that Lebanon’s post-war transition has been 
problematic and that human insecurity persists.   
The study then moved to discuss Security Sector Reform as a tool for 
governing the security sector at the domestic level. SSR has been conceptualised as a 
programme for achieving good and/or democratic security sector governance – 
bridging therefore our discussions on security and governance. Both SSR and security 
sector governance hold a specific normative framework – a civilianized and 
democratically governed effective and efficient security sector. This study maintained 
that such governance of a security sector can promote human security. It does so by 
promoting an inclusive, non-militaristic, and non-authoritarian security sector. The 
discussion in the first part of this chapter summarizes the Lebanon-relevant findings. 
 As discussed, the theoretical framework chosen for this study—critical 
security studies—strongly bases the referent of security on the ‘ultimate unit’ – that is, 
the individual rather than the state.
39
 Also, both the discussions on security and SSR 
emphasised the role of non-state actors and bottom-up approaches in the governance 
of a people-centred security. Critical security studies exposes and challenges 
regressive assumptions and structural constrains, which are based on competition, 
confrontation, and exclusiveness. It instead argues for an egalitarian, just and 
reconciliatory security, and suggests that a bottom-up approach to changing 
exclusivist and power-centric systems can, in time, shatter regressive policies. Indeed, 
as was shown in chapter 6, the Lebanese system exacerbates the human insecurity of 
                                                 
39
 However, not in an individualistic sense. Booth, 1991, p 318. 
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marginalized and vulnerable groups but bottom-up pressure has succeeded in 
achieving landmark wins. In the realm of women’s rights, the missing and the 
disappeared, secularism, LGBT rights, and domestic workers, civil society has forced 
the system to open up to these voices.
40
 These are key to transforming Lebanon’s 
regressive traditional system, which is based on top-down, power-centric, 
confrontational, clientalistic, and exclusivist policies. What I called progressive 
emancipatory voices can pressure for a more inclusive, reconciliatory and just system 
— the vision of security set by critical security studies. 
In terms of weighing the contributions of the constituent parts of this tool-kit: 
although SSR claims to adopt a deep notion of security and calls for the participation 
of the wider public, including minorities and vulnerable groups, it falls short of 
Critical Security Studies’ aim of emancipating the individual from power-centric 
structures. SSR is simply an attempt by the international community to pursue human 
security; despite problems in implementation and the conceptual flaws stemming from 
its ambitious comprehensive approach, it represents the closest effort to translating the 
widening and the deepening of security into practice. Recalling the discussion on 
global governance, post-structuralists have noted that the international community 
follows a power-centric system which governs populations of the world and tries to 
engineer societies into the “liberal” model. Therefore, there is some tension between 
the theoretical framework chosen by this study and the policy discussion.
41
 
Nevertheless, this study holds onto the pragmatism of critical security studies. It 
borrows its approach to immanent critique by examining concepts against claims they 
set. The critique is not intended to entirely dismiss concepts and policies. Rather, 
through praxis, critique refines concepts and engages with reconstruction. This was 
done by arguing for governance according to world society ideals, the narrow version 
of human security, and governance-centred SSR. On the practical level, the study 
finds that actors of global governance remain ambivalent towards implementing 
human security and SSR. However, it argues that while the concepts discussed do not 
                                                 
40
 Sadly less so for refugees. 
41
 Without dismissing them, Krause speaks of a ‘paradox’ between the objective of empowering 
the weak and policies, such as human security and SSR, that reinforce the state and the powerful. 
Krause, 2005b, p 65. 
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achieve emancipation, they contribute to ‘reshap[ing]’ the relationship between states 
and their citizens’, in favour of the latter.42  
The discussion of Lebanon highlights endemic socio-political and structural 
problems that have obstructed the break from traditional politics. Despite the thinness 
of the sectarian narrative, the masses continue (to a large extent but not exclusively) to 
be mobilized along sectarian lines. This study regrets the failure of the majority of 
Lebanese youth and political parties to construct alternative, inclusive and 
reconciliatory identities, and integrating programmes. Equally, however, this study 
acknowledges the diversity and the dynamism of Lebanese society. It strongly 
supports the efforts of civil society groups that do not confine themselves to the two 
main political blocks; and supports grassroots efforts to widen the pursuit of human 
security and to challenge regressive politics. Having said that, this study is aware that 
regional instability and the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict will overshadow domestic 
efforts to insulate Lebanese society and politics. Sadly, this will be at the cost of 
stability and human security in Lebanese society – both in its narrow and broad 
notions. However, this study finds that actors of global governance can and should 
play a more constructive role in Lebanon.  
 
This argumentation was made possible by examining concepts that stand at 
different levels and at different ends of the study of politics. This ’tool-kit’ linked the 
discussions on governance, security, human security and SSR to Lebanon – a case 
representing a fragile post-conflict state from the Global South. In doing so, this study 
made a threefold contribution to the study of world politics. It tested the applicability 
and the implementation of policy-relevant concepts, it tested the relevance and usage 
of a school of thought in security studies, and it critiqued the international system of 
governance. On the one hand, therefore, this study weighed debates on timely subjects 
such as security and governance, as well as concepts such as human security and SSR. 
On the other hand, it contributed to the Lebanese case by deconstructing historical, 
structural and current policies, and by offering a direction for future course of action – 
at the academic, policy and practical levels. Lastly, at the micro level, this study’s 
contributions lie in its examination of Lebanon’s main security organizations and in 
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adopting the plight of marginalized and vulnerable groups as a basis for progressive 
change. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Interviews 
Western stakeholders: 
1. Mr Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer) 
2. Mr Mirko Hinz (German Embassy, Advisor to the Lebanon Independent 
Border Assessment Team)  
3. UK Embassy Stabilisation Advisor. 
4. Mr Duccio Bandini (EU delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché) 
5. Mr Ted Kontek (US Embassy INL Director- International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs) 
6. Mr Marc Passoti (French Embassy Stabilisation Advisor) 
 
Lebanese stakeholders: 
7. General Pierre Salem (Adviser to the Minister of Interior and Municipalities 
Ziad Baroud) 
8. Major Antoine Frangieh (ISF-off record) 
9. General Pierre Nassar (ISF Head of Planning and Organisation) 
10. Communications with the LAF Communication Department. 
 
Civil Society: 
11. Retired General Elias Hanna (academic/ MTV News advisor) 
12. Mr Marc Maouad (NICO Senior Advisor) 
13. Mr Jonathan McIvor (NICO Senior Advisor)  
14. Mrs Flavia Adib (Executive Director) and Ms Nivine Abbas (CESMO-Centre 
d’Etudes Stratégiques pour le Moyen-Orient) 
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Appendix 2 
 
‘The Taif Agreement  
This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, 
in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989. 
First, General Principles and Reforms:  
I. General Principles  
A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its 
citizens.  
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the 
Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding 
member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon 
is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these 
principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.  
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on 
equality in rights and duties among all citizens,without discrimination or preference.  
D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise 
their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.  
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private 
ownership.  
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the 
state's unity and of the system's stability.  
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, 
economic, and social reform.  
H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled 
to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The 
people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there 
shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in 
Lebanon].  
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I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate  
II. Political Reforms  
A. Chamber of Deputies:  
The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over 
government policy and activities.  
1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the 
chamber's term.  
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the 
chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy 
speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition 
submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall 
convene immediately to fill the vacant post.  
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is 
included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the 
grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill 
with the approval of the cabinet.  
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.  
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the 
parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:  
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.  
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.  
c. Proportionately between the districts.  
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared 
equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of 
this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation 
of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through 
appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.  
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7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a 
senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The 
senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.  
 
B.  President of Republic:  
The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall 
contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, 
and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the 
supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The 
president shall exercise the following powers:  
1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.  
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.  
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the 
cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition 
of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted 
resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, 
the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.  
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution 
and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After 
notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within 
the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of 
the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace 
periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.  
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.  
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies 
speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the 
president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.  
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.  
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.  
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and 
decrees relieving them from their duties.  
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10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state 
medals by decree.  
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of 
international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The 
cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the 
country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties 
involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which 
may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of 
Deputies' approval.  
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.  
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold 
special sessions by decree.  
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue 
beyond the agenda.  
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session 
whenever he deems it necessary.  
16. Grant special pardon by decree.  
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the 
constitution or commits high treason.  
 
C.  Prime Minister:  
The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He 
is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister 
shall exercise the following powers:  
a. Head the cabinet.  
b. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the 
president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement 
to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its 
formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the 
confidence, after its  
2. resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of 
disposing of affairs.  
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3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.  
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting 
cabinet resignation or considering it retired.  
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting 
the reexamination of laws.  
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic 
in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be 
discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.  
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; coordinate between 
the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.  
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the 
minister concerned.  
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.  
 
D.  Cabinet:  
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.  
The following are among the powers exercised by it:  
1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and 
takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.  
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of 
all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security 
departments and institutions.  
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.  
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with 
the law.  
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of 
the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session 
lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if 
the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the 
government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called 
for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.  
372 
 
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet 
shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet 
meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by 
consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of 
the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet 
members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and 
it abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and 
treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, 
the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the 
administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the 
citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.  
 
E.  Minister:  
The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's 
general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be 
relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies 
withdraws its confidence from him individually. 
  
F.  Cabinet Resignation:  
Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:  
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:  
a. If its chairman resigns.  
b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming 
it.  
c. If its chairman dies.  
d. At the beginning of a president's term.  
e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.  
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an 
initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.  
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2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the 
prime minister, with cabinet approval.  
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by 
law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. 
A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.  
 
G.  Abolition of Political Sectarianism:  
Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.  
To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The 
Chamber of Deputies election the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall 
adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is 
headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister 
and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The 
council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, 
to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation 
of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:  
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in 
public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in 
the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding 
the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and 
Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.  
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.  
 
III. Other Reforms  
A. Administrative Decentralism:  
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.  
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and 
all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the 
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highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs 
locally.  
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national 
fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, 
people, and institutions.  
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller 
administrative units [district and smaller units ] through the election of a council, 
headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.  
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces 
economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, 
unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary 
financial resources.  
B. Courts:  
[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to 
insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one 
hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as 
stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:  
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try 
presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this 
council shall be promulgated.  
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the 
constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from 
presidential and parliamentary elections.  
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in 
matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality 
of the laws:  
a. The president of the republic.  
b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.  
c. The prime minister.  
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.  
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[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese 
sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:  
1. Personal status affairs.  
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.  
3. Freedom of religious education.  
 
[3] To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council 
shall be elected by the judiciary body.  
D. Parliamentary Election Law:  
Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces 
and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that 
ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and 
generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context 
of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.  
E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development:  
A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors 
participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.  
F. Education:  
1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary 
stage at least.  
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and 
regulations.  
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and 
textbooks shall be strengthened.  
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and 
developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction 
needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be 
provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.  
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5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national 
belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the 
subjects of history and national education.  
 
G. Information:  
All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the 
framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of 
ending the state of war.  
 
Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:  
 
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state 
founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed 
one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all 
Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be 
as follows:  
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The 
militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 
months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of 
the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the 
political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.  
B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:  
1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, 
beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the 
units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training 
courses.  
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and 
departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.  
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C. Strengthening the armed forces:  
1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if 
necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the 
internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.  
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in 
preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.  
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may 
be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli 
aggression.  
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, 
the armed forces shall return to their barracks. 
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives 
exclusively.  
 
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of 
every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted 
shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of 
reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon 
is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, 
represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal 
relations binding  
Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate 
Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of 
no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of 
the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the 
political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian 
Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the 
Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah 
line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military 
committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the 
strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to 
define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. 
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The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop 
this agreement.  
 
Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:  
Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized 
Lebanese borders requires the following:  
A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions 
calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.  
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.  
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli 
occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the 
Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce 
the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and 
to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.  
 
Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:  
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. 
Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the 
roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which 
the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by 
the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two 
fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of 
each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate 
needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat 
to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to 
Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself 
to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its 
security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and 
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unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to 
Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.’2068 
 
                                                 
2068
 Republic of Lebanon, "The Ta'if Agreement," Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, 
http://www.un.int/wcm/content/lang/en/pid/1723. 
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